



Report on research findings for the projects:

**CCOS02940: Design of Standard Operating
Procedures and Models on Section 6.1-6.13
Neighbourhood Watch**

&

**CCOS02941: Design of Standard Operating
Procedures and Models on Section 5.1-5.3
Community Police Forums**

Safety and Violence Initiative and the Centre of Criminology,
University of Cape Town

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Centre of Criminology

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CONTRIBUTORS

This report was compiled by members of the Centre of Criminology and the Safety and Violence Initiative, University of Cape Town, with the assistance of staff and associate researchers. Professors Clifford Shearing and John Cartwright provided valuable comments on the report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Centre of Criminology and the Safety and Violence Initiative, University of Cape Town, were contracted by the Department of Community Safety, Western Cape Provincial Government, to undertake two projects, which commenced in March 2015: *CCOS02940: Design of Standard Operating Procedures and Models on Section 6.1-6.13 Neighbourhood Watch* and *CCOS02941: Design of Standard Operating Procedures and Models on Section 5.1-5.3 Community Police Forums*. The research projects involved in-depth research on Neighbourhood Watches and Community Police Forums in five selected sites – BKM (Bergvliet, Kreupelbosch, Meadowridge), Khayelitsha, Lavender Hill, Paarl East, and Vredenburg (and surrounds). Two stakeholder workshops were also run in November 2015 and February 2016 to supplement and validate the research findings. This report is an amalgamation of the two projects into a single report which outlines the aims and scope of the project; a brief overview of community policing in South Africa; the research methodology employed to investigate the sites; a socio-demographic profile of each site as well as the specific research findings for each site; recommendations (Section Six of the report) with regards to (further) supporting Neighbourhood Watches and Community Police Forums so as to (better) contribute to a system of safety governance which is democratic and whole-of-society orientated. With regards to the latter the recommendations are organised around seven criteria for democratic safety governance and includes: equity, delivery of service, responsiveness, distribution of power, information, redress, and participation. The envisaged role of DOCS is also presented in these recommendations.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

In mid-2010 the Centre of Criminology, University of Cape Town, in collaboration with members of the Institute for Liberal Democracy, was awarded funds by the Western Cape Provincial Government for a project entitled *Increasing Safety in the Western Cape: Putting SO5 into Practice*. The development of the project was in response to Cabinet's adoption of *SO5: Increasing Safety* in which the Western Cape Provincial Government committed to promoting a whole-of-society model of security governance. The Centre of Criminology was tasked with assisting the government in designing the SO5 principles by undertaking a 'pre-design phase'. Therefore, the purpose of the pre-design phase, which ran from September 2010 to March 2011, was to conduct research and analysis so as to develop effective whole-of-society design principles which could underscore partnership-based safety projects in future. The research entailed a 'deep dive' of six select sites, chosen due to their relevance to the whole-of-society governance approach being examined in the research, that is, that there was an already-existing innovation in safety governance in that site from which underlying principles could be drawn. Much was learnt from the deep dive research but essentially four design principles were drafted as follows:

Design Principle 1: Focus on the future, not the past

Design Principle 2: Focus on opportunities

Design Principle 3: Identify, mobilise and integrate a wide range of knowledge, capacities and resources

Design Principle 4: Make sure one has a safety budget, not just a security force budget

The design principles were essentially aimed at providing a means by which safety governance could be applied to diverse contexts with differing security needs, rather than attempting to duplicate practices from one context to another context. Therefore, how these design principles are implemented may look different from context to context depending on how they are operationalised.

1.2. AIM OF THE PROJECT

In July 2014 the Centre of Criminology and the Safety and Violence Initiative responded to a call for expressions of interest from the Department of Community Safety via the Cape High Education Consortium (CHEC). The original call for expressions of interest required that the successful bidder write Regulations for the Western Cape Community Safety Act, 2013 – more specifically that Regulations be drafted for Community Police Forums and Neighbourhood Watches (as well as for the Western Cape Provincial Police Ombudsman). The Centre of Criminology and the Safety and Violence Initiative were awarded two projects which commenced in March 2015: *CCOS02940: Design of Standard Operating Procedures and Models on Section 6.1-6.13 Neighbourhood Watch* and *CCOS02941: Design of Standard Operating Procedures and Models on Section 5.1-5.3 Community Police Forums*. Given that the Regulations were drafted while the research project was still underway and in light of the 2010/2011 research conducted by the Centre of Criminology (and in line with the four design principles emanating from the research), a specific aim of the current research projects was to produce a model of safety governance that can be operationalised and made tangible, supplemented by Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that can themselves be used in the further development of the legislative and procedural infrastructure governing democratic community safety initiatives in South Africa. Given the original project terms of reference, the research presented here speaks specifically to two very important nodes in such a security assemblage – Community Police Forums (CPFs) and Neighbourhood Watches (NHWs). In line with the Design Principles, both of these nodes have the potential to harness the knowledge, resources and capacities of a range of state and non-state actors and/or hold state and non-state actors accountable for their actions. Moreover, we argue that they are pivotal in creating secure public spaces that can be owned and developed by community members themselves. The act of ownership, we argue, is of paramount importance in ensuring that these initiatives govern themselves correctly and in line with democratic principles. As we touch upon, in some noteworthy cases both CPFs and NHWs have been effective in doing just that, and now act as central points around which the concept of ‘community’ itself revolves. However, in many more areas across the Province, research has shown that CPFs and NHWs have not reached their full potential due to a range of issues, ranging from financial to managerial.

The research thus aimed to investigate the current, actual functioning of CPFs and NHWs in select, representative sites across the Western Province, so as to design a model of democratic governance and the SOPs needed to give effect to this model. This model can then be used in the creation, development, assessment, and strengthening of CPFs and NHWs in the Western Cape. The sites chosen to inform this model were BKM (Bergvliet, Kreupelbosch, Meadowridge), Khayelitsha, Lavender Hill, Paarl East, and Vredenburg (and surrounds). Further to research conducted in the sites, a stakeholder workshop was held in November 2015 to validate the research and to begin to test ideas of how NHWs and CPFs could better function. Another follow-on workshop was held in February 2016 to further test ideas and models of safety governance to inform the development of SOPs.

1.3. TOWARDS A WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH

As mentioned above, the research presented here has been informed by the goal of developing a model of safety governance that draws on a whole-of-society approach. Such an approach has not only been methodological, but also normative, in that it seeks to guide community safety organisations towards achieving their potential through being Constitutionally-aligned, well-functioning, resource-efficient, partnership-based, sustainable, accountable, and regulated. With support, we argue that such organisations will directly and significantly contribute towards increasing safety in the Province. No such actions can, however, occur in a vacuum, and it is of recognisable importance to ensure that such mandates are themselves in line with the pre-existing legislative architecture in the country more broadly, and as it specifically relates to safety, security, and policing. This is directly in line with the Western Cape Community Safety Act, 2013, which states that its purpose is:

“To provide for the carrying out and the regulation of the functions of the Province and the Department of Community Safety under Chapter 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and Chapter 8 of the Constitution of the Western Cape, 1997; to provide for the support of and cooperation with the Civilian Secretariat and the Provincial Secretariat established in terms of the Civilian Secretariat for Police Service Act, 2011; to

provide for directives for the establishment of community police forums and boards in terms of the South African Police Service Act, 1995; to provide for the accreditation of organisations and associations as neighbourhood watches; to provide for partnerships with community organisations; to establish and maintain an integrated information system and a database of organisations; to provide for the voluntary registration of security service providers on the database of organisations; to establish the Office of the Western Cape Provincial Police Ombudsman to investigate complaints regarding the police; to regulate reporting on the police service; to establish the Provincial Safety Advisory Committee; and to provide for matters incidental thereto.”

As such, a key design principle focuses on the need to identify, mobilise and integrate a wide variety of knowledge, capacities and resources. Such a concern attempts to initiate governance strategies that, while not immediately possible, can still be realised in the future. Such a concern, previously articulated by Clifford Shearing as ‘repairing the future’, requires the harnessing of presently available resources in as systematic a manner as possible, in the most efficient manner as possible. Indeed, such initiatives would ideally use pre-existing resources in a new manner, so as that the familiar becomes repurposed into something new. Drawing on the data at hand, an example may be noted from one of the research sites. Here, an open field has been repurposed by the community to act as a public park. In creating this, they have come together and drawn on the resources available in the local community to further their aims. Thus, old car tyres form the basis of most of the recreational and play equipment, of which there are many superfluous because of the industrial nature of the surrounding area. In building these, a local parolee was tasked with creating the space. As a result, his reputation as a seasoned gangster helped create an unspoken law preventing the vandalising of the space. In the process of building the park, his physical labour served as both a confession and a penance, the result of which is that he himself has been reintegrated into the community, and serves as a positive role-model for local children who are naturally drawn to the park as a place of recreation. In this example, then, the historical narratives of individuals and the harnessing of resources easily acquired in the locality have been used together in an efficient manner to create a space that is owned both by those who built it and by the

community who purposed it. Moreover, the symbolic ordering of these actors has allowed for both to reconcile, and use the experiences of each other to create a value system that may reinforce rather than undermine many young children's futures. This is of course but one example, but one which shows that the fulfilment of the Constitutional right to safety is itself dependent on initiating strategies of governance which use the current to plan for the future. It is important that such key opportunities are identified in the contexts in which they occur, and that these are seen as models to be understood and not merely replicated. Essentially, this is the whole-of-society approach, in which the relationships between actors and institutions becomes the conduits through which governance can be enabled through daily interaction, mitigating the need for forms of oversight that can easily become out of tune with those who are governed. The Constitutional mandate can only be fulfilled if the rights and privileges it supports are themselves substantively lived by individuals, rather than merely remaining procedural demands little understood or felt by South African citizens in the places they live and work.

1.4. PURPOSE AND OUTLINE OF THIS REPORT

The purpose of this report is to present the findings of the research conducted in the five sites as well as to recommend a model of safety governance (and SOPs) to achieve democratic whole-of-society security. What follows this section is a brief review of community policing in South Africa. Section 3 provides a description of the research methodology undertaken in the research sites. Section 4 of the report provides a brief review of noteworthy socio-economic demographics and crime trends to provide a context to the sites chosen and Section 5 presents the research findings of each site as well as the outcomes of the two stakeholder meetings. Section 6 makes recommendations as to the manner by which democratic whole-of-society safety governance should be achieved and Section 7 concludes the report.

2. COMMUNITY POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICA

In the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, neighbourhood watches became quite popular in parts of the US and the UK.¹ Today, neighbourhood watches are present in more affluent South African suburbs, too.² Typically, neighbourhood watches assist with the surveillance of their area, in an effort to reduce crimes such as burglary and theft. This speaks to the Chapter 2 of the Constitution – Section 12 thereof stipulates that everyone has the “right to freedom and security of the person”, which includes the right to be free from all forms of violence from public or private sources, and not be treated or punished in a cruel, inhumane, or degrading way. The right to bodily and psychological integrity additionally includes the right to security and control over one’s own body. The key feature of ‘neighbourhood watch’ as a concept is that citizens and communities become engaged in providing their own safety, in partnership with law enforcement personnel. As Crawford notes:³

“The expansion of neighbourhood watch is often held up as the icon of successful community policing. Neighbourhood watch ... combines both the crime prevention impulse and the ‘community’ ethic. Neighbourhood watch seeks to generate community-based activity in two inter-related ways. First, it represents a means of encouraging individuals and families to become more security conscious, both in terms of their own responsibility for personal crime prevention and for community security through surveillance. Secondly, it seeks to build upon and promote a shared concern about matters of crime and security in the hope that this will produce new patterns of informal social interaction amongst people living within a locality, thereby creating forms of internal community control and regulation ...”

¹ Bennett, T., Holloway, K. & Farrington, D. 2006. Does neighbourhood watch reduce crime? A systematic review and meta-analysis. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 2, 437; Garofalo, J. & McLeod, M. 1989. The Structure and Operations of Neighbourhood Watch Programs in the United States. *Crime and Delinquency*, 35, 326; Huck, S. & Kosfeld, M. 2007. The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch and Norm Enforcement. *The Economic Journal*, 117, 270.

² A basic Google search for ‘neighbourhood watch South Africa’ yields neighbourhood watch websites for suburbs such as Pinelands, Edgemoor, Oranjezicht, Vredehoek and Hout Bay (interestingly, all Cape Town suburbs), but none for Khayelitsha, Langa, Manenberg, or Lavender Hill, for example. What a basic search like this cannot distinguish is whether or not these poorer areas do not have neighbourhood watches at all, or do not have websites for their watches.

³ Crawford, A. 1999. *The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 50.

Since the mid-to-late 2000s, this feature of neighbourhood watch – that communities become actively involved in creating their security – has gained traction in the broader academic literature on policing. ‘Community policing’, ‘plural policing’, or a ‘whole-of-society-approach’ to policing are increasingly suggested as more effective alternatives to state monopoly over the provision of safety.

Three ‘red flags’ in the literature used for this paper are worth noting before proceeding to the main topic, because these ‘red flags’ affect the validity of the findings presented here. The first is that the studies referred to in this paper are predominantly European or American in origin, and are mainly dated to the 1980s or 1990s; little African or recent research is available on neighbourhood watches. Secondly, a point which is frequently raised in these studies is that there is little reliable evidence to suggest that neighbourhood watches actually work. The concept of a neighbourhood watch has ‘face validity’⁴: it makes sense logically or intuitively, in other words. However, few studies have found that neighbourhood watches in practice are able to deliver a consistent and sustainable reduction in neighbourhood crime. Finally, in researching for this paper, it has become apparent that neighbourhood watches in different parts of the world form and operate in a variety of ways.⁵ The neighbourhood watch concept appears to be used as a label for a range of community-based initiatives – it has become ‘all things to all people’⁶. In selectively engaging with these, there are three themes that emerge. The themes explored here include the activities neighbourhood watches engage in, the financing of neighbourhood watches, and the role of law enforcement agencies in neighbourhood watches.

A scale of activities

Although neighbourhood watches are stereotypically associated with surveillance, in reality neighbourhood watch programmes engage in a range of activities. A useful

⁴ Laycock, G. & Tilley, N., *Policing and Neighbourhood Watch*, 9.

⁵ Garofalo, J. & McLeod, M., ‘The Structure and Operations’, 328; Laycock, G. & Tilley, N., *Policing and Neighbourhood Watch*, 3.

⁶ Laycock, G. & Tilley, N., *Policing and Neighbourhood Watch*, 10.

way of understanding the variety of activities in which neighbourhood watches engage is to imagine a scale of activities: one end of this scale represents very narrowly focused surveillance activities, while the opposite end represents broadly focused community-improvement activities. The focused aspect of the programmes does meet the mandate of the Constitution however – Chapter 11 outlines the principles which govern national security, such as that national security must be pursued in compliance with the law, while also reflecting “the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want to seek a better life” (Section 198:a). It highlights the ideal conduct and structure of security services and defence forces, emphasising policing as its duties/objectives/responsibilities, functions, and control on national and provincial level. Neighbourhood watch programmes at the narrowly focused end of the scale aim to protect property in the neighbourhood, or reduce theft, and operate by asking neighbours to report suspicious activity to the local police.⁷ At the broad-focused end of this imaginary scale are watch programmes which aim to build community-spirit in the neighbourhood, by organising neighbourhood parties and neighbourhood improvement projects, as well as safety-oriented activities.⁸ These programmes require sustained engagement from communities, and are as rare as watch programmes singularly concerned with watching and reporting.

Undefined roles

Firstly, it is repeatedly noted in the literature on neighbourhood watches that maintaining neighbourhood watches and sustaining community involvement in them is difficult.⁹ Often, neighbourhood watch organisers struggle to get residents to attend meetings or to carry out security changes to their homes, for example. As

⁷ Garofalo, J. & McLeod, M., ‘The Structure and Operations’, 328; Western Cape Government. Community Safety Act, No. 3 of 2013. *Provincial Gazette 7116, P.N. 105/2013* (5 April 2013, Cape Town), 6. Available: <http://www.westerncape.gov.za/dept/community-safety/documents/acts/2013> [Online 23 January 2013].

⁸ Garofalo, J. & McLeod, M., ‘The Structure and Operations’, 330; Laycock, G. & Tilley, N., *Policing and Neighbourhood Watch*, 3; Liu, E. ‘Real Neighbourhoods Should Do More than Watch’, *Time* (17 April 2012), 1. Available: <http://ideas.time.com/2012/04/17/real-neighborhoods-should-do-more-than-watch/> [Online 23 January 2015].

⁹ Garofalo, J. & McLeod, M., ‘The Structure and Operations’, 336; Huck, S. & Kosfeld, M., ‘The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch’, 271; Laycock, G. & Tilley, N., *Policing and Neighbourhood Watch*, 9.

neighbourhood watches are perceived to be appropriate to Khayelitsha because of their 'community policing' element, this inconsistent community involvement in watch programmes is a concerning trend. As such, this speaks to the Western Cape Community Safety Act of 2013, which mandates 'for the carrying out and the regulation of the functions of the Province and the Department of Community Safety under Chapter 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and Chapter 8 of the Constitution of the Western Cape, 1997'. It addresses the support and cooperation with the Civilian Secretariat and the Provincial Secretariat and establishes the office of the Western Cape Provincial Police Ombudsman, to investigate complaints regarding the police. Some researchers, such as Garofalo, suggest that because crime usually occurs in waves, or sporadically, in most neighbourhoods, neighbourhood interest in security matters waxes and wanes; therefore, neighbourhood support in watch programmes waxes and wanes too.¹⁰ The proposed solution is that neighbourhood watch programmes adopt diverse activities which include non-security related activities (so, situate themselves at the broad-end of the activities scale), so that they retain community interest even when community interest in security lags.¹¹ The second critical point worth raising here is that, because there is no clear model of neighbourhood watch, the reality is that neighbourhood watches can become vigilante groups. Community policing can easily grow into vigilantism: the two practices are essentially part of the same process of communities trying to create their own safety.¹² This speaks to the Draft White Paper for Policing, which was drafted to support the continued transformation of the police and provide a broad policy framework, all in the vision of building a professional, well-resourced and highly skilled police force. It builds on the understanding that dealing with crime is a shared responsibility, and in order to achieve long-term, sustainable safety in its communities it will required deliberate integration of both long and short term interventions. For effective crime detection, prevention, and combating the SAPS must create the necessary conditions and support a developmental approach to

¹⁰ Garofalo, J. & Tilley, N., *Policing and Neighbourhood Watch*, 336; Huck, S. & Kosfeld, M., 'The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch', 271.

¹¹ Garofalo, J. & McLeod, M., 'The Structure and Operations', 336.

¹² Darian-Smith, E. 1993. Neighbourhood Watch - Who Watches Whom? Reinterpreting the Concept of Neighbourhood Watch. *Human Organization*, 52, 86; Fourchard, L. 2011. The Politics of Mobilization for Security in South African Townships. *African Affairs*, 110, 609.

security and safety. The paper argues that it is crucial that law enforcement resources be used more efficiently and effectively to allow for more strategic deployment.

Financial Capital

The financial costs of initiating and operating a neighbourhood watch programme depend on the activities the watch programme undertakes. Organising meetings and patrolling, for example, can be done without financial cost (assuming community support for these activities). However, if patrols want cars, or newsletters are to be printed, or radios acquired, the financial costs of the programme begin to mount. Currently, in South Africa, neighbourhood watch programmes in affluent suburbs are able to purchase CCTV cameras, radios or hire private security because residents club together to cover these costs.¹³ The second model of financially resourcing watch programmes in Khayelitsha also involves the state providing finances: a potential idea is for government to provide money for watch programmes in Khayelitsha to employ local residents as patrol members. The counter-argument to this suggestion is that paying community members to patrol for neighbourhood watch immediately changes the voluntary, participatory, community-led nature of neighbourhood watch in its ideal form. That lack of social capital, in the form of trust and cohesion, may negatively affect the success of neighbourhood watch programmes, raises questions around the success of establishing neighbourhood watch in Khayelitsha. It is arguable that community trust is severely damaged in Khayelitsha, and that residents may struggle to trust each other enough to be involved in safety-making together.

Law Enforcement

The third ‘theme’ this paper addresses is the relationship various neighbourhood watches have with their local law enforcement agencies; this theme includes exploration of different neighbourhood watch structures.

¹³ The fundraising initiatives for CCTV cameras in Pinelands and Hout Bay (both Cape Town suburbs) illustrate this trend clearly. See details at the respective webpages of each suburb’s neighbourhood watch: <http://www.pinelandsnw.co.za/> (Pinelands) and <http://www.houtbaywatch.com/> (Hout Bay).

Part of the conceptual definition of a neighbourhood watch is that the watch programme works in partnership with law enforcement agencies. This partnership can be structured in various ways, which distribute the organisational burden of the watch programme more or less on local law enforcement. Some watch programmes have highly formalised structures: in Australia, many neighbourhood-level watch programmes have a board of community members headed by an elected president, which reports back to a national neighbourhood watch 'secretariat'.¹⁴ Highly organised programmes like this may decrease the administrative burden on local law enforcement (as community-run structures handle administration), but may require more law enforcement involvement in the form of supplying up-to-date crime statistics, supplying training and equipment, and attending watch-related community functions (active involvement from law enforcement agencies is required).¹⁵ Some watch programmes are equally as organised, with some type of board or committee, but are more self-contained, as no national secretariat exists. Many current South African examples follow this model. These self-contained watch programmes may require equally as much active involvement from police, or may require only passive support from police, support in word but not action.¹⁶

Using existing structures

Up until the late 1980s, organisations called 'street committees' existed in a number of South African townships. Although street committees largely dissolved after 1994, prior to 1994 they formed an important element of informal governance in township areas.¹⁷ In short, street committees were groups of elected adults from a localised area, being a cluster of houses or a street, who operated as an informal court for that area.¹⁸ Cases of domestic abuse, custody disputes, disputes between neighbours, and disputes between parents and children could be brought before the street committee for mediation; it was incumbent upon the street committee to mediate a solution to

¹⁴ Bennett, T., Holloway, K. & Farrington, D., 'Does neighbourhood watch reduce crime?', 439; Fleming, J., *Working Together*, 2.

¹⁵ Garofalo, J. & McLeod, M., 'The Structure and Organisation', 328.

¹⁶ Laycock, G. & Tilley, N., *Policing and Neighbourhood Watch*, 14.

¹⁷ Burman, S. & Scharf, W. 1990. Creating People's Justice: Street Committees and People's Courts in a South African City. *Law & Society Review*, 24, 706.

¹⁸ Burman, S. & Scharf, W., 'Creating People's Justice', 708.

which all parties agreed or could be pressured into accepting.¹⁹ The similarity between street committees and neighbourhood watches as concepts is that both are community-based forms of organisation seeking to enforce social norms which are largely supported by the community – norms against spousal abuse or theft, for example. However, the key difference – a difference which possibly makes street committees an inappropriate model on which to base a neighbourhood watch – is that street committees have a judicial function, while neighbourhood watches (in concept and in practice) do not. The danger of giving neighbourhood watches a judicial function is that this may prompt vigilantism, and may also reduce the need to work in partnership with law enforcement agencies. Street committees, at the time that they were operative, existed largely in the absence of effective, unbiased law enforcement in townships; although law enforcement in Khayelitsha is in need of serious improvement, it is at least present.

Community Policing Forums (CPFs), initiated after 1994, are structures which currently exist in townships across South Africa. In concept, CPFs are very similar to neighbourhood watches: they are an organisational conduit through which community representatives and law enforcement personnel can communicate, so as to improve relations between the community and law enforcement personnel.²⁰ Although CPFs are not specifically engaged in ‘watching the neighbourhood’, they are geared towards roping the community and the police together in the project of making the community safer. As a concept on paper, CPFs look like a suitable existing structure from which neighbourhood watch might be launched.

However, the Commission found that CPFs in reality are not making a significant contribution towards improving community-law enforcement relations in Khayelitsha.²¹ A number of witnesses testified to the Commission that CPFs have become political bodies, affiliated with particular political parties, and are therefore not neutral spaces in which to share community concerns.²² Furthermore, the Mthente survey conducted for the Commission found that many residents did not know of or

¹⁹ Burman, S. & Scharf, W., ‘Creating People’s Justice’, 708 & 710.

²⁰ Khayelitsha Commission, ‘Chapter Fourteen’, 406.

²¹ Khayelitsha Commission, ‘Chapter Fourteen’, 407.

²² Khayelitsha Commission, ‘Chapter Fourteen’, 407.

were not involved in their local CPF, and those that did reflected that some CPFs have ended any relationship with the police, preferring to deal with reports of crime themselves.²³ Clearly, CPFs in practice are not functioning the way they were envisioned. The issues currently affecting CPFs may in fact serve as a lesson, highlighting the pitfalls neighbourhood watch programmes may encounter in Khayelitsha.

²³ Mthente Research and Consulting Services, *Khayelitsha Commission*, 44 & 45.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The field research is a primary component of the research project, and has been designed to elicit information from a variety of sources. The results presented here are derivative of these, yet remained discrete during the data-acquisition process. For analytical clarity they are presented in this section independently, before being drawn upon collectively in the presentation of the findings. The field research was undertaken in the five sites from May to August 2015. As mentioned, the sites chosen in collaboration with the Department of Community Safety included BKM (Bergvliet, Kreupelbosch, Meadowridge), Khayelitsha, Lavender Hill, Paarl East, and Vredenburg (and surrounds). The sites were elected for a range of reasons including their levels of non-state innovation or dysfunction, their geographic spread, access to these sites (including the safety of the researcher), as well as features such as rural/urban character, income levels and levels of crime.

Ethical clearance was sought from the Law Faculty Research Ethics Committee before the commencement of the research and clearance was granted with effect from the 30 April 2015 for a period of 12 months (subject to renewal if required).

3.1. NODAL GOVERNANCE

Within the field of criminology, nodal governance has come to be seen as a means by which criminologists can analyse the changing nature of social order. Mainstream criminology has traditionally been state-centric, focusing exclusively on state systems of police and justice. Whereas studies on non-state systems of policing and justice have been growing, it is by no means comparable to the extensive and “voluminous” research conducted on the state police.²⁴ The challenge for criminologists is therefore to take cognizance of the changing realities of social order, by recognizing the “continuing erosion of clear-cut distinctions between the public and the private realms of crime control, together with the displacement of the criminal justice state from centre stage in the production of security and crime control” and so too to engage with

²⁴ Brodeur, J-P. 2010. *The policing web*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 263.

new questions of regulation and control and to think “beyond the state.”²⁵ Nodal governance is thus a way in which criminologists (and others) can do this. The nodal governance approach has been described as a theory, but it is also an analytical tool for understanding the nature of an increasingly pluralised social world. However, as an analytical tool or method, it is used by researchers to simply “map out the relationships between nodes as auspices and providers” and thus recognises that all and any nodes – whether state or non-state – “are always potentially governors and governed”.²⁶ Nodal governance ‘theory’ is also a conceptual tool used as a framing device to understand new power formations and recognises that nodal arrangements may consist of a proliferation of nodes or nodal assemblages, including the state (which is itself a nodal assemblage, for instance), businesses, NGOs, as well as the informal sector.²⁷ Nodal theorists argue that conceptual priority should not be given to any one node (such as the state) or any one governance system, but that this is an empirical question dependent on the context and in consideration of the empirical reality of governance developments.²⁸

In summary, the researchers employed a nodal governance approach to undertaking research, which is an analytical tool used by the researcher to treat situations as an empirical state of affairs and so prevents a particular conceptual framing from distorting the empirical facts on the ground. Informed by a nodal governance approach, the research was informed by three primary questions: What functions are currently being performed (by NHWs and CPFs)? What other functions could be performed? What are the obstacles to the adoption and sustainability of these functions? In order to answer these questions the following methods were employed during the research:

²⁵ Garland, D. & Sparks, R. 2000. Criminology, social theory and the challenge of our times. *British Journal of Criminology*. 40(2):189-204 at 191.

²⁶ Shearing, C. 2006. Reflections on the refusal to acknowledge private governments. In *Democracy, society and the governance of security*. J. Wood & B. Dupont, Eds. New York: Cambridge University Press. 11-32, p. 27 and 32.

²⁷ Burris, S., Kempa, M. & Shearing, C. 2008. Changes in governance: a cross-disciplinary review of current scholarship. *Akron Law Review*. 41(1):1-66.

²⁸ Johnston, L. & Shearing, C. 2003. *Governing security: explorations in policing and justice*. Oxon, New York: Routledge.

3.2. DESKTOP ANALYSIS

A desktop review of documentation was conducted to supplement the field research, especially in broadening the understanding of the context and structures which define the communities in which fieldwork was conducted. Literature was gathered from a variety of sources to inform the drafting of a literature review on community responses to crime. Other documents have also been sourced to inform the research, including but not limited to, relevant legislation and policy, budget and other speeches, annual reports, constitutions, court cases, workshop/CPF reports, minutes of meetings, brochures and pamphlets, newspaper articles, websites and so forth.

3.3. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted in all the sites with numerous primary role players, influencers, and interested parties. These interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis, recorded and transcribed (with the permission of the interviewee). The interview schedule was unique to each site, and formulated as a result of the desktop-based analysis, in which the primary issues were identified and isolated. This is not to say, however, that new topics were not broached by the interviews, and when this did occur, were followed up by the individual researchers.

Representatives from all areas of the research were approached for interviewing, as were other interested parties, so as that a number of interviews were conducted:

- Members of the CPFs, including the chairs of the CPFs, local councillors, active community members, security nodes in attendance, religious organisations and so forth.
- Security nodes or security-related nodes involved in or with the CPFs, such as the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the private security industry.
- Key members or organisations from the community, such as schools, key businesses, NGOs and so forth.

The core and relevant issues were thus further corroborated in discussion with interviewees, and where necessary, further research was conducted to explore the key issues identified by them. These individual interviews, and the data derivative of them, were further verified and analysed in November workshop held with those who

had been interviewed during the research. It is here that interviewees were offered the opportunity of engaging with others in an environment conducive to the research process.

3.4. DIRECT AND PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION

From the outset, there was always the intention to also engage in detailed forms of direct and participant observation. CPFs, for instance, were approached and permission gained to enable the researchers to observe the daily activities/duties of individuals involved in the specific CPFs. In some instances, such opportunities were also used with regards to the observation of NHWs and private security personnel. During these opportunities, the researchers engaged in informal interviews and discussions and observed activities, which were recorded by means of note-taking and/or tape recorder and so supplemented the in-depth interviews. These proved pivotal in showing the broad range of possible activities a community safety project could undertake. Research was also conducted through the attendance of meetings held between relevant role-players depending on the level of access granted to the researcher. Numerous meetings were attended, in all of the research sites.

As a result of this work, key themes emerging from the data were identified and processed accordingly. Some of the themes that will inform the SOPs and safety governance model include for instance, the issue of knowledge sharing, power relations, space/location, resources, effectiveness, accountability, partnerships, and normative expectations. The findings of the research – as they have been generated – have been communicated to the technical committee on a regular basis. Derivative of these conversations, the models proposed are thus evidence-based yet also the product of deliberations with numerous recognised experts in community safety concerns in South Africa.

3.5. STAKEHOLDER GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Beyond this, and finally, we invited many of the primary stakeholders to participate in two day-long workshops, which were convened at the University of Cape Town on 25th November 2015 and 20th February 2016. Our aim here was to bring together numerous respondents from each of the different research sites targeted by the project,

so as to collate and further understand the critical issues, ongoing challenges, and opportunities for success that have been experienced by a broad range of stakeholders. While individual interviews are useful in obtaining valid experiential information, discussions have shown to be a very good forum in which new ideas and perspectives can be generated. The resulting information has also been used to both verify the data recorded through the other methods, and as a means of further extending the scope of the research so as to suggest new ideas and paths for community safety projects. We have also used this information to further sharpen the design of the outputs, as documented here. So as to ensure that the day was of benefit to all involved, while we explored these various topics we also drew on the expertise of a number of high-level discussants, including input and demonstrations by criminologists, mediation experts, and security personnel. Our intention here, as such, was then that these discussions would not only provide us with further material for the research, but would also provide key role-players with information and skills that can be put to use in further developing community safety standards at the local level.


As noted, all of these methodological strategies have been employed in generating this research report. In most cases, we have not included the details of the interviewee when citing quotations – for the sake of keeping respondents anonymous as well as for consistency. However, where relevant, we note where the data originated from, although as the study employed a thematic analysis in many instances, often these are derivative of aggregated data and the collation of information more broadly.

4. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH SITES

The research sites were all quite different to one another, and in some respects, fairly radically so. As has been widely documented, South African cities and urban spaces often continue to reflect the racial and socio-economic disparities that were artificially manipulated by the apartheid government. While these enforced differences may no longer be legally mandated, their influence can still be easily seen, and is reflected in the sites under analysis. Such differences are also important considerations in terms of the safety, security, and development of communities, not only influencing broader socio-economic prospects, but also more localised concerns, such as policing strategies (and their effectiveness), the design of community policing organisations, and so on. Before presenting the primary findings from each of the individual reports then, it is instructive to present a situational analysis of these areas, as follows.

4.1. BERGVLIET (BKM)

The area was selected as illustrative of the dynamics at play in a well-resourced, affluent area with lower levels of criminal activity, and home to a very well developed community safety structure. As the map below shows, the area under analysis comprises of three suburban areas which all fall under the jurisdiction of the BKM NHW:




Based on national census data from 2001, from a total population of 4 428 the following demographic statistics were reported:

Race	Black	5%
	White	86%
	Coloured	6.2%
	Other	1.5%
Language	Afrikaans	4.33%
	English	93.6%
	Xhosa	0.54%
Highest Education	No schooling	0.1%
	Some primary	0.4%
	Completed primary	0.4%
	Some secondary	7.2%
	Completed secondary	34.3%
	Higher education	56.5%
	N/A	1.1%
Employment	Employed	2 019
	Unemployed	87
	Discouraged	12
	Not Active	894

From the perspective of education, there are numerous schools, libraries, and education institutes in the area. Speaking to community safety initiatives, there is one primary NHW, BKM, which interfaces with at least three CPFs. Beyond the SAPS, many security companies operate in the area, primary among these being ADT. Amongst others, of primary concern to the community members were issues relating to housebreaking, robbery, and theft.

4.2. KHAYELITSHA

This area was selected as illustrative of a large, urban ‘township’ (as is found in all other South African cities), with high levels of violence, crime, and socio-economic problems, yet has also been witness to high levels of intervention and intense scrutiny, varying from local reviews to nationally mandated enquiries. As can be seen from the map below, it is a large area:



Based on national census data from 2001, from a total population of 391 749 the following demographic statistics were reported:

Race	Black	98.6%
	White	0.1%
	Coloured	0.6%
	Other	0.6%
Language	Afrikaans	1.06%
	English	3.2%
	Xhosa	90.5%
Highest Education	No schooling	2.6%

	Some primary	9.8%
	Completed primary	4.4%
	Some secondary	47.3%
	Completed secondary	30.7%
	Higher education	4.9%
	N/A	0.2%
Employment	Employed	111 093
	Unemployed	68 142
	Discouraged	11 199
	Not Active	84 552

From the perspective of education, there are numerous places of education, including 21 registered high schools. Speaking to community safety initiatives, it was very difficult to determine the total number as many are in operation that are unregistered – there are at least 14 operational and registered NHWs and three CPFs, corresponding to the three police stations. Beyond the SAPS, many security companies operate in the area, although it is again difficult to determine the extent of these, as many are unregistered and unofficial. Amongst others, of primary concern to the community members were issues relating to unemployment, violent robbery, violent assault, and sexual violence.

4.3. LAVENDER HILL

This area was selected as illustrative of a large urban area developed as a result of the Group Areas Act to act as a catchment for displaced ‘coloured’ people. Such areas often have high levels of gang activity, substance use, and economic crimes, and have been subject to punitive policing methods. Comparatively, as can be seen from the map below, it is a relatively small area:



Based on national census data from 2001, from a total population of 32 598 the following demographic statistics were reported:


Race	Black	3.7%
	White	0.1%
	Coloured	95%
	Other	0.6%
Language	Afrikaans	81.3%
	English	18.4%
	Xhosa	0.1%
Highest Education	No schooling	1.8%
	Some primary	14.2%
	Completed primary	10.7%
	Some secondary	53.5%

	Completed secondary	18.4%
	Higher education	1.0%
	N/A	0.3%
Employment	Employed	8 070
	Unemployed	5 850
	Discouraged	879
	Not Active	7 047

From the perspective of education, there is one high school. Speaking to community safety initiatives, there are three NHWs in operation, and one CPF. The NHWs are all in different stages of registration, and all conduct different activities. Beyond the SAPS, many security companies operate in the area, although it is again difficult to determine the extent of these, as many are unregistered and unofficial. Amongst others, of primary concern to the community members were issues relating to gangsterism, illegal substance use, and housebreaking. Unemployment and education continue to fuel these concerns.

4.4. PAARL EAST

The area was selected as illustrative of the dynamics at play in an urban satellite area (in relation to the City of Cape Town), with a high number of socio-economic and crime issues, yet one that had also been witness to a fair number of interventions and remedial efforts. As the map below shows, the area forms part of the larger urban municipality of the Drakenstein:



Based on national census data from 2001, the last national survey, from a total population of 251 262 the following demographic statistics were reported:

Race	Black	22.7%
	White	13.5%
	Coloured	62.5%
	Other	0.4%
Language	Afrikaans	72.5%
	English	4.9%
	Xhosa	16.2%
Highest Education	No schooling	3.1%
	Some primary	38%
	Completed primary	6.6%
	Some secondary	31.4%
	Completed secondary	14.4%
	Higher education	2.2%
	N/A	4.5%
Employment	Employed	87 336

	Unemployed	18 694
	Discouraged	5 705
	Not Active	62 102

From the perspective of education, there are a total of six places of education, including a school for the aged and a public library. Speaking to community safety initiatives, it was found that there is a total of 16 NHWs (including street committees), overseen by the Paarl East CPF, with cooperation from the Valcare Trust. Beyond the SAPS, five security companies operate in the area, two of which are locally based while the others are owned by larger, international conglomerates. Amongst others, of primary concern to the community members were issues relating to unemployment, the use of illegal substances, housebreaking, and illegal scrap yards.

4.5. VREDENBURG/SALDHANA BAY MUNICIPALITY

This area was selected as illustrative of a provincial municipal area not near the City of Cape Town, and one not within the commuter belt. Vredenburg is located approximately 140 kilometres north of Cape Town. It is situated within the Saldana Bay Municipality (SBM) on the West Coast District of the Western Cape. The SBM comprises of Vredenburg, St Helena Bay, Paternoster, Jacobsbaai, Saldanha, and Langebaan. Comparatively, as can be seen from the map below, it is a large area comprising of three main towns:



Based on national census data from 2001, from a total population of 99 193 the following demographic statistics were reported:

Race	Black	24.5%
	White	18%
	Coloured	55.8%
	Other	0.9%
Language	Afrikaans	70.8%
	English	6.5%
	Xhosa	16%
Highest Education	No schooling	3.2%
	Some primary	39.2%
	Completed primary	6.2%

	Some secondary	34.8%
	Completed secondary	12.4%
	Higher education	1.4%
	N/A	2.9%
Employment	Employed	34 359
	Unemployed	10 470
	Discouraged	1909
	Not Active	22 168

In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the SBM is in the Western Province's top ten growing non-metro municipalities. These rates hover between 22% to 23% of the total population for the 2001-2010 periods. The SBM's poverty rates compare better than the greater West Coast District (30.4%) but slightly lower than that of the Western Cape Province (22.1%). The majority of people who live in the SBM have access to basic services (water, electricity, refuse removal, and so on). However, there is still room for improvement, especially when it comes to housing. Of the total population of the municipality, 81.1% have access to formal housing.

5. FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH

In this section, a detailed overview of the findings of the research conducted in each area is presented. As these areas are often very different, the findings themselves varied both in substance and priority. Rather than artificially shape these differences to produce similarities, we present the data as it emerged, which is more accurate and relevant.

5.1. BKM (BERGVLIET, KREUPELBOSCH, MEADOWRIDGE)

BKM Watch (or simply ‘BKM’ as it will be referred to) was co-founded at the end of 2006 by two local residents. BKM straddles two police station precincts and subsequently works with two police stations and reports to two CPFs (Kirstenhof and Diep River). BKM is fully accredited with the Department of Community Safety (DOCS). At its inception, BKM wrote its own Constitution supplementing the original template provided by DOCS. The Constitution was compiled by the founders and concerned citizens under the auspices of both CPFs.

In 2007 BKM set up an office space within Bergvliet, and employed a part-time office co-ordinator to assist in the administration of the Watch. Inside this office space there is a control room – otherwise referred to as the technology room – which both the central technological hub for communication and where centralised forms of direction can occur. Having a formalised, central, politically neutral space through which BKM can conduct operations was expressed as a very important asset. This physical space, in and of itself, operates as a pathway for the efficient running of an organised NHW. Indeed, when BKM advises other NHWs about how to establish their own organisation, they state that having a set space from where operations can run is key in establishing the group’s success as a NHW. They believe this to such an extent that they have even funded a container for a neighbouring NHW, so that it would be able to run its own operations more efficiently.

BKM sustains itself financially through sponsorship from ADT, optional annual membership fees (R120 per year), and individual donations. They have never received any funding or remuneration from DOCS. One of the co-founders of BKM stated explicitly that DOCS had never helped establish or resource BKM despite the Watch

asking DOCS for assistance in these regards during its inception. All funds for the Camera Monitoring and Licence Plate Recognition projects were fundraised by the community.

BKM has divided the area into eleven zones. A zone consists of roughly 200 to 250 houses. Each zone operates as a NHW in itself, while adhering to common rules and protocols. In every zone there is a volunteer manager, volunteer patrollers and a carefully organised roster detailing the patrolling shifts.

BKM's primary objectives are to:

- Use preventative means to reduce opportunities for crime to take place in the area.
- Work together with SAPS and private security companies by being the 'eyes and ears on the ground.'
- Contribute and create a sense of community within the BKM area.

As such, they also aim to further educate residents on how to protect themselves and their property, and develop the overall safety of the community.

Patrolling is the main strategy used by BKM in order to secure their area. BKM has a very clear definition regarding what being a patroller involves, namely:

“The patrollers, the volunteer patrollers are our eyes and ears. We don't want them involved in anything. They are not Rambos running out with guns.”

Vehicle patrols are the primary means of conducting patrols, but residents occasionally go on walking and bicycle patrols too. BKM encourages all members to always be on 'patrol' (i.e. the eyes and the ears) when they are out in the area. For example, if a person is going for a run or out walking their dog, they may put on their 'BKM Watch' vest, or carry their radio and/or cell phone to report any suspicious activity to the control room.

All patrollers are unarmed while on duty, and are explicitly instructed to not directly engage in any activity that seems 'suspicious', rather to call – via the radio network –

to SAPS, private security, or other members who are trained as police reservists or special law enforcers for appropriate action. In addition, all members have the phone number of the chairman (who is a law enforcement officer). Patrollers are instructed to continue to monitor and observe the ‘suspicious activity’ but should not put themselves in danger if possible.

Every time a patroller goes on duty, they are meant to log onto the BKM website and call into the patrol room to let the operators know that they are going on patrol. Whenever a patroller goes on duty, they have the option to wear a luminous vest, or ‘BKM Watch’ decals for cars and may have flashing orange lights for their vehicle. Patrollers are expected to, at a minimum, give up one hour a month to patrolling. Patrolling is also very flexible, with volunteers being able to clock on and clock off whenever they choose. An interviewee who patrols for about three to four hours a week commented:

“I am retired so I do it whenever I feel like it. Like this afternoon, there is no one else on the roster, so I thought, okay, let me do something this afternoon. Or, let me put in an hour or whatever. So there is nothing regular about it, I just do it when I feel like it.”

It is hard to measure the number of patrollers who are on duty at any given time (one interviewee estimated it was about four people during peak times). However, the leadership of BKM stress that this is not enough to cover the entire BKM area. Situated in various strategic spots around BKM (i.e. the local garage and supermarket) are various safe deposits which hold a radio, a vest, a decal, a register and a torch. The idea is that patrollers who go on duty have easy access to such equipment, and are not reliant on fellow patrollers to an inordinate extent to conduct patrols:

“It makes it convenient to the patrollers and where they live.”

All new patrollers must undergo compulsory training, which has been developed and is administered by BKM. New member training takes place twice a month. During

training, patrollers learn about the ‘dos and don’ts’ of patrolling for BKM Watch as well as how to work the radio system and the website. BKM Watch is very particular about how training has to happen and why training is a vital part of the organisation. As a member of the BKM ExCo said:

“If you come on training for example, and you have not filled out your card, or your patroller’s ID is not ready, it hasn’t been signed off by the police, then you do not come on training. And you will only be allowed out on the road once you have completed that training session. And those are non-negotiable. I think if we were to say: ‘Agh, it’s just a free for all, and you can just patrol when you want’ then you don’t know who is on the road, how they are on the road, what they are up to.”

The Watch occasionally partners with SAPS and private security companies to offer training courses, open to all members, free of charge in the following areas:

- Victim Support Training
- Drug Training
- Basic First Aid Training

While BKM posits that the entire premise of their NHW is for the residents to feel in charge of their own safety and key agents in reducing crime, they also firmly stress that such things can only be achieved through partnership with other stakeholders in the area. The belief amongst the BKM leadership is that it is only when all stakeholders are working together and the community is bringing *additional* sources of crime prevention will safety be achieved:

“We communicate with the law enforcement officials, who are understaffed, to try and show them in the right direction to reduce the amount of crime. That is the essence of our BKM Watch.”

This thus speaks to the whole-of-society approach to safety and security, as it emphasises the need for all of societal stakeholders in a given context to be working together as partners. In BKM, SAPS, the CPFs and private security companies thus all

work together, as a partnership, with one common unifying goal of improving safety in the area and reducing crime.

BKM also employs a holistic approach to achieve their goal of reducing crime in the neighbourhood:

“It’s a community type of organisation. It’s not only about crime, it’s about trying to get the neighbourhood together.... We are trying to get people away from thinking the neighbourhood watches are only here because of crime. You know, they [BKM Watch] are here for them [the residents].”

While interviewees mentioned that BKM is primarily about ‘crime fighting’ (i.e. having patrols), many also explicitly stated that it was vital that patrolling be met with other efforts of crime prevention. These efforts should be centred on activities which instil a sense of neighbourliness and community spirit, fundamental to the development of supportive relationships which increase levels of safety:

“It is a community service. We are trying to get people to know their neighbour. That way if you do try to get a response, and that response is slow coming, you can at least call the person next door.”

Participants spoke of the importance of creating neighbourliness as an effective crime reduction strategy. Their initiative ‘play-dates in the park’ was referenced as being a good representation of this. During these ‘dates’, neighbours leave their high-fenced houses and connect with one another, while the children play in the park:

“We have a jumping castle and hotdog rolls and the youngsters bring their kids to the park and the parents meet each other. And that’s how we are bringing the community spirit to one another.”

Interviewees also cited ‘The Broken Window Theory’ as being the central theory underlying BKM’s approach to reduce crime in the area. A participant stated:

“We don’t only report on crime, we report on issues that are related to crime. The Broken Window Theory is what drives us. You know, if you’ve got the graffiti, long grass and trees where everyone can hide under, and no lights and broken window panes, that is also called into control.”

Another interviewee stated:

“We don’t only deal with the criminal element, but let’s say that the street lights are out in an area, they will report it. So if we can fix those little things, it deters the criminal element.”

Broken Window Theory, rooted in criminology, states that by maintaining the urban environment, it creates an atmosphere of lawfulness and increases ‘buy in’ from the residents, ultimately keeping serious criminal activity at bay. This theory speaks to a holistic approach to reducing crime in that it involves the entire community in activities which do not directly seem to be crime prevention, but rather to the promotion of safety.

Importantly, many participants also stated that running a NHW like a business was its primary means to ensuring its success:

“Every neighbourhood watch should do a SWOT analysis and develop an objective year plan, it’s so simple to do.”

This business mind-set ensures that the NHW will remain a mainstay in the community rather than a fleeting effort. This set ‘game plan’, focusing on the future, also prevents the efforts of a NHW from petering out. Thus BKM aims, through partnerships, to reduce and prevent crime from happening in the area. They also have a very set understanding as to how exactly they shall achieve this aim, namely to be the eyes and the ears within the area. The three main theories participants referred to regarding the work of BKM are:

1. having a partnership approach to community safety;
2. taking a holistic approach to reducing crime; and

3. running the NHW like a business.

From an operational perspective too, they also had a number of strategies in place. For analytical clarity, the participants made a distinction between internal and external operations, reflected here. Internal operations refer to how BKM is structured, who are the main internal stakeholders, and what their role is. External operations refer to how BKM operates in relation to other stakeholders in the area. Specifically, it explores BKM's relationship with private security companies, SAPS, government and DOCS.

BKM comprises of three internal structures:

1. The members (this includes both 'passive' and 'active' members).
2. The Management Committee (ManCo), made up of the zone managers.
3. The Executive committee (ExCo), the leadership involved in the decision-making regarding the NHW.

These categories are not discrete, where often a person on the ExCo may also be a manager, and/or an active member. All members of the internal structure are on a voluntary basis. The rationale behind this internal structure is to have as many community members in leadership positions in the organisation as possible. That way, responsibilities are distributed, so if one person is unable to fulfil their role, the entire organisation does not collapse. For instance, a participant referred to how the Kreupelbosch Zone functions in terms of being a successful structure of a zone and a NHW at large:

“They’ve got a guy to look after the trees, one for the bushes, the potholes you name it, they are so organised! It’s fantastic!”

This acute breakdown of roles not only provides tangible, operationally defined tasks as to what is needed to make the area a safer place, but also presents members with small, manageable duties which lead them to feel that they are actively involved in making their area safe. This ‘manageable amount of responsibility’ is a key factor in ensuring buy-in from residents in the community.

Speaking specifically to the ExCo of BKM, it has overall oversight of the organisation. This includes the membership corpus, the ManCo and one paid part-time employee. The committee supervises the collection, analysis and dissemination of all the crime incident reports. The ExCo generally meets every three months. It comprises of a chairman, a vice chairman, and six different portfolios heads.

Those who are actively involved with BKM are mostly older, male, white, and middle to upper class individuals. BKM comprises of working, working part-time, self-employed members, retired persons and homemakers. This mix means that firstly, members have the financial and temporal means to permit being involved in their NHW, and secondly, that there are people who are able to be the ‘eyes and ears’ during the day. The two previous chairmen of BKM were both retired when taking on the position, and thus had time to lead the organisation and take on all the responsibilities. The current chairman says he gives on average about 20 hours a month to BKM.

Many of the members are professionals with management skills who possess the ability, confidence and freedom to put them to service to the community. In addition, many of the members (patrollers and leadership) are also police reservists for the area or have trained as law enforcement officers with the City of Cape Town. One interviewee stated that joining BKM was a progression from his time spent as a police reservist:

“After twenty years as a reservist, I thought that it was time for me to leave, and I thought that with experience like that it shouldn’t really be wasted, and maybe I should get involved with something that was a bit low key, and so the Neighbourhood Watch thing seemed ideal.”

Speaking to these motivations, the reasons interviewees cited as to why they decided to join and become actively involved in BKM were threefold. Firstly, they wanted to give back to their communities; secondly, they wanted to create a safer community for themselves and their children and finally, participants felt sympathetic towards the police. In term of becoming more involved in the leadership, all interviewees said that

it was because context necessitated it, and that since there was no one else to fulfil that role, they took it on. Participants also mentioned how they struggled to increase the motivation for others to join BKM. This apathy within BKM, especially with patrolling, was the number one challenge facing BKM. An interviewee postulated:

“I think that this apathy happens in the more affluent areas. If you go down to Plumstead or Southfield, you’ll get far more patrollers, because they are the front line, that’s where the crime starts, and then it moves up.”

Most interviewees believed that they had a good relationship with SAPS, particularly with the Diep River Station where one of the BKM co-founders worked as a police reservist. Interviewees cited his long history and involvement in the station as being a reason why such strong bonds between the two exist. Interviewees cited having a firm relationship with SAPS as being integral to the success of any NHW:

“If you have a relationship with them [SAPS], then they come, if you don’t have a relationship with them, then they don’t. It’s as simple as that.”

BKM leadership usually has weekly meetings with SAPS. Furthermore, the two also support each other at events. For example, during the fieldwork, BKM hosted a special operations night patrol where members conducted vehicle patrols around the area from 19h00 to 02h00. Members from both SAPS stations were present at the event, as well as being active on the radio. BKM saw their role to SAPS to primarily make provisions for where SAPS lacked the resources to make BKM a safer place. Interviewees reported that SAPS benefits hugely from this relationship as BKM provides SAPS with intelligence from their camera systems or licence plate recognition, assisting SAPS in making arrests.

Interviewees also commented on how NHWs and normal everyday citizens are needed to fill the gap between the private security providers and the public security providers (i.e. the police). This growing gap was attributed to lack of accountability from all public security stakeholders (law enforcements in Cape Town, Metro in Cape

Town, and SAPS). Interviewees felt that there was a lack of accountability amongst public security stakeholders to make safety a priority.

All interviewees also reported having a very strong relationship with the private security companies in the area, and relying heavily on them to achieve and maintain safety in BKM. There are a number of private security companies which operate in the BKM. These include for instance, ADT, BH, Chubb and Premier Security Company.

While BKM works with all private security companies, they recognise ADT primarily because it is the official sponsor of BKM. ADT pays for the salaries of the six trained staff in the technology room who deal with any calls made to the emergency telephone number as well as the monitoring of the cameras for the License Plate Recognition System. In exchange, ADT enjoys full endorsement from BKM, as well as neighbouring suburbs, who are also connected to the radio system in the control room, as being the private security company of choice.

Interviewees realised that this relationship, which has been so vital to BKM's success, is not necessarily viable for NHWs in low income areas. As an interviewee stated:

“The only reason why we have ADT sponsoring this is because of the number of people who are ADT members in the area. But in you know, Hanover Park, they don't have armed security companies looking after their houses, so ADT is not going to pump money into that.”

Rather than this partnership of BKM and ADT being a deterrent to other security companies supporting the Watch's operations, it has the opposite effect. Interviewees reported that all private security companies in BKM support their efforts, specifically patrolling. For example:

“The security company often stands in if there is no patroller on duty. They carry the radios and they do it.”

Furthermore, the interviewees stated there are close ties between the private security companies, who act as comrades rather than competition to combat crime in the area:

“Everyone is working as a team. You know, sometimes, I will hear on the radio, an ADT guy call up a BH guy and he will say, ‘can you please go check this out, my guys are busy.’ They work hand in hand. It is a nice little community vibe. It’s not a big corporate ship.”

However, such camaraderie was understood as being a beneficial marketing strategy for the individual private security companies:

“It is obviously a marketing tool for them, you know if something goes down, and they are able to get there, then it is good news for them.”

In keeping with findings from a previous report, BKM members see it as part of their job to hold their crime fighting partners accountable and ‘encourage professionalism and commitment’ within both the local SAPS stations and also within the ADT control room. They do this by giving direct criticism when ‘inadequate services are being rendered.’ For example, a participant stated:

“There was a dog struck in a drain for two days in Southfield and the call came through to the control room and she [the ADT controller] said, ‘Well you’ve just got to phone the SPCA and get someone to deal with it.’ So I went back on the radio and I said to her, ‘it’s your job’, you should be the one phoning SPCA, it’s not his job.”

BKM is part of an area called the Constantia Valley Watches Association (CVWA). The CVWA is a collaboration between the different NHWs in the Constantia Valley area. This includes BKM Watch, Constantia Watch, Constantia Hills Watch, Nova Constantia Watch, Plumstead, and Southfield Watch. There were no major reported conflicts between the different neighbourhood watches in the area:

“The goal is for all the neighbourhood watches in the Constantia valley to work under this umbrella of the CVWA.”

The committee includes the chairpersons of the aforementioned NHWs. Tony Schreiber is an employed Special Ops consultant for the CVWA. Activities of the CVWA are being run from the BKM offices.

This association is another reason as to why security in the Constantia Valley area is so strong. Certainly, it is as a result of human and financial capital which all of the NHWs possess, but it is also out of fear of being the ‘weakest’ suburb and an easier target for crime. If the BKM area is determined to keep crime out of the area, then neighbouring suburbs become more attractive options for criminals. This larger collaboration incentivises all suburbs to keep on maintaining effective NHWs in the area.

While interviewees said that they understood the need for a CPF in theory, in practice BKM works directly with station commanders and police at the stations, rather than going through the CPF. The CPFs in the area were compared to DOCS in that, perhaps their absence was a sign that meant that BKM Watch was on track:

“Maybe they just feel that they don’t need to worry about us. That’s the only reason why I feel we haven’t seen them.”

Other interviewees stated that this absence from the CPFs was extremely problematic, and the CPF in the area where failing to some extent:

“I have never been in one meeting with the CPF from Kirstenhof ... even if there are quarterly meetings that would be beneficial just for us to all see if we are on the same page.”

One interviewee stated that the CVWA was even set up as a response to how CPFs were failing in connecting the various community crime fighting efforts in the area.

With respect to the role of businesses in the BKM area, it was found that businesses offer special deals or ‘loyalty’ programmes to registered patrollers and sponsor food, drinks or rewards at fundraising or patroller-appreciation events organised by BKM. Again, this was framed as being a mutually beneficial relationship for both the BKM and businesses:

“We like to support the local businesses with our patronage, so that they can support us.”

Interviewees reported that the ward councillors for the areas have virtually no involvement in BKM. In the past three years, the councillors from both precincts have never been to the BKM offices, signed up with the Watch or engaged with BKM leadership about community safety in the area.

BKM relies heavily on technology in ensuring the success of the organisation. The control room – or the technology room – is a room within the BKM offices which deals with all of the technology in the Watch. As mentioned earlier, the control room does not only look after the BKM area, but all of the suburbs as part of the CVWA (namely Plumstead, Southfield, Kirstenhof and Constantia). The room is divided into two sections: the camera area and the radio system area. The one side consists of screens linked to the wireless cameras as well as the Licence Plate Recognition system (LPR). These cameras are wireless and mounted on poles in strategic spots in the area which are known getaway areas (as determined by SAPS). They were funded by donations from the residents. The LPR is a system which takes a front and an overhead snapshot of all vehicles travelling through the Constantia Valley area. If a vehicle has been loaded as being a suspicious vehicle by officers in SAPS, Tony Schreiber or the War Room in Cape Town, it will trigger an alarm. The system is constantly being updated, and suspicious vehicles are constantly loaded onto the system. There are three status levels for suspicious vehicles; level three being the most severe (the car was suspected to be involved in a house break-in etc) to level one (the car needs to be observed).

On the other side of the control room are the ADT radio operators who respond to the BKM emergency hotline, which is never down. Many people throughout the area utilise the BKM Watch emergency hotline:

“You’ll find more and more that people, when they have a problem, are not going to call the police, but they call BKM which they know how powerful the radio network is, and they know they are going to get some instant action.”

This radio system is also connected to both police stations, and the police in Wynberg, the private armed response private security companies, law enforcement, traffic officers, schools, tow truck companies and the patrollers. Overall then the NHW is a well-funded, well-resourced unit that operates cohesively, drawing on technological aids to further supplement its abilities.

5.2. KHAYELITSHA

Khayelitsha is one of the poorest areas of Cape Town, with an average income per family of R20,000 a year, half of the City of Cape Town average of R40,000. The partial informal settlement was established in 1984, more than half of the 118,000 households live in informal dwellings and most of the youth are unemployed. Crime remains very high and only a small portion of residents see improvements as a result of infrastructure and welfare interventions. Some 70% of residents still live in shacks and one in three people have to walk 200 metres or further to access water. Around 53% of Khayelitsha's total working age population is employed. 89% of households in Khayelitsha are either moderately or severely food insecure leaving many very vulnerable.

As indicated in the 2014/2015 South African Police Services statistics (Table 1), Khayelitsha has one of the highest rates of contact crime. These vary from aggravated robbery, assault, sexual crimes, attempted murder and murder. Crime amongst young people especially male is ripe. After numerous demonstrations, protests and formal complaints on inefficient policing in Khayelitsha and the breakdown in the relationship between the police and the community, the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry was established in August 2012 by the Provincial Government to investigate

these allegations. CPF representatives were amongst the witnesses in the inquiry. Weaknesses in policing by SAPS were identified in both internal structures and the functioning of external relationships.

Table 1: 2014 Khayelitsha Crime Totals

Description	2014 Total
Robbery Aggravated	1185
Drug-Related Crime	803
Assault Common	774
General Theft	717
Assault GBH	687
Sexual Crimes	233
Murder	146
Attempted Murder	144
Neglect and ill treatment of Children	17

Khayelitsha has three police stations: Site B (sometimes called Khayelitsha, and the oldest station in the area), Lingeletu-West and Harare, which form the two satellite stations. Makhaza has been proposed as the site for a fourth station in the area. These stations are part of a larger group called the Khayelitsha Cluster Board with five other police stations from the surrounding areas: Lwandle, Macassar, Strand, Somerset West and Gordons Bay. Each station has a CPF and each CPF has its own sectors or areas they service within that suburb, Khayelitsha has:

- Lingeletu-West CPF – 4 sectors (4 sub forums)
- Harare CPF – 4 sectors
- Site B CPF – 6 sectors

All the CPFs declared that they are governed by the Uniform CPF Constitution for the Western Cape Province and do not have customised constitutions. Guided by the constitution (section 7.1.2.4, 8.2.1 & 8.2.6) each sector must have a sub-forum, with 14 sectors therefore there are 14 sub-forums. These sub-forums in Khayelitsha are called the Neighbourhood Watches. The Lingeletu-West, Sub-forum Sector Manager revealed that, “where there is a strong CPF, the NHW will be visible too”.

The box below contains sections from various documents affirming the interpretations of how NHWs are viewed in Khayelitsha by CPFs. As stated by Site B secretary, “if NHW are a project of CPF then CPF must have full control of them”.

The lack of policing and the alarming increase crime rate forced other community structures to take on the duties of providing safety and crime prevention in the Khayelitsha community. These structures believe safety of the community and the environment they live in is paramount, some of these are:

Security Companies

Security employment makes up 10.4% of the most common employable services in Khayelitsha. CPFs are said to not have any relationship with private security companies. “Security companies are seen as independent with no collaborative efforts, loosely organised and have an everyone for themselves approach”, a statement made by the ex-Khayelitsha Cluster Head. This structure falls under the business forums; Khayelitsha Development Forum and Khayelitsha Business Forum. They provide services to business organisations and government buildings. There are approximately 20 private security companies operating in the area.

Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF) - Safety and Security

The KDF operate as one of the gatekeepers in Khayelitsha, as all business wanting to operate in the area must seek permission from them and join their membership structure. They have a strong affiliation to the ANC and any DA work in the community is usually obstructed and meetings not attended. KDF is a selected structure which has a safety desk called the Khayelitsha Safety and Security Forum (it is not functional as they have no work groups on the ground). The group requested CPF to be part of them but this offer was declined by the CPF. The CPF did not want to join them under this pretence as they believed they will be doing their work for them. Therefore there is an internal feud between the CPF Cluster and KDF.

Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU)

The VPUU is a City of Cape Town project aimed at reducing violent crime and improving social conditions in Cape Town communities through infrastructure upgrading. This project was initiated in 2006, in partnership with the German Government, through the German Development Bank (KFW). The project has so far focused on the improvement of areas in the Khayelitsha “suburbs” of Harare, Kuyasa, Site C/TR section and Site B to create safe areas for people.

The VPUU built great working relationship with the Harare CPF, skilling the NHWs on Safety and Security. It was part of the Harare Integrated Safety Plan. Since their (VPUU) departure, the Harare CPF has not operated efficiently. The VPUU’s contract with City of Cape Town (CoCT) completed in 2015 and it is said CoCT took over VPUU staff and their work in Harare but there was no strategy on the way forward. The KDF is campaigning to run the project (Mayoral Urban Renewal Project member, interview).

South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO)

SANCO is a non-political civic society movement representing the people of that community where they live in accessing and advocating for services available in different Government departments and other service providers. It was formed in 1992 nationally. SANCO in Khayelitsha has had internal conflicts with three fractions all wanting leadership roles and in the process fragmenting the structure. It seems like SANCO’s role in the community has been diluted, as community members are not sure who is leading the organisation (ex-Khayelitsha Cluster Head, interview). Street committees formalise themselves by being members of SANCO. This is the platform they voice out service delivery matters. Most street committees in Khayelitsha are not functional and in disarray as numerous people are claiming to be in charge of them with no legitimate power or control. CPFs will tend to speak with Street Committee members that are significant for strategic needs (ex-Khayelitsha Cluster Head, interview). Any opposition party having initiatives or projects in Khayelitsha face a great deal of challenges when trying to launch, these are some of the political complexes of Khayelitsha.

There are also other stakeholders who contribute to the Khayelitsha community and occasionally work with CPFs/NHWs these are:

- I. Business: Social Development Fund, Local Economic Development Fund, Khayelitsha Central Business District, Khayelitsha Product & Enterprise Development.
- II. Other organisations: Abahlali baseMjondolo, the Mandela Park Backyarders, the Treatment Action Campaign, the Social Justice Coalition, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF), Equal Education, Free Gender, Ndifunda Ukwazi, Sonke Gender Justice, The South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO), Faith Organisations, Khayelitsha Hubspace , Bandwidth Barn Khayelitsha, Learn to Earn, Cape Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Khayelitsha Chapter, Golden Future South Africa, Football for Hope, Khayelitsha Community Trust, Khayelitsha Training Centre, Partners Across the Ocean.

Organisations involved in the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry; Equal Education, Free Gender, Triangle Project, Women's Legal Centre.

CPFs & NHWs

Before focusing on the three CPFs and their NHWs/Sub-forums, it is important to understand the vastness of areas that make up Khayelitsha. See below the sector map produced by VPUU (Map 1). Some of the sectors have not been demarcated and are built on church spaces where the land belongs to the faith organisations; these areas are called Temporalis (some date back to 1986).

Map 1: Khayelitsha Areas and Sectors




Table 2: Khayelitsha Police Stations and Service Areas

Police Stations	Street	Service Areas
Khayelitsha/Site B Police Station	Bonga Drive & Site B	Site C, Site B, TR, RR & BM informal
Lingeletu-West (satellite)	Makabeni Street	Central areas in Khayelitsha, Ilitha Park and Endlovini
Harare (satellite)	Steve Biko Drive	Harare, South-Eastern Kuyusa, Makhaza, Enkanini, Endlovini

The oldest CPF in Khayelitsha is Site B/Khayelitsha, and was established in 1991. The duties of the CPFs are stipulated in their aims and objectives of the Uniform Constitution and Chapter 7 of the SAPS Act of 1995. Some the roles include building relationships with organisations that fight crime and can assist the needs of the community. Some of these are:

- **Government Departments:** Health, Education, Social Development, Correctional Services, Home Affairs, Community Safety, Provincial Liquor Board
- **Law Enforcement:** SAPS, Metro Police, Traffic Services
- **Local Stakeholders:** Faith Organisations, Community Leaders, NGOs, Councillors, Schools (assist youth/children who are involved with drugs).

All these structures must be registered with the CPFs in order to foster co-ordination of projects. There are no formal documents, mere verbal agreements. The number of CPF representatives for a given CPF is 15 as mandated by the constitution, in Lingeletu-West there are 10, Site B 11 and Harare 7 active members. The membership numbers were initially at their capacity until members realised, that the work they were doing was under volunteerism with no compensation. The CPF is seen as the link between the community and SAPS. The police assist CPFs with transport to events and meetings in and around their own precinct or Cape Town. This is a regular feature that CPF members are driven by the police. CPFs call Imbizos (gathering of stakeholders and community members to discuss community matters), with the assistance of SAPS when tensions in the community are high or contested decisions must be made. CPFs are meant to ensure communities know the role that SAPS play in terms of policing that community. This service has not been demonstrated competently in Khayelitsha, as many community members criticize CPFs on their visibility and information sharing.

Neighbourhood watches were formed in Khayelitsha to reduce crime as Khayelitsha grew exponentially. The duties they are known for, include street patrols with the police and providing safety to community members by accompanying scholars and workers in the mornings, afternoons and during pay days as this are high crime rate times. Each sector must have a Sub-forum/NHW as stipulated in the constitution, their portfolios (Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Secretary, Deputy Secretary Treasurer, Co-ordinator, PRO) are similar to CPFs. The Sub-forums/NHWs are tasked to recruit volunteers. The Chairperson and Secretary of each Sub-forum sit and report to the CPF executive team for their respective area.

Each sector manages their own NHW and the number of volunteers varies from one to another.

Lingelethu-West CPF & NHW

Lingelethu-West is reported as having approximately 30 members for all four sectors. This is a low number whereas Site B NHWs consist of approximately 150 members and Harare's NHWs over 200 members. When the Lingelethu-West NHWs patrol, they walk in groups of four, primarily between 21h00 to 02h00 from Thursday to the weekend. During the week some of the members are hired by the False Bay College to protect the students on their way to and from school. This happens from Monday to Friday with shifts of ten NHW members from 07h30 to 14h00 and from 14h00 to 20h00. Not all areas or boundaries in Lingelethu-West are known by NHW community members, and therefore their patrols will tend to operate around the areas of familiarity.

The NHWs here have attempted to align their activities with crime trends happening in Khayelitsha; there are noticeable trends, such as street robberies of workers and learners taking place between 06h00 and 08h00, and street robberies of foot traffic between 14h00 and 20h00. Paydays are part of crime trends, where community members are targeted by criminals; different constituencies get paid on different days (for example, on 15th of the month teachers are paid, on 25th & end of the month normal workers and the first three days of the month, those who receive grants).

Site B CPF & NHW

Site B also patrols at similar times but as a large NHW it will patrol in larger groups of 10 to 20 people. The larger the group patrolling, the safer the members feel as they protect each other on patrols.

Harare CPF & NHW

Harare NHWs patrol in the morning from 05h00, assisting scholars and workers around the transport interchanges and at night from 21h00 to 03h00. Their busiest days are between Thursday to Sunday.

Resources & Equipment

A Lingelethu-West representative mentioned they receive a stipend of R120 per shift (from 21h00 to 04h00); this stipend is paid not from DOCS but the City of Cape Town (CoCT). This is one of the challenges where the CoCT develops a relationship with a NHW and DOCS is not aware of it; creating a conflict of interests. Some of the resources that the NHWs receive include safety boots, reflective vests, flashlights, batons, and two-way radios linked to the nearest police station. The resources issued are not consistent from one NHW to another as Site B received bicycles for patrolling and an office container (vacant and hardly used as they use one of the offices in the building) whilst Harare has a challenge securing an office space.

The CoCT also gave Site B's NHWs jackets but were not enough for their members and are still waiting for others. Harare on the other hand received resources from DOCS and VPPU; 2 bicycles (their value was questioned as only two members will be using them) and the 30 vests given were not enough for their NHW. The training received by the Lingelethu-West NHWs was reportedly conducted at the Chrysalis academy for 5 days. The Harare group has not been trained and are waiting for their two-day training from DOCS, Site B received 3 days from DOCS. The inconsistency of training is also questioned.

Relationships

Some positive relationships have been built in Khayelitsha especially between the SAPS Station Commander and the CPF Cluster Head (oversees the three CPFs). As a result of the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry the SAPS Joints Forum was formed, with the primary goal of improving relations between the community and the police and also assist in bringing issues to the fore and encourage collective responses that are mutually supportive. In particular, it was found that the Harare CPF has a good relationship with SAPS, as they help in mobilising the community for Imbizos and assist with distributing information letters to community members. Site B and Lingelethu-West each have office containers on the grounds of SAPS and from time to time make use of vacant offices and boardroom for meetings and administrative purposes.

Yet, there have been concerns raised about clarity of roles between CPFs and SAPS leading to trust issues and transparency challenges. These are revealed when SAPS deals directly with the community without informing or consulting with CPFs or when they speak to sub-forums/NHWs directly. An emphasis was made by NHWs/CPFes on the need for a harmonious relationship between the community, SAPS and DOCS.

Success has come in a way of organising soccer tournaments (working with youth to give them a sport day) and community events. This is so as to reduce the opportunities for youths to participate in illegal activities (such as stealing or drug use). In many respects when incidents occur; community members would rather call the CPF/Chair instead of the police station believing that they will get a quicker response.

The research found that DOCS works closely with CPFs, but the relationship at times has been strained due to DOCS not having enough capacity to support CPFs and limited resources to cater for NHWs. This in turn creates internal struggles between NHWs and CPFs where CPFs are accused to be pocketing resources and seen as barriers for NHWs to receive stipends. The positive interactions that DOCS has with CPFs and NHWs are demonstrated through DOCS providing assistance with coordinating CPF committees for projects; induction workshops for NHWs; financing CPFs on community projects (CPFes have to report to DOCS on any funded projects and provide slips, the funds are deposited in the CPF account that is monitored by CPF executives); arranging training for new NHWs at Chrysalis Academy and the issuing of equipment to NHWs (such as, as mentioned, reflectors jackets, bibs, torches, safety boots etc.). In general the relationship with DOCS involves monthly reports (what is happening in the community) that are recounted by NHWs/Sub-forums and compiled by CPFs, minutes of crime reports, the receipt of monthly stipends, and the provision of resources (such as bicycles for patrolling and a small office container for instance). In terms of the training received from DOCS (which may vary from three to five days) it includes training on disciplinary matters, physical training and training around legal issues (obligations that the CPF have as per Constitution and how to deal with apprehending citizens and reporting incidents to

SAPS). DOCS has a representative who attends weekly CPF meetings and gives feedback on any developments by DOCS. This is one of the roles that CPFs view DOCS should be playing being a secretariat.

CPFs relationships with other organisations in the community happen on a mutual needs base approach (example request for counselling or dealing with drug addicts, substance abuse and youth challenges). More faith based organisations and NGOs are reported to be working with CPFs.

Concerns & Challenges

Some of the difficulties identified by the research in relation to DOCS are that it has been claimed that DOCS does not provide support or assistance to CPFs with respect to their budgets and expenditures on operational items. CPFs want to be empowered on administration processes and a more hands-on approach from DOCS. At times, greater assistance is received from the CoCT which also runs projects in Khayelitsha and gives stipends to NHWs (for example during long holidays and the festive season). CPF representatives insist that CoCT and DOCS must define their roles when assisting them so that there is clarity on reporting structures. CPFs have an impression of being undermined and threatened when CoCT or DOCS work directly with the NHWs/Sub-forums. This is the trend that is observed in Khayelitsha: CPFs want to have the ultimate say in community safety, leaving NHWs dependent on them.

An interesting finding emanating from the research is that CPFs have no relationship with private security companies operating in Khayelitsha, despite the fact that there are a number of these companies in the area. Their main services are asset protection, buildings security (break-ins and vandalism) and money protection in transit. NHWs proposed that vetting of volunteers must happen in advance before they patrol, as there may be elements of criminals or 'skollies' posing as volunteers and patrolling with NHWs.

The research found that there are a number of everyday challenges that are faced by the CPFs and/or NHWs. These challenges include for instance, administrative issues (such as writing of reports and minutes); transport issues (in terms of requiring

assistance from SAPS for movement around dedicated areas at night); space issues (in terms of not having their own offices); relationships with others (in terms of the trust and transparency issues that occur between the CPFs and SAPS for instance). CPFs have been proposing a funding proposal for themselves and the unemployed NHWs but expressed that DOCS has not considered it for more than 10 years.

All in all the biggest challenge faced by the CPFs/NHWs in Khayelitsha are the levels of unemployment that create unfounded expectation necessities for NHWs stipends to assist or they leave. Lingeletu-West started with 50 volunteers and now approximately 30 with 10 who are active. Harare is increasing with 200 registered members but only Sector 4 is consistent with their night and day patrols.

For instance, it was reported that the CoCT does not have enough funds to provide regular stipends money and only offer a stipend to NHWs during special occasions and holiday projects. Furthermore, when local government offers paid positions most NHWs feel cheated as they are not able to get these positions. The requirements tend to be complex; for example a Grade 12 certificate and a driver's licence for instance. This excludes most volunteers who would have applied for the positions because they are already doing the job but do not have the qualifications required.

Another challenge is the lack of basic resources and finances to support their activities – with for instance, one of the CPFs not having space, furniture, computers or phones. The challenge that was mentioned is gaining access to finances. In the last year, for instance, Harare CPF had not completed their reports for DOCS, and therefore their CPF has not been paid. There were complaints about the EPP (Expanded Partnership Project) report being too big (more than 20 pages) and the fact that these reports have to be submitted by the 7th of every month. Some of the reporting they have to do is the evaluation of the stations, attendance of meetings, registering of members, and conducting five day and five night visits to the police station. Furthermore, most CPFs have dedicated individuals but the groups need people with strong administrative and project management skills; administrative work is a challenge for most CPFs and the monthly report is too big to complete.

Another particular challenge unique to Khayelitsha is that CPFs are seen as political profiling platforms – this is a strategy that many political parties use to rally citizens through the use of the CPF office. One faith leader mentioned, “NHW are not effective, the funds they receive go to politicking or for their own abuse”. In effect, politics plays a big part in shaping what happens in the community and most events organised by government officials are seen as DA campaigns and are not well attended, and if they are, people come for refreshments and do not participate. Another official representing MURP mentioned, “everyone has an agenda when it comes to CPFs”; “many political parties use CPF members to rally citizens for their own purposes”. Politics should not be part of CPFs as it tends to undermine the cohesive response to crime and safety issues in the area. This relates in part to the relationship between the NHWs and CPFs. As mentioned, in Khayelitsha there is an inherited hierarchical relationship between CPFs (managing role) and NHW (reporting role), which has left most NHWs dependent on CPFs and limits the role of NHWs in the community; particularly if CPFs serve as gatekeepers over resource distribution because they have political alignments.

There are significant challenges that remain pertinent in the context of Khayelitsha, and require sincere and coordinated responses from multiple stakeholders. In light of these challenges there are certain expectations from CPFs and NHWs with respect to the receipt of stipends and remuneration, as well as expectations that each SAPS station should appoint a dedicated individual to serve in each CPF. Internal conflicts of personal and organisational and political ladder in Khayelitsha hinder positive initiatives for the greater community.

With respect to DOCS there were desires expressed that DOCS should implement and initiate more projects in the community and get the assistance of the community to roll it out. Similarly, DOCS must change its strategy of working in the community – currently it seems that they need to be seen to be doing something through meetings, forums and so forth (their consultative measures). When asked what it has done ‘on the ground’, there is nothing to show. However, it was felt that they must strengthen organisations that are presently focusing on community safety or wishing to embark

on safety initiative and upskill them to fulfil their mandates and therefore everyone wins.

In addition, timeous feedback from DOCS on progress of projects initiated and workshops held is important in order to have the community engage with them when they return. “DOCS must be the enabler and communities’ implementers”, stated one faith organisation leader. He also mentioned that street committees are more effective than NHWs (they focus on smaller areas that concern the immediate community or houses) and must collaborate with CPFs/NHWs on safety initiatives.

The fundamental needs of the CPFs/NHWs were also identified including the need for more resources:

- Office administration equipment: computers(training), furniture, telephones, copy/fax machines;
- Administrative skills: minutes & report writing, basic Microsoft skills, how to process information)
- Patrolling tools: 2-way radios for groups, reflective bibs, torches, batters;
- Clothing/uniform to suite climate conditions (seasonal and day changes), they cited examples of uniforms worn by SAPS;
- Transport: night transport, bicycles with lights;
- Insurance: funeral plans or compensation packages for injuries sustained on duty;
- More extensive training.

In terms of the latter, the CPFs expressed the desire for SAPS to provide training, in the belief that this training would be tougher and more rigorous than DOCS training. There was thus recommendations that the types of training offered could include theoretic training (on the legislation and interpretation of the Constitution); administrative process information); project and event co-ordination; leadership training; community mobilising skills and understanding roles of other players in the community; as well as more physical training. The inconsistency of number of training days provided by DOCS (two, three or five days) was also identified as

problematic, causing friction amongst CPF/NHW members as those with less days trained felt inferior.

5.3. LAVENDER HILL

Lavender Hill has significant and systemic criminal problems related to gangsterism. It has also witnessed numerous community policing changes. While in the past there were numerous NHWs operating in Lavender Hill, most of these have ceased to operate. Many stopped functioning because of the dangers of patrolling in this high crime environment – particular following the high numbers of shootings in 2013/2014. For a long time there were no NHWs functioning in Lavender Hill. Today there are three NHWs functioning to some extent in the area. One is registered and patrolling, and one is currently under registration and patrolling, and one is registered but is not patrolling any longer.

The first of these, Southern Eye Neighbourhood Watch, is chaired by a local resident who started the NHW in response to someone jumping over her fence. There are roughly 60 homes in Southern Hills, the area wherein the group operates, and the chairperson says that every one of them has at one time been burgled. The chairperson was frustrated by the fact that community members were not talking to each other about this, or working together to address this. She wrote an article in the local paper in early 2015 complaining that the police were non-responsive. Following from this, a decision was made to start a NHW in their community.

In April 2015 they held their first meeting and started patrolling. At that point, they had received no training or equipment. At those initial patrols, patrollers carried baseball bats and sticks. Despite this, according to the chairperson, after only two patrols they could already see a difference. While there had previously been many suspected criminals walking on their streets between 01h00 and 03h00, this had largely stopped on patrol nights.

Soon after their establishment, SAPS helped them to formally set up the NHW and to register with DOCS. A representative from SAPS took their fingerprints, helped them complete the required forms, and delivered this to DOCS. In May 2015, DOCS

provided them with training. DOCS also gave them some equipment – however they report that there was hardly any equipment given. Members of the group feel frustrated by this. They say that they have repeatedly been promised additional equipment, yet this has never been issued. Southern Eye NHW has about 50 members, with a fairly equal gender split.

Southern Eye is currently active in patrolling. They patrol a relatively small area – around four city blocks in size. They patrol mainly in the formal housing area, where most of their members reside. While a few people in their group live in the informal settlements, they do not venture into it for safety reasons. When the patrol group crosses a particular field that is closer to the gang blocks, some members who feel afraid remain behind, standing at the far other end of the field, where they can still watch the others as they walk across it. This field is a key site of concern, as shootings frequently take place there. The chairperson's vision is to convert this field into a play hub and flea market, which has holding points for the NHW on it. Southern Eye NHW is trying to broaden their patrol area; however they are doing this slowly.

When they go on patrols they tend to split the group into two – ensuring there are at least ten people in each group. They try to keep changing the days, times and routes of the patrols. The NHW places a team at two strategic hotspots from 05h00 to 08h00 – a high-risk time for crime, as people are robbed on their way to work. During the night, they patrol between 20h00 and 22h00, three times a week – on different days each week. They also hold patrols between 01h00 and 03h00, three days a week. On Friday, Saturday and Sunday they have around 28 people on a foot patrol.

As a matter of principle the group does not engage with the gangs. They will not engage until they have the necessary skills and personnel to do this safely. Lucinda is adamant that they are not putting their members' lives at risk. Their patrols pass around or near to gang territory, yet do not actually cross into the gang's blocks. Rather, they restrict themselves to guarding the streets they live on, not moving into the gang's locations to disrupt their efforts.

The members of the group communicate by way of a WhatsApp group and Zello – a two-way radio application for smartphones. The SAPS representative allocated to assist them is also on their WhatsApp group. The chairperson complains about the fact that they do not have radios to use on patrols, although they were promised these. The group uses bulk SMS to communicate with community members. They have publicly promoted their NHW in the local newspaper. They plan to create a Facebook page. They have branded the group with four orange lights and bibs. At this point they are still waiting to receive uniforms.

Southern Eye NHW struggles with funding. Members of the group feel they should be given incentives or stipends for their participation – required by them, as many of their members are unemployed. As they have no core funding they have to find people to sponsor their various activities.

Beyond patrolling, Southern Eye NHW conducts a range of other activities. Many of these are aimed at building camaraderie between members. For example, they hold family evenings for the NHW. The first event was a ‘father’s evening’, to acknowledge the fathers of the community – and in particular the 27 men of their NHW, who they feel serve as mentors to community men, promoting positive messages around masculinity. Their second event was a ‘family boerewors roll day’. They also have social evenings for members, such as a group visit to a jazz club in Cape Town. On Fridays they have ‘Oppie Koffie’, where they sit around a fire, building up the team. The chairperson is of the belief that debriefs are crucial for the group – and Oppie Koffie and other activities serve as unofficial debriefs. She explains that as they work in a “traumatised context”, introducing social elements into the neighbourhood watch helps to alleviate trauma. As no stipends are provided to members, the biggest benefits of membership are friendship and community building and as such, they take these activities seriously.

In terms of governance, there are a number of steps that the NHW still needs to take. They hold a meeting once a month for all members, and minutes of the meeting are recorded. They have yet to hold an AGM – at the time of conducting this research this had not yet been held, yet was being planned. The group still needs to adopt a

constitution – the one they are currently using comes from other NHWs, but is tweaked slightly. The group has created its own operational procedures and guidelines. They also have a disciplinary code and a code of ethics. When they have conflicts within the group, they call group members together to talk about it – however beyond this, there are no official systems in place for resolving group conflicts.

The group has allocated roles and functions to specific members of the NHW. Aside from the chairperson, the group has two patrol leaders, responsible for scheduling patrols and reporting after each patrol. They have a secretary and a deputy secretary. They also have a treasurer for fundraising, and someone who takes care of logistics.

They are documenting the NHW's efforts as they go along; however it is too early to conduct a proper evaluation. They are considering conducting an evaluation appraisal in October 2015. The chairperson explains that she has developed a multi-year strategy and business plan for NHWs in Lavender Hill. Her dream is for there to be ten NHWs in the area within three years.

The second of the Watches, Thunderbolt Neighbourhood Watch operates around Village Heights, one of Lavender Hill's informal settlements. While Thunderbolt is still registered as a NHW, they are not currently patrolling. The SAPS sector manager was under the impression that this group was no longer active, however they claim they are still active, albeit in alternative ways. While they do not patrol any longer, they still have 'street committees', which watch what is happening in the area and report it. People in the area continue to inform the Thunderbolt's chairperson when robberies take place, in order that she can contact the police with this information. These tasks, she explains, all constitute tasks of a functioning NHW.

Thunderbolt NHW stopped patrolling as a result of violence in the area, and in particular after one of their members was killed by gangsters. They do not know if this killing was relating to the member's involvement with the NHW. Following the killing, they continued to patrol for a while, yet started doing fewer and fewer patrols, until they eventually stopped patrolling in 2014. Members of the group reportedly felt

endangered. They stopped patrolling, as they were not provided police coverage during patrols, so were doing dangerous patrols on their own.

SAPS reportedly tried to revive Thunderbolt's patrols by calling a meeting with them, but no one came to the meeting. The chairperson says that they are considering patrolling again; however they would want to do it differently this time. If they restart, they would not patrol as wide an area as they did before. Instead of patrolling, she would prefer them to stand around fires – her plan is that they will split the group, select three spots in which to build fires, and stand around them, keeping guard. The chairperson emphasises that if they do not receive assistance from SAPS, they will not go on patrol.

Thunderbolt NHW was run and staffed mainly by women. Back when they were actively patrolling they had 20 women and four men. When they went on patrols, the whole group patrolled together – they did not split up into groups. They would patrol between 08h00 and 18h00 on Fridays and Saturdays. They patrolled a much larger area than the other two current NHWs.

The third of the Watches, Supreme Neighbourhood Watch is a new neighbourhood watch, currently in the process of being registered. A representative from SAPS recently took fingerprints from them and submitted their paperwork. Although they are not yet officially registered, they are already patrolling – however, they cannot get official SAPS permission to patrol as a NHW until their registration is complete. At the time of writing this report, they had been patrolling for almost three months.

The group was started in response to three break-ins in the area. The head of the group explains that when they located the perpetrator, they “gave him the hiding of his life”. Following from that, the NHW was started. While the group's chair acknowledges that this was not the correct way to deal with a perpetrator, his view is that, “If you come with violence against me, I'll react with violence.” This raises an important point about the levels of violence some NHWs employ in their efforts – and the need for regulation and oversight of this.

In October 2015 Supreme NHW was due to receive DOCS training for its members. This will be the first training that they receive. At the time of writing, they had not received any equipment, so they were patrolling carrying batons, torches and golf sticks – all items that they could source themselves. They expected to be given more equipment following the training.

Supreme NHW has 27 active members. 20 are women and seven are men. They also have two youths in the group – aged 12 and 13.

The group patrols a small area located between two schools – an area of about 500 metres squared. SAPS have told them that they cannot expand to a larger territory, until people from those areas join their group. The group is on duty every night. Much of their time they stand around a fire. They patrol for an hour, then rest, standing in the road to keep guard. During the week, this takes place from 20h00 to 24h00; on weekends this normally takes place between 20h00 to 03h00 – but sometimes runs throughout the night.

The area they patrol is made up of formal housing. They have gang blocks on either side of their territory. The gangs purportedly fight, shoot at each other and run through the territory they live in, meaning that for them encounters with the gangs are unavoidable. Their differing approach to dealing with gangsters is discussed below.

Lavender Hill falls under the auspices of the Steenberg CPF. Steenberg CPF is responsible for several ‘sectors’, with a range of communities falling under it – including upper middle class suburbs, middle class neighbourhoods and lower income communities. Steenberg CPF is responsible for four sectors; Heathfield, Retreat, Steenberg and Lavender Hill. Lavender Hill is “Sector 4”. The CPF falls within the Steenberg Policing Precinct Area.

Steenberg CPF is the controlling body for the various ‘sub-forums’ in the area – known as ‘CPF sector forums’. These are described as “mini-CPFs”. Members of the CPF are asked not to bring up issues at the CPF plenary meeting, until these have first been discussed at sector-forum level. Only the pressing issues arising at the sector

forums that cannot be properly dealt with at sector level, are reported to the CPF plenary and dealt with there. The NHWs in the area attend the sector forums, as well as the CPF plenary. Sector forum meetings are a SAPS-driven initiative – following from these, the SAPS sector commander must report to the SAPS commander about developments and issues in each area. Lavender Hill was the first sub-forum to exist, however, this sub-forum is not running anymore – reportedly because of a lack of resources to keep it going.

The CPF plenary holds monthly meetings, held at the Steenberg police station. As part of these meetings they have sector report backs – where the sectors present reports on what is going on in their areas. They also hear reports from the NHWs in the area.

The CPF executive (ExCo) meets the week before the plenary meeting. The Steenberg ExCo is made up of a chairperson, deputy chairperson, a treasurer, a secretary, a project manager and certain additional members. Members of the ExCo are elected. In the past, ExCo members were voted in for two-year terms, however, this has been extended to five years, in line with other government election periods. The elections for the CPF is run by SAPS – however, they can choose to get the Independent Election Committee to assist with this, if they require it.

As with the NHWs described above, the success of the CPF largely comes down to the leader. The former chairperson of the Steenberg CPF served in that capacity for ten years – and now works as a ward councillor in the area. There is a newly appointed chairperson. A few people spoke of the differences between them, and the ways this had affected the running of the CPF. The previous chairperson ran the CPF as a full-time activity. He was called ‘highly involved’ and ‘vociferous’. He regularly attended police management meetings and frequently engaged with SAPS. He had a good relationship with the police and in particular, with the SAPS station commissioner – something he credits the CPF’s success with. The new chairperson on the other hand works as a schoolteacher during the day, and his participation is limited by this. For example, he cannot miss school to take part in SAPS meetings and activities during the working day.

Interestingly midway through conducting this research, the chairperson from Southern Eye joined the Steenberg CPF ExCo, further linking her group to the CPF. This created some negative feelings from other NHWs, who complained about the transparency of her appointment and possible favouritism towards her group by the CPF – discussed later.

Other members of the CPF plenary come from organisations in the areas. The CPF is made up of nominated organisations, rather than nominated individuals. When organisations apply to be members, SAPS screens and approves them. The number of member organisations has fluctuated over the years. Ideally they would want as many organisations as possible, from as broad a segment of the community as possible. In the past there have been up to 25 organisations. Recently there have only been 12 member organisations. The former CPF chair explained that in periods when the crime rate is higher, more organisations tend to become involved, but when crime goes down, organisational members tend to dissipate. Some NGOs, civic associations and church groups also attend the CPF plenary, however, these types of groups are not too well attended in this area. Organisations send between one to three representatives to CPF plenary meetings, so meetings might have up to 20 individuals participating.

The NHWs in the area report to the CPF about the situations in their locations – reporting, for example, on crime hotspots. In turn, the NHWs can request CPF assistance in addressing problems. For example, if NHWs are struggling to get SAPS to join them on patrols, the CPF might intervene with SAPS to help bring about a resolution. Joint patrols with SAPS and NHWs are frequently discussed at CPF plenary meetings.

Largely the Steenberg CPF is sustained by members' own funds. Individuals in the CPF tend to use their own vehicles, petrol, cell phones and phone credit in running the CPF. They are fortunate in Steenberg, as many of the ExCo members are relatively well off or self-resourced – meaning they have access to things like Internet and phones, which might not be available in other CPFs. The fact that they have personal

resources has meant they can sustain themselves with little external assistance – meaning more independence. The Steenberg CPF had some funds in their account – mostly those that come from DOCS for filling out forms and monitoring SAPS (estimated at around R40,000) – yet they hardly touch these funds. At one point DOCS funding fell away, yet they report this did not really impact them, as they had enough funds to keep the CPF going. All CPF work is voluntary and no one is compensated for their time. When asked why people join, the chairman answered:

“...because of a sense of responsibility. It’s a special group of people.”

The Steenberg CPF uses the government legislated standard-form constitution. When the CPFs began operating they all had different constitutions, but this was found to be problematic. At one point, the Western Cape Constitution was reportedly in conflict with the national one. It was decided that it was important that there be consistency – primarily because CPFs fell under SAPS. So as part of an inclusive process a standard constitution was created for all CPFs. The Steenberg CPF holds an AGM each year. Over the next five years the AGM will be for information purposes only, rather than for elections – as they recently held elections. To the chairperson’s knowledge, they do not have regulations for the CPF or an SOP document.

As well as typical CPF activities, the Steenberg CPF also holds other activities. Together with SAPS they host a sporting event, open to all NHWs in the area – aimed at building camaraderie between SAPS, the CPF and NHWs. The Steenberg CPF will soon start an ‘assisted learnership scheme’. Young people will apply for this scheme, be screened, before being taken on by the CPF. The CPF will provide them with training and administrative experience – such as minute and note taking – in exchange for which the CPF will receive administrative support.

When asked about whether the Steenberg CPF has been successful in curbing crime, the former chairperson explained that this has varied between the different areas. Sector One has had a significant dip in crime, with their NHW being highly effective. In contrast, Lavender Hill (Sector Four) has been less successful. This sector struggled and its CPF sub-forum waned. As explanation for this, one of the problems

in Lavender Hill is the personalities involved – “people don’t trust each other”. The former chairperson explains that there is an attitude that, “because you are in charge, I don’t want to support you.”

When asked about what the Steenberg CPF is doing about the current outbreak of violence and shooting in Lavender Hill, a CPF member explained that there is not much the CPF can do, other than liaise with SAPS and raise questions about their response. In this recent outbreak, SAPS has assured them that relevant police clusters have been sent reinforcements from other SAPS stations.

There are many resources that Lavender Hill’s NHWs require, which they feel would assist them in better performing their roles. Of these the primary concerns revolve around equipment and funding.

With regards to the first, all the NHWs in Lavender Hill complained about a lack of equipment. Many feel angry with DOCS, who they claim promised them equipment, yet failed to deliver. They explain that too little equipment has been provided. As a NHW member exclaimed:

“Three torches for the entire neighbourhood watch is not enough!”

Sometimes the equipment provided is not good quality. Many described bicycles donated by the City, which were in such bad condition that they could not be repaired.

The CPF members were concerned about the fact that equipment provided to NHWs did not remain with them for long, or were lost and wasted when NHWs ceased operating:

“You find people walking around in a neighbourhood watch jacket who have never been in a neighbourhood watch.”

The CPF is supposed to be accountable for equipment provided to NHWs by DOCS. NHWs are supposed to provide an inventory of equipment to the CPF – yet they often

do not do this. The last time equipment was distributed to NHWs in Lavender Hill was two years ago, when the Minister visited there. The secretary of the Steenberg CPF noted:

“They just handed it to every Tom, Dick and Harry – and now they are holding the CPF responsible for this equipment. How can they hold the CPF responsible for equipment that they did not entrust them with?”

Given how little is provided by DOCS, for the most part, members of NHWs have to pay for their own equipment or conduct fundraising drives. Many feel that this is unfair.

The following is equipment that Lavender Hill’s NHW requested:

- Patrolling equipment: torches, truncheons, pepper spray
- Protective equipment: people would like bulletproof vests before they go into the ‘hot’ areas of the ganglands
- Communication equipment: radios. Currently many of the groups use WhatsApp or Zello on their smartphones. However, the point was raised that using phones on patrols might make them targets of crime, by those who wish to steal their phones.
- Vehicles: bicycles, motorised bikes
- First-aid kits
- Warmth: combat boots, warmer jackets
- Clothing: Hanover Park’s Ceasefire explained how important branded clothing can be to the success of these types of operations. Ceasefire’s members wear red tracksuits and blue body warmers, and people recognise them by these, keeping them safe and allowing them to fulfil their roles.
- Holding area: In the winter, the groups have no holding place. If it is raining, they cannot patrol, as they have nowhere to go for shelter. They would like to build holding areas in their patrol zones.

With regards to monetary concerns, these may further be divided into the following notable issues:

- ‘Petty-cash’ funds: NHWs require funds for small things – like milk or sandwiches for those on patrols. They feel they should not have to use their own money for these things.
- Insurance cover for family: There is currently no insurance for those in NHWs. If people are hurt in the line of neighbourhood watch duties, nothing will be provided to their families. In fact a representative from the NHW expressed concern about losing his existing insurance for taking part in a NHW, as the insurance company might frame this as him putting himself in harm’s way. In the past the Steenberg CPF engaged with DOCS and SAPS about arranging insurance coverage for NHW members. NHWs in Lavender Hill have also advocated to the police and CPF about burial cover for members, yet they have not heard back from them about this.
- Incentives/stipends: Many interviewees in Lavender Hill thought those serving in NHWs should be incentivised with stipends. Another option to a monetary stipend is a grocery hamper. Many of those in Lavender Hill’s NHWs are unemployed, so stipends or incentives would really be helpful to them. An interviewee noted, “We are also doing the police’s work. If they get a salary, we should at least get a stipend.” Another interviewee conceded that it must be a stipend – not a salary, “because the passion must still be there at the end of the day.” The point was raised that as they are not being paid, NHWs have no incentive to not use violence.

Interviewees did acknowledge that payment/stipend options might be open to abuse. A different concern expressed was that if paid, NHWs would become like ‘security agencies’, who are paid to protect and who take on guarding and protection jobs for money, a result that can be problematic.

DOCS provides training to NHWs, teaching them the basics of how to run a NHW and how to patrol properly. There are mixed reports about the DOCS training. Most agree its standard is sufficient. The problem, they say, is that the trainings mostly consist of workshops and lectures, rather than being a practical training – which is what NHW members need. They say the content of the training should be made more relevant to the specific context trainees operate in – prior to training, content should

be tailored to specific contexts. One NHW member recalled that the DOCS facilitator was not too strong, and that the trainers had a fight in front of them. People suggested that SAPS should be included in presenting trainings.

However, more than the quality of the training, people felt the quantity was a problem. Almost all interviewees felt that *more* training was needed. The training currently provided by DOCS is about a week's long training – taking place over two weekends. This was felt to be insufficient. NHW members felt that they did not have enough information and skills following the training, to be able to adequately deal with the situations they found themselves in. A different problem raised was that DOCS does not give them enough notice for the training. People need advanced notice in order that they can prepare their schedules for this.

There are many skills for which Lavender Hill's NHW members say they would like to receive training. These include the following:

- Conflict resolution and conflict management
- How to work at roadblocks
- 'Stop and search' training. (Others were of the opinion that providing this would be problematic, as it would encourage NHWs to carry out searches they are not legally permitted to run.)
- Training on the law and on court procedure
- Law enforcement training – akin to police training
- Safeguarding of crime scenes
- First aid training (in particular, they need to be able to deal with stabbings and fractures, as they are often the first on the scene)
- Self-defence training
- Reporting and administrative skills
- Trauma response

While DOCS provides training to all NHWs, the City of Cape Town also provides a NHW training, called 'Broken Windows.' However, they only give this training to certain NHW – and the decision of who will receive this is said to be highly political. There was animosity by those who had not been provided the City's training. More

generally, the point was repeatedly raised, that training of NHWs has become politicised – with disputes between the national government and the City of Cape Town interfering with people’s training needs. Both DOCS and the City issue equipment to those they have trained, making the question of who receives training, all the more contentious.

CPF members would like training on the following:

- Working at police stations
- Training on administrative skills
- Training on management
- Training on how to better conduct EPP – including data capture and accumulation
- Trauma counselling

SAPS’ approach to fighting gangsterism is called ‘Operation Combat’. This aims to take down high-ranking gangsters in the Western Cape and to prosecute them under the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA). SAPS’s approach to fighting gangs has four pillars:

- Intelligence-driven information: Questioning whether police have the right informants in the right places.
- Project-driven gang investigations: Suspects are identified and targeted with multiple investigations, so they are investigated in a number of cases, not just one.
- Strategic approach to visible policing: particularly in hotspots or in areas where gangs are known to be doing their business.
- Community mobilisation: Working out how to counter the gang’s influences, with the education and social services playing a part in this.²⁹

Not all support the police’s approach to ensuring safety in the ganglands. One interviewee noted that, ‘officialdom’ has a forceful approach, “They use the army, raids, police, shutting things down.” The names of operations have a military style,

²⁹ <http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/fighting-cape-flats-gangs-1.1793744#.VZqXkaaieGQ>

such as ‘Operation Combat’. However, it has been asserted that their strategy to win the war is questionable.

Many allege that the gangs collaborate with the police, colluding with them and paying them off. It has become difficult for police to successfully conduct gang raids, as police tip off gang members about these. The police involved in gang raids have to hide their dockets and raiding schedules, in order to prevent tip offs. An interviewee noted that the police are badly paid, badly trained and often have bad leadership, all facilitating collusion with gangs. Put differently, the police are “leaky as hell.”

People in Lavender Hill do not trust the police. The relationship between the population and the police is antagonistic – with them criticising the police for not doing enough. The problem is that the police cannot do anything in Lavender Hill without community support, which they are not receiving. Seen from the police’s viewpoint, if people will not talk to the police, the police cannot properly protect them. The CPF and NHWs are supposed to work with SAPS to improve the relationship between the community and the police, and ultimately, to help them better combat crime.

One of the Steenberg CPF’s key roles is to monitor and support SAPS. The Steenberg CPF liaises with SAPS regularly. There are “open lines of communication” between them and their relationship is purportedly very good. Interviewees agreed that SAPS in Steenberg are receptive to the CPF.

The CPF feeds information to SAPS about what is going on in the various areas; about crime, hotspots, suspicious drug trade and other problems. In turn SAPS passes relevant information to the CPF; about crime in the areas and what is being done to combat it. This creates a two-way information flow. The CPF advises SAPS about problems the NHWs are facing. If NHWs request police presence on patrols and the police do not arrive, the CPF should follow up as to why.

The Acting Station Commander at Steenberg works with the CPF. SAPS representatives are supposed to attend all CPF meetings – plenary and sub-forum.

Interviewees report that SAPS representatives normally attend the CPF meeting, but not always. The SAPS commander in turn invites the CPF chairperson to SAPS management meetings. While the former CPF chair used to attend, the new chairperson cannot, as these are held during the daytime while he is at his day job.

The CPF monitors the police and its performance in the area. SAPS provides the CPF with statistics from its monthly work. A standard item at CPF meetings is reviewing and interrogating police reports. However, in addition to addressing problems at the CPF meetings, the CPF also deals with complaints more informally as they arise.

CPF representatives conduct a monthly monitoring visit to Steenberg police station – checking on things like police cells, visitations and staff. They report on this to DOCS, in exchange for which they are provided with funds of up to R3500 per month. Where they identify problems at the police station, they work to solve, with the aim of making the police station more welcoming to the public. For example, in Steenberg they cut the grass at the police station to make it look more welcoming. For years the Steenberg police station had a fence with holes in it, so the CPF became involved to resolve the problem.

The Steenberg CPF tries to encourage and incentivise SAPS officers in their area. They have created awards for police officers, conferred annually, where they hold a function and provide trophies for well-done police work. The CPF provides support to programmes the police arrange in the area. Where necessary, they help the police raise funds for things they need, as police cannot fundraise themselves.

NHWs are not supposed to patrol without a police escort. However, in practice they often do, as police escorts are frequently unavailable.

A Warrant Officer is the SAPS officer allocated to the NHWs in Lavender Hill. He is quite ‘hands on’ and is said to be very helpful to those in the local NHWs. He is invested in the NHWs and views them as being helpful to him. Members of NHWs have his mobile phone number and can call him if there are problems. There are four SAPS sector managers in the area, each of whom are allocated a weekend each month

to assist the NHWs – and on their allocated weekends they patrol with the groups. Interviewees noted that when the Warrant Officer is on duty, SAPS is helpful, yet when he is not on duty, the police hardly assist them.

Of all of the NHWs, Southern Eye felt the police to be the most supportive. The Warrant Officer often patrols with Southern Eye, either as a SAPS representative or in his personal capacity when he is not on duty. He also joins them on patrol about twice a month. He has a good personal relationship with the Southern Eye chairperson, as they went to school together. This raises a problem voiced by others – that SAPS support can be personality driven.

If NHWs run into problems on their patrols, they should call the police for back up. However, many interviewees complained about the level of backup they receive. A representative from Supreme NHW recalled how one night armed gang members had threatened their patrol. They called the police, who took over an hour to arrive. During that hour, they also approached the gang leader, who reportedly responded immediately to cool the situation. One problem arising from the police's slow response time is that they cannot conduct searches of suspicious people – meaning when they see a person with guns or drugs they are powerless. Someone from Thunderbolt explained:

“If you stop and search someone, and call the police, it would take them two or three hours to arrive. You can’t just hold the guys for that long.”

People in Lavender Hill's NHWs feel the support they are provided from SAPS is insufficient for the services they offer as volunteers. As someone said:

“Why must they put their lives at risk when there is nothing to cover them at the end of the day?”

Of course, many of the problems are not due to SAPS unwillingness to help, but rather, to SAPS' limited resources. SAPS reportedly has one vehicle (two persons)

per 45,000 people in the area. With so few men and vehicles, they simply cannot be in all of the places in Lavender Hill when they are needed.

NHWs are supposed to provide information about crime to SAPS. However, sharing information with SAPS can be problematic, and they might be stigmatised for working with the police. Doing so can even put their lives at risk, bringing retribution from the gangs for colluding with police. People told anecdotal tales of how even talking to the police – saying ‘hello’ to them – could lead to trouble from the gangs, or to blame for “bringing the police to the area.” Interviewees expressed concern about police tipping off gang members about reports made to them. If someone reports on the gangs to the police, the gangs are informed about this. A NHW member commented:

“We know where they [the gangs] keep the guns and everything. Who should we give this information to now seeing that we don’t know who to trust in Steenberg? How can we keep the area crime free, when the people responsible for preventing crime are involved in crime?”

Only two NHWs are currently patrolling in Lavender Hill and both of these are quite new – they only started in the months preceding the writing of this report.

An evident problem in Lavender Hill has been NHW ‘retention’. In the past there were reportedly 16 NHWs in the area, but this is down to three. Interviewees explained that some closed down because of the dangers involved, while others shut down, as they received no support from the police. A problem arising from this lack of ‘retention’ is that training and equipment provided to former NHWs are wasted.

An interesting observation about Lavender Hill’s NHWs – as well as other community safety initiatives in the area – is that these are dominated by women. Strong women lead two of the neighbourhood watches, and the majority of members are women. When asked about this, respondents answered that men are too scared to take up leadership positions in the ganglands, as this might make them targets. Another explanation is that men do not join, as they are part of the gangs. It was

explained by a NHW member that sometimes wives become upset with their husbands for patrolling in the evenings; however, overall they support this.

It is clear that the NHWs are reliant on particular individuals for their success and continuation. Both local chairpersons are strong leaders, who had been responsible for keeping their groups going. Interestingly, both of them also run other organisations within their communities – dealing with issues like domestic violence and child protection, while running their NHWs alongside these. Problematically, this reliance on particular individuals is not sustainable, and groups might quickly dwindle when those leaders are not present. In a similar vein, the NHWs' relationships with SAPS were also personality driven, with them receiving SAPS support and assistance, when there was a good personal relationship with the SAPS representative on duty at the time, yet not receiving the required support otherwise. The reliance on personal connections and a lack of coherent systems to take over when relationships are not as strong appears to be a problem.

NHWs in the Lavender Hill area do not really work together or share ideas. In fact there seemed to be some jealousy and competition between them. One member commented:

“If you treat the one neighbourhood watch better than the other neighbourhood watch, why must we still work together?”

A NHW member from Thunderbolt complained about the fact that the other NHW group had been receiving so much support lately. The interviewee wanted to know why other groups were not supported in the same way. In contrast to Thunderbolt, which is more isolated, Supreme NHW has been in touch with Southern Eye – they are on Zello and WhatsApp together, and reportedly have a good understanding between them. However, aside from this, they are not really sharing ideas and seeing how they can be of assistance to each other in their common goals.

With regards to the CPF, there were mixed views. Those working with the Steenberg CPF were very positive about their efforts, expressing the view that they have

effectively bridged the relationship between the police and the community, and have successfully resolved numerous issues. They claimed that they have engaged with relevant role-players over the years, in order to ensure that NHWs have received the support that they required.

However, not everyone felt they had been as successful – and many in the NHWs emphasised that they had *not* received the support required. Some perceived the CPF as being biased to certain groups, and not being fair to all. There were complaints that Lucinda from Southern Eye had been co-opted onto the CPF ExCo so suddenly – with comments made that there should have been a more transparent process for this. There were complaints from Thunderbolt that her group is being marginalised by the CPF. It was recalled that Thunderbolt had always used to attend CPF meetings, and were always invited, yet that recently they have not been given notice about meetings. The secretary of the Steenberg CPF responded that there is no marginalisation – the meetings are held at the same time and place each month and all are welcome to attend. He noted that when people do not come to meetings for three months, they are removed from the mailing lists – and them not receiving invitations could have been as a result of this. This illustrates the point raised in the section above, of personal ‘dramas’ becoming dominant in the running of these groups.

Despite these criticisms, the perception of the Steenberg CPF seemed far more positive than perceptions of other CPFs operating in the ganglands. For example, in Manenberg interviewees noted that, “The CPF is like a toothless tiger” or, “It’s more like they’re employed by the state, rather than being a mouthpiece for the people.” The Manenberg Safety Forum complained that they had used to provide the CPF with information, yet nothing would ever come of this, until it got to the point that they decided not to work with the CPF anymore.

“They want us to sign the documents, tick the box, and then they don’t see us again for three months.”

In contrast to Manenberg, reports about the Steenberg CPF seem relatively positive.

An issue that came up often in interviews was that CPFs have become the site of political disputes between the ANC in national government (under whom the police fall), and the DA in the province. The fight between them plays out in the CPF, disrupting their ability to do the work that they are supposed to do. A representative from the Steenberg CPF explained that the CPF is not political and they try to keep it this way. However, political people sometimes come to their meetings – often when it is politically strategic at that particular time, arriving to show their faces when gang violence has broken out.

“They come with a road show, make a lot of promises, and the promises are not kept.”

The issues reported here thus seem more systemic, administrative, and require firm leadership to resolve.

5.4. PAARL EAST

Such structures and concerns in Lavender Hill are not, for instance, equally reflected in Paarl East. The CPF has command and control of the NHWs in its jurisdiction. They decide what funding and equipment to allocate to each NHW. The CPF acts as the liaison between them and DOCS. NHWs have to register with the CPF in order to begin operating. They have to comply with the CPF’s standards, rules and regulations. Members of the NHWs usually attend the CPF meetings. Any grievances that the NHWs have are communicated to the CPF:

“We closed some of the shebeens with the help of the neighbourhood watches together with the police. Because they bring the information and we share it with the police and that’s the main thing. And we got crime rates here ... Now we are sixteen neighbourhood watches in Paarl East and Paarl East is a big area ... and we try to establish another. And I think there is Fairyland the crime rate is coming down now because there are now two neighbourhood watches there ... and now three in the red zone.”

Some of the NHW regulations listed include:

- Neighbourhood watches are to work in partnership with the CPF at all times;
- A name and address list and copy of identity document of each member affiliated to a NHW must be available at all times;
- Any equipment utilised by the NHW must be recorded and available for inspection by the CPF at all times;
- Members performing NHW duties are to have identity cards when performing duties. These cards will be issued by the CPF to the specific NHW.

As one participant noted, speaking to the relationships that had evolved between the various safety and security structures:

“You see, that is one of the problems I said. He is the social crime prevention officer, but he never work with us. He should work close with the CPF ... because according to our rules he is our sources in the police station ... But he never came to a meeting. He never wants to work with social crime with ... he wants to work on his own. You see, that is why he never came back to you [researcher].”

The Paarl East CPF does, however, have good relationships with specific members of SAPS. Overall, the forum aims to build a positive relationship with the police, being their ‘eyes and ears’. On the other hand, the CPF considers itself a watchdog, often querying the police’s actions and reporting their officers. They believe that by holding the police accountable they will get the police to do their job properly. This implies that there are members of the police they perceive to be falling short of their mandate:

“No we are working very close. If we got a problem we go to the station commander and speak about that and then we will and we will go to DOCS and tell them listen, this is not right here. And we’re working close with Paarl Cluster. Stellenbosch, Paarl Cluster ... What I can tell you here in this Paarl East station, is that the Colonel’s office is always open for people to come in and complain about the police. So we got a good understanding with the Colonel here and we got a good understanding with the Major here and also the sector managers.”

When the researcher attended one of the CPF meetings, a few issues emerged. Firstly, it was clear that crucial members of the police were not present. A senior officer had to apologise for them not being there. Secondly, there was talk that the sector managers must tell the CPF what the problem areas are in order for their members to assemble and be deployed accordingly. In so doing, this would build a relationship with the police. There was a suggestion that the CPF bestow an award for a 'police officer of the month', which they believe would incentivise the police officers. Lastly, the CPF members stated that it is crucial for the police to have more visible policing in the Paarl East area.

The CPF and the municipality seem to have a positive collaboration. The municipality offers fire-fighting training for the NHWs which is organised together with the CPF. A researcher was also told that members from the municipality attend CPF meetings:

“They came in. They are very close working with us for. They organise some food or training for the people. We are in partnership with Drakenstein Municipality as well. So we are not standing alone we are in partnership with the police and Drakenstein municipality and neighbourhood watches. So we are all part of the community.”

Many of the non-profit organisations have programmes operating in areas in Paarl East that have high crime rates. There is therefore a need for them to have a close relationship with the police in order to protect themselves. A NPO (non-profit organisation) member spoken to said that they had a positive relationship with the police. There was an incident whereby a young boy in Paarl East wanted to set his dog on one of the NPO workers to keep them away from an area. The police were called and the situation settled.

“Where we live we are part of the neighbourhood watch or we know about them and then we’ve got very good relationships with the Paarl East police ... So there’s a very good relationship between our organisation and the police. So ja, I think they ... they always getting the bad ... people are saying bad

things about the police, but I think the police force in Paarl is really trying to do their best. It's fighting a losing battle, but they really try."

Drakenstein's Community Services deals extensively with Paarl East Police. Members representing the municipality are said to attend CPF meetings. The Director of Community Services attends cluster meetings and other forums. Law enforcement (part of Traffic services) work with the police during operations such as enforcing by-laws and shutting down illegal shebeens:

"We have about 18 law enforcement officers. Also when we do operations, we do combined operations. Probably once every two months. So we would identify an area in Paarl East, where we will go and monitor the adherence to certain by-laws. And then we will sit with SAPS to go in with us and we'll do a joint operation. So I think on the communication level, there is a very good relationship ... So I would like to call the relationship very constructive and very productive."

The municipality uses private security companies to guard their sites and act as access control for some of their offices. This may imply a good working relationship. However, one of the security companies stated that the Drakenstein Municipality is often reluctant to deal them as they constantly file complaints against municipal workers with the municipality.

The municipality works closely with many NPOs in order to fulfil their mandate. The research found that there was general agreement that the municipality would not be able to fulfil their mandate if they did not have a working relationship with and support from the NPOs.

In terms of community safety in Paarl East, the municipality recently organised a Street Persons Summit, which invited a number of stakeholder NPOs, the first of its kind in the Paarl area. This was most likely arranged to discuss policy recommendations. The view from the NPOs is that more still needs to be done. A NPO member had this to say:

“I think our Drakenstein Municipality is one of a few that doesn’t have anything for the youth. Like a 24-hour drop-in centre or skills training centre for youth. We really just don’t have it. So if we would have something like that in place, where a child that drops out of the school system at 13 can’t go to Paarl School of Skills because they simply don’t have enough places, they only allow so many children per year. So the waiting lists are very long. And now this child can’t perform well enough at school, but ... he can’t come back to the normal school next year and then he falls out because he can’t go to Paarl School of Skills. Paarl School of Skills take them until they are 15 years old. So the child that drops out of 13, they not 18 yet, they can’t work, so if we have something that can help those children to teach them skills, to prepare them for the life outside of school, to prepare them. Because we can say what we want to ... some of these families still believe that the children must go out and work. So you will sit with a 15-year-old boy that’s been raised by his grandmother and she will tell him ‘you’re a loser, you whatever’, because he doesn’t earn an income. He can’t earn an income. No one wants a 15-year-old boy that dropped out of the school system in their business. So what’s going to happen with him? So if we are not going to look into that problem, we will have bigger problems then in the future. A lot of ... a lot more children will end on the street.”

Another also argued that:

“I’m very glad that last week Thursday we had our first ever ... they call it a Summit for the Street People ... So I think that might be the platform we are looking for. It’s been years since we’ve been asking for something like that. The municipality didn’t have a policy on street people at all. So we might see something now within a year just a lot ... I’m actually invited now ... to do a round table discussion on youth in our district. Which I think is wonderful because all our organisations can sit around the table and say ‘ok, but can we put a little bit more pressure on the municipality or whoever to give us a building’, or ... there’s a lot of people that can form of a plan ... it will

definitely have an impact on our community. We get we get so many reports from children that we have to follow up and by the time we hear about them, they've been out of school for six months. We can't get them back and we have no place to put them. So they just sleep outside ... they will sleep with friends on a stoep or outside in a garage or under a car. So they basically street children. You just don't see them."

The municipality plays a crucial role in servicing the community, specifically the NHWs that are comprised of the community. Drakenstein's Community Services has organised for the NHWs in Paarl East to receive specialised fire-fighting training from the fire brigade. Importantly, the municipality is one of the sources of funding for the CPF, which in turn funds the NHWs. One of the NHW members who was interviewed regularly deals with different branches of the municipality. However, it seems that the NHW has frustrations with the municipality. One of the issues was getting the municipality to increase the lighting in certain parts of the neighbourhood. For instance, there is a particular area that was shown to the researcher which is an open field that has no lighting that the members say is being used by criminals to escape the area once they've committed a crime. A second issue was that this specific NHW was having difficulty getting the information they need about the by-laws in the area:

"The other challenge that we've got is the fact that it's always a juggle between municipality, they are calling a unit there the 'wed toepasers'. Between the municipality and between the cops, they don't know who takes charge of what. We've been fighting to get access to the by-laws for instance ... There's by-laws that supposed to protect us. There are some people now will party almost every weekend during the summer. There's a by-law against noise pollution ... stuff like that man. So you see, it's all of that that comes into factoring of us being effective. To do our job."

The SAPS and the NHW should theoretically have a close relationship with one another as they both directly police the community. In theory, the NHW would be able to give information to the police of any criminal activity in the area. The best

situation would be that the NHW is protected by the police while the members go on patrol. From attendance at the CPF meetings, the research found that in fact in Paarl East there is a demand for such protection. In the 'hot spot' areas such as Fairyland and Chicago this would be ideal due to the high levels of gangsterism and violent crime. However, there are sixteen neighbourhood watches in Paarl East. The police in Paarl East suffer from high absenteeism and a lack of manpower. As it stands, it is unlikely that the NHWs would ever be able to get police escorts during their patrols. A member of the CPF asserted that the relationship that should exist between the police and the NHWs is one of information sharing. The NHWs know exactly which parties are committing crimes and where these crimes are taking place. The call is for police to acknowledge the NHW and use them to gather information on crime in the area:

“The challenges we have here is that the police must acknowledge and recognise the community and the neighbourhood watches in the area and work more closely. Because there are some of the policeman don't know the neighbourhood watches ... don't want to work with the neighbourhood watches ... So that's the main concern. The police are not actually working or recognise that there is a neighbourhood watch.”

The private security companies interviewed said that they have no working relationship with the police. As is endemic to the private security industry, they have a lot of negative things to say about the police and the work that they do. The senior member of the company, living in Paarl East, stated that he is “sick of the problems” and isn't scared to speak out against the police. He stated that he is fighting with police to hold them accountable by filing formal complaints. They expressed the old adage, shared amongst private security agents, that private security is offering services (to consumers) that police aren't prepared to pay for; there is no liability in the police; police are going from bad to worse; experienced cops are leaving; no discipline in police; poor police performance all around; and that most of the issues with community safety stem from the police. Another company interviewed were more sympathetic towards the state of the police force. The consultants stated that the police don't have the same human resources as private security and that private

security is not replacing the policing. Instead they focus on the criminal justice system being the root of the problems. Their solution to community safety as a whole is to reform the justice system as it is causing the police to struggle. Specifically, it was said that the police lose motivation when someone they catch is back on the streets two weeks later with a slap on the wrist, asking “Why would the police want to keep catching the same criminals when they see them go to court and get away with it?”

In practice, there is a relationship between the police and private security. A member of a private security company attends cluster meetings with the police. A second security company signed an agreement with the police and this was overseen and finalised by a senior police officer. This agreement allows for the private sector to help police fight and/or prevent crime. The security vehicles attend to scenes if the police need backup. An example was given that a police vehicle had rolled over in the middle of the night. The police called the private security company to arrange for backup until the scene was secured. In exchange the private security company asks for police to assist them in their foot patrols and camera surveillance in the CBD area.

The Community Services Directorate has a number of functions in the community. These include parks, sports and recreation, human settlements, libraries, community development, fire, and traffic services. There are a number of important projects going on in the Paarl East community, including a number of housing projects. All of these require direct contact with the community. However, the community often deals directly with the police. As a widespread issue, the research found that the community is not satisfied with the police presence in the Paarl East area. All of the role-players that were interviewed spoke of the same thing: absenteeism and a lack of human resources. This was cited by a senior police officer as the reason why NHWs could not receive police supervision during their patrols. A few community members voiced the problem of certain police not doing their jobs and/or having a bad attitude. For example, one of the senior members of the CPF walked in to the Paarl East station one day and there was no one present at the reception area. Ten minutes later an officer walked to the counter, at which point the CPF member joked that he could have stolen everything from the station in those ten minutes. The officer became highly aggressive and antagonistic towards the member. The complaint at the CPF

meeting was that this bad attitude is more of a trend than it is an isolated incident. A CPF member had this to say:

“We’ve got small things like the vans is driving past people when patrolling or they take too long to come out. And we got the main concern we have in Paarl East is they are undermanned, they got no manpower, enough manpower. And there is not enough vehicles cause we’ve got four sectors and there’s only two guys, two sectors working with one vehicle. So that’s a big concern in our area. That is our main concern in our area. The manpower and the transport.”

NHWs are comprised of members of the public. Members of the NHW that are not part of the patrols, but are represented by them collect a small amount of money from households annually in order to cover the operational and equipment costs. The households that pay to be included in the patrol area are invited to join a WhatsApp group that receives reports on the activities in the area. This is used for updates, notification of meetings, and as an informal crime watch/reporting platform.

The NHW is also made up of community members that are not active members, but rather patrol the area of their own volition. They do not want to be registered members of the NHW, but do engage in the same patrolling and often give information to the registered members. These individuals are highly respected in the community as many of them are retired and freely give of their own time, without remuneration. They are part of the active patrollers WhatsApp group. Community members attend the CPF and the CPF executive is comprised of community members. Anyone is free to attend the monthly CPF meetings. The CPF acts as a liaison between the community and the police, as well as between the community and DOCS:

“We are driven by the community. The Community Police Forum is driven by the community. That we must every time there is a complaint about the police, bad service in the police then we must take it forward to the higher level and speak to the Colonels or Station Commander about the crime rate in our area.”

It was found that the relationship between the Paarl East CPF and DOCS is a turbulent one. The consensus is that DOCS is not working together with CPF parties and is under-delivering on too many of their promises to the community. The most apparent shortcoming is, at the time of writing, the continued absence of DOCS representatives at CPF meetings, contrary to regulation. In fact, one of the topics of discussion at the CPF meeting was the absence of a DOCS representative as well as other members and groups responsible for community safety. A CPF member had this to say:

“I address that with DOCS. We put that in our EPP forms and when we had a meeting, DOCS never attends our meetings. Only one meeting did he attend [CPF meetings] ... And they are supposed to be here in every meeting. When we having a CPF meeting ... So then they can answer the questions, when the people ask the questions, they can answer it. So that is our big concern. That DOCS want us to help them ... but DOCS never came forward actually. They just sent a memo: ‘I want an EPP form. I want that. I want that.’ But they are not here to help the people. And not the community ... sometimes the communities ... they will take the law in their own hands ... Especially now when its winter, the people want to go on march; they want to patrol the areas. See that the crime rate come down. But they got no equipment ... They don’t want to patrol anymore and that’s why the crime rate starts to go up again.”

“DOCS mustn’t make promises to the people when they came down here. They send some people and they make promises in our area. And now the people are following it up with the Community Police Forum. “Oh but we were in a meeting and DOCS said so and nothing has happened.”

Another one of the grievances from the CPF is the lack, or inappropriateness, of the resources given by DOCS. Apparently, bicycles were given, which in the context of Paarl East is completely inappropriate. The resources need to be geared towards street patrolling such as rain-jackets, radios, and torches, amongst other things.

As is evident, the relationship between the CPF and DOCS is strained as the members of the community are not satisfied with how DOCS is providing for them. Whether or not they really are actually falling short is not the only concern. The Paarl East population's perception of DOCS has a profound effect on community safety. The CPF represents the community in general and it is clear that a loss of trust has led to frustration, demotivation, and the community is now willing to take safety into their own hands.

There is also the issue of NHWs not receiving enough appropriate resources. At the moment, the NHWs only have the high visibility jackets and boots that they were issued during training. During a NHW committee meeting it was apparent that they were struggling to get money from DOCS and that the equipment that is needed most for patrols is high visibility jackets for all members, identity cards for all members, vehicle magnets, torches, and radios. The radios that are currently being used by this group belong to the individuals or were donated by business owners to assist the NHW. Even though they receive R125 per household annually, they can't nearly afford the radios that are needed. The other thing that is needed is funds for petrol money. In winter it is too cold for members to walk in the streets to patrol. At the moment they are personally paying for petrol costs. Even though this highlights their commitment to their community, Paarl East is not an affluent area where the population can afford to do that on a daily basis.

The CPF in Paarl East is currently funding sixteen NHWs. It was often the case that the CPF Chairman had no or very little equipment to give the NHWs. Naturally, this results in NHWs complaining about a lack of funding. As for the support, the finances are one side of the story. The NHWs discuss a lack of willingness amongst the lower ranks to engage with them and provide them the support they need to function properly. The R2500 that the CPF received from submitting the necessary forms was being spent on a computer and printer which would allow them to conduct their CPF work without having to use their own computers any longer.

In sum, the research found that there is a real sense of frustration and alienation amongst the community. There is no denying that there is rampant crime in Paarl East

and the community is not simply sitting back and waiting for an external party to resolve it. They are putting in extensive time and effort to make the area a better place. It reflects their strong sense of pride about their community. They are following the procedure to formally create official organisations and keep their actions above board by following the rules and regulations, yet they feel they are alone and powerless in their quest. It has created an insiders ('us versus them') attitude. There are thus serious concerns around the relationships, and their sustainability, amongst various role players.

5.5. VREDENBURG AND SURROUNDS

As noted above, the Vredenburg site was somewhat different as it was much larger and the jurisdiction of various agencies covered multiple towns. As such, in understanding the organisational structures of the community safety organisations, they were often described in relation to each other:

“We [CPF/SAPS] identified a certain area in our community where crime is high, the Witteklip community, there were a lot of people that wanted to do something in that area, but instead everyone was doing it on their own. We wanted to place everyone under one umbrella and work from there, the CPF, the community, other role players.”


As is spoken to below, it became clear that the primary organisations – the NHWs and CPFs, were driven and sustained by strong leadership – ‘Walking in front and taking leadership.’ While in other areas leadership by SAPS officers may undermine the ability of these organisations to provide oversight and critique, in all of the sites investigated here, SAPS leadership formed the bedrock on which the sustainability of these organisations was based:

“We [SAPS] have a very good relationship, really, he [CPF] is attending all the meetings, all the responsibilities, that is required from a CPF chairperson. He [CPF] is doing his station visits, he is doing his station inspections, he is always objective ... with regards to complaints from the community, with regards to adhering to what the community requires of him.”

“There is a very good relationship [between the CPF and SAPS], I can walk in anytime, I can call him when I need to, he is always available ... They know who I am ... If the CPF walks in here they ask how they can help. If they [SAPS] need something we are there for them [CPF].”

These leaders also acted as fulcrum points around which various administrative and institutional procedures could pivot. Thus, for instance, the Vredenburg CPF chairperson’s position and leadership was pivotal in the continuation of a variety of projects, and his relationship with the Station Commander of Vredenburg SAPS fostered the empowerment of projects that represented community interests. Moreover, by working closely with one another, the CPFs responsibilities of providing oversight – by, for instance, checking on the condition of holding cells – were not only facilitated but expedited. Such relationships, in short, had made more efficient and effective both stakeholder’s primary objectives and aims: “We [CPF] work closely with SAPS.”

Below is a schematic representation of the primary stakeholders.



As can be seen, leadership at the cluster level plays a pivotal role in ensuring the continued operation of a variety of projects, using defined management levels:

“The NHWs form part of our CPF executive, in coordinating the NHWs.”

This is especially true in speaking to Vredenburg directly – the influence and importance of each stakeholder did seem to vary somewhat between sites, and different parties represented the importance of other organisations somewhat differently. Thus, in Vredenburg, Cluster Command, the CPF, and the SAPS Station were the most influential bodies, while in Langebaan, the SAPS Station and NHW were the primary nodes. In Jacobsbaai however, a very well-resourced site, the Rate Payers’ Association was also an important body, frequently mentioned by participants.

From a numeric perspective, it was difficult to establish precise figures regarding the number of members each organisation had, or indeed which organisations were actually operating in the pragmatic sense. At the community level, in some sites this seemed to be the result of a) a lack of understanding as to what constituted ‘official’ recognition, and b) because many of these organisations were interest-based, and thus often ad hoc. For example, it was noted that street committees in Saldanha would often emerge in response to a specific problem, and then dissolve once that concern had dissipated. This is not to say that these groupings are not effective, legitimate, or useful, but rather that the present regulatory structures cannot account for particular interest groups, nor are the registration processes well understood or advertised. This is spoken to in more detail below. The table below provides a numeric overview of membership levels. These figures are at best however generalisations, and are subject to ongoing fluctuations (especially at the level of street committees) and are primarily inferred from details provided in the interviews and knowledge of the contexts in which they operate. It should be noted that CPF values only reflect executive committee size, and not support basis. Furthermore, ad hoc street committees are issue dependant – ranging from concerns with anything from the building of walls to the targeting of gang organisations – and their membership levels and longevity can fluctuate greatly, as required.

Site	Organisation	Membership
Vredenburg	CPF	± 10
	Vredenburg NHW	± 360

	Paternoster NHW	± 80
	Witteklip NHW	± 200
	Witteklip SCs	± 6 (per committee)
	Ad hoc SCs	Issue dependant
Saldanha	CPF	± 8
	Saldanha NHW	± 220
	Jacobsbaai NHW	± 60
	Diazville SCs	± 6 (per committee)
	Ad hoc SCs	Issue dependant
Langebaan	CPF	± 6
	Langebaan NHW	± 400
	Long Acres NHW	± 60

All of the organisations that were engaged with in the research were involved in various projects, more detailed attention of which is drawn to select examples below:

“We [CPF] have a project management meeting on its own, where all the role players ... sit together as a collective that wants to make a difference.”

While the length, focus, and involvement of these projects varied greatly, the illustration below provides a schematic overview of the primary projects underway in each area.



Some of these, such as the festive season policing project, are iterative while others, such as the camera projects, are not. It is important to note however that these projects are cohesive responses to specific issues or challenges faced by communities, and should be understood in the context in which they have emerged. Thus, for instance, the Paternoster NHW (and therefore the Vredenburg CPF) has developed an iterative programme to facilitate the strengthening of policing over the festive season:

“The one [NHW] in Paternoster is one of our best ... The shift commander and Chairperson are working very closely with us.’

This is because while the community of Paternoster remains very small, it is a well-known holiday destination, and over the annual holiday period, its population balloons with the many visitors and tourists. Such increases require that the policing structures also be inflated and strengthened, so as to maintain levels of security and safety, and so as to ensure that the infrastructure and systems can adapt in response.

“They [Paternoster NHW] are much more organised because the community bought into the concept ... It [Paternoster] is attractive to tourists, so there is a lot of activities, a lot of money going out ... the guesthouse owners invest in that because if there is too much crime they won’t get tourism coming in.”

This is critical not only in and of itself, but also because many of the businesses and organisations rely on the visitor influx economically, and thus require that visitors remain safe and that they perceive the town to be a secure destination. The continued prosperity of the local economy, in other words, is intimately entwined with the safety and security of the area, a feature found in Langebaan as well.

Beyond interactions with themselves, the CPFs and NHWs also interacted with a number of other groupings in both their immediate vicinity and the wider area: “We [CPFs] try to get all the organisations to work with us.” These interactions most frequently occurred with private security firms, ratepayers’ associations and local businesses (or representative bodies thereof), and municipal representatives and/or departments. Because the town of Vredenburg falls under the municipal

administration of Saldanha Municipality, the latter is also a further justification for speaking to these relationships in a more holistic manner. In focusing on these relationships, the projects detailed above are also further outlined.

Focusing on each individually, in all of the large towns there are a number of private security firms in operation, which range in size and complexity from branches of multi-national corporations such as ADT to locally based alarm companies. While their market share, responsibilities, and interactions with each other are beyond the scope of this report, most respondents here indicated that they had cordial relationships with representatives from these companies, and that their individual directives were mutually supportive. In one instance, a prominent member of a NHW is also the owner of local private security firm, which some community members have argued is a conflict of interest. Notwithstanding this, in both Jacobsbaai and Langebaan, the NHWs had installed (or are in the processing of installing) camera systems (including vehicle number plate recognition technology) to further safeguard the primary entry points, and as a resource were shared by the community organisations and private security firms either directly, or operationally by providing visual support for on-duty agents.

The ‘School Absenteeism’ project, while initiated in Langebaan, has been noted more broadly and the potential for wider adoption in process. Essentially a collaborative effort, SAPS, the NHW, and CPF have partnered with local schools so that learners who are repeatedly and consistently absent from school without good reason are noted, and their parents/guardians visited by an officer once all other attempts at contact have failed. The visit is, however, not punitive or positioned as disciplinary, but rather purposed as supportive. After having determined the underlying causes of the absenteeism, which can range in form from the fact that a learner does not have shoes to that they are not being supervised in any way, supportive steps are put in place to ensure that the learner is helped, empowered, and returned to their school. Again, it should be noted that the learner is supported in this process, and not simply physically transported to the school grounds. As a result, the education of the community’s children is safeguarded, the visits provide a very useful means of assessing the living conditions of individual families (and thus providing a means of

focusing additional support), and community relationships are strengthened as these forms of policing are generative.

Related to this, in all three larger towns, the CPFs (in conjunction with local businesses and sponsors) actively identify those households and individuals that are in dire need of some form of assistance or aid. Once these needs are identified, purpose-driven task teams are formed comprised of individuals with the skills or experience necessary to facilitate an efficient response. These teams then meet the need head-on. Past examples are varied, but can range in size and cost. Recently, for instance, members of the community identified a household in which an elderly woman resided. She had become confined to the house, as she required a wheelchair for mobility and none of the entrances to the house had ramp access. Her children, on whom she depended, could not afford to have one built, nor to replace the broken hot water geyser. A task team was formed and over the course of one afternoon a cement ramp was laid and a new geyser installed, using skills and funds drawn from local businesses. The benefits to the quality of life of this individual were immeasurable, and the resulting support provided a focal point around which a cohesive community identity – one in which community safety structures and the safety structures were central – was cemented and made meaningful.

The festive season policing and camera projects have been referred to above. Those remaining – the ‘Blow the Whistle’ campaign, talent show, public parks and tyres projects – will be expanded on in more detail below. In reviewing and summarising the findings as they concern the structures and relationships of the organisations itself, a number of salient points become clear. These will be spoken to only descriptively here, while concerns and successes will be detailed in the separate section below.

The organisational structures of community safety organisations, ranging from CPFs and NHWs to street committees, can vary greatly in terms of formal organisation, longevity, applicability, efficacy, and mandate. In this site, many of these organisational bodies interacted with one another on a number of levels. While they may be seen as separate administratively, they interact with one another both at an operational level and in terms of their mandates. Projects are a primary facilitator of

and basis for collaboration and interaction. They are important bi-directional and cross-cutting vehicles through which resources, experiences and skills can be channelled so as to further strengthen both the projects and the organisations involved. With specific reference to NHWs, friendly forms of competition and assessment can encourage individual organisations to further initiate, develop and implement cross-sectorial projects and events, which have wide applicability, engage as large a cohort of community members as possible, and which further develop and entrench community ties and relationships. Organisational bodies that invest in interactive projects are strengthened both structurally and operationally, with redundancy systems emerging as a result which increases the resilience and longevity of community-based projects. Moreover, by involving many different organisations, the replicability of the projects becomes entrenched within their structural design, as a function of having to take into account multiple diverse perspectives and operational contexts.

Such relationships can however be undermined by partisan concerns, and may be difficult in areas or in the pursuit of highly politicised or emotive concerns. Even in more neutral contexts, it is fundamentally important that clear roles are defined, and that systems of oversight and accountability are implemented from initiation. Often, such processes initially require strong leadership.

The operational approaches or paradigms taken by the various organisations varied somewhat in practical terms. This being said, strong leadership and centralised direction ensured that these differences in approach did not conflict with one another, and that they were in general mutually supportive. While few examples were mentioned, in those instances conflict or opposition was inferred, further detail is provided below. In this section, the primary approach to safety and security – that of supportive or generative policing – is detailed using examples from the sites, before examples in variances noted in pragmatic examples are detailed. With this in place, examples of the primary successes and challenges noted by the organisations are provided, excluding those relating to organisations' relationship to or interactions with DOCS, which are detailed in the following section.

As has been noted above, in all of the three primary towns, and especially in Vredenburg, strong centralised leadership was provided by the SAPS Vredenburg Cluster Command. This included ensuring that the various organisations continued to operate as effectively as possible, the creation and implementation of projects, and the cross-pollination of successful ventures. This body also verified that the oversight activities of the organisations had been carried out and completed, such as ensuring that a member of the CPF had inspected the holding cells at Vredenburg SAPS, and verifying and noting any complaints that had been received.

The approach primarily taking in operationalising these objectives was supportive and generative, both in tasking the primary organisations in further fulfilling their mandates and in the policing of the communities themselves. This is not to say that the primary purpose of the SAPS and ancillary bodies – the enforcement of the law – was not followed, but rather that both the police, CPFs, and NHWs spent much time and effort supporting projects and events aimed at strengthening the community, and their relationships with community members:

“There is a lot of activities to address the issues ... we like to get the community involved because you can’t do this in isolation.”

As detailed below, this approach is exemplified by the ‘Blow the Whistle’ campaign, yet there are numerous other notable projects underway in a number of the areas. In Saldanha, for instance, an organisation supporting the empowerment of mentally disabled community members had also received support, and the result was a cooperative vegetable garden. In Vredenburg, on the other hand, the CPF and members of the NHW continue to run services aimed at encouraging the donation of clothes, food items, and other items needed by impoverished members of the community:

“We [CPF] get old clothes and issue them to the community (the clothing bank).”

These would then be sorted and distributed to community members via the member-based networks. Both in implementing and continuing to sustain such projects, the CPF chairperson, Station Commander and Cluster Commander were in agreement that community safety organisations and projects were not only useful, but necessary in the further development of the communities in which they worked. They also all independently supported, and worked towards developing, a strong community identity, one that would encourage the active participation of members. In so doing, the strengthening of relationships created supportive environments which decreased criminal activities. In their words:

“We [CPF/SAPS] would like the community to take ownership, in partnership with us, to look after the parks ... the sustainability of the environment in those areas. I believe we make a lot of inroads with regards to winning the trust of the community. That is the most important thing. We will go door-to-door ... as a collective, we have our projects on the ground.”

As noted, while the broad approach to safety and security was supportive, variances at the local level were mentioned. These variances emerged out of specific contexts, in which individual needs were identified and prioritised. Seemingly obviously, such flexibility is important – while strong leadership is needed in administering and guiding community organisations and projects, the concerns and needs of community members at the most local level also need to be accounted for.

For instance, in Jacobsbaai, there are only two points of entry for vehicles, and as such, presented an ideal opportunity for the use of camera-based surveillance systems to monitor road traffic and entry. While these systems are prohibitively expensive – especially if the capacity for vehicle registration plates is included – and thus only realistic when there are few entry point, the Jacobsbaai NHW members approved and supported the venture. The system has now been operation for a number of years, and has been expanded to cover those positions identified as primary ports of entry for foot traffic, and have been used with success. A similar, albeit larger, surveillance system is currently being installed in Langebaan, and has been entirely funded by the local NHW. Such projects have been designed to be inclusive in nature, with a

monitoring station being installed both in a location for the NHW and in the SAPS station itself. Such collaboration, based on positively reinforced relationships between the police and the community, thus directly contribute to the monitoring and policing capacity of all of the organisations. This may not be easily replicable however:

“They [other areas] have money to spend on technology. Unfortunately, you are sitting in a community like Witteklip, people are jobless, that don't even have a cell phone. So all this technology that is working in other neighbourhoods is not necessarily practical in our environment, our circumstance.”

In Vredenburg, such cooperative processes have also been established between the CPF/NHWs and the traffic department. The result is a number of projects aimed at making both drivers and pedestrians more responsible and safe road users. Such outputs include safety campaigns, educational initiatives, and the management of pedestrian road crossings by traffic officials during the hours of peak demand. The CPF/NHWs also further disseminate police warnings and alerts to the broader community, and feed information relevant to policing back to the officers. NHW members may also be deployed to areas identified as particularly problematic or troublesome, simply as a deterrent rather than to actively enforce the law. When the research on which this report is based was undertaken, for instance, the SAPS Station Commander and the CPF Chairperson had identified an undeveloped allotment as a key point at which victims of sexual crimes first encountered their assailants. As a result, CPF and NHW members were active in the area, especially so at the times identified as particularly problematic. These forms of intervention point to the importance both of active policing and the use of deterrents as a means of creating safer spaces and places. While many of these activities do not ‘enforce’ the law in an active manner, they create the spaces in which the law is not actively broken.

Before engaging specifically with concerns related to the community safety organisations and DOCS, this section identifies the three most prominent challenges noted by participants in the research, and illustrates three notable successful strategies

using examples from the area for illustration. It is to the latter that this report first turns.

With regards to successes, the Langebaan NHW – ‘Team Langebaan’ – has developed by themselves numerous oversight mechanisms, safeguards, and operational procedures which greatly aid the sustainability and effectiveness of the organisation. Moreover, these mechanisms and procedures can be adopted elsewhere with little difficulty, and are therefore provided as important instruments of any future models. With regards to oversight mechanisms, the NHW has implemented counter-signature paper-based procedures for the use of any equipment, the shift-based patrolling system, and the complaints/concerns processes. In each the person concerned is required to sign a document stating that they have loaned or been involved in the activity, which must be countersigned by a SAPS officer on duty at the time. This counter-signature can then be further checked against the actual SAPS roster, providing a more stringent process. With regards to safeguards, the NHW has implemented a number of procedures and regulations that ensure that members do not themselves transgress any laws in the fulfilment of their duties, and that clear channels of communication are maintained between the SAPS and the NHW. Such clearly defined limits prevent conflict, prevent antagonistic forms of control, and also provide mutual oversight – the NHW members ensure that SAPS members fulfil their mandate, and SAPS members ensure that NHW activities remain legal and legitimate. Beyond this, they have also adopted a number of innovative operational procedures. For instance, during the busy festive season they have called upon young adults to help bolster patrols, thus also introducing them to community-based forms of policing. Moreover, ‘Team Langebaan’ is a registered NPO, the result of which is that when they ask for donations business entities can offset tax accruals through this, which ultimately has increased the capacity of the NHW to hold events, obtain equipment, and to provide a more effective service. While Langebaan is a well-resourced town, such strategies have resulted in a very strong, legitimate NHW that is self-sustaining. It is thus these *types* of practices that are of critical importance in the development of the structures of NHWs and CPFs. While each organisation and area will be different, and therefore require diverse forms of engagement, these tools can

be standardised and integrated into an oversight/evaluation system that can span the width of the various organisations.

There are also a number of innovative projects initiated in the Vredenburg Cluster that show the importance of harnessing every available local opportunity, and the benefits that such activities can have for the wider community. Drawing on an example from Saldanha, the Cluster Commander and CPF Chairperson have engaged local community members convicted of crimes, and who are on patrol, to act as leaders and facilitators in the development of public spaces and parks. The result is not only that those convicted of local crimes are positioned to contribute to the same communities, but that they themselves become agents of change. In one instance, a local parolee now leads an initiative to develop a play area for children in the area, the result of which is that an open pit littered with stones and building refuse has now been grassed, fenced, and the first pieces of play equipment installed. Instrumentally, because this development has been driven by an individual who at the time of his conviction was understood to be a seasoned gangster, the area has not been damaged or vandalised at all even though it has not been actively policed. In this way, local knowledges and relationships can be channelled through programmes that both develop individuals and areas so as that they become sustainable initiatives that foster generative interactions between people, even in urban areas that continue to lack some of the most basic of services. Such initiatives require creativity, leadership, and the space for opportunity, and thus are important considerations.

It is also clear from this site that all of the community safety initiatives are driven by key individuals. While their work is greatly aided by well-run, passionate committees and task groups, it is these individuals that seem to make projects sustainable over the long term. Drawing on two examples from this site, the impact that strong leadership can have, and the changes that can be effected as a result, are clear. While there may be many other examples, these two have been developed within, facilitated through, and continue to remain impactful because they are operationalised *through* the CPF/NHW structures, rather than in spite of them. This being said, in both instances these structures are well developed, well run, and are not placed in competition with other organisational structures in the fulfilment of their mandate. By being led by

stakeholders that had clear goals, a clear understanding of the needs of the community, and who were prepared to pursue these projects even in their personal capacity, the results are well-defined, successful projects that are now self-sustaining – having reached a ‘critical mass’, community members themselves continue to play a significant role in driving these projects forward.

The ‘Blow the Whistle’ campaign was initiated by a past chairperson of the Langebaan CPF as a means of rebuilding relationships between SAPS members and the broader community. He recognised that for many adults such practices were deeply engrained, and yet, that they these habits were deeply problematic and were undermining the operational efficacy and efficiency of the local station. He therefore initiated and began a campaign termed ‘Blow the Whistle’, in which specific attention was given to school-going children. Once a year, the children from the local schools would be gathered together for a day-long outing, held on a local sports field, in which they played games, were taught about policing and crime, and were provided with the information they needed to play a role in community policing. Crucially, this event was facilitated and staffed by SAPS officers from the local station, the result of which is that the children became familiarised with the officers, played games with them, and were instructed by them. In the process, relationships of trust were forged and the children were empowered to understand policing in its own context. An unintended consequence of this event was that the parents of these children were witness to the interactions between officers and children, the result of which was that trusting relationships between police officers and the wider community began to be built:

“We [CPF/NHWs/SAPS] will target the youngsters, because as soon as you do the parents will come and see what is going on there.”

As the event continued to occur each year, these relationships were reinforced, the result of which was the development of more effective policing measures. The CPF chairperson helped grow the event, gaining sponsorship from large corporations who provided food and drinks, and sports equipment. Most recently, the event has also been used by other governmental agencies – such as the emergency and military

services – as a platform for recruitment and the dissemination of knowledge. Having repeatedly shown itself a success, the model is now being exported to neighbouring towns, so as that this year the event will be held in all of the primary towns in the Vredenburg Cluster.

A newer initiative, driven in this instance by a SAPS Captain at Saldanha Station, is a talent show contest held in both Vredenburg and Saldanha. Recognising that despite their circumstances, many children and young adults had remarkable talents, the show provides a platform through which they can compete, show these talents to the community, and should they be successful, win prizes aimed at further grooming these talents so as that they become a means by which individuals can empower themselves. Again, these events have been driven by clear and persistent leadership, and have been aided by donations and contributions from both local and national businesses. The events were so popular that the halls in which they were held were not able to accommodate the crowds of community members. While the focus of these events may not be policing itself, they are facilitated and driven by SAPS members, creating alternate understandings of the role of the police in the community. By developing relationships and engendering trust, police officers have found that their tasks are made more efficient, and that from these interactions local leaders and champions of community safety emerge, who further drive the projects in a self-sustaining manner. By having the communities of Saldanha and Vredenburg compete in friendly competition, furthermore, the competition itself acts as a catalyst for their further development.

This being said, in all of the sites, even those that can in no way be seen as anything less than extremely successful, participants noted that they had experienced challenges in initiating and sustaining the support of both pre-existing group members and the community at large. This challenge was also experienced at the administrative level, in the filling of leadership positions during the changes mandated by their respective constitutions.

“There is a kind of ‘non-interest’ in the community ... When you call Imbizos only a handful of people turn up.”

With regard to the latter, many of the organisations had found that while members were prepared to participate sporadically in annual events or even in more frequent exercises, such as patrols, the administrative burdens and responsibilities of the governing bodies was too great. As a result, in some instances the same group of members (barring, of course, periodic entries and exits) rotated among the leadership positions. While not in itself problematic in a context where the necessary electoral processes had been followed in an open and participatory manner, a number noted that they were becoming fatigued with the attendant responsibilities and burdens. As is noted below, it is thus pivotal that the administrative tools and instruments be streamlined, made replicable, and the broader systems have redundancy measures built into them so as to ensure that the processes are streamlined, verifiable, and made as efficient as possible.

This fatigue was also experienced by the wider body of members, the dedication levels of which seemed to spike only when increases in crime were recorded. Again, and from the perspective of prevention, any processes need to be made as efficient as possible. However, such fatigue also indicates that community organisations need to expand their roles, so as that they engage with and undertake activities related to institutions that are both of concern to members and help develop the communities. It should also be remembered that in some instances, members of these organisations can become targeted by criminal networks, and thus should be prioritised with regards to forms of policing. This is especially pertinent considering that these people may become targets and thus endanger their lives even though participation is voluntary:

“People are not interested, people that are scared, that don't want to be involved in NHW work, for obvious reasons.”

Thus, for instance, these may include participation at local clinics, animal welfare centres, and educational organisations. In Vredenburg specifically, the CPF Chair also reported that NHW members had in the past been targeted by criminal organisations and individuals, and that participation in these groups had decreased as a result. Such occurrences should be dealt with decisively, using law enforcement agency activities

to indicate that participation is a valued, and safe, activity that should be undertaken by a broad a cohort of the community as possible.

Moreover, while all of the community safety organisations interacted positively with one another, and had cemented important ties with local businesses and institutions, a recurrent challenge experienced at all levels concerned engaging with and continuing to work next to the municipal bodies and administrative departments. Remembering that all of the sites fall under the auspices of the Saldanha Bay Municipality, this is somewhat worrying. Furthermore, participants were cautious in mentioning this, itself telling of the relationship. Many felt that municipal employees were inattentive to requests, did little to facilitate further engagements, and were often simply not present at community meetings.

“When we have these meetings, they [Saldanha Bay Municipality] don't send people that have the mandate ... When we decide on something, just the next meeting they don't pitch. The machine is not rolling ... They don't convey and carry over what we are saying.”

“They [Saldanha Bay Municipality] have a big role to play ... They can't keep promises ... When it comes to the implementation phase that is the problem because there is no one willing to jump in and do something.”

Indeed, at the time of the interviews two respondents had arranged a meeting with representatives of the Mayor's office, only to be left standing outside the offices for an hour before eventually leaving. While this example may be isolated, that so many participants felt that the municipality was unsupportive of their efforts is indicative of systemic concerns. The existence of these concerns is furthermore not without irony, as it is the municipality as a whole and elected officials individually that greatly benefit from the activities and outcomes of community safety organisations. In apprehending such problems, interventions by those institutions that have the authority to do so is needed, such as DOCS. As is further detailed below however, participants did not indicate that this was a viable strategy, primarily as a severe lack of communication between the Department and representatives of the organisations.

In speaking to representatives of community safety organisations, it became clear that even in those cases where the organisation had clearly defined roles and a structured constitution, there existed a lack of knowledge and understanding of the legal roles, responsibilities and mandates of community safety organisations and representatives:

“It is important for us [CPF/SAPS] to be aware of what they are doing, so that we can guide, ‘Listen, you only have this authority, you can do this, this part is for us to do’.”

Such concerns were especially apparent when members undertook active policing measures, such as patrols. In one instance, members wished to identify the patrol vehicle in a manner that made it easily recognisable to the community, using both magnetic stickers and rotating lights. There was, however, little clarity on what colour these lights could be, resulting in the first set being deemed illegal and the resources used in their purchase being wasted. In another instance, a patrol had followed what members identified as a vehicle being driven by an individual that was both underage and intoxicated. When the vehicle stopped outside a residence, the members stepped out of their vehicle and were subsequently involved in an altercation. Subsequent enquiries determined that it was unclear whether the patrol members were supposed to simply identify the residence and leave, stop outside the residence, or block the path of the vehicle so it could no longer be used.

While it may be very difficult for guidelines to cover all possible scenarios, it is clear that further attention needs to be paid to the training of community safety members, so as that they can minimally protect themselves from both contravening any laws and any legal reprisals. Such training is not only needed to safeguard community safety members, but so as to pre-emptively establish and define their specific roles and responsibilities, especially in areas and communities where forms of vigilantism are especially prevalent:

“You will have some kind of resistance when it comes to crime fighting ... people will challenge you when it comes to the role of the NHWs ... So obviously they [NHWs] will become the enemy of the criminals.”

Participants in Vredenburg also noted that DOCS had not synchronised its efforts or programmes, and many felt that the different projects or organisations that received funding were positioned as in competition with each other, the result of which is that their utility and overall effect was negated:

“They [DOCS] gave a lot of money out last year, the CPF was not even aware that they had given the churches money ... then people operate on their own ... We can’t now take responsibility for the projects and programmes.”

In citing examples, it was often mentioned that faith-based institutions would receive funding or support to develop communities and yet safety and security, pivotal concerns in the development of said communities, was not touched upon and/or respondents considerable experience and expertise was ignored. As a result, individuals felt discouraged and alienated from the directives of DOCS further increasing the distance between the Department and individuals working voluntarily within these organisations.

While training was, as noted above, very much appreciated by respondents, a number also noted that it had changed little over the course of many years and that the further development of their skills and knowledge was not attended to. While ‘basic training’ thus provided a firm foundation, little supplementary activities were provided, despite their need. Indeed, in the instance of one NHW, the initiation of larger and more cohesive projects had not occurred because while the Chairperson had served the community for many years, he lacked the education and skills needed – such as project management and financial record keeping – to further continue his work. Such skills-based development courses could easily be implemented, especially if all of the instruments and tools used by the organisations are standardised.

It is clear that in Vredenburg and surrounding areas there are many extremely dedicated, hard-working individuals that have led numerous organisations to successfully influence the lives of people. It is also clear that the challenges noted by the respondents are not insurmountable, and can be overcome, but that to do this not only will changes be needed to the community safety organisations themselves but to DOCS itself. An opportunity thus exists for these organisations and individuals to learn from each other, to acknowledge each other's importance, and to work closely together in fulfilling their respective mandates. A SAPS-led model in which officers play a central role in such processes may not be replicable elsewhere, nor should it be artificially disbanded when it is clearly successful here. Safety should not simply be thought of as a product of physical security, but rather the result of the input and participation of a number of critical organisations. Such work requires consideration and cooperation, all too frequently undermined in South Africa by self-interested concerns and conflict. This area, unlike the others, does not have the resources or structures that those in urban areas may have. As a result, they have in their very structure been forced to be resourceful, creative, and to develop relationships with whomever they can in furthering their aims. It is such an attitude, above all, that has steered them towards success.

5.6. STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOPS

The first stakeholder workshop was held on 25th November 2015 and the second workshop held on 20th February 2016, as mentioned. Only the respondents from the research were invited as participants to the first workshop. At the first workshop, it was decided to hold a second follow-on workshop to be held on a Saturday to accommodate those unable to attend a weekday event, as well as following through with some of the discussions held during the first workshop. It was also decided to invite external role-players (such as DOCS) to the second workshop.

Please find the minutes for both of the workshops in the Appendix of this report, but below offers a brief summary of each workshop:

The primary purpose of the first workshop was to share the results of the research and to test or validate these with the respondents themselves. In large part, the respondents

confirmed and validated the research results and a number of other issues were raised during the workshop. Concerns were expressed about the general lack of implementation of research conducted and the ‘shelving’ of research. Respondents were passionate about the need for research to inform practice and to make a meaningful contribution to the functioning of NHWs and CPFS. Much of the discussions were about the challenges confronting NHWs and CPFs. A Visioning Session was led by John Cartwright during this workshop in order to develop a common vision of what safety governance can and should look like. It was also for the purposes of discussing broader issues of safety and how NHWs and CPFs could more meaningfully contribute to making communities safer (not simply more secure). There was much discussion also as to how challenges could be overcome within a broader thinking of safety governance as well as future roles/expectations for various entities.

The second workshop was primarily organised to accommodate respondents who could not attend the first workshop, to invite external stakeholders as well as to further ‘test’ possible functions that NHWs and CPFs could add to their repertoires in order to address many of the difficulties that they had identified during the first workshop. A presentation by Murray Williams on the New Neighbourhood Watch was aimed at further exploring the range of possibilities open to NHWs in terms of contributing to safety in their communities from a citizen-centric perspective. Furthermore Eldred de Klerk gave a presentation on Mediation in terms of a possible role or solution for NHWs operating in violent spaces and similarly John Cartwright gave a talk on placemaking as another potential role that NHWs could perform in their communities. Again, the workshop discussants raised a number of issues with regards to the challenges faced by NHWs and CPFs, the ways by which these could be overcome and the role of various service providers.

5.7. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

A brief summary of the findings of the research projects can be summarised as follows:

- Both CPFs and NHWs can occupy very different positions, and perform different functions, the effectiveness and importance of which is locally

contingent. The **nodal roles** are thus contingent, yet also stable in that the roles must be fulfilled. This creates the possibility of repurposing nodes and/or roles to be of more utility to the communities in which they operate, but equally, that in instances where they are already effective, they need not be changed.

- The power of community safety organisations is fundamentally based on the strength of their **networks** – both in relation to each other and external parties. These relationships need to be facilitated and strengthened by creating opportunities for their establishment, and by further strengthening those that already exist. This is an important role for public institutions, as it is a useful form of oversight that strategically places government as a central role player, without negating the fundamental need for locally contingent knowledge and experience.
- Of the many challenges, the need for better **operational resources and technology** was consistently pointed out. As we explore below, there are a number of tools available to these groupings that would vastly increase their effectiveness and strength, yet these will need to be acquired and purposed through a controlled system which itself is overseen by other parties.
- Of both necessity and yet also concern, **training** has been provided to all the members of the local institutions which were encountered during the field research. This being said, the training is far too narrow in its scope, and needs to be repurposed so as that members are given the conceptual tools and knowledge needed to not only patrol neighbourhoods, but to manage projects, financial obligations, and so on.
- In resource poor areas, **regulation and incentivisation** are very important concerns and at the forefront of much debate. In the past it seems, these have not been met consistently and there has been little open debate. Drawing on the above point, we will provide an analysis of this in the final report and select examples of how these concerns can be reconfigured to strengthen the regulation of the various community safety organisations.
- As was touched upon, the **role of DOCS** requires further analysis, but at present the organisation is largely seen in a negative light. We argue that the Department itself will need to undergo a number of substantive changes, often

mirroring those suggested for NHWs and CPFs, so as that it can become more responsive, accountable, and relevant. In the process, the opportunity exists for it to become a powerful and strategically important node in the governance of the country as a whole.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS: TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC, WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY SAFETY GOVERNANCE

6.1. INTRODUCTION

The ideas presented below are informed by a vision of what policing or ‘security governance’ can and should look like in South Africa. When we use the term ‘policing’ we do not mean simply what the police do. ‘Policing’ is usually associated simply with what the state police do (for instance, as in the Community Safety Act, 2003 where ‘policing’ is defined as “functions performed by police officials”). Our understanding of policing is far broader than this; we differentiate between the noun ‘police’ and the verb ‘police’ and therefore we understand ‘policing’ to mean those involved in safety governance or security governance, which can be defined as the shaping of the flow of events in a social system “so as to create safe ‘spaces’ in which people can live, work and play”³⁰ and refers:

“...to the constellation of institutions, whether formal or informal, governmental or private, commercial or voluntary, that provide for social control and conflict resolution, and that attempt to promote peace in the face of threats (either realized or anticipated) that arise from collective life.”³¹

In other words, the term ‘safety governance’ includes all those institutions, organisations, groupings and/or individuals – or ‘nodes’ as we refer to them – involved in promoting safety. This is including (but not exclusive to) the state police, as well as community organisations (such as NHWs and street committees), private security, businesses, religious organisations, schools, and so forth.

³⁰ Wood, J. & Shearing, C. 2007. *Imagining Security*. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, p. 7.

³¹ Dupont, B., Grabosky, P. & Shearing, C. 2003. The governance of security in weak and failing States. *Criminal Justice*. 3(4):331-349 at 332.

Safety governance in South Africa has always been pluralised – meaning simply that there has always been a range of state and non-state nodes involved in promoting safety or ‘doing’ policing.

“Policing today is distributed across a range of institutions that together comprise a policing network for the governance of security. Policing has been radically pluralized.”³²

This plurality has long been recognised and although there has been an acceptance that safety governance is undertaken by a range of nodes, up until recently there has been an over-emphasis on one node – the state police. However, recent policy debates and documents have shifted the emphasis from a state-centric understanding of safety governance to one that is far more cognisant of the range of other nodes. In short, we have shifted from a ‘whole-of-government’ way of thinking to a ‘whole-of-society’ way of thinking about safety in South Africa. ‘Whole-of-society’ governance is now a term being used increasingly in policy circles to describe a system of governance that acknowledges the complexity of unsafety and crime in South Africa. For instance, consider this quote from the National Development Plan:

“It is necessary to move from a narrow law-enforcement approach to crime and safety to a focus on identifying and resolving the root causes of crime. To achieve this, a wider range of state and non-state capacities will need to be mobilised at all levels, which requires shifting to an integrated approach with active citizen involvement and co-responsibility.”

Whole-of-society governance is an approach that:


“... acknowledges that the multiple causes and reasons for crime (and the diverse contexts and conditions in which crimes occur) require multiple solutions ... It also acknowledges the value of the diverse resources, knowledges and capacities of the state, private sector and civil society in

³² Shearing, C. 2000. ‘A New Beginning’ for policing. *Journal of Law and Society*. 27(3):386-393 at 388.


finding solutions to crime and insecurity. It is an approach that seeks ways in which these resources, knowledges and capacities from all three sectors can be identified, mobilised and integrated and thus seeks a way to develop mechanisms that will do this. The challenge therefore, is to develop the institutional arrangements to achieve whole-of-society security governance.”³³

In other words, a whole-of-society approach is simply harnessing the right resources, knowledges and capacities in the right way at the right time. It is to identify the appropriate node that could be involved in contributing to the solution to some safety problem (whether it be a problem with an unsafe space or a particular criminal activity or any safety issue). Once appropriate nodes are identified as being valuable to finding a solution to the safety problem, a process of mobilisation would have to take place. In this way resources (knowledge, skills and/or finances) are aligned to resolving the problem in the best possible way. The final phase to resolving a safety issue is a process of integration whereby a network of independent nodes is formed who co-ordinate their activities, where no single node necessarily dominates all the rest (but it depends on the safety issue at hand), where each node has a unique, complementary strength which is brought to bear on the problem and where there is a system of circular accountability between those involved in the network (they hold each other accountable). The network of nodes may be temporary (formed only for the purpose of resolving that particular safety issue), small (only involving three nodes for instance), or multi-scaled (involving, for instance, grass roots nodes such as an NGO, working alongside a provincial or national government department). To illustrate this further, there is a tendency to conceive of governance as hierarchical, and if it is a safety issue, to put the state police at the top of that hierarchy.

³³ Centre of Criminology. 2011. *Strategic Objective 5: Pre-Design Phase Research Report*. Centre of Criminology, University of Cape Town.



This may be the case at some point, but there seems to be an assumption that this is always the case – that this is the normative state of affairs. However, in reality systems or networks of security governance usually take on the qualities as presented in the diagram below:³⁴



³⁴ Sourced from: <http://blog.oup.com/2013/08/intelligence-dilemma-daniel-pelka-edward-snowden/>

The model can be understood as a theoretical way of understanding governance arrangements, but can also be understood as a spatial and relational representation of how nodes interact. Each circle represents a node (be it private security, a school governing body, a NHW, a church organisation etc) which comes together as and when needed to resolve a particular safety issue(s). The centre of gravity shifts according to the problem being addressed:

“Policing is, we believe, by definition a matter of networks and institutional assemblages, no matter where the centre of gravity lies.”³⁵

This type of formation as shown in the diagram above has been referred to as ‘polycentric’ – that is, it is not one overarching node dominating the whole system (as shown in the hierarchical diagram) but in fact nodes may be the centre of networks of governance depending on the nature of the safety issue being addressed. Whatever the form, function and lifespan of the network, and which node is at the centre of the network, it has to adhere to principles of good governance – it has to adhere to democratic values of public participation, accountability and effectiveness in line with the public interest.

In summary, our vision of safety governance is a system or systems of polycentric security governance coalescing around safety issues as and when appropriate so as to bring to bear the necessary skills and resources to a safety problem. These systems should be democratic in that they allow for opportunities for public participation in decision-making, are accountable to each other and to a normative framework (such as the Constitution) and are effective in line with the interests and rights of the public. In light of this the key focus of this report is to hone in on two nodes within this polycentric network – NHWs and CPFs.

Where do NHWs and CPFs fit into this vision? In other words, how to make NHWs and CPFs (more) capable partners within a democratic, whole-of-society approach to safety governance? The following sections will focus on ways in which NHWs and

³⁵ Ayling, J., Grabosky, P. & Shearing C. 2009. *Lengthening the arm of the law: enhancing police resources in the 21st century*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 244.

CPFs can be strengthened so as to more effectively make a contribution to polycentric systems of safety governance. In other words, how NHWs and CPFs as nodes of safety governance can more meaningfully contribute to safety in their communities in a democratic manner and how DOCS (and others) could more effectively facilitate that role. This is to recognise that NHWs and CPFs – particularly NHWs – are very well-placed to act out the design principles which DOCS has adopted (a whole-of-society approach focused on fixing future harms, reducing opportunities for unsafety and drawing on a functional set of resources to fulfil this). However, this is also to recognise that many NHWs and CPFs are already functioning optimally and that there is a continuum of possibilities of support that can be offered if and when needed.

In light of the research findings of the project, this section will therefore explore the possible model that could inform how NHWs and CPFs function. Ultimately the aim is to answer the questions: What would a democratic model of whole-of-society governance look like? And where do NHWs and CPFs fit into this vision? When one thinks of a ‘model’, one is inclined to think of a template of thinking or action, which can be replicated, imitated or applied in a diversity of settings. It can also be thought of as a way of looking at, and understanding, the world. The challenge with developing a model of safety governance – with NHWs and CPFs in mind – is that it needs to cater for diverse contexts of insecurity and development as well as the needs of the NHWs and CPFs themselves. The case study sites selected for this research demonstrate this diversity through for instance: the types of crime and insecurity experienced and the ways to mitigate these, the levels of danger experienced by those at the frontline of engagement as well as deeper issues around the history, demographics, state-community relations and geographical outlay of the community in question. Therefore any model of safety governance needs to be consistent enough to be implemented in diverse settings but also contain flexible components which could address contextual differences. As is detailed below, it also needs to be practical. To this end we have made reference to a number of templates that have been packaged with this report, which are easy-to-use resources with which to guide the input of individual NHWs and CPFs, so as that the data that is submitted to DOCS is consistent and measurable. Indeed, replicability is critical to the success of the proposed designs – it is important that those in NHWs can review the data submitted

by CPFs and vice-versa. To this end, a sense of familiarity is needed. Such replicability also expedites training and decreases the administrative load on all the concerned parties.

6.2. CRITERIA FOR DEMOCRATIC SAFETY GOVERNANCE AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO NHWS AND CPFS

There is a tendency to associate democratic policing only with the state, however, the reality is that the state police may not operate democratically. In fact, it may be found that non-state entities operate more democratically than the state in certain contexts. In light of the realities of state policing deficits and the fact that, as mentioned, South Africa has a long history of pluralised forms of policing, it makes sense to focus not only on reforming the state police to align with democratic values, but also to focus on the non-state. There are a number of ways by which democratic policing is measured or assessed. However, a number of criteria for democracy will be focused on in this report, as outlined by Jones et al (1994). They include: 1) equity, 2) delivery of service, 3) responsiveness, 4) distribution of power, 5) information, 6) redress, and 7) participation.³⁶ These criteria were originally developed for only the state police; however, the remainder of this report will discuss each criterion in turn and suggest the ways by which NHWs and CPFs could be better aligned to achieving it and the role of DOCS and others in attaining this. Therefore each of the following seven sections will discuss a democratic criterion through:


- explaining what it entails and the problem or challenges in achieving it,
- a discussion of possible solutions to these challenges, and
- recommendations as to what could be done, by whom, and how it could be implemented.

As mentioned, this is the first time that a systematic attempt has been made to associate democratic principles of policing to the non-state sector. There has always been a scholarly belief (especially in the Global North) that only the state can fulfil democratic policing and that the non-state is a temporary, ad hoc, and/or support system for the state police. Yet, we know in South Africa, and in fact in the rest of the continent, that non-state forms of policing have long, deeply rooted histories and form

³⁶ Jones, T., Newburn, T. and Smith, D. (1994) *Democracy and Policing*. London: Policy Studies Institute, pp. 44.

an integral part of the safety governance landscape. Instead of simply attempting to attain a normative vision of democratic state policing, we should pragmatically and logically address the role of the non-state as well. Both the NHWs and CPFs have been envisioned here as equal partners. While they may fulfil somewhat different roles in communities – NHWs focusing their attention on the enabling of community partnerships, while CPFs focusing their attention on the enabling of relationships between the state and the public – neither can be seen as superior to the other. Pragmatically, it is for this reason that we propose that the core structures of both are replicated, that they each fulfil oversight roles in relation to each other, and that the administrative structures they draw on are very similar. In both instance, it is envisioned that each NHW and CPF will have a central administrative hub. If possible, it is only here that individuals should be employed on a monetary basis, or paid through the use of stipends. This is because this is the only role that can be considered to be a full-time role. Around this central administrative hub, different modules detailed below can be drawn on and implemented, depending on the needs of the specific location. These modules are interchangeable, and can be swapped as need be. As they are replicated across the system, training need not be undertaken wholesale in each instance, or when modules are changed.³⁷ This can be diagrammatically represented as such:

³⁷ The modules mentioned above are purely for demonstrative purposes, the details of those envisioned can be found later in the report.



This report attempts to do that, through exploring the possibilities and avenues towards the non-state fulfilling a role within democratic, whole-of-society safety governance.

6.3. EQUITY: NHWS AND CPFS AS DISTRIBUTED FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY

6.3.1. Statement of the problem

Policing in South Africa has never been equitable. Depending on context and location, community and citizen experiences of the state police and policing in general, will be very different. For instance, with regards to state policing, one of the findings of the Khayelitsha Commission was the fact that resources (as determined by the Resources Allocation Guide of the SAPS) were unfairly distributed in parts of the Western Cape and that, for instance, Harare police station had the lowest number of

SAPS police to population in the Western Cape.³⁸ In other words, there is a real, quantifiable difference in state policing in different communities in terms of policing resources allocated. Similarly the level of quality of state policing will differ from community to community – with some people having a good experience of the state police and other people having a very negative experience. However, this applies to non-state policing as well – there are communities who have access to, or are able to draw on extensive resources to be able to resolve unsafety in their communities and other communities who are reliant on only one or two resources. Policing is in other words, unfairly distributed. An example of this is the recent cases of Franziska Blöchliger and Sinoxolo Mafevuka. Franziska was found murdered in the Tokai forest on the afternoon of Monday, the 7th March, a reward was offered, drones were used to get sight of the murder scene, top forensic expert David Klatzow was hired, SAPS top detectives were put on the case, a community vigil was held on the Tuesday evening and the incident was covered extensively by the media. The neighbouring community of Westlake also marched in support and provided valuable information to the SAPS since, according to one resident, “Criminals or baddies are generally known to community members”.³⁹ Within days, three suspects, and later a fourth, were arrested and appeared in court on the Friday – within a week of the murder taking place. All of this happened quickly and almost spontaneously as various resources were drawn on in response to Franziska’s murder. In comparison, consider the case of Sinoxolo Mafevuka. Sinoxolo had been murdered earlier in the month, with no media coverage of the incident, and according to the family of Sinoxolo, little police assistance or information as to the status of the case – the police dealings with the case being described as “lacklustre” by the ANC Western Cape.⁴⁰ These two cases were recently juxtaposed when the Deputy Minister of Police, Maggie Sotyu conducted a visit to Khayelitsha and found that the family of Sinoxolo knew more about Franziska’s case than the case of Sinoxolo. It seems that it is only through the Deputy Minister’s visit to Khayelitsha and the enquiry about Sinoxolo that action was taken with a reward being offered, a march organised and the police becoming more responsive to the

³⁸ Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations between SAPS and the Community in Khayelitsha. 2014. *Towards a Safer Khayelitsha: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations between SAPS and the Community of Khayelitsha* at p. 315.

³⁹ Etheridge, J. 2016. ‘Tip-offs helped police in Tokai Forest killing’, *News24*, 10 March.

⁴⁰ Gqirana, T. 2016. ‘ANC slams cops for ‘lacklustre service’ in murdered Khayelitsha teen’s case’, *News24*, 11 March.

case. In discussions with those involved in the march, it was also discovered that community members in fact knew who the perpetrators were but did not know what to do with the information. Only much later were they prompted into revealing this information leading to the arrest of suspects.

There are clearly inequalities in the two contexts – inequalities of resources (especially state police resources) as well as inequalities in the abilities to leverage the types of resources to come to bear on an issue in the community, that is fulcrum capacity. In light of the sometimes-glaring inequalities in policing between communities, there is a tendency for some communities to remain inert while they wait for government to address this. This came out particularly in the first workshop that UCT held with stakeholders who were involved in the field research – where it was clear that communities felt that nothing could be done unless government first fulfilled their mandates. It is also apparent that governments work better with communities, which are already mobilised and responsive. So, in effect, each party is waiting for the other one to make a move and the result is that a community is in a state of inertia when it comes to safety, relying on one or two entities to fulfil the task of policing, sometimes ineffectively at that.

6.3.2. Solution

South African policing needs to be delivered equitably, so that all communities and citizens are able to access policing which is effective, responsive and accountable. It is no longer a given that this will be delivered solely by the state, the solution needs to take into account the resources that are already available. As outlined by Clifford Shearing:

“We have in South Africa all the resources, knowledge and capacity we need to develop a security system that will keep us safe. ... [we need to] integrate the resources of the public, the private and the community sectors ... in a whole-of-society approach ... [and] treat the various partners as equally

important in the contributions they can make to the larger whole. What you need is a network of strong partners.”⁴¹

In other words, the solution is in thinking of policing as more than just what the police do and finding ways to balance the inequities in policing between various communities through boosting non-state endeavours and ensuring they align to democratic values of conduct. For instance, as with the cases of Sinxolo and Franziska, the available ‘resource’ in both instances, was community knowledge of who could have been involved in committing these crimes. In Franziska’s case, this knowledge or resource was immediately mobilised and in Sinxolo’s case, it was not. For the police to harness these knowledge networks requires that they re-build or strengthen their relationships with community members and organisations – NHWs can be seen as pivotal fulcrums here, in which they can themselves become the forum through which the intentions and desires of each is expressed. As such, it is important that NHW meetings and events are well attended by *both* parties, in spaces that need to be reclaimed (such as local parks and playgrounds).

6.3.3. Recommendation and implementation

This report is focused specifically on the role of NHWs and CPFs within networks of policing. Resolving deep-seated inequalities in state policing is an ongoing and difficult endeavour outside the purview of this report. However, as mentioned, the playing field between different communities can be levelled through a focus on improving non-state capacities both in terms of harnessing resources (monetary, knowledge-based and otherwise) as well as ensuring that there are fulcrums in the community which could mobilise these resources without being dependent on any one institution or node (such as the SAPS, particularly where they are not trusted by the community). A focus on how to make NHWs and CPFs more effective is to be discussed in the next section, but in terms of the challenge of providing equitable policing it is true that government departments (local and provincial) and SAPS have a (constitutional) mandate to provide services equitably to communities. Yet, the reality is that this is an ongoing endeavour – the Constitution has not yet been fully

⁴¹ Shearing, C. 2008. Making South Africans Safe: Possibilities and Prospects. *Acta Criminologica CRIMSA Conference Special Edition* (1):1-11 at 2, 4, 6.

fulfilled, it is an aspiration. However, it is not true that communities need to wait for these inequalities to be addressed before they can mobilise. What can be done in the meantime is to boost the non-state to shift mentalities (mindsets) so as to be able to think of policing as ‘everyone’s business’ and to realise that NHWs and CPFs have resources (knowledges, for instance) that are invaluable in resolving safety issues. Think again of the case of Franziska, mentioned above, where community knowledge was integral to making arrests of those suspected of murdering Franziska. What is the role of DOCS in this regard? It seems to be the case that only already-existing NHWs are being accredited by DOCS. What of the possibilities of inspiring NHWs to be developed where there are none? Communities often wait for an incident to happen before they mobilise and then once things have returned to a state of normality, the mobilisation dissipates. There is a need to inspire communities to mobilise in times of normality and in times of crisis, there is a need for a shift in mindset in terms of the possibilities open to communities with respect to the vast array of tools at their disposal (which will be discussed) as well as the fact that they do not need to wait for government before something is done. DOCS, in co-operation with the City of Cape Town, could be involved as a fulcrum or broker in leveraging peer-to-peer engagements, where well-functioning NHWs and CPFs could be encouraged to, and supported in, meeting with communities where NHWs and CPFs are defunct or are having difficulties, to inspire and to share successes. In fact, this was mentioned on more than one occasion during the two UCT workshops – the importance of peer-to-peer interactions and the need for more opportunities for this to happen. DOCS could therefore play a role in facilitating these interactions by ‘connecting’ communities or to broker the involvement of an individual or institution who could do this. Much of the challenge of aligning the non-state to democratic, effective safety governance is in fact a shift in ways of thinking.

6.4. DELIVERY OF SERVICE: NHWS AND CPFS AS EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT

6.4.1. Statement of the problem

The challenge, as mentioned, is that not all communities experience effective and efficient policing – involving state and non-state entities in a whole-of-society, democratic manner. Effectiveness is an important part of democratic policing, as

effectiveness boosts legitimacy. In other words, being effective can lead towards a node or institution being viewed as legitimate (having authority or the right to govern) and in turn incline others (individuals, communities, businesses, the government) to support it. However, the irony is that although effectiveness may lead to an increase in legitimacy, legitimacy may be a pre-condition of effectiveness. Legitimacy may be “a necessary condition for effectiveness: no legitimacy, no success.”⁴² In other words being legitimate helps one to be more effective (as it facilitates co-operation), so too, effectiveness helps one to be seen to be more legitimate – legitimacy and effectiveness are mutually constitutive.

Either way, for effectiveness to be democratic (not just for an elite group), the result of its activities should be for the ‘public interest’ or provided on an equitable basis – especially with respect to policing. In other words, aspiring to provide security for a public, collective or social good is also a means by which legitimacy claims are made. For instance, mob justice may be effective and be viewed as a legitimate means of dealing with a crime by a small group within the community, but in the long term the effects of mob justice are damaging to the community and to relations with others. In short, being effective in line with public goods provision or in line with the public interest simply means that the service being provided “promote[s] the objectives and concerns of ‘society’”.⁴³ The challenge is how can the non-state be more effective in line with the public interest? And how can this effectiveness be gauged or assessed? The challenge is also that the non-state (and state) may be trapped in a security logic or a way of thinking, which prevents it from exploring innovative ways of impacting on safety in communities. Where there is a desire to be innovative, there may not be the skills or capacity to go beyond rudimentary mechanisms of securing communities (such as simple gating practices or the resort to violence). In the case of NHWs for instance, NHWs may exist on a continuum of skills and may require capacitation to go beyond basic activities.

⁴² Krasner, S.D and Risse, T. 2014. External actors, state-building, and service provision in areas of limited statehood: introduction. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*. 27(4):545–567 at 547.

⁴³ Shearing, C. & Wood, J. 2003. Governing security for common goods. *International Journal of the Sociology of Law*. 31:205-225 at 205.

6.4.2. Solution

In order for safety to be dealt with holistically (whole-of-society) in a community there are a number of functions or ways of thinking that have to exist. In communities where there is whole-of-society policing or safety governance the effects on safety can be quite remarkable (think of for instance, well-functioning and well-established City Improvement Districts, also known as Special Rating Areas). For instance, every community needs a node to perform a reactive, rapid response to an emergency. In many respects, if the emergency is crime-related, then this should be a state police function given their unique powers to legitimately use coercive force. The reality is however, that other nodes are performing this function, such as private security. So too, communities need some node or nodes to perform a law enforcement function – whether it is traffic-related or by-law related. There are a number of other functions that need to be undertaken to mitigate the effects of insecurity and unsafety. These functions could be service delivery functions, which contribute to the development of a community – such as waste management, street maintenance and cleansing as well as provision of housing, for instance. There is no denying that these functions contribute to the long-term safety needs of a community. In many respects provision is made for all these services or functions to exist in a community – whether or not they are actually delivered is the key challenge. Yet, besides all of these functions, for which the Constitution and supporting normative frameworks makes provision, there are usually more immediate and direct safety functions besides rapid response and law enforcement, which are not necessarily mandated for or being adequately addressed in communities. We would argue that these functions constitute serious gaps when considering safety holistically. Essentially what is not mandated for in communities or is not offered consistently in some communities is a node or nodes specifically tasked to undertaking the following functions:

Analytical capacity to prevent unsafety and to problem-solve

There is the need for a node or nodes to undertake an analysis of safety issues in the community or to engage in a problem-solving approach. This is to fulfil the design principle of being future focused and asking the questions:

- What was the reason for this happening?
- What can be done to prevent it from happening again?

Or put in another way – what are the conditions that existed which allowed the incident to happen and how to alter those conditions so that the incident doesn't happen again?

Analysing a safety issue could be crime-focused in that after an incident has happened these questions could be asked and the relevant node(s) and resources mobilised accordingly. Analysing a safety issue could also be focused on a space or on people's perceptions (of the police, of safety, of crime, of fear of crime); it could also be pre-emptive – predicting that a harm or crime will occur and finding ways to reduce the likelihood of it happening.

Which node is the most equipped to take on this analytical role? Depending on the nature of the community in question the first responder to a crime incident would likely be the SAPS, private security, community members, street committees or the NHW. It may not be desirable for the role of analysis to simply be assigned to the node which is the first responder to the incident after it has happened. Not all nodes have the flexibility, knowledge and/or legitimacy to take on this role, especially in a way that is aligned to democratic values (for instance, community members responding to an incident may take the law into their own hands). However, the most capable of achieving this role are the NHWs and CPFs. NHWs operate at street level and so can engage in street-level analysis and problem-solving. CPFs operate within a community or institutional space and so could analyse incidents after they have occurred involving others involved in the CPF meetings (the SAPS, councillors, NHW members, private security or community members).

Fulcrum capacity: the ability to leverage nodes and resources

Besides an analytical focus there is also a need to harness the right knowledges, resources and capacities to come to bear on a safety issue. Once an analysis of the safety issue has taken place then the correct nodes and resources could be mobilised to address the issue and there are a number of ways to 'think' about an issue. For instance, in the case of Franziska, one response from the community was simply to abandon the Tokai forest altogether. Another response could be having more visible policing, and yet another response could be populating the forest through organised

activities, events and community presence. Yet another response could be to cement relations with neighbouring communities with respect to closing the gaps in unsafety by linking community knowledges about the causes of unsafety. The use of technology (drones, cell phone communication, incident reporting apps etc) could also be considered in this analysis. In other words, depending on how a safety issue is analysed will determine what resources are mobilised to address that issue. A future-orientated analysis therefore, cannot simply entail a solution of ‘more or better police’, as the state police react to a crime incident after it has happened – waiting for a murder, rape or assault to happen and then to react is counter-intuitive especially when communities in fact have the knowledge to be able to prevent or mitigate crimes. In terms of fulcrum capacity – NHWs could perform a mobile fulcrum role (on a street level, harnessing the responses needed to resolve an issue), in line with the Neighbourhood Safety Officer scheme being rolled out by the City of Cape Town. CPFs could play a static fulcrum role, using CPF meetings to analyse as well as leverage resources to resolve a problem through assigning tasks to various nodes (some CPFs are already undertaking this role). Oversight then becomes embedded in the functioning of the CPF, since allocating taskings to various nodes in order to operationalise a whole-of-society approach also leads to follow-up in terms of whether that tasking was fulfilled. In other words, CPFs could facilitate circular or horizontal accountability between nodes in an equal manner.

Toolkit of responses to unsafety

What is essentially needed in a whole-of-society approach is a toolkit of responses to be used as and when needed. CPFs and NHWs could take on task and activities that could be more responsive to the challenges of unsafety. In fact, it could be argued that the SAPS are the least flexible institution given their mandate and operational role. NHWs and CPFs are far more flexible and have the scope to undertake innovative solutions to crime and safety challenges. Some ‘tools’ that NHWs and/or CPFs could be trained in using is:

- Dispute resolution / restorative justice

NHWs and/or CPFs could be trained in conflict mediation based on Peace Committee principles, alternatively street committees could be partnered to achieve this.

- Space management (such as placemaking)


Placemaking is a way of thinking about, and acting on, a space so as to reduce the likelihood of that space being supportive of risky, harmful or unwanted behaviour.

➤ Mobile/static analytical capacity and fulcrum activity

As mentioned, being trained to analyse a safety issue (either on the ground or within a meeting space), to think innovatively about who could be involved in its resolution and to mobilise those nodes able to contribute to the solution.

These tools or functions could be over and beyond the more traditional functions of NHWs and CPFs, such as patrolling in the former case, and oversight in the latter case.


This is not to say these roles or functions are not performed, but it is to acknowledge that communities may experience gaps in these types of functions as they may be undertaken on an ad hoc basis. If they are not performed at all or not performed well there is no recourse for oversight or answerability as they are generally not a statutory obligation for any particular safety node. It is simply to ask what functions could be undertaken by NHWs and CPFs that fill a gap in safety governance in a particular community in light of what is already being provided effectively in that community. In other words, NHWs could have a basket of functions – patrolling for the sake of deterrence, visibility or ‘eyes and ears’, patrolling for the sake of being a mobile fulcrum, dispute resolution, placemaking and so forth. Or it may be necessary to fulfil only one or two functions given, for instance, the existence of a well-functioning private security company already performing an ‘eyes and ears’ role or a church organisation already fulfilling a dispute resolution or conflict mediation role. In other words, as mentioned, this is where models of safety governance need to have flexible components which factor into account contextual conditions. All NHWs and CPFs should have a core administrative and managerial hub, but the functions they perform could be flexible components or offshoots of that hub performing these functions as part of the NHW but also with some degree of independence. The administrative and managerial hub could then co-ordinate the flexible components of the NHW or CPF. A possible way of envisioning this is through the diagrams below:



CPFs and NHWs could therefore fill those spaces (both physical space and functional space) where there is no other capable node to do this. In other words, they have a static core but flexible functionality that can be used as and when needed without harming the sustainability of the NHW or CPF in itself.

Another way of doing this would be to view NHWs or CPFs as fulfilling one of two functions. They could in themselves be trained to offer these types of functions (they would be the providers) or they could take on a brokering role to identify, mobilise and integrate those in the community who are performing these functions but doing so in isolation of other efforts or on an ad hoc basis. In other words, depending on the context, NHWs could be the conflict mediators or have a module or portfolio which they offer to fulfil this function. Alternatively, they could mobilise conflict mediators in the community as and when needed (play a fulcrum role). They could also perform both functions – provide the services which are not performed in the community and identify, mobilise and integrate those which are already being performed.

In fulfilling some of, or all of, these roles or facilitating those who do, gaps in safety




provision can be filled, even if temporarily. This also raises the issue of redundancy, there may be redundancy in actual operations/function or redundancy in mentalities (in analytical capacity) the point is to ensure that all gaps in safety governance are filled and that safety is approached holistically involving a range of resources, knowledges and capacities. The point is that there are endless possible functions NHWs and CPFs could perform – either in terms of providing these functions themselves or leveraging the nodes or resources who could perform these functions. It depends on the gaps and needs of a community – NHWs or CPFs, for instance, could provide for victim and civic support through assisting in the sheltering of victims of abuse, providing counselling, rehabilitation, access to safehouses or halfway houses, temporary or relief housing, reintegration of ex-offenders and so forth.

The role of DOCs here is primarily one of oversight – however, such oversight cannot effectively occur unless the practical templates and measures proposed here are themselves replicated in DOCs itself. Such communication channels can easily be established, so as that the data entered into the templates by individual NHWs and CPFs is made visible for DOCs representatives. Moreover, it is clear from the above reports that representivity is a critical concern. It is therefore advised that area managers not only be established, but that their performance merits be evaluated, in part, from submissions by those NHW and CPF representatives in the areas to which they have been attached.

6.4.3. Recommendation and implementation

NHWs and CPFs currently operate on a continuum of capacities – some are able to fulfil multiple functions and can draw on a range of skills and capacities from within their own communities. Some NHWs and CPFs currently fulfil only basic functions.

This can be presented as a linear or developmental progression – NHWs and CPFs amassing skills and capacities over time and it can also be presented as a continuum of possibilities – some NHWs having advanced skills and some not. NHWs and CPFs must be capacitated to reach their maximum potential, but an audit of this potential needs to be undertaken. In other words, what are the current functions NHWs and CPFs are able to perform? Where on the continuum of possibilities are they situated? For instance, consider the diagram below, showing a continuum of safety skills:



In other words, to capacitate NHWs and CPFs there is a need to not only expand the possibilities of what they could be doing but to provide training and support to achieve these possibilities. DOCS could provide this training but perhaps a better alternative would be for DOCS to leverage the support of others who could do this, in light of the diversity of training needs and the fact that some training would have to be conducted by highly-skilled specialists. There was also a clear call by NHWs and CPFs involved in the research that training be delivered ‘on-the-ground’. For some modules – such as placemaking – this is imperative. Again, DOCS could act as a fulcrum through mobilising, incentivising and/or commissioning skilled trainers to provide training to NHWs and CPFs in their communities. Or in some instances, training would be better performed through peer-to-peer encounters through identifying NHWs who have advanced skills in certain safety functions and encouraging interactions with other NHWs (for instance, BKM has a number of technological skillsets which it could share with others). Templates for training could be developed by the trainers themselves and shared.

Apart from an audit of the functionality of NHWs and CPFs, there is also a need for a safety audit within communities. This could be done by NHWs and CPFs themselves with support provided from government. This safety audit could entail a mapping of the dangers or risk in a community, but also the available and potential resources and

partners in that community. This may simply entail a NHW taking on a Neighbourhood Safety Officer function and walking through the community analysing risks and possibilities and simply speaking to people and institutions. It may be a more sophisticated endeavour involving City-generated mapping systems, crime statistics, victim surveys and/or business surveys. Either way, some form of assessment of the resources emanating from a community needs to be performed with the assistance of the City of Cape Town and or DOCS or institutions (government or private sector) within these communities.

What of incentives to fulfil multiple and diverse functions within a whole-of-society framing? Although research differs on this issue, it has been found that the non-state may be incentivised to be more effectiveness in alignment with the public interest if prompted by a “strong state” or “shadow of hierarchy” somewhere in the background to (positively) motivate the non-state to deliver security that caters for the public interest.⁴⁴ This could be the role of DOCS in terms of the accreditation process underway with NHWs and the role of SAPS with regards to its mandate to ensure that CPFs are operational. The state in general can re-incentivise communities through providing support in a feedback loop – in other words, through being responsive. Besides this, there are multiple other ways in which NHWs and CPFs can be motivated to provide safety in innovative ways for the public interest. Other motivators include:

- the benefits of being more effective (cleaning up a space and so reduce vandalism of that space, for instance) is a motivator to continue
- the fruits of being seen as more legitimate and the resulting participation and/or co-operation of others (the more effective the NHWs or CPFs, the more citizens, communities and institutions are drawn to becoming involved)
- the individual benefits of contributing to one’s community (or another community), or more concretely being trained in skills that one did not previously have
- more directly, being paid a stipend to participate or some in-kind contribution (such as a petrol voucher, a shopping voucher, an airtime voucher, receiving a

⁴⁴ Börzel, T. & Risse, T. 2010. Governance without a state: can it work? *Regulation & Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*. 4:113–134 at 113 and 114.

sponsorship or donation from a business or private security company, or using money collected from community membership fees or donations etc).

In other words, the non-state (NHWs and CPFs) may over time be motivated to “internalize the logic of [the] public good” in and of itself rather than due to a shadow of hierarchy motivating this.⁴⁵ However, as mentioned, NHWs and CPFs are on a continuum of development. Through having a stable administrative and managerial core with flexible or functional components, monetary incentives could be provided to NHWs although performing the role of Peace Committees. In other words, there is no need to fund new models of safety governance, but to recognise that old structures are simply performing new tasks. Incentives could be aligned to outputs – such as for instance, if a NHW or a CPF takes on a Peace Committee function, then small stipends could be paid for every gathering organised. In other words, DOCS could support modules (through stipends or training or feedback) adopted by NHWs and CPFs which are in alignment with democratic values of policing while fitting into the whole-of-society, future-orientated way of safety governance. As mentioned earlier, a MoU could be signed between DOCS and some communities – particularly those which are still in developmental stages. In this way there is a reciprocal relationship and an expectation from both in terms of what is expected rather than a one-sided communication engagement.

The challenge is how to measure whether any of this has made an impact on improving safety. Crime statistics may or may not be shared by the SAPS, may be outdated by the time they are shared, are reflective of a small part of safety governance and may not actually be useful in gauging anything except trust between the SAPS and a community (through high or low levels of reporting). A better measure would be perceptions of safety and feelings of fear. If the NHWs and CPFs are functioning well enough to tap into the knowledge, resources, capacities and general ‘mood’ of a community then this will be known to them. Inexpensive and simple methods exist (through the use of cell phone technology and applications) whereby one could conduct a community survey to gather this type of information

⁴⁵ White, A. 2011. The new political economy of private security. *Theoretical Criminology*. 16(1):85-101 at 97.

(such as the app ‘OurHood’ or through the City of Cape Town’s EPIC programme). In other words, developments in crowd-sourcing information can be explored and tested.

6.5. NHWS AND CPFS AS RESPONSIVE

6.5.1. Statement of the problem

The responsiveness of a policing entity generally means that it aligns its services with the “wishes of the people”.⁴⁶ But it is also being responsive to changing safety dynamics within one’s community. In other words, policing nodes need to be flexible in their responsiveness to changing community needs and risks. Again, this cannot be outside of democratic values – in other words, the needs of a community cannot trump Constitutional values through demanding retributive violence or racial profiling, for instance. It is also to acknowledge the challenge of having a “hyperactive citizenry” – where there are too many and too diverse community demands made on a policing entity and where a degree of apathy may be a good thing.⁴⁷

6.5.2. Solution

Responsiveness to the needs of a community can be fulfilled through NHWs and CPFs allowing participation in their structures and decisions. In other words, allowing for all community voices to be heard and to adopt a citizen-centric or a human security perspective. This simply means considering safety issues from the perspectives of those affected by them, that is, members of the community. These safety issues could be anything from bullying at school to experiencing a hijacking in one’s driveway. The perspective of citizens needs to be taken into account and in so doing align safety solutions to real needs and to changing risk environments, instead of simply carrying on with the same solution for every problem without pausing to reflect on the continued value of this approach. NHWs and CPFs therefore should be in touch with community needs and perspectives as well as changing security risks but then also translate or transmit the needs of the community to others who could

⁴⁶ Jones, T., Newburn, T. and Smith, D. 1994. *Democracy and Policing*. London: Policy Studies Institute, pp. 44-8 at 47.

⁴⁷ Hecl, 1999 in Grabosky, P. 2009. Democratic policing. In *Community policing and peacekeeping*. P. Grabosky, Ed. Boca Raton: CRC Press. 33-54 at 50.

contribute to resolving safety issues in that community (the government or the private sector, for instance).

6.5.3. Recommendation and implementation

As mentioned, there are a number of ways by which one can crowd-source information with respect to actual incidences of unsafety, feelings of unsafety and/or suggestions on preventing or mitigating unsafety. In other words, with the right platforms in place (such as an incident reporting cell phone application) there is no need to over-rely on the sharing of crime statistics, as the crime statistics will only necessarily present one facet of the broader safety issues facing a community. NHWs and CPFs can therefore be responsive to community risks, perceptions and suggestions through the use of technology. CPFs are further capacitated to act as a link between communities and the state and so can act as a translation service between the community and government entities, especially when government services need to be harnessed to resolve particular safety issues. Again, peer-to-peer learning may be a way by which technologies can be introduced into different communities. Those communities already making use of technology can be asked to present these options to other communities and this could be facilitated by DOCS or the City of Cape Town or an appropriate body. The creation of a forum which meets on a regular basis could also be the way by which peer-to-peer learnings are introduced and sustained.

6.6. DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

6.6.1. Statement of the problem

It is inevitable that there will be at some point power struggles within leadership structures in a community.

“Modern societies are shifting networks of agencies, associations, corporations and domestic units, with many distinct and differentiated *loci* of decision, criteria of judgment, bodies of knowledge and expertise. This “pluralism” entails genuine conflicts of interest, struggles for political ascendancy and labile alliances.”⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Rose, N. 1987. Beyond the public/private division: law, power and the family. *Journal of Law and Society*. 14(1):61-76 at 68.


The challenge is when these power structures undermine the broader safety project of a community through being subverted by individual or sectional motivations. To avoid this, power should be distributed so that power is not concentrated among a single individual or a few individuals or nodes whose interests trump the interests of the greater good.

6.6.2. Solution


The concentration of power in the hands of a few can be mitigated through responsiveness (as mentioned above) and through participation (to be discussed). The other option is for power to be distributed across a community and to recognise that each individual or node has its own forms of power that can be harnessed to achieve whole-of-society safety governance. In terms of the former point, there are many ways by which NHWs and CPFs can organise themselves so as to ensure democratic appointment of governance structures without relying on a single, strong individual personality. For instance, although BKM has in fact relied on a strong personality it has also created a set of distributed governing authorities (a managing committee, an executive committee) and so forth. There should be an opportunity to allow for open and democratic elections – such as used by schools to elect school governing bodies. These can be simple ways in which the community (again possible through voting apps on a cell phone) could ensure that there is a say in terms of where power is distributed and also to ensure that power is temporally distributed (through having regular elections over time). As mentioned, it is also to acknowledge the value of differing forms of power – economic, political, cultural, social and symbolic forms of power.⁴⁹ In other words, that there are a variety of forms of power besides legal power or use of force/violence. This is to acknowledge that within a whole-of-society framing, partnerships between various nodes should be equal or reciprocal, as the value of each node is recognised and hierarchical systems of governance replaced by polycentric ones (as discussed earlier). This is to recognise that leadership does not have to be owned or hierarchical but can be shifting and distributed (such as is the case with the way in which Peace Committees function). This is particularly pertinent

⁴⁹ Bourdieu, P. 1986. The forms of capital. In *Education: culture, economy, and society*. A. Halsey, Ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 46-58.

with respect to the relationship between the state and the non-state and between non-state entities (such as between NHWs and CPFs). It is not necessarily the case that there should be a hierarchical reporting structure between CPFs and NHWs and/or that CPFs act as gatekeepers to resources being distributed. In fact this may undermine the functioning of NHWs and in fact in some contexts, there may not even be a relationship between the two entities depending on need. The type of relationship between the CPFs and NHWs should rather be one of networking (co-ordination and co-operation) and a means by which various 'levels' in a community can be connected as the following diagram shows:



Another way of visualising this relationship is as follows:



6.6.3. Recommendation and implementation

The issue of encouraging distributed power or power which is constructive and beneficial is to ensure partnerships are equal between various nodes in recognising that each entity has a strength which it can bring to bear on resolving safety. A simple starting point to ensuring equal partnering is for two parties to sign a Memorandum of Understanding to identify mutual needs or incentives, recognise the core values of each party and to ensure that entities are speaking the same language about the problems needing to be addressed in a community. This is a simple mechanism by which partnerships could be initiated and sustained, to build trust between entities and also to develop a joint vision of safety governance.

Further to this, it is also to ensure that power structures do not undermine the broader democratic safety project. A way to achieve this is through the involvement of DOCS in ensuring that NHWs and CPFs are aligned to democratic values through aligning accreditation criteria with these values. However, it is imperative that DOCS is not simply the recipient of accreditation forms – there must be on-the-ground support for this process and guidance in terms of standards and behaviour which is expected in line with the democratic values as outlined in this report. This support could be provided by DOCS (or the City of Cape Town) itself or it could be peer-to-peer engagements or a private consultancy set up for the purpose of assisting NHWs in getting accredited, drafting proposals for funding from government and developing a

business case which aligns with a democratic vision of non-state safety governance. Incentivisation for achieving this need not be direct monetary benefits but also the benefits that come from being accredited and gaining legitimacy (being seen as credible and trusted) and through this process, opening up prospects of partnering with others (the private sector for instance). The benefits need to be communicated to those involved at all stages.

6.7. INFORMATION

6.7.1. Statement of the problem

Information gathering, sharing and communication are fundamental to any system of safety governance and is often the cause of a break-down in relationships between nodes. In order to fulfil many of the democratic criteria discussed, routine, good information is usually the lynchpin to success. Sharing information is not only vital for pragmatic reasons but is also a symbolic exchange of mutual support between nodes.⁵⁰ As demonstrated by the Franziska and Sinxolo cases, local knowledge is vital and in fact is one of the prevailing strengths of communities. Yet, there are difficulties in tapping into this knowledge or other knowledges. The privacy of information (crime statistics or police operations for instance) may result in certain nodes (such as the state police, for instance) withholding vital information. The inability or unwillingness to share information negatively impacts on the building of reciprocity and trust between nodes and, in turn, certain nodes (again the state police, for instance) may not support co-operation where there is a lack of trust.

6.7.2. Solution

As mentioned, redundancy may happen when nodes aren't speaking to each other, but there are also a number of ways in which information sharing can be easily promoted. Technology is the answer to many obstacles with respect to information sharing. Where information is private and cannot be shared there are always opportunities to create parallel systems of information (again, through the crowd-sourcing option). What is important though is that information sharing is reciprocal.

⁵⁰ Fleming, J. 2006. Working through networks: the challenge of partnership policing. In *Fighting crime together: the challenges of policing and security networks*. J. Fleming & J. Wood, Eds. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press. 87-115.

6.7.3. Recommendation and implementation

The role of DOCS in information sharing is something that needs to be re-considered given that the experience of communities has been that communication with DOCS is one-sided. DOCS may collect information (through EPP forms and accreditation forms) but the levels of feedback to communities was an issue raised by many involved in the research. Information harnessed from the community must be acknowledged or applied in some way so as to recognise the value of such information. Technology, again, can be an easy manner by which a short acknowledgement is given to some information gathered, through an SMS or a WhatsApp message or email.

6.8. REDRESS

6.8.1. Statement of the problem

Opportunities for redress should be available where something has gone wrong and there is cause for complaint. For instance, a node is underperforming, subversive or using tactics which are undemocratic. There needs to be a forum where complaints can be laid and these are taken seriously. This is an ongoing challenge with respect to policing especially considering the powers at play with regards to those involved. There are many formal structures available to citizens for complaining about government bodies (which may or may not be functioning well) but no similar systems for the non-state. As mentioned, one of the ways by which a node gains legitimacy is through being effective, but so too through being transparent and accountable. Being accountable means having the obligation to answer (to another entity) for one's activities – this includes both those activities that have happened and that will happen. Being transparent means allowing one's activities to be accessible to others.⁵¹ It should also be acknowledged that state and non-state nodes may both be sources and recipients of oversight techniques, both as regulators and as the regulated.⁵² Such an account views accountability as something embedded in social

⁵¹ Lodge, M. 2004. Accountability and transparency in regulation: critiques, doctrines and instruments. In *The politics of regulation: institutions and regulatory reforms for the age of governance*. J. Jordana & D. Levi-Faur, Eds. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 124-144.

⁵² Black, J. 2008. Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes. *Regulation & Governance*. 2:137-164.

relations – forms of social control that can happen amongst nodes in a community as from outside of the community. In other words, there is a range of top-down, formal and/or state accountability mechanisms in place to regulate state policing nodes, yet, as mentioned, they may not be effective. These mechanisms, although important, generally promote “accountability upward” (top-down) rather than “accountability downward” (bottom-up).⁵³ The one mechanism that is meant to promote accountability downward – the CPF – is not always able to fulfil this task. CPFs – normatively speaking – are a state-mandated mechanism by which public participation and political representation can happen within communities (with respect to security provision). But they have largely failed to do this for a variety of reasons. In general, although hierarchical systems of oversight and accountability are important in terms of their role in keeping nodes accountable, they tend to be ad hoc, as opposed to systemic, reactive as opposed to preventative, and nodally focused as opposed to network-focused.

6.8.2. Solution

There is a need to explore supplementary and innovative systems of redress and accountability. Contractual systems of accountability – through for instance, service level agreements, have been posited as one way of achieving mutual accountability between contracting entities. There are also a number of informal systems by which nodes can be held accountable – through peer pressure, cold shouldering or naming and shaming. Public outcry over an event is a way to mobilise formal accountability and complaints systems. Incentivised self-regulation is also a way by which incentives could be aligned to accountability requirements where for instance, the prospect of mutual gain also ensures that nodes are accountable to each other to avoid for instance, cold shouldering or the threat of ejection / exclusion from a network or relationship. There are positive means by which accountability is ensured, for instance, the Facebook page of a neighbourhood watch praising the performance of the police. In other words, there are a number of organic and informal ways by which accountability can be promoted and ensured and this is linked to desires by the non-state to gain legitimacy and to be effective. In other words, ‘real’ accountability lies in

⁵³ Baker, B. 2008. *Multi-choice policing in Africa*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, p. 178.

the daily transactional relationships between nodes, which is evolving and organic – both complementing and supplanting formal systems of regulation.

6.8.3. Recommendation and implementation

A way to align activities with transparency and accountability requirements is to ensure that incentives promote certain desirable activities and values. The accreditation process is a way to achieve this but it should be complemented with communication around what desirable activities and values are wanted. In other words, DOCS itself needs to be transparent and accountable to communities in terms of its intentions and aims. Accreditation forms need to come with consultation and support. It is also to acknowledge the importance of informal and organic systems of accountability which already exist between nodes and to further encourage these systems through MoUs between parties to resolve misunderstandings about performance and services. CPFs in particular have a useful role to play in inspiring organic systems of accountability but also fulfilling its oversight mandate. CPFs, in other words are potentially sites of mutual, horizontal and vertical accountabilities and redress – and operate as such in some communities already.

6.9. PARTICIPATION

6.9.1. Statement of the problem

Any democratic system of governance allows for the participation of citizenry in deciding on governing objectives (through elections or through other forums). This does not mean that each and every citizen should or must participate as one needs to consider also the right *not* participate, but there should be means by which citizenry can participate, as they have the right to do so.⁵⁴ It is also to acknowledge the challenge of hyperactive citizenry as mentioned earlier, where over-active participation results in stagnation, where nothing can be decided upon. A large component of democratic participation is therefore electing a core group of representatives who will take forward the ‘public interest’ but who do not undermine community needs through power mongering or power struggles (as mentioned). The

⁵⁴ Jones, T., Newburn, T. and Smith, D. 1994. *Democracy and Policing*. London: Policy Studies Institute, pp. 44-8.

challenge then is to ensure that representation (of the community) is not unduly influenced by the strongest voices. What is desirable, however, is to be able to draw on the participation of the community or individuals as and when needed to resolve some safety need or issue in the community. Such as for instance, recruiting the services of a builder to fix a dilapidated house or an accountant to audit the books of the local CPF. It speaks to the very idea of the whole-of-society approach – to enrol nodes as and when needed to participate in resolving a safety issue. Participation only happens when communities or individuals are incentivised to participate (through morals or money for instance) and have bought-into the NHW or CPF. That is, the NHW or CPF are viewed as legitimate. As mentioned, legitimacy is derived from being effective and accountable, but also through perceptions of being representative. If CPFs or NHWs are viewed as representing partisan interests then they may be seen as legitimate by some parts of the community and illegitimate by other parts of the community.

6.9.2. Solution

A large part of the challenge of finding balanced participation is in fact through the widening of the functionality of NHWs and CPFs. For example, only certain members of parts of the community would be interested in patrolling but rendering other types of functions (such as conflict resolution) and being trained in this, will encourage the participation of other members of the community. If the NHWs accept diversity of function, there will always be something to do and always someone needing to partner with. In other words, through implementing a multi-functional role (plus training) for NHWs and CPFs, participation should increase. This in turn will increase the legitimacy of these nodes and so inspire a more active citizenry. This is not to dismiss a volunteer-based approach, but to consider the needs of specific communities and find ways to incentivise beyond an individual moral commitment

6.9.3. Recommendation and implementation

DOCS could again play a brokering role to inspire the alignment of private sector donations or rewards to those involved in NHWs and CPFs. As mentioned, petrol vouchers, meal vouchers or airtime vouchers are small ways by which to incentivise some participation in a NHW or CPF as and when needed. For places where resources

are scarce and competed for, individual incentives should be favoured over group incentives – as this may create or perpetuate sectional power struggles. The aim is to facilitate a flow of resources both from within and from outside communities so as to inspire non-state action which is democratic and legitimate. In terms of formal democratic participation the CPFs have a fundamental role to play in this regard, in theory, CPFs are a means by which members of the public can participate, apolitically, in decisions on the security of their community. If done well, it is a way to operationalise safety governance as it provides a means by which the public can participate in decision-making and problem-solving processes and engage with the police in terms of the security governance of their neighbourhood. The CPFs are a state mandated and initiated mechanism of democratic participation (normatively speaking) but it is only through the workings of the community within the CPFs that make this democratic goal an empirical reality. Through CPFs taking on a fulcrum role and by inspiring the allocation and operationalization of tasks to promote whole-of-society safety governance, it also fulfils its constitutional mandate to promote oversight of the state police (and others) through simultaneously promoting horizontal and mutual accountability between all nodes as equal partners. Again, the task is to encourage a re-imagining of current roles to incorporate more innovative and engaged forms of safety governance. This could involve DOCS encouraging or facilitating peer-to-peer engagements, particular of CPFs which are already undertaking a whole-of-society role. In fact consider the diagram below extracted from the City of Cape Town website in which the CPF is already presented as a central node or fulcrum for other players (whereas many would expect the SAPS to be the central node in a hierarchical manner):⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Diagram taken from: <https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/MetroPolice2/Pages/Community-police-forums.aspx>



The point of all the above is to work towards developing NHWs and CPFs as legitimate nodes in all communities. In order to function effectively NWHs and CPFs need to be seen to be legitimate both by the state and by the communities in which they function and all the organisations with which they associate or partner. To be legitimate may mean that a node holds firm to ideals of democratic conduct, such as, being transparent and accountable, representative of the community and so forth. Legitimacy can also mean that a node is generally considered to be an appropriate, proper or acceptable organisation which has the trust and confidence of those with whom it works or associates. Furthermore, those who consider an authority to be legitimate “feel personally obligated to defer” to it and obey it, hence the importance of having a legitimate state police, for instance.⁵⁶

A prevailing concern for government is the inability to effectively work with or partner with non-state or community nodes, for a variety of reasons – such as logistical reasons, lack of understanding between the two or simply that the government views some community organisations as threatening or perhaps illegitimate. Much of the way to resolve this problem is a mind-set in viewing

⁵⁶ Tyler, T.R. 2006. Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation. *Annual Review of Psychology*. 57:375-400 at 376.

communities as assets, as (potential) active citizens and therefore capable partners rather than as a threat or obstacle to government activities. The other ways in which this problem could be tackled is through boosting the legitimacy of these community organisations by encouraging their alignment to democratic values (if not already in alignment) and thorough enabling them to be more effective. The process of accreditation of NHWs is a means by which legitimacy is gained, that is, the state through having its own political legitimacy can confer an authority status onto NHWs.

6.10. OVERVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS


In light of the above, below is a brief summary of the main recommendations:

- ❖ There is a need for a re-think of the way NHWs think of themselves – many are caught in a narrow focus on patrolling and only working with SAPS.
- ❖ There is a need for diverse training in light of the contextual challenges faced by NHWs in different areas.
- ❖ The manner in which training is provided is important, in that peer-to-peer learning is a possibility and/or training offered by a diversity of capable partners and offered ‘on-the-ground’.
- ❖ There is a need for the simplification of procedures with respect to accreditation processes and the EPP and/or more ‘on-the-ground’ support for this (possibly through peer-to-peer engagements).
- ❖ There is a need for ways to cement relationships between organisations through the use of MoUs or informal SLAs (especially between parties where they are not mandated or obliged to partner with each other); this ties into building horizontal systems of accountability (where each holds the other accountable).
- ❖ The use of technology is an important consideration as a means by which organisations can connect and share information, as well as hold each other to account, and the facilitation or substitute of technology in contexts where this is not possible.
- ❖ There is a need to reconsider the role of DOCS in these processes as fulcrum or broker in some contexts – that is, facilitating the support, resources and/or involvement of other government departments or non-state organisations such as the private sector for instance (e.g. facilitating peer-to-peer learning,

harnessing the resources and knowledges of organisations as and when needed, such as for training).


6.11. TEMPLATES AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

As has been highlighted above, a number of templates have been developed so as to expedite the deployment of the suggested changes. These can be diagrammatically represented as follows:



The administrative templates – concerning the recording of assets, finances, and human resources – are replicated across all three domains. These are to be kept relevant and accurate by the administrative core. The other templates are replicable but can also be tailored to the specific needs of a project or unit. Examples of all of these can be found below, but have also been submitted with this final report.

Human Resources:



Projects:

NHW [Name]
[Date]

Project Proposal: [Name of Project]

|

Background

[Why is the project being undertaken? Describe an opportunity or problem that the project is to address.]

Objectives

- [specific & measurable objective_1]
- [specific & measurable objective_2]
- [specific & measurable objective_3]

Scope

[What will be the end result of the project? Describe here what phases of work will be undertaken.]

Timeframe

	Description of Work	Start and End Dates
Phase One
Phase Two
Phase Three

Project Budget

	Description of Work	Anticipated Costs
Phase One
Phase Two
Phase Three
Total		R 0.00

Key Stakeholders

Client	[name]
Sponsor	[name]
Project manager	[name]

Monitoring and Evaluation

[Describe how progress will be evaluated throughout and at the end of the project. Formulate clear indicators for objectives and result.]

Approval Signatures

[Name], NHW Chairperson

[Name], CPF Representative

[Name], DoCS Area Manager

7. CONCLUSION

The field research conducted in the five sites was intended to provide a bottom-up account of the functioning, relations, successes and challenges of NHWs and CPFs. What underpins a whole-of-society approach to governance is to empirically investigate the unique strengths that each safety node can contribute to a broader system of governance. This is to recognise the pitfalls of starting off with a normative goal or descriptor at the expense of first focusing on and understanding what is working on the ground. The ultimate goal is to promote a system of safety governance which is legitimate – effective, inclusive, accountable and democratic. Normative prescriptions are only part of achieving this as, for instance, much of the success stories as exemplified in this report are as a result of evolving relationships and learnings rather than simply from the law or statute. There are advantages and disadvantages to this, but the fact remains that even ‘democracy’ itself is an ongoing experiment; it has to be enacted, implemented or accomplished for it to work.

Democratic, effective security governance is a co-produced accomplishment – it is co-produced by the state and the non-state. The question to be asked is therefore: ‘What needs to be in place for the state, non-state or a hybrid mix of the two, to be motivated enough for public participation, accountability and transparency and public goods provision to happen?’ In other words, what is the practical outcome that we seek and how do we progress towards it in light of the contemporary realities of (state and non-state) policing practices on the ground. Informed by the design principles mentioned at the outset of this report, the research aimed to consider the conditions that need to be present for two important safety nodes (CPF and NHW) to successfully align with the interests of the public and conform to democratic values.