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Editorial

Making sense of the duality of social cohesion

This edition of *South African Crime Quarterly* is a special edition dedicated to investigating the role of social cohesion in understanding and addressing the problem of violence in South Africa.

Social cohesion is a broad concept, but can be summarised briefly as referring to the factors that 'hold a society together'.[1] The term has been utilised to denote a broad array of social characteristics that are seen to contribute to connectedness and solidarity at local and national levels. These include common values and identity, feelings of belonging, citizen participation in common organisations, and community cooperation and interaction. It extends further to encompass those things that are necessary for sustaining (holding together) a democratic nation-state, such as political legitimacy and democratic participation. By implication, a society lacking cohesion would be one that displayed social disorder and conflict, disparate moral values, extreme social inequality, low levels of social interaction between and within communities, and low levels of place attachment – characteristics that are familiar to South Africa.[2] Collective efficacy, a more recent development of the concept of social cohesion, refers to how social cohesion can prevent violence when it is translated into collective action for the 'common good' at neighbourhood level.[3]

While a lack of social cohesion is theorised to result in a state of disorder or conflict, low levels of social cohesion are also seen to undermine the effectiveness of crime prevention initiatives at local level. International studies have found that communities with the highest crime and violence rates are often those who are unable or reluctant to organise collaboratively as a result of lack of trust. But is this the case in South Africa?

This edition of the *SACQ* seeks to critically interrogate the concept of social cohesion and its meaning in South Africa. Thus far, the leading policy and academic work on social cohesion and collective efficacy has taken place in countries in the global North and has been oriented to address the problems of division in these contexts. In South Africa, we face a different set of challenges in a country defined by its heterogeneity and inequality. One of our primary challenges is to determine how to constitute a new democratic nation-state, based on relationships of solidarity and connection between citizens, after the many decades of conflict and division that tore apart our social fabric and while inequality remains a stubborn feature of our landscape.

While the term 'social cohesion' has been incorporated into government discourse over the past decade, and efforts have been made to indigenise the concept by incorporating local concepts such as ubuntu into our notion of social cohesion, there has been very little empirical investigation into the lived meaning and conditions of social cohesion in the South African context, or analysis of how bonds between citizens may help to prevent or indeed increase violence. The articles in this edition attempt to address some of these empirical and conceptual gaps and go some way towards revealing the duality of social cohesion that can either work towards or against peace.

Three of the articles in this edition feature research findings from studies in the Western Cape, which is apt given the high levels of heterogeneity and violence in the province.

Don Pinnock takes us back to District Six to grapple with the consequences of razing that multi-racial, multi-cultural community and the legacy of social dislocation this act of violent destruction left. He explores the

tangible and immaterial factors that constituted the social cohesion of District Six and paints a picture of a heterogeneous community that, despite poverty and even violence, cohered in the face of state legislated racial segregation. It is this sense of connection that former residents still yearn for and its loss that informs the marginalisation and alienation of the descendants of those who lived there.

Vanessa Barolsky's article, based on an ethnographic study in Khayelitsha, critically interrogates the meaning of international conceptions of social cohesion and their relevance to the South African context. She shows that this large urban township is characterised by high levels of informal social organisation and interaction and a deeply engrained ethic of care implicitly based on the South African ethos of ubuntu. People do intervene on each other's behalf as a part of daily life. Yet these same close ties can sanction and enable violence as citizens cohere to violently respond to individuals identified as 'other': 'criminals' or foreign nationals. Here, as in several other communities, taxi associations play a key role in the violent regulation of social relations, particularly the control of youth gang violence in a context where citizens have an ambiguous relation to the law and formal state regulation. It is in this complex and contested context that the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) project has sought to intervene by creating a model for preventing violence. The VPUU is an internationally funded and conceptualised violence prevention intervention that posits a positive change in social relations based on urban upgrading and a vision of an ordered city and classic Western entrepreneur. Barolsky shows that the value-laden project faces considerable difficulty in implementing its vision in the informal environment of Khayelitsha, and may have undermined social cohesion as a result.

Laurence Piper and Joanna Wheeler investigate the complex contemporary conditions of social cohesion in the Western Cape informal settlement Imizamo Yethu. They show how this community is characterised by a gradual unravelling of the cohesion that tenuously existed under the leadership of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) for a few years after 1994. However, they argue that while violence is a constant presence in social life, it is, perhaps surprisingly, not used by political leaders to retain control – contrary to international literature that hypothesises that weak rule is associated with violent contests over political power. Instead, in Imizamo Yethu, violence is used to underpin other forms of coercive power, such as that exercised by taxi associations. As local rule has weakened, these types of violence have increased in the absence of effective civic regulation. In this context, like in Khayelitsha, violence becomes a means of policing certain types of parochial cohesion and morality, for example through a recent violent mobilisation against drug gangs, which led to the killing of two gang leaders whose violence had deeply disturbed community peace.

Moving away from the Western Cape, Malose Langa and his colleagues analyse the impact of the Community Work Programme (CWP) on social cohesion and violence. They consider local initiatives that have sought to address violence through diverse projects that range from clearing grass in crime 'hotspots' to providing recreational activities for young men, integrating ex-offenders, assisting in the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act, and creating campaigns against gang violence. The research on which this article is based found that the CWP appears to have a positive effect on social cohesion in many of the areas where it is implemented. It does so by creating networks between citizens that help them to mobilise human and social capital to address social problems (collective efficacy at work). Yet the CWP is also shown to be vulnerable to political contestation and gatekeeping, particularly in relation to controlling access to the employment opportunities it provides. In such instances social cohesion is undermined and divisions exacerbated.

In their article Ben Roberts and Steven Gordon examine the potentially corrosive effects of fear of crime on the social fabric through an analysis of national level survey data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). The article investigates two competing models that hypothesise the impact of fear of crime on the social fabric. One holds that escalating fear of crime can inhibit social interaction and lead to social withdrawal. This weakens the ability of local communities to collectively address problems, undermining both collective efficacy and social cohesion. The other model posits that fear of crime may enhance community solidarity by motivating residents to come together and respond collectively to the problem of crime. The findings suggest

that fear of crime has only a marginal negative impact on social trust in South Africa, which may indicate that South Africans are resilient to fear of crime, but could also reflect that social trust in the country is already low. The authors show that fear of crime has a more robust link to dissatisfaction with what Roberts and Gordon call 'civic cohesion', which relates to issues of political legitimacy and democratic participation rather than to social cohesion more broadly. In other words, fear of crime fuels a lack of faith in the government, particularly in the police, rather than undermining social cohesion.

Anine Kriegler and Mark Shaw investigate the relationship between social cohesion, fear of crime and reported victimisation through a survey of 400 households in Cosmo City, a new mixed-use settlement north-west of Johannesburg, explicitly designed for social inclusion and cohesion. They find that the settlement is indeed characterised by high levels of social cohesion if evaluated in terms of local place attachment, with a significant proportion of residents expressing attachment to the neighbourhood in which they live within Cosmo City. The results demonstrate complex linkages between incidence of crime, fear of crime and social cohesion. In general residents expressed lower levels of fear of crime than citizens canvassed in the country's National Victimisation Survey. On the other hand, residents reported a statistically improbably high experience of crime, including violent crime. They conclude that social cohesion between neighbours may lead to a heightened perception of risk through 'talk about crime', but at the same time, cohesion between neighbours may mitigate the impact of this perception of risk, reducing levels of fear of crime.

What emerges from these articles is a complex picture that does not simplistically support a hypothesis that high levels of social cohesion reduce violence. In the wake of the entrenched fracturing of social cohesion by apartheid, communities across South Africa still cohere in multifaceted and paradoxical ways that seem to frequently (and unsurprisingly) support, rather than resist, violence. In these contexts, violence may become an organising principle of localised and defensive forms of social cohesion, disputing the relation between social cohesion and order articulated in international literature. Here the research indicates that violent forms of cohesion are utilised by citizens to manage a deeply contested political and social environment.

Vanessa Barolsky
(Guest editor)

Chandré Gould
(Editor)

Notes

1   Republic of South Africa, The Presidency, *Social cohesion & social justice in South Africa*, Pretoria: Policy Co-ordination, Advisory Services, 2004, iv.

2   Ray Forrest and Ade Kearns, Social cohesion, social capital and the neighbourhood, *Urban Studies,* 38:12, 2001, 2125–2143.

3   RJ Sampson, SW Raudenbush and F Earls, Neighborhoods and violent crime: a multilevel study of collective efficacy, *Science,* 277, 1997, 918–924.

To be a somebody

Probing the roots of community in District Six

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The term community is a moving target, widely used and often misused in defining a group of people in a particular area or with similar cultural practices. In Cape Town the sense of a loss of community is precisely what residents of an area known as District Six mourn, following their eviction and its destruction in the 1970s in terms of the racial Group Areas Act. What was it they perceived they had? And what did they lose, following their removal to the Cape Flats? In asking these questions it is possible to get a clearer understanding of the way in which multiple perceptions and relationships stitch together a social cohesiveness that undergirds the notion of community. And what happens when it is lost.

In the way that elephants gather in places where one of them once died, thoughtfully fondling the bones of the departed, I sometimes go to the empty fields of District Six and park, waiting for the full moon to rise. I always leave feeling melancholy. It is strange that, in such a rapidly expanding and infilling city such as Cape Town, this space has remained largely unoccupied for nearly half a century.[1]

There have been bureaucratic reasons for this, land claim delays and squabbles. But this hardly explains the city's sustained unwillingness or inability to re-people the area. Something else is at work here, the collective memory of an outrage done to a socially cohesive community, perhaps. Or maybe a sadness of what cannot come back to life or be regained for District Six's descendants, now scattered in the stark tenements and dangerous still-racial ghettoes of the Cape Flats?

Woven into the chaotic tapestry of the area seem to have been golden threads of community that,

having unravelled, nobody seems willing to try to reweave lest their hearts be broken yet again by the impossibility. Where District Six once stood has, to a considerable degree, become holy ground, a treeless, windblown monument to lost community. What was this thing they called community?[2]

The history of a city is the story of its neighbourhoods. Each has a zeitgeist, an identifiable personality. They all look and feel distinct from one another and have persistence over generations. Explaining zeitgeist is difficult because it comprises many things: the type of buildings; the width of streets; the presence or absence of gates and walls; greenery or lack of it; street lighting at night; how people dress; who is hanging around; the friendliness, indifference or fear of people; the smell of cooking; rubbish or garden flowers; and the type of cars.

The most important undergirding of neighbourhood zeitgeist is the degree of social efficacy.[3] Organised communities have higher levels of formal and informal solidarity. There is consensus on important norms and values, often cohesion and social interaction among neighbours, formal and informal surveillance, and preparedness to intervene in altercations, question strangers and admonish children for unacceptable

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behaviour. These areas generally look and feel different. District Six was such an area and has come to represent a time when things were better. But what made it so? Is there something we can learn from it as we retro-fit fierce Cape Flats townships and build new ones?

The district was never easy to live in. It was over-crowded. Houses were often not repaired by absent landlords who were content to rack-rent to families by the room. Alleys often stank of urine and fish heads. But it is not the physical conditions that former residents yearn for, it is the way in which people interacted, a feeling of sharedness. In a city where this has been lost, it is this sense – these golden threads – that are most remembered and mourned.

District Six was built, over time, in waves and layers. It was originally farmland on the lower slopes of Table Mountain and first settled by Europeans attached to the Dutch East India Company. Then, in the early 19th century, it expanded rapidly when Cape Town's growing middle class began to build modest homes for themselves within easy reach of the central area. The wealthier merchants and officials already had houses closer to the city on land that their clerks and assistants could not afford. And so, on the outskirts of town, a middle-income community began to grow in District Six.[4]

The houses of these new residents were unpretentious, generally two-storied, and built as terraces in a style typical of the Cape under Victorian and Georgian rule. Narrow blocks were laid out parallel to the main artery, Hanover Street, and small, semi-detached houses with long service lanes were built. Later, in the 1880s, skilled European artisans – drawn to South Africa by the mining boom after the discovery of gold – began moving into Cape Town and settled in the district.

Following the outbreak of the South African War, Cape Town's population was swollen by an influx of troops as well as refugees from the Transvaal.[5] Much building activity took place in District Six at this time and two- and three-storeyed blocks in a variety of architectural styles began to appear. Most of the properties in the area were owned by descendants of the European settlers, and a few by Asians.

No homes were provided specifically for workers in the city, however, and the limited houses available to them were filled to overcrowding, many being forced to squat on whatever land was available. After the war, a large number of businesses and offices were transferred back to the Transvaal. The houses in District Six were vacated (but not transferred out of European hands) as tradesmen, artisans and soldiers moved north. Through a filtering-down process, working-class families moved in and, by leap-frog movements, middle-income Europeans shifted out, first to Woodstock, then to Vredehoek, Observatory, Mowbray and beyond.[6]

Initially, the largely coloured working-class migration into the city had been circular, undertaken mainly by job seekers from surrounding farms and villages. As the transition from a farming economy to an industrial one gathered pace, it became a one-way flow of whole families. By the 1920s Cape Town's administrators were describing the march of the poor into Cape Town as 'formidable'.[7] In 1936 the official census put the population of District Six at 22 440 and in 1946 at 28 377.[8] Four years later the figure was around 40 000.[9] In 1950 the Housing Supervisor of the Cape Town Municipality told the *Cape Times*:

> Almost every house in the district where the Coloured people live is packed tight. Children grow up and marry and in turn have children and are unable to find a place of their own. A family is turned out of an overcrowded house and finds a shelter with friends for a few days – which grow into weeks, months, years. They sleep in living-rooms, in kitchens, in passages, in garages, on stoeps; married couples share rooms with other married couples… Waiting-lists for accommodation grow longer and longer… Families wait anything from six months to 10 years before they can be re-housed.[10]

Many families in the area were extremely poor, living for generations by working at odd jobs here and there, scratching out an existence by forms of economic enterprise that counted profits in halfpennies and farthings. Viewing the district from their middle-class perspective, city officials and wealthier inner-city residents regarded the burgeoning area with alarm. There were warnings of disease and crime and these views, linked to apartheid laws, became the

cornerstones for the later removal of people from the area. There *was* crime and some disease, but given the crowding, housing conditions and poverty, it was by today's standards extremely limited.[11] This limitation of social harm was directly linked to the social cohesiveness and control exercised by extended families.

Throughout the migrations into Cape Town, it was always the extended family that formed the catch-net of the urban poor. Within it were people who could be trusted implicitly and would give assistance willingly, immediately and without counting the cost. In major calamities, such as the loss of a job or a death in the family, it was kinsfolk who rallied to support, and whose support lasted longest. Kin also helped find employment and accommodation and bribed or bailed you out of the clutches of the law. They were, in short, indispensable.[12] In a hostile and uncaring world, extended families provided a refuge and a domain within which strategies of survival could be worked out.

Essential to the survival of the family, of course, were the wage packets brought into it. Like most unskilled earners in the third world, workers in District Six were paid an extremely low wage, which had to be conserved and stretched. The poor responded to this situation in typical fashion, organising systems of redistribution that helped extend meagre incomes to the limits of their elasticity. These patterns of redistribution percolated money through networks and finally into the pockets of those who were unable to obtain wage employment. It was, above all, a social form of redistribution, operating among friends, neighbours, workmates, acquaintances and friends of friends.[13] The fine-grained lattice of community enterprise was noted by journalist Brian Barrow:

> The place has more barbershops to the acre than anywhere else in Africa. There are tailors by the score, herbalists, butchers, grocers, tattoo-artists, cinemas, bars, hotels, a public bath-house, rows of quaint little houses with names like 'Buzz Off' and 'Wy Wurry' and there is a magnificent range of spice smells from the curry shops. The vitality and variety in the place seem endless and the good-humour of the people inexhaustible. Anything could happen and everyone in the end would laugh about it.

Go into one of the fruit and vegetable shops and you soon realize how the very poor manage to live. In these shops people can still buy something useful for 1d. They can buy one potato if that is all they can afford at the moment, or one cigarette. You can hear them ask for an *olap patiselli* (a penny's worth of parsley), a *tikkie tamaties* or a *tikkie swart bekkies* (black-eyed beans), a sixpence soup-greens, an *olap knofelok* (garlic) or *olap broos*, which means a penny's worth of bruised fruit.[14]

An inventory of employment in District Six in the early 1960s gives a sense of the underlying fabric that kept it alive.[15]

Figure 1: Employment in District Six, 1960s

Formal

Formal
- **Public sector wages**
- **Private firms:** wages, dividends etc.
- **Transfer payments:** pensions, unemployment benefits and workmen's compensation

Semi-formal (legitimate)
- **Domestic labour:** wages and payment in kind

Informal (legitimate)
- **Productive and secondary activities:** building contractors and associated activities, self-employed artisans, shoemakers, tailors, lacemakers, knitters, carvers, artists, makers of sweetmeats and samoosas
- **Transporters:** taxis, trucks, carts and bicycles
- **Distribution enterprises:** rooming, commodity speculation and rentier activities
- **Small-scale distribution:** market operatives, petty traders, street hawkers, caterers in food and drink, jumble sellers, legal lenders and wood sellers
- **Other services:** musicians, launderers, shoeshiners, hairdressers, photographers, vehicle-repair and other maintenance workers, scrap collectors, tinkers, those engaged in ritual services and in magic and medicine
- **Small-scale renting**
- **Private transfer payments:** gifts and similar flows of money and goods between persons, borrowing, begging, inheritance and lobola

Informal (semi-legal)
- Protection rackets, shebeens, begging, scrap-recycling and pawn-broking

Informal (Illegal)
- **Production:** liquor
- **Services:** hustling and spivving in general, receiving stolen goods, usury, drug pushing, prostitution, poncing, smuggling, bribery, political corruption, protection-racketeering, touting for courts and pickpocketing
- **Transfers:** petty thefts, pickpocketing, bag-snatching, burglary, armed robbery, speculation and embezzlement, confidence tricks, gambling and *fahfee*

Illegal

In all this, the extended family was the ground floor of small-scale economic activities. In 1937 a Commission of Inquiry found that 'the entire Cape Coloured family in the urban areas very often forms the earning-unit, the income of the parents and one or more of the children being pooled to meet household needs'.[16] The area became known for the ingenuity, novelty and enterprise of its residents. By day it hummed with trade, barter and manufacture, and by night it offered the 'various pleasures of conviviality or forgetfulness'.[17]

The district's networks of kin, worship, friendships, work and play involved an intricate mix of rights and obligations, intimacies and distances, which grounded a sense of solidarity, local loyalties and traditions. The former warden of the Cape Flats Distress Association, Dr Oscar Wollheim, lyrically described the intricacy of these social webs:

> Each individual has his own personal web which varies in size and complexity, according to the impact he makes on those around him and the influence he wields in the community. His usefulness to and within the community is determined entirely by the freedom with which he is able to move in and about his web, his knowledge of its structure and the facility with which he is able to make contact with the correct position of the web at the correct time.

> The rings closest to the centre are represented by the man's immediate and extended family and his closest friends. The next would represent his acquaintances, his church, his school and the clubs he frequents. Other rings represent his employer, his transport and communications, the shops he frequents, the municipal and other officials he meets, his doctor, the police, the postman, the tax official. The anchors of the web represent the customs, habits and moral concepts of the community in which he lives.[18]

Maintaining order

The area's rich social fabric had an unintended function as well. Not only did it provide the possibilities of a roof and an income, it also fostered networks of social control. On the district's many shallow verandas grandparents commented, gossiped and watched. Because effective police protection was lacking, this surveillance was beneficial, even essential, to life. It kept things 'safe'. The interconnectedness and effect of this surveillance was described to John Western by a former resident of the organisationally similar suburb of Mowbray:

> When I was 15 or 16 if we did anything rude, offhanded, in the street – like going to bars or smoking or taking a dame out – you'd get a *pak* [hiding] at night at home; they [parents] knew about it right away… It was the old men who used to stand at the corners chatting or sit on the stoeps; they'd pretend to be reading the Koran or a comic or playing *karem* or whatever, but out of the corner of their eye they were really watching you.[19]

This surveillance provided safe spaces for children to be children, as Brian Barrow observed:

> Children everywhere. Shouting, laughing, whistling, teasing, darting between old men's legs, running between fast-moving buses and cars and missing them by inches with perfect judgement. Poor, underfed children but cheeky, confident, happy and so emotionally secure in the bosom of their sordid surroundings. Everyone loved them. To them, it seemed, every adult on those busy streets was another mother, another father.[20]

Powerful families also 'ordered' the district through their connections, inter-marriages, agreements, 'respect' and, in some cases, their access to violence. An aspect of this type of control was the rise of the Globe Gang.

In Cape Town today, gangs are synonymous with urban decay – social structures that dissolve the glue of community. But what is generally missed in this representation is that they are at the same time the outcome of social ordering within the environment in which they exist.[21] In contexts of crowding, joblessness and low income (if any at all), they are a response by young people attempting to make sense of their space within the neighbourhood. Within certain contexts – where informal surveillance is in place, backed by strong community disapproval of

behaviour beyond certain limits – gangs can have the same function as sport or cultural activities, where adolescent approval can be won. When social controls weaken or are absent, gang activity generally becomes predatory, destructive to both its members and the community. The Globe Gang is an example of this transition.

During World War Two, street corners in the district seemed to fill up overnight and the sight of people or even whole families sleeping on staircase landings and in doorways became common. Pressure began to build up over territory for hawking, shebeening, prostitution or just for standing space. Youths from the 'outside' began hanging together, with empty stomachs and nothing much to do. They started hustling, picking up this and that from shops, leaning on a few people for cash or favours and living by shifts and ruses of all kinds. Police methods of dealing with these groups were simple, direct and ineffective: 'We would pick them up and fine them and they could be hired out for some work while under sentence, usually to farms,' a former policeman explained. 'These kinds of people were just idle loiterers who took part in illegal activities now and then.'[22]

The way members of the district's community responded was equally direct. Sons from the 'old' organised families, consisting mainly of shopkeepers, skilled craftsmen and better-off hawkers, used to congregate under a streetlight alongside the Globe Furnishing Company in Hanover Street opposite the Star Bioscope, watching the abundant street life of the district. They were aware that the security of their parents was being threatened and resolved to take action.

In the early 1940s a group of scruffy youths would stand at the door of the Star, extracting a penny 'tax' from every patron. One night the Globe group, mostly Asians from the Muir Street area, decided they had had enough. They gathered together their fathers' workers and barrow boys, armed them with sticks and implements from a nearby stable, and thrashed the cinema *skollies*.

Among the Globe members were bricklayers, hawkers and painters. Its chief, Mikey Ismail, was a plasterer. At its centre was the Ismail family, one of whom, A Ismail, was a city councillor. Several of his brothers

controlled the district's morning vegetable market, one ran a bus service and four had general dealer shops. 'The Globe were not criminals,' according to a tailor who made their clothes. 'They started to control the Jesters of Constitution Street, who were beginning to *maak soos hulle wil* [do what they like]. Their aim was to eventually break all gangs, to clean up the district.' A member of the Globe gang told me:

> The Globe hated the *skollie* element that started coming into the district, like the people who robbed the crowds on celebrations or when there were those marches in town with the Torch Commando or Cissy Gool's singsong [demonstration] outside Parliament buildings. Mikey and the boys would really bomb out the *skollie* element when they robbed the people then. They tore them to ribbons.[23]

The Globe was, essentially, an organised vigilante extension of an extended family network. According to a close associate of the Globe at the time, Vincent Kolbe:

> The Globe ... respected each other and their families and so on. There were only a few who smoked pot and really got *gesuip* [drunk], but never the top dogs. They always tried to do things that wouldn't bring a scratch to their good family name. You know all these people I'm talking about are wealthy businessmen today – except, of course, Mikey is dead now. The Globe were the most decent and well-bred guys ever. All their parents were well-to-do businessmen with flashy cars and good clothes. The leaders were always beautifully dressed. Mikey had silk shirts specially made for him. And he drove around in lovely cars. And the women! Mikey always had the best women around him.[24]

So it may have remained, but in 1966 District Six was declared a whites-only area. This was met, initially, by disbelief, then anger and finally acceptance. The fabric of community began unravelling. It is difficult to make a direct link between the actions of the Globe and the mood of the time, but from about that period the gang turned bad. It collected 'protection' money from shopkeepers, clubs and cinemas, ran extortion rackets and controlled blackmail, illicit buying of every

kind, smuggling, shebeens, gambling and political movements in the district. Then its leader, Mikey, was killed – stabbed with a kitchen knife by the brother of a girl who thought he was molesting her. Mikey's brother was jailed for blackmail. As the gang's rackets increased, it also lost the support of the class that had given birth to it. Gradually prison elements infiltrated the Globe. Vincent Kolbe describes the process:

> Slowly there came the *skollie* element. A guy from Porter Reformatory joined them: Chicken. Then prisoners from up-country who'd never been in the cities. They raped and had tattoos on their faces and necks and killed anybody, for nothing. Young boys arrived, and carried guns for no reason. As the community became more divided over the removals and extended families began breaking up, more gangs were formed, like the Bun Boys, the Stalag 17, the Doolans, the Mongrels, the Born Frees. These types were really just snot-nosed young boys. Then one day somebody interfered with a gang in the District and this gang thought it was the Globe but it wasn't. They attacked us and this set off the most terrible war. People were killed and the Globe decided to bust every gang everywhere. They couldn't stop. And that was the start of the Globe's really bad name.[25]

Time of the bulldozers

For District Six, throughout the 1950s, storm clouds were gathering. The National Party won the elections in 1948 on a segregationist ticket and began to promulgate racist laws. The aim of the Group Areas Act of 1950 was 'to provide for the establishment of group areas, for the control of the acquisition of immovable property and the occupation of land and premises'.[26]

For a while, however, official 'labour preference' for people designated 'coloured' over those described as 'Bantu' ensured temporary protection from the winds of change. Fierce resistance to the act,[27] plus the National Party's slim majority in Parliament, held off its roll-out for nearly 15 years, but eventually, in 1966, the sword fell. This was signalled by a Cape

Town City Council committee meeting called in that year to discuss the 'proclamation of District Six under the Group Areas Act as an area for ownership and occupation by members of the White group'.[28] Government officials gave their reasons for the removals:

- Inter-racial interaction bred conflict, necessitating the separation of the races
- The area was a slum, fit only for clearance, not rehabilitation
- The area was crime-ridden and dangerous
- It was a vice den of gambling, drinking, and prostitution

Removal of around 2 000 families and the destruction of houses began in 1968.

The Group Areas Act was to undermine and ultimately smash social cohesion in District Six and many other areas. In ploughing up networks of knowledge, relationships, shared experiences and history, the scaffolding of a culture was systematically dismantled. The effects of racial legislation were, as Oscar Wollheim explained,

> [l]ike a man with a stick breaking spiderwebs in a forest. The spider may survive the fall, but he can't survive without his web. When he comes to build it again he finds the anchors are gone, the people are all over and the fabric of generations is lost. Before, there was always something that kept the community ticking over and operating correctly … there was the extended family; the granny and grandpa were at home, doing the household chores and looking after the kids.

> Now, the family is taken out of this environment where everything is safe and known. It is put in a matchbox in a strange place. All social norms have suddenly been abolished. Before, the children who got up to mischief in the streets were reprimanded by neighbours. Now there's nobody, and they join gangs because that's the only way to find friends.[29]

In 1974 the Theron Commission was to conclude that 'no other statutory measure had evoked so much bitterness, mistrust and hostility on the part

of the Coloured people as the Group Areas Act'.[30] This statement echoed Wollheim, who had warned in 1960 that 'we can look forward to a period of increasing social dislocation, which will have its root in no other causes but in the application of the [Group Areas] Act'.[31]

Counting the costs

One of the greatest complaints I heard about Group Areas removals while doing research for a book on relocations was that individual people or singular families, rather than whole neighbourhoods, were moved to the Cape Flats.[32] Extended families were not considered and only nuclear family dwellings were provided. Informal childcare and surveillance evaporated. The stresses resulting from these changes brought with them psychological difficulties and skewed 'coping' behaviour. Marital relationships were upset and the rates of divorce and desertion rose. Parent-child relationships also became problematic – often because of the father's sense of inadequacy in his new environment. For young people there was nowhere to go but out on the street.[33]

The destruction of District Six also blew out the candle of household production, craft industries and services. The result on the Cape Flats was a gradual polarisation of the labour force into those with more specialised, skilled or better paid jobs, those with the dead-end, low-paid jobs, and the unemployed. As the new housing pattern dissolved kinship networks, the isolated family could no longer call on the resources of the extended family or the neighbourhood. The nuclear family itself became the sole focus of solidarity.

This meant that problems tended to be bottled up within the immediate interpersonal context that produced them. At the same time, family relationships gathered a new intensity to compensate for the diversity of relationships previously generated through neighbours and wider kinship ties. Pressures gradually built up, which many newly nuclear families were unable to deal with. The working-class household was thus not only isolated from the outside, but also undermined from within.

These pressures weighed heavily on house-bound mothers. Neighbours were not well known and, with nobody to supervise them, the street was no longer a safe place for children to play. The only space that felt safe was a small flat. One route out of the claustrophobic tensions of family life was the use of alcohol and drugs. This became the standard path of many men. Children were shaken loose in different ways. One way was into early sexual relationships and perhaps marriage. Another was into fierce streetcorner drug-driven subcultures, reinforcing the neighbourhood climate of fear.[34] The situation was to be compounded by rising unemployment among young people.

To assess the effect of Group Areas removals on families, I made a comparison between family life and working-class culture in an 'inner city' working-class area and on the Cape Flats, where many people had been relocated. The established area was Harfield Village, which forms part of Claremont (it was later gentrified and is now predominantly white).[35]

At the time of the survey, Harfield Village was a suburb 'in transition' from a mixed to a white Group Area, and only about a hundred original families remained. On average, families had resided there for 19 years, although more than 10% had been there 50 years or longer. The average number of people in each house was a fraction above five.

What was significant about the area was the high number of people available for what might be described as 'crisis support'. Some 80% of the people interviewed had relations in Harfield and slightly more than this had close friends in the area. This was despite the fact that 65% had seen related families moved from the village by Group Areas. There was no crèche in Harfield. Of those mothers whom I interviewed, the majority looked after their own children and a sizable number relied on relations to do this.

In total, 95% of children aged under 16 were taken care of within extended families, the remaining number being minded by friends. In comparison with the Cape Flats this was an extremely high level of family-based childcare. Harfield had all the benchmarks of a stable supportive community. This was also the case in Mowbray, where John Western found an average residency of 33 years and where

70% of his interviewees were related to at least one other physically separate household.[36]

The Cape Flats survey focused specifically on mothers living in 35 different housing estates. The average number of people in each dwelling was a little over seven and the average length of residency was a mere four years. Of the sample, 44% of the Cape Flats mothers were working and 25% were raising a family without a husband.

In order to gauge changes in living patterns, the mothers were asked about their own childhoods and then about their children. The findings showed a marked historical fall-off in access to family networks of childcare. A high percentage of children under 16 received no parental care during the day, while a very small number were placed in crèches. When asked about any problems they were experiencing, the greater number of mothers said it was a fear of gangs and lack of police protection.[37]

Crime fills the vacuum

The failure of the current government to reduce poverty or to prevent rapid squatter settlements, compounded by older racial ghettoisation and the division of the city between glitter and ghetto, has – by design, inability or perceived necessity – resulted in massive social disorganisation of poorer neighbourhoods. Despite the turnover of residents through time, these conditions persist and residents in 'those kinds of places' continue to be seen as 'those kind of people'.[38] They are labelled and treated accordingly to a point where many of them embody the definition and *act* accordingly, lashing out or wearing their situation as a badge of ironic resignation. In these neighbourhoods, collective efficacy declines, violence increases and other forces move into the power vacuum in an attempt to control, stabilise, disrupt or benefit.

The impact of social disconnectness was sketched by American criminologist Robert Sampson in his work on Chicago's high-risk areas:

Neighborhood characteristics such as family disorganisation, residential mobility and structural density weaken informal social control networks. Informal social controls are impeded by weak local social bonds, lowered community attachment, anonymity and reduced capacity for surveillance and guardianship… Residents in areas characterised by family disorganisation, mobility and building density are less able to perform guardianship activities, less likely to report general deviance to authorities, to intervene in public disturbances and to assume responsibility for supervision of youth activities. The result is that deviance is tolerated and public norms of social control are not effective.[39]

Contact crime across a city tends to cluster in such neighbourhoods, as do low income, high unemployment and raised levels of interpersonal conflict and stress.[40] What is important to note, however, is that social disorganisation is a property of neighbourhoods, not individuals, and that crime is one of its characteristics. The difference between District Six and newer neighbourhoods such as Manenberg and Lavender Hill, or the more recently developed Khayelitsha, is that the former was a community that ordered and policed itself and the latter are, comparatively, socially disarrayed and organisationally unglued. Poverty is not merely deprivation, it is isolation and social confusedness.

As a consequence, many of the residents in Cape Town's high-risk, low-income townships voice a degree of fatalism about transformation in their own lifetime and a moral cynicism about crime, which they view as inevitable. As a result, contact crimes are not vigorously condemned, because of an inability to prevent them occurring. Given the lack of assured conventional economic advancement, many residents shrug at an income based on the theft of vehicles or sale of drugs and may even benefit from or depend on it themselves.

In 1994 the newly elected African National Congress (ANC) government was to inherit a Cape Town working class that was like a routed, scattered army, dotted in confusion about the land of their birth. In the lonely crowd of satellite clusters with rising rates of violence, the townships had become increasingly difficult places to meet people after work, favouring silent conformity and not rebellion.

The ultimate losers were the working-class families. The emotional brutality dealt out to them in the name of rational urban planning has been incalculable. The

only defence the youths had was to build something coherent out of the one thing they had left – each other. Between windblown tenements on the dusty sand, gangs blossomed. The city's urban managers now had a major problem on their hands – violent crime.

Searching for themselves

As I watch the full moon slowly illuminate grassy mounds covering the bricks and mortar of buildings that once housed District Six, the saddest thing is the silence. Here once was a community that buzzed with life and laughter. What former residents miss and yearn for is, I think, not so much where they once *lived*, but who they once *were*, living there.

What, then, can we say about the golden threads that illuminated the tapestry of this particular urban neighbourhood? People may be defined by their built environment – be it patched and crumbling – and the economy that supports it, even if in halfpennies and farthings. But these are pale threads. More robust and colourful are yarns of context – of others, mainly extended family, within whose regard a person is held. Lacing through the warp and woof of that regard run bright strands of what a community really is: the sense that, without doubt, you are somebody in a place where people accord you respect.

Exposed to the harsh acid rain of racist urban management that dissolved communities in Cape Town and unpicked the fabric of their lives, this gold turned to tinsel. In the social tangle amid unforgiving tenements on the dusty Cape Flats the message was clear: 'You're nobody.' Two quotes capture the essence of what had been and what became. The first is Brian Barrow again:

District Six would be nothing without its people and way of life. Above all it was one of the world's great meeting places of people of many races, religions and colours and it proved that none of these things really matters. It had a fundamental honesty in that no man or woman who lived there tried to be anything but what they were. And this perhaps was the real secret of the happiness of District Six.

There was no bluff and everyone knew where he stood, knew what was attainable and what was not. At times it was a place of violence. But mostly it was a place of love, tolerance and kindness, a place of poverty and often degradation, but a place where people had the intelligence to take what life gave them and give it meaning.[41]

The second quote is from the 19th century French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville, speaking of the isolation that can result from planned urban reconstruction:

The first thing that strikes one's observation is an uncountable number of men… Each of them living apart is a stranger to the fate of all the rest – his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind; as for the rest of his fellow citizens, he is close to them, but he sees them not; he touches them, but he feels them not; he exists but in himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country.[42]

What the residents of District Six had was a community that was socially cohesive and held together by friendships and obligations within and between extended families. What they lost after laws and bulldozers scattered them across the Cape Flats was a sense of who they are. That is one of apartheid's most insidious crimes.[43]

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Notes

1   In February 1966 the government of South Africa proclaimed the area abutting the city's central business district as being for the exclusive use of white people. Those who were not – people defined as coloured, Indian or African – were removed, but those for whom it was proclaimed never moved in.

2   Most of the historical research for this article was done for my MA thesis (Don Pinnock, *The brotherhoods: street gangs and state control in Cape Town,* University of Cape Town [UCT], 1982), which became a book (Don Pinnock, *The brotherhoods,* Cape Town: David Philip, 1984). As little research had been done on gangs in the city, most of the information came from interviews, participant observation, official city and state documents and newspaper reports. More contemporary research and analysis is from my book *Gang town* (Don Pinnock, *Gang town*, Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2016).

3   Social efficacy is the extent or strength of a community's belief in its ability to complete tasks and reach goals. See Robert Sampson, *Great American city: Chicago and the enduring neighborhood effect,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.

4   John Western, *Outcast Cape Town,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

5   Transvaal was the name of one of the provinces until borders were redrawn and provinces renamed in 1994.

6   Western, *Outcast Cape Town*.

7   Pinnock, *The brotherhoods*.

8   These figures were given by Dr Oscar Wollheim of the Cape Flats Distress Association (CAFDA). Further data can be found in Office of Population Research, The 1936 census of the Union of South Africa, *Population Index,* 9:3, July 1943, 153–155.

9   AJ Christopher, The Union of South Africa censuses 1911–1960: an incomplete record, *Historia,* 56:2, November 2011.

10 *Cape Times,* 20 June 1950 (copies available in the South African Archives, Cape Town).

11 Interview with Sergeant Willem Nel, former head of the Police Special Squad, District Six, Cape Town, 1981.

12 D Webster, The social organization of poverty, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, Seminar Paper, 1980, 15.

13 Ibid., 16.

14 Brian Barrow, Behind the dark doors of District Six, Wollheim Collection, UCT, 1966.

15 This information is from extensive interviews with former District Six residents and a survey of the *Cape Times* and *Cape Argus* of the decade.

16 Union of South Africa Parliament, Report of the Cape Coloured Commission, U.G. 54-1937.

17 Brian Barrow, who wrote the text for the photographic book by Cloete Breytenbach, *The spirit of District Six,* Cape Town: Struik, 1970.

18 OD Wollheim, Peninsula's tragedy of the poor, *Cape Times,* 26 January 1959.

19 Western, *Outcast Cape Town,* 312.

20 Barrow, *The spirit of District Six*.

21 For a more detailed discussion of this seeming paradox, see Pinnock, *Gang town*.

22 Interview with Sergeant Willem Nel, former head of the Police Special Squad, District Six, Cape Town 1981. All interviews and supporting materials are in the Don Pinnock Collection, Mayibuye Centre, University of the Western Cape.

23 Interview with 'Gums', a Globe gang member, Hanover Park, Cape Town, 1980.

24 Interview with Vincent Kolbe, Wynberg, 1981.

25 Ibid.

26 South African Group Areas Act (Act 41 of 1950), Pretoria: Government Printer, 1950.

27 Resistance came in the form of rolling action against apartheid from the ANC's Programme of Action in 1949, the Defiance Campaign of 1952, the anti-pass campaigns of the Federation of South African Women from 1954, the Congress of the People and the creation of the Freedom Charter in 1955 and the formation of the SA Congress of Trade Unions the same year. What followed was the massive Treason Trial in 1956, the Sharpeville massacre and the state of emergency declared afterwards, the Rivonia Trial, which jailed Nelson Mandela and others, and the ANC's turn to sabotage from 1964.

28 Special and adjourned ordinary meeting agenda, Cape Town City Council, 1 March 1966, South African Archives, Cape Town.

29 Interview with Dr OD Wollheim, Cape Town, March 1981.

30 Republic of South Africa Parliament, Commission of inquiry into matters relating to the coloured population, R.P. 38-1976 (Theron Commission), 261, 227.

31 OD Wollheim, Group areas in South Africa, Wollheim Collection, UCT, undated article.

32 Pinnock, *The brotherhoods*.

33 This information comes from extensive interviews conducted by the author on the Cape Flats in 1980/81.

34 Pinnock, *The brotherhoods*.

35 The survey was conducted by the author with 15 mothers each in Harfield Village, Lower Claremont, Hanover Park and Manenberg in 1982. The results were not published but were used to underpin the chapter Unemployment and the breaking of the web, in Pinnock, *The brotherhoods*.

36 Western, *Outcast Cape Town,* 312.

37 Pinnock, *The brotherhoods*.

38 This depiction is from R Stark, Deviant places: a theory of the ecology of crime, *Criminology,* 25, 1987, 893.

39 RJ Sampson, Communities and crime, in MR Gottfredson and T Hirschi (eds), *Positive criminology,* Newbury Park: Sage, 1987, 109.

40 See Charis Kubrin, Social disorganization theory: then, now and in the future, in Marvin Krohn, Alan Lizotte and Gina Penly Hall (eds), *Handbook on crime and deviance,* New York: Springer, 2009.

41 Breytenbach, *The spirit of District Six,* 6.

42 Alexis de Tocqueville, What sort of despotism democratic nations have to fear?, in *Democracy in America,* vol. 1 and 2, 1835 and 1840.

43 Parts of this narrative are drawn from Pinnock, *Gang town*.

Is social cohesion relevant to a city in the global South?

A case study of Khayelitsha township

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The concept of social cohesion is increasingly being utilised in local and international policy discourse and scholarship. The idea of collective efficacy, defined as 'social cohesion among neighbours combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good', has been posited as having an important protective effect against violence. This article investigates the relevance of international framings of social cohesion and collective efficacy, which have largely been conceptualised and tested in the global North, to the conditions of social life and violence prevention in a city in the global South. These circumstances are interrogated through an ethnographic study conducted in Khayelitsha township in the Western Cape, where a major internationally funded and conceptualised violence prevention intervention, Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU), has been implemented. The ethnographic material contests some of the key assumptions in international discourses on social cohesion and the manner in which social cohesion has been interpreted and effected in the violence prevention initiatives of the VPUU.

How relevant are prominent Western notions of social cohesion to emerging democratic nation-states? Classic studies on neighbourhood civility focus on the importance of voluntarism and civic participation in local associations.[1] In a country such as South Africa (in the global South) the question of neighbourliness refers to a different set of challenges that concern surviving poverty and immediate defence of life against imminent violence.

The aim of this article is to understand urban violence in South Africa in the context of local and international engagements, with the concept of social cohesion and collective efficacy as factors that can potentially

'protect' communities against violence at a neighbourhood level.

The analysis is based on a multi-year international comparative study on the relationship between social cohesion and violence conducted in South Africa and Brazil, funded by the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Safe and Inclusive Cities Programme.

This article focuses on the ethnographic material gathered as part of the study during 10 months of fieldwork in the South African township of Khayelitsha in the Western Cape, which experiences high levels of violence and poverty and is the site of a major, internationally funded, violence prevention intervention called 'Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading' (VPUU). An ethnographic

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methodology was utilised because it allows an understanding of the meanings, beliefs, values and practices of social actors and tries to understand human experience on its own terms, rather than judging it from a normative position.[2] The article seeks to interrogate formal discourses around social cohesion and violence prevention in relation to an examination of the 'lived' experience of citizens as revealed by the ethnography.

Background

Social cohesion is a broad concept but generally refers to the factors that 'hold a society together', which has been the focus of philosophical and social inquiry since the time of Aristotle, Aquinas and Montaigne, and in the sociology of Durkheim in the 19th century. Collective efficacy looks at how social cohesion can prevent violence when it is translated into collective action for the 'common good' at neighbourhood level.[3]

Historically, the greatest levels of concern with social cohesion have been at moments of major change, for example during the period of industrialisation, which Durkheim saw as undermining social cohesion. More contemporary challenges and fragmentation associated with globalisation have precipitated a renewed interest in social cohesion as a policy construct from the 1990s.

The concept of social cohesion has been widely used in the international policy environment and has been taken up within forums such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the World Bank, the Club of Rome and the Canadian federal government since the 1990s.

In South Africa, engagement with the concept through government policy has grown substantially over the past decade,[4] which saw the launch of a national social cohesion strategy in 2012.[5] 'Social cohesion' is now a major outcome in the country's medium-term strategic framework for national development.[6]

Thus far, however, there has been limited empirical research on social cohesion and its relationship to violence in the global South, particularly in new democratic nation-states such as South Africa. Policy

and practical interventions by multi-lateral institutions, including the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), are formulated on the basis of understandings of social solidarity conceptualised in settings such as Europe and Canada.

The few existing academic studies in South Africa have identified a clear need for empirical research on the specific meaning of social cohesion in the South African environment[7] and have noted the 'scanty and anecdotal' scholarship on the South African social fabric.[8] On the policy front, a major study in 2011 conducted for the Presidency strongly asserted the need for locally appropriate indicators to measure social cohesion.[9]

'Social cohesion' is a complex and multi-faceted concept, and a significant difficulty tackled by the scholarly research has been to define its scope.[10] However, most policy and scholarly research focuses on one or several of five dimensions identified by Jenson: (1) the sharing of common values, feelings of belonging; (2) economic inclusion and opportunities to participate in the labour market; (3) participation in public affairs, local and national; (4) tolerance of differences and diversity; and (5) legitimacy of institutions, in particular how well they are able to represent citizens and mediate conflict.[11]

Thus far, most policy and scholarly literature utilises the concept to understand how to integrate all members of the national community into a well-established and relatively cohesive democratic nation-state. However, newly democratised nation-states such as South Africa face a more fundamental challenge: how to *establish* a socially unified democratic nation-state in the first place, often after individuals and communities have been deeply divided by generations of violence and socio-political conflict. This remains a deeply complex and fraught task in post-colonial societies that are in general endemically heterogeneous. In such environments social pluralism may be devalued as a desire to establish national forms of identity, and statehood takes precedence. Vitally, the question of social cohesion in these recently established democratic nation-states is a profoundly political one; it involves establishing the terms of citizenship in a democratic nation-state based on 'fraternity' or community between citizens rather

than on an authoritarian relationship between state and citizen.[12]

The majority of empirical research attempting to measure social cohesion or advocating a way to measure it employs survey data that are readily available only in the United States (US) and Western Europe, and increasingly, Australasia. More importantly, many indicators used to 'measure' social solidarity currently are premised on notions of 'civic-ness', 'neighbourliness' and 'moral community' that characterise the relatively orderly conditions of society in North America and Western Europe, rather than the far more tenuous conditions of local and national unity in countries such as South Africa.

Here, the most basic legitimacy of state institutions is at stake. Participation may involve immediate defence of life, for example, defending neighbours against violent attack, while a sense of national or even local belonging remains intensely problematic. From this perspective the very meaning of the dimensions of social cohesion that current research attempts to measure may be profoundly different in the global North and South.

In addition, the literature on social cohesion has been shaped by particular theoretical assumptions about the nature of social solidarity and social life. Durkheim's teleological arguments that as societies modernise, they move from communitarian forms of solidarity to solidarity built around relationships between autonomous individuals, have been particularly influential. The hypothesis of collective efficacy, which is now widely used in criminological theory, influentially defined by Sampson as 'social cohesion among neighbours combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good', uses data from Chicago in the US and envisages individualised, independent subjects choosing to come together for the good of a particular community.[13]

Yet, in environments such as South Africa where communitarian social relations and identities are still prevalent, such forms of mutual interaction are an assumed part of social life rather than an individual 'choice' in the manner envisaged in Western contractarian thought. As an interviewee in Khayelitsha explained, 'individualism is in the head it is not in the blood'.[14] These conceptions are strongly linked to the ethics of ubuntu that both implicitly and explicitly structure social life and identity in environments such as South Africa. Ubuntu, an Nguni word, signifies a complex concept that is not easily translated into English but nevertheless has a profound impact on African ontology across the continent. In terms of this ethics, ethical personhood, as opposed to mere existence, is realised through the collective, and by means of actively carrying out duties and obligations to kin and community.[15]

Khayelitsha: a case study

Methods

To investigate how social relations and cohesion are understood – and produced – by social actors themselves and to compare this to formal discourses around social cohesion, the research utilised an ethnographic methodology. Ethnography seeks to interpret the meanings located in particular social and cultural systems.[16] Geertz argues that social actors are suspended in 'webs of significance' that they themselves create and sustain meaningful and stable social relationships with each other because they share those common understandings of reality.[17]

Therefore this research did not attempt a quantitative analysis of violence, social cohesion or the impact of the VPUU intervention on both of these factors. Instead it sought to understand the context of violence and social cohesion in Khayelitsha and the meanings attributed to the VPUU in this milieu.

The fieldwork was carried out by research team member Ncedo Mngqibisa over a period of 10 months. He immersed himself in the communities living in the Harare and Kuyasa sections of Khayelitsha by conducting daily field visits that allowed him to produce a 'thick description'[18] of the 'way of being'[19] of these communities through semi-structured interviews, focus groups, informal conversations and ongoing systematic observations, which were recorded in field notes. All interactions probed questions about the way in which people do and do not cooperate in Khayelitsha, forms of social and other organisation, the degree of sociality between neighbours, experiences and norms around

violence, and local responses to violence, including both formal interventions such as the VPUU and informal activities such as community patrols and vigilante action.

Interviewees were identified through a 'snowball sampling' methodology that gave the researcher deepening access to different components of the community. Snowball sampling is particularly useful for accessing 'hidden'[20] or more 'vulnerable' and 'impenetrable'[21] social groups. The research began with a process of community profiling that involved identifying and interviewing key community leaders from local government, civil society, schools and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). While every effort was made to speak to a range of role players with different perspectives, a snowball sampling approach does introduce the possibility of bias as a result of the fact that the methodology depends on referral from one interviewee to another, who are almost inevitably linked within social or other networks.

The research on the VPUU was constrained by the fact that the HSRC was unable to secure formal cooperation with the intervention, although this was the initial intention of the research project. Therefore this study relies on the perspectives of those who interacted with the intervention and what publicly available documentation we could obtain.

Through a process of engagement with the Khayelitsha community in Harare and Kuyasa, informal traders emerged as a group who had a significant level of engagement with and stake in the VPUU intervention and hence were interviewed systematically, both individually and in a focus group. Another focus group was held with informal traders who are foreign nationals to gain their perspective of informal trading in the township. In addition, focus groups were held with beneficiaries of the VPUU social development programme who had received funding from the organisation for community-based projects, as well as with young entrepreneurs who had been using VPUU facilities such as the 'Hub' business development space. Finally, focus groups were held with young men and young women respectively to draw out the gendered dimensions of violence in Khayelitsha.

Recordings of a total of 58 interviews and six focus groups were translated into English by a professional translator, combined with Mngqibisa's field notes and commentary on the key research issues of the study. The qualitative material was analysed using inductive thematic analysis. This process consists of reading through textual data, identifying themes in the data, coding those themes, and then interpreting the structure and content of the themes.[22] The analysis also drew on grounded theory, which is a type of inductive thematic analysis. Developed by Glaser and Strauss,[23] grounded theory is a set of iterative techniques designed to identify categories and concepts within texts that are then linked into formal theoretical models.[24] This method made it possible to 'read' the different sources of data collected against each other in an ongoing recursive analysis.

Social cohesion in Khayelitsha

Khayelitsha is the country's second largest township. It is characterised by severe levels of violence and poverty. The township experiences some of the highest murder rates in the country, currently at a ratio of between 76 and 108 murders per 100 000 of the population at different police stations in the area.[25] This is well above the national murder rate of 32 murders per 100 000 of the population, which is already five times higher than the 2013 global average of six murders per 100 000.[26]

The ethnography shows pervasive levels of fear of violence in public and private spaces. A young woman explained that 'we cannot walk outside at night because of the fear. You fear being raped, robbed, I don't know if I will get to where I am going alive or if I will be killed on my way.'[27] Private spaces are also contaminated:

> You can't really sleep at night even when you are with the person you are in a relationship with. During our mothers' and grandmothers' times they felt safe when they were with their men. You only feel safe under your roof and even there you need to lock. You have to sleep with airtime on your phone so you can call for help.[28]

There is also considerable youth gang violence. Residents feel 'robbed by our children that we gave birth to in the township'.[29]

Khayelitsha is also marked by substantial economic disadvantage, with the average income of those employed not more than R2 000 per month and half of the population living in shacks or informal dwellings. Khayelitsha was one of the last townships established under apartheid and was intended to forcibly 'consolidate' the settlement of black people in the urban areas of the Western Cape.[30]

Throughout its history it has experienced significant migration, particularly from the largely poor, rural province of the Eastern Cape. Currently about 50% of the adult population come from this province, although young people below 19 have largely been born in the township.[31] Khayelitsha has therefore developed from a 'previously planned township area under apartheid into a sprawling, largely informal urban area characterised by a lack of basic services and infrastructure where over-crowding and inadequate living conditions prevail for the vast majority of its residents'.[32] While high levels of migration do not automatically lead to higher levels of violence, rapid migration, particularly when it is not well managed by the state, can place strains on existing social bonds and local forms of regulation.[33]

The analysis of the ethnographic data shows that Khayelitsha does not experience an absence of social cohesion but, like many South African townships, is characterised by dense informal social networks and multiple forms of social ordering and social organisation, founded implicitly on communitarian ethics and social practice.

> I think it's a cultural thing to know everyone.[34]

> One of the things most of us grew up with is that the neighbour is also your mom or dad. If your parents are at work, they normally take care of us and play the role of a parent. When celebrating things we do it together as a community. I'd say that if you are living in the township it is hard to say you don't know your neighbour unless if you are new.[35]

Informal traders explain: 'We trust each other. If someone has a problem they can approach the other person for help.'[36] 'We are tight in this area.'[37] People do intervene on each other's behalf: 'We don't have securities. My security is this one and that one [other traders] … If we get robbed or I am being robbed, these securities you see here have to come out to help me.'[38] However, many of these networks are also under pressure. 'People no longer have ubuntu'.[39] Class divisions undermine cohesion: 'Greeting the neighbour is fine, but it is not alright to ask for sugar from a neighbour that is in a higher level than you.'[40] In addition, 'Western ways of living' are 'influencing people on how they should live'[41] and undermining communitarian values and practices.

Although networks can be a source of resilience, they can also be a source of violent exclusion and control, manifested in group violence against a precariously defined 'other'. Here neighbours are extraordinarily willing to intervene on each other's behalf; however, the 'common good' they seek to achieve is often the violent exclusion of the criminal and the momentary restoration of 'order'.

A trader outlined: 'Most of the time, Xosh is not at her stand. The skollies go to Xosh's stand and take whatever they want. I have to stop the fights. If the person runs, they [community members] chase the person with a knife.'[42] Another trader reiterated that he is prepared to risk his life and face lethal gun violence to defend other traders: 'We don't care about the gun and dying.'[43]

Violence is frequently organised as a public spectacle, a performance of moral community, as the following field report of a spontaneous armed gathering at a shop owned by a Chinese national accused of mistreating a worker indicates. 'It was roughly around lunch time when I saw people amalgamated in front of the Chinese 5 Rand store, carrying stones, umbrellas and brooms from the toilets in the mall ... People claimed that Chinese treat their workers [badly] and they … were singing that they must go back to China.'[44]

One of the classic indicators of social cohesion is 'Do you recognise people in your neighbourhood?' People in Khayelitsha 'know' each other but this 'knowing' can be a source of violent retribution. Those who are identified as 'criminals' may be subjected to violent public punishment. A former gang member explained that 'our utmost fear is not going to jail or dying but it's the torture by the community should they find you'.[45] Those who report crime are known to those

who commit crime. These individuals often have networks with local police. A female focus group participant explained why she does not report drug dealing: 'I don't report it because I fear for my life … if I go and report … at the police station, the police will get to that house and tell on me.'[46]

While traditional crime prevention approaches are premised on utilising community knowledge, in this situation 'knowing' can be dangerous. The concept of collective action and a willingness to intervene on behalf of a 'common good', which underpins international definitions of collective efficacy, therefore takes an ambiguous turn in environments where the nature of the common good is profoundly contested and parochial conceptions of it are violently defended. In this setting, citizens often have an ambiguous relationship with the state, law and legality and conventional forms of regulation. For example, one interviewee, referring to constitutional provisions for the rights of women and children, asserted that 'the government has destroyed this country with the laws they set'.[47] The police occupy a precarious and weak position in this world of informality. A respondent stated in this regard that 'they [police] are defeated'.[48]

Associations of minibus taxi drivers, the main form of transport for many South Africans, play a central regulatory function in Khayelitsha. This emerges from a history of informal regulation and social control that developed in townships as a result of the absence of legitimate governance under apartheid. In many ways taxi associations are a more influential presence than the police, and are well known for their use of coercive force. Taxi drivers act as informal police who 'discipline' young people, act against criminals, even control informal economic relations, and often mete out significant violence. There appears to be at least some sanction for the violence of taxi associations, although the parents of young people alleged to be gang members who are beaten up by taxi drivers do not support their violence. A young schoolgirl argued that 'taxi drivers help reduce the incidences of gang war by fighting fire with fire'.[49]

The violence of taxi drivers is partly a response to the widespread youth gang problem in the township where schoolgoing boys, armed with knives and guns, are shaping the nature and meaning of public

space. This includes parks built through urban upgrading, and the institutional space of the school, as this quote illustrates: 'A fight had broken in the boys' bathrooms [at school] and knives were drawn … so now the boys who drew knives for each other went to their gangs and now it's no longer one on one but gang versus gang.'[50]

The gangs impose their own form of policing and social order, which involves the territorial control of space. They overturn generational hierarchies, for example, taking control of the space of the school to pursue gang conflicts and threatening teachers with violence. A schoolgirl emphasised that 'those teachers who don't have cars are in big trouble because they can be attacked easily'.[51] In a world of deprivation and violence, however, gangs can play an important role in the lives of young men. A gang member outlined his motivations for belonging to a gang: 'It is also wanting to be part of a group of guys who are cool (*amajita*) because it gives you two things, status and protection.'[52]

Therefore, in this setting, localised forms of cohesion that help residents cope with rampant crime and violence through vigilante associations and public violence actually undermine national social cohesion founded on constitutional values, by asserting an alternative, parochial regime of collective justice and punishment that disputes the values and practices of a universal and individualised, rights-based, formal law. The violent expression of this local justice contests the sovereignty of the state, which is ostensibly founded on a monopoly of the use of force in the country.

Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU)

In order to address some of the challenges of violence and poverty experienced in Khayelitsha, the VPUU initiative was established through a partnership between the City of Cape Town and the German Development Bank in 2004. The intervention aims to reduce violence and improve the quality of life in Khayelitsha. The VPUU is primarily an urban upgrading programme, but it links this to 'work streams' that support social and institutional crime prevention.

The project endeavours to create a sense of 'place' and ownership of space through aesthetic and practical upgrading interventions that attempt to address the history of Khayelitsha as a mere catchment area for labour under apartheid. In addition, it seeks to provide support for local entrepreneurship, training in the management of facilities and support for community policing. It has made sizeable contributions to infrastructure development, initially in the Harare area of Khayelitsha and increasingly in other areas of the township. It is also being rolled out to a number of other places in the Western Cape.

While the VPUU argues that it is a 'technical' intervention, it is in fact a deeply socially and culturally embedded undertaking, which disrupted, interacted with and shaped existing forms of social relation and social cohesion in the environments in which it was implemented.

The VPUU 'model' draws substantially from international development models, particularly those of UN-Habitat, the World Health Organization (WHO) and, most importantly, the German Development Bank. The bank's model of 'violence prevention through urban upgrading' informs German financial cooperation with countries such as South Africa. This model explicitly seeks to address violence by using 'conventional urban planning tools' and 'coherent and integrated town planning' in order to create an ordered and managed urban environment that bridges 'the divide between the formal and the informal city' and 'stabilise[s] the social environment'.[53] Urban upgrading in this perspective creates the foundation for new forms of citizenship based on physical and symbolic ownership of space. 'For inhabitants, having an official address means formally being resident of a city', which ostensibly leads to a reduction in violence.[54] Nonetheless, as Muggah notes in terms of the relationship between violence and urban upgrading, 'the outcomes of slum upgrading are still highly contested with some observers detecting varying socio-economic dividends for the urban poor'.[55]

In addition, cities in the global South are a particularly complex and often deeply informal environment that may not lend themselves easily to traditional approaches of formalisation, regulation and upgrading. Swilling and Annecke note that cities in general are the outcomes of complex interactions of various socio-political, cultural, institutional and technical networks and that the urban environment is often characterised by contradictory processes of routinisation, repetitive crises and transformational practices.[56] The peculiarities of southern cities are the result of their history of colonialism and post-colonialism, as well as contemporary processes of rapid urbanisation and globalisation. In this environment, 'illegality and informality tug at the normative roots of the state leading to an arena charged with the violence of and toward the governed'.[57] Consequently, while the traditional urban planning approach to the city foresees the possibility of a significantly planned and regularised environment that could ostensibly 'design out' violence, the empirical 'reality' of most cities, particularly in the global South, involves a range of contradictory practices and processes that make this ideal very difficult to attain, even if it were desirable.

Nevertheless, the image of an 'ordered' city, founded on the model of European and American urbanisation, remains the primary conceptual framing for development interventions such as those funded by the German Development Bank and implemented by the VPUU in Khayelitsha. In this vision of the city, urban planners favour formality, order and modernisation in order to promote an international urbanism that is associated with the vision of a modern city as 'hygienic', sanitary and 'respectable'. Often informality is misunderstood and misrecognised as a result of normative notions of 'rational' economic behaviour and values.[58] Therefore, while informality may be cast as 'irrational' in these discourses, various types of informality are in fact embedded in a complex of local norms, forms of regulation and sociality that structure daily life in ways that are both meaningful and 'rational'.

The VPUU is fundamentally influenced by these international development policy discourses that seek to create a managed society, characterised by ordered and economised social relations and founded on a normative conception of a formalised city and the self-regulating, economic-rational actor. As a senior VPUU manager explained at the

Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry: 'What the programme would like to show over time is the increase in what we would call managed urban areas and the map on the left with the orange dots shows the very few areas that were effectively managed.'[59]

This is a vision that is profoundly contested by the material reality of informal norms of regulation and control in the fluid space of Khayelitsha, where local colloquial networks often have a far more significant social and symbolic resonance than formal institutional networks. In this context official and 'everyday' networks co-exist and interact with each other, creating overlapping rings of authority and governance in what Shearing and Wood have called the 'pluralization of the governance of security'.[60]

The ethnographic fieldwork evidences some of the struggles by the VPUU to mediate the formal-informal divide and to 'super-impose' a model of order on a deeply contested, informal space. In this space the state is accepted if it provides services, but not if it tries to assert its authority. Here some of the most resonant forms of social regulation are violent and outside the state. Here the lines between what is legal, illegal, criminal or not are blurred, and informal businesses operate according to rationales that do not adhere to normative business practices. In this environment 'scientific' models developed by global organisations struggle to embed themselves in forms of sociality and governance that are far more deeply rooted, and which dispute the normative underpinnings of these interventions.

The VPUU has responded to this challenge by trying to create an explicitly 'apolitical', technical intervention in terms of both who implements (a consulting company) and how the intervention takes place. The initial financing agreement between the German Development Bank and the City of Cape Town stipulated that a 'project-implementing agent' or intermediary, known as the VPUU Consortium, should implement the intervention, led by a team of consultants from Sun Development Pty., which is a subsidiary of a company headquartered in Germany.[61] The intervention thus avoids direct implementation through existing local government or non-governmental structures.

The ethnography reveals that while the VPUU characterises itself as 'apolitical' in terms of a lack of allegiance to any particular party, it is deeply invested in regimes of power at both local and city levels. Also, at the same time as the VPUU asserts the 'apolitical' nature of its work in the township of Khayelitsha, the intervention claims and receives notable political support from the City of Cape Town and is institutionally located in the City of Cape Town Mayoral Office, giving it substantial political sanction.

The VPUU argues that its 'apolitical' approach has assisted it to achieve community trust in circumstances of high political contestation and anger at lack of government service delivery in Khayelitsha. It is also intended to facilitate equal participation in development without the contamination of political party patronage and is seen to give the intervention the ability to move freely in different environments without being seen as aligned any party or faction.[62]

The VPUU sees social cohesion and social capital as central to its approach. The organisation states that it draws on 'South American models' that focus on the building of community cohesion and social capital.[63] Social capital, which can be defined as 'networks of social relations that may provide individuals and groups with access to resources and supports'[64] plays a contributory role in building social cohesion. The main means through which the VPUU asserts that it builds social cohesion is community participation in development. It argues that it has engaged in a participatory methodology that 'strives for negotiated solutions in cooperation with communities', which it sees as having been a crucial success factor for the intervention that has helped build social cohesion in Khayelitsha.[65]

However, Piper has called the form of community consultation that the VPUU engages in and the forums it creates as 'designed' in ways that allow for a very limited form of direct citizen participation in democratic decision-making.[66] Instead, what is created is a representative democracy model led by a cohort of 'responsible' leadership designated and socialised by the VPUU, whose function is to ensure the interests of the project by representing

stakeholders chosen by the VPUU, rather than being directly accountable to the general citizenry.

One of the key citizen engagement tools that the VPUU uses is baseline surveys, which the organisation discursively constructs as giving a 'voice' to 'ordinary' citizens through a random sample. Therefore, 'although one person in 10 speaks, what they say will be an accurate reflection of what everyone living there would say'.[67] This is an ostensibly neutral manner of collecting all 'voices': 'it's a way of ensuring that we get an opinion which is independent of any other kind of gate keeping structures or political affiliations which are in place, so that the voice of the community can emerge'.[68] However, what can be 'said' in a survey is already pre-determined. Which communities can emerge in this putatively 'apolitical' space is also unclear. The baseline surveys that the VPUU conducts collect largely demographic information, which is valuable in its own right but cannot be claimed as a means of giving 'voice' to citizens and is far removed from the type of deliberative voice that Habermas envisaged in his model of a public sphere, that is, 'an arena in which individuals participate in discussions about matters of common concern'.[69]

In order to avoid the contestation and patronage of local politics, the VPUU therefore creates its own parallel, managed governance spaces oriented to ensure the delivery of development objectives through controlled community participation. However, as a 'community participation work-stream manager' acknowledged, a major challenge in establishing the organisation's structures at local level has been trying to explain to communities why the VPUU is setting up completely new representative structures.[70]

The major decision-making forums for the project at local level are Safe Node Area Committees (SNAC). the VPUU argues that these are more representative and democratic than current local governance structures, allowing for the equal participation of a range of stakeholders. The SNAC is thus made up of 50% of stakeholders coming from local government structures and 50% from community-based organisations, NGOs and faith-based organisations. The VPUU conducts an audit in a particular area and interviews the leadership of organisations to decide

who should participate in the structure, based on a range of criteria. Establishing such structures under the tutelage of the VPUU is intended to prevent any one stakeholder from gaining too much power over the development process and to avert the real threat that development processes might be captured for party political or other narrow interests.

In as much as the VPUU seeks to manage who will participate in its 'decision-making' structures, its implementation is steeped in a managerialist discourse and practice that will only acknowledge those citizens who conform to these norms; i.e., the classic neo-liberal, self-governing, 'responsible' citizen. One example of this is the set of procedures that must be followed by Community Policing Forums (CPFs) in order to receive financial support from the VPUU. Modelling its contractual relationship with CPFs on formal business conventions, the organisation seeks to conclude 'service level agreements' with CPFs that involve a number of pre-conditions, including that each CPF must have 'accurate data about their membership *and* who is active *and* where they are active' (own emphasis).[71] Secondly, each active member of a neighbourhood watch must submit an incident report at the end of their duties. In addition, each CPF must enter into a 'development contract' with individual volunteers.[72] 'Standards' have to be agreed to on each of these tasks and 'if the CPF performs to standard they get the money into their account'.[73] However, when questioned about the success of these contracts with CPFs, a senior VPUU manager acknowledged that 'up until now only the Harare CPF has actually received payments so it's not something that has been that successful up until now'.[74]

In contrast to this ideal procedural model that the VPUU seeks to realise, is an example of what is seen as 'inappropriate' behaviour. It was recorded in a neighbourhood watch report, but is in fact a mundane form of interaction in the environment of Khayelitsha:

> Incident report: 'We met X, Y and Z, they were carrying big stones. We asked them why. The people started swearing and shouting at us and throwing the stones at us. We started throwing the stones back at them. X was hit and fell down. We called a van to check on him.'[75]

Informal traders

A pivotal site where tensions have emerged between the formality that the VPUU seeks to create and local practices of informality, relates to contestation around the creation of formal kiosks for trading by the VPUU.

The VPUU seeks to create a classic Western 'entrepreneur' – the self-interested, utility-maximising individual whose major rationale is the generation of profit. Therefore, the formalisation that the VPUU wants to achieve as the basis of a more 'ordered' and controlled urban environment is not simply about infrastructure but about creating citizens with a particular subjectivity, which is contested by traders' existing norms, world views and forms of social practice. As one trader noted: 'We do want development, we do want the good and glamorous things, but the VPUU needs to know the people they are bringing this development to.'[76]

The VPUU therefore enforces a range of business principles and practices that are seen as alien and exclusionary. 'They come with a list of criteria';[74] 'they tell you that your business should have a business account and business plan … their requirements keep you out'.[77] At the same time the VPUU is itself seen to be engaging in 'business' rather than development as a result of the fact that charges are levied for the use of its facilities.

While on the one hand the kiosks the VPUU has built provide important services, e.g. access to water, electricity and storage space, at the same time the initiative is seen as undermining pre-existing relationships of sociality and reciprocity that underpinned survivalist businesses, where relations between traders were governed horizontally and informally. 'It's better to sell different things. Business will not go well if you all sell the same thing. That is the guideline.' 'Each person knows their spot. We have rules. You know your place.'[78] Myers argues in this vein that the integration of social networks and patterns of sociality into structured formal forms of urban development can be a poor substitute for previous forms of economic reciprocity and sociality.[79] In this context, formality can constitute a threat to social networks and patterns of sociality, and render the benefits derivable from it 'doubtful or uncertain'.[80]

In return for the infrastructure it has built, the VPUU enforces a contractual relationship with traders who now occupy these spaces. Many of these traders previously traded 'in the sand'[81] where the VPUU buildings are now located.

The VPUU seeks to establish new forms of ownership of space, in line with classic Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles that theorise the link between urban space and crime in terms of the notion of 'territoriality', i.e. the concept that a sense of ownership of and responsibility for space can help reduce crime. However, it is exactly this ownership of space that is contested by traders. While some traders acknowledge that the VPUU did engage in consultative processes before the intervention was implemented, the organisation is still seen as having appropriated space that traders were already invested in. This space is now literally and symbolically owned and controlled by the VPUU: 'The place they put up the building is the place we used to work from.' 'They forget that we were trading here.'[82]

Informal traders who currently occupy the kiosks that the VPUU has created did not pay for the land on which they traded previously, and maintain that they felt a sense of proprietorship and autonomy. Now they have to pay rent of R900 per month and are subject to a new regulatory regime imposed by the VPUU, which designates what and how they trade. The organisation is therefore seen to have usurped space previously utilised by traders, without external rule or regulation: 'Keep in mind that they build in your spot with your business not registered.'[83] A number of traders are now severely indebted. Most seem to have understood that some payment would be needed in compensation for the facilities, but allege they were not aware of how high rents would be. As one female trader elucidated: 'The VPUU brings development, but they don't tell us the price.'[84]

The VPUU is seen by some traders to be callously enforcing a contractual relationship. 'They say, "This is not charity."'[85]

> They just tell us, 'vacate if you cannot afford. We have a list of people that want to move in.' … if you cannot afford to pay rent because there is no business they tell you about moving out. You

will leave and go stay at the location and what will you eat?[86]

While the VPUU argues that it seeks to understand the 'voice' of citizens through its baseline surveys, interviews with traders appear to reveal a profound struggle to be heard: 'We talked and gave up.'[87] 'They don't sit down and talk to the people they found here to find solutions.'[88] 'They just come to us only to tell us what they have decided to do.'[89] 'That affects you as the person who has been here.'[90]

The rent charged to traders is in line with the methodology outlined by the German Development Bank that contends that 'upgrading can be affordable when carried out jointly. Programmes show that even low-income residents are willing to pay for infrastructure services in adequate conditions.'[91] The VPUU echoes this in its own assertions that 'long term financial sustainability is central to the VPUU approach – to create and develop facilities and systems that are affordable and will pay for themselves.'[92] In its semi-annual progress report of 2013, the VPUU notes the achievement of a 'milestone' as the fact that 'rental income has for the first time exceeded basic maintenance costs'.[93] However, affordability appears to be a critical issue in terms of both access to facilities and the rental cost of trading kiosks.

In this setting, attempting to formalise the urban space through urban upgrading, while beneficial, may disrupt complex social networks and have unintended consequences. The question is, how is it possible to fashion violence prevention initiatives around social cohesion that take these complex social networks into account, and that utilise existing community resources and conceptions of social solidarity?

Conclusion

It is evident that the relationship between social cohesion and violence plays out in multifaceted ways in contexts such as Khayelitsha, disputing some of the assumptions in international interpretations of social cohesion and collective efficacy. Nevertheless, social cohesion is relevant to understanding the conditions of both solidarity and violence in a city in the global South such as Khayelitsha. It is widely used in policy discourse both locally and internationally, has generated a body of scholarship, and most

importantly, is shaping the way in which violence prevention is being understood and implemented. This article has therefore sought to interrogate the applicability of international conceptions of social cohesion and its relation to violence in an environment such as Khayelitsha. For all its limitations and definitional fluidity, social cohesion as a conceptual category that tries to capture some of the conditions of cohesion and citizenship in the nation-state, does have analytical and practical value. It grapples with a fundamental question about how societies can cohere in ways that support non-violent forms of local and national democratic unity in a manner that does not stifle contention and embraces and mediates social pluralism.

However, the way in which solidarity has been conceptualised in dominant discourses may be limited by presuppositions about the nature of social, political and economic life typical of the milieu in the global North. The concept therefore needs to be interrogated and recalibrated to take into account what Bourdieu calls the 'habitus' of citizens in the global South, i.e. their lifestyle, values, outlooks and expectations, their specific subjectivities, their forms of identity and their mutual relations.[94] All these, often operating as 'common sense' ways of being, determine social practice far more powerfully than externally imposed norms.

Thus, in Khayelitsha communitarian world views support forms of mutual sociality that are intrinsic to social life and identity. These are underpinned implicitly by the philosophy of ubuntu in which personhood is achieved through social relations rather than through individual empowerment. However, these communitarian networks and 'ways of life' are under social and structural strain and moreover are the conduits not only for reciprocity, but also for violence. This is an environment where citizens intervene on each other's behalf, as in Sampson's concept of collective efficacy, but frequently in order to enact what are seen as defensive forms of violence in a situation of considerable disorder, rather than to oppose violence. Informal networks are not channels for middle class forms of sociality such as the bowling clubs that Putnam envisaged, but instead function as vital regulatory mechanisms for social, economic and

political life in an environment where the state in general, and the police in particular, can be substantively absent as meaningful governing agents.

These conditions of informality, plurality and violence pose difficult questions for violence prevention efforts that seek to build non-violent forms of cohesion. What this research has revealed, however, is the ubiquitousness of community networks and world views that conceptually and practically support intervention and solidarity, and which could be mobilised for violence prevention. This is not to say that violence does not remain an authoritative source of power in private and public life and social networks.

In this environment, an internationally conceptualised and funded intervention such as the VPUU attempts to avoid engaging with the 'irregularity' of the social and political environment. It instead insists on normative practices and subjectivities, as well as its own governance spaces and regulatory mechanisms, implicitly shaped by an assumption of their superiority. Citizens are delivered a 'model' that they did not substantively help formulate and are 'allowed' to participate on terms that are already set. However, attempts to 'ignore' the society in which the organisation is embedded in order to effect an ostensibly technical and neutral intervention founders on the unavoidable fabric of society in which the programme is embedded, limiting its ability to recognise and build on existing forms of social cohesion and communitarianism and to form a genuinely equal partnership for the prevention of violence.

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Pervasive, but not politicised

Everyday violence, local rule and party popularity in a Cape Town township

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Through examining violence in the township of Imizamo Yethu in Cape Town, we show that leadership in this community is not based on violence, despite its pervasiveness in the settlement. Further, rule by local leaders and the state is often weak, and normally not violently enforced. This account challenges three common views in the literature. The first is that, under conditions of weak rule, violence is primarily about contests over political power. The use of violence by a variety of social actors in Imizamo Yethu, but rarely by political leaders or parties, challenges this assumption. The second is that violence is central to maintaining local rule – but in Imizamo Yethu leaders have seldom used coercion. Lastly, our case illustrates that effective local rule is not necessarily a condition of party identification, which is rooted in larger dynamics of state patronage and race politics that may even weaken local rule.

On the morning of 6 December 2011, we arrived in Imizamo Yethu as a small group of researchers[1] prepared to start a three-month action-research project on violence, local (dis)order and rule. As we drove into the township, we noticed that large rocks and tyres had been pushed into the road, blocking the way. Smoke drifted across the settlement and we saw broken glass and debris in the road. We started counting the numbers of cars with smashed windows. At the police station at the entrance to the township, a large group of angry people was gathered, shouting and arguing.

Eventually, after speaking with various community leaders and residents, we were able to establish

that there had been an outbreak the previous night of 'taxi violence', involving two different factions of the local Imizamo Yethu taxi operators. The dispute centred around the licencing process and access to lucrative taxi routes, with the more established association refusing entrance to others. When a second, less formalised group began to operate taxis in the area, the more formal group retaliated by attacking their cars and stabbing a driver. The situation then spiralled into a series of retaliations between the different taxi groups.

What emerged on our first day in Imizamo Yethu was an indication of the complexities surrounding the pervasiveness of violence in the settlement, and the implications for social and political order: two taxi associations with uncertain links to competing factions of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) local leadership; stories of episodic neighbourhood watches; and allegations

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of local linkages between all of these and the main political parties in Cape Town. Over time, the frame of violence covered by our fieldwork extended to dealing with issues of crime, xenophobia and service delivery protests, but all of these were threaded through by the dynamics of local political rivalry and weak rule by both state and local leaders, as demonstrated by the taxi violence on our first day in Imizamo Yethu.

By late 2015, while we were writing this article, Imizamo Yethu witnessed a popular mobilisation of unprecedented scale against two drug gangs, the amaXaba and the Bad Boys Company, whose turf battle had led to regular stabbings and even deaths over the preceding year. In August, a large vigilante group confronted and killed the leaders of both gangs. In the days that followed, SANCO leaders met with the remaining gang members to end the conflict and demobilise the gangs. Since that period a nightly community patrol has been in place that, by all accounts, has significantly reduced crime. Once again, local leaders reacted to the use of violence by other actors in Imizamo Yethu, although this time they endorsed the violence and new forms of coercion which united the community, local leaders and even the police.

This article explores the relationship between violence, local rule and political actors in order to contribute to the current debate on social cohesion, inequality and security in cities of the global South. The relationship, we suggest, is a lot less linear than often assumed. We show how violence has not been used to gain or consolidate local leadership in Imizamo Yethu, at least not yet, and has been used only in exceptional cases to enforce local rule. Rather, violence is a pervasive and a constant background presence in many private and some public interactions, and is used to police particular moral views, such as the immorality of drug use – reinforcing the kind of social cohesion that leads to the vigilante mobilisation described above.

Rebelocracy and violence

Some influential recent literature on violence explores the linkages between micro-level analysis and meso- and macro-level analyses of conflict, in order to construct new arguments about the implications of

violent conflict for wider political, economic and social processes,[2] and the extent to which violence is used by particular groups to establish political order.[3] Thus there is an emergent literature from conflict resolution studies exploring the relationships between armed actors and specific regimes of governance.[4] This study interrogates some of the assumptions reflected in the literature with regard to how violence constitutes the political under conditions of weak state rule, and poses questions about social cohesion by revealing that weak social cohesion need not result in rule through violence.

As part of the attempt to bridge different levels of analysis of violence, Ana Arjona offers a typology of authority regimes within civil and political conflict that entails a 'degree of intervention of armed groups in civilian affairs' and the 'presence of social contract between armed group and local population'.[5] Although this includes situations of civil war, in theory it includes any context in which state monopoly of violence is contested or filled by other armed non-state actors. Indeed, as Davis points out, this is a common phenomenon across the global South, particularly in respect of economic control of local areas, for instance with drug gangs or militias.[6] The inability of the South African state to address endemic levels of insecurity in poor, urban settlements of South Africa, and the proliferation of actors pursuing violence, from gangs to vigilante organisations to moments of popular mobilisation such as xenophobic attacks, reveal the relevance of armed, non-state actors to local rule in South Africa.

With this in mind, we return to Arjona's typology, where 'rebelocracy' refers to a high degree of intervention by armed groups in civilian affairs, and a sense of a social contract between the armed group and the local population. This would include the provision of services similar to those provided by a state, as well as other symbols of state-like power, such as a flag or nationalist symbols. On the other end of the typology, Arjona identifies 'aliocracy' as a narrow range of interventions by armed groups in civilian affairs, and a social contract between the armed group and the local population, such as militia expelling drug gangs from the favelas of Rio. The lack of a social contract between armed groups and the local population would fall into 'disorder' in Arjona's typology.

We suggest that since its formation in the early 1990s, Imizamo Yethu has been slipping from a form of 'aliocracy' under a relatively strong civic leadership, towards 'disorder' with the weakening of SANCO and local state rule. This is despite the fact that SANCO is closely identified with the African National Congress (ANC) at local level. Notably, however, the ANC's legitimacy remains in place through the influence of national ideas and racialised experiences of life in Hout Bay, rather than through legitimate local political leadership and effective rule in Imizamo Yethu. The possible exception to this trend is the recent anti-drug gang mobilisation which has, paradoxically, strengthened both SANCO and its relations with the local police on the back of an implicit anti-crime social contract with the residents of Imizamo Yethu. How long this will last is hard to say.

Key to understanding local politics in Imizamo Yethu is the fact that this is an ANC-aligned community in a city that has been run by the Democratic Alliance (DA) since 2006, and in a province that has been run by the DA since 2009. As argued elsewhere,[7] this has placed significant strain on relations between community leaders and the city and province, as SANCO's partisan identity threatens rather than reinforces its claim to legitimate leadership of Imizamo Yethu in the eyes of these two spheres of the state. Conversely, DA governance desires 'non-partisan' community representation, an approach attempted in Imizamo Yethu by the SANCO leadership of 2007 until this undermined their relations with the local ANC, and they were eventually supplanted in 2015 by a clearly more partisan group. These dynamics, we suggest, are mostly driven by the larger logic of race and party politics in South Africa, and thus it seems likely that tensions between the DA province and city and SANCO will continue into the future, potentially undermining local rule in Imizamo Yethu, and leading from the current state of 'aliocracy' back down the path to disorder.

Arjona, Kalyvas et al. and Davis make the case that contexts of civil war and political violence cannot be treated as homogenous political spaces, and this is also consistent with our argument – that the informal nature of governance within the settlement means that political rule is not only about the state, or one form of state/non-state rule, but

may vary significantly across place. In this regard the dominant party literature on the South African political system is particularly useful. Thus Butler[8] suggests that the enduring rule by the ANC in South Africa, arguably reinforced by race politics where the ANC is seen as the leader of black people, leads to a blurring of party and state, with a range of positive benefits for governance but negative consequences for accountability. On the one hand, the ANC's popularity means it can make unpopular but wise long-term policy choices on, for example, land reform, but on the other, it can ignore a public outcry about unpopular choices or corrupt practices. Some scholars have pointed to the role of liberation nationalism and the access to state resources in cementing the idea of a 'party-state', where racial identity (black African), political party (ANC) and state power are seen as both instrumentally and normatively linked.[9]

At the local level, we can add the notion of 'party-society' that conjoins racial identity, political party and community leadership.[10] This leadership is not exercised by the ANC alone, but also by its allies, often in the form of SANCO. In this context, the claim that the ANC (and its allies) is entitled to rule as the historic champion of oppressed black South Africans is reinforced at local level by the dependency of poor communities on the ANC-run state for development. Consequently, as Benit-Gbaffou notes, the most reliable way of accessing the state for most poor, black communities throughout the country is often through networks in the party rather than state channels.[11] It is often these informal networks that mediate state-society relations, more than formal processes or structures are able to.

As already noted, in Imizamo Yethu the link between party and state has been weakened with the advent of the DA to political power in the city and in the province. While this has weakened state patronage to local Imizamo Yethu leaders through the party, it has not necessarily weakened the popularity of the ANC. A key reason for this centres on the politics of development, in particular the long struggle over what to do with the vacant land adjacent to Imizamo Yethu.[12] The debate centres on whether to build community-specific facilities like a school, as advocated by leaders of the white community,

or build more houses and have Imizamo Yethu children attending schools in other parts of Hout Bay, as advocated by SANCO. The vision of the white community is seen by Imizamo Yethu leaders as an attempt to entrench racial segregation in Hout Bay, rather than challenge it by constructing one set of schools, clinics and other public facilities for all residents. It is offered as evidence of white racism. Thus the politics of race, party and place reinforces a form of political cohesion in Imizamo Yethu despite, or even because of, weak local rule.

In addition, violence in Imizamo Yethu is more commonly practiced by non-political actors, who are not obviously connected to local leadership. The one exception here has been the anti-gang mobilisation, which has brought the community, SANCO and the police together through the use of violence against criminals. This exceptional moment brings us to the question of social cohesion. Social cohesion is fundamentally a normative concept that prescribes a shared sense of morality, purpose and order within a particular context. Thus Forest and Kearns state:

> Social cohesion can emphasise the need for a shared sense of morality and common purpose; aspects of social control and social order; the threat to social solidarity of income and wealth inequalities between people, groups and places; the level of social interaction within communities or families; and a sense of belonging to place. By implication, a society lacking cohesion would be one which displayed social disorder and conflict, disparate moral values, extreme social inequality, low levels of social interaction between and within communities and low levels of place attachment.[13]

Other research on urban neighbourhoods in Chicago shows that more organised and socially cohesive localities may have higher levels of organised violence, as the levels of mutuality and social networks provide a resource for violent actors.[14] The authors make the case for 'negotiated co-existence', which could be seen to correspond to Arjona's type of aliocracy. However, as we will show, neither of these categories fully capture the realities of the relationship between violence, regimes of authority and local order in Imizamo Yethu. The key point

here is that most of the evidence points to uneven and transitory forms of social cohesion, in which violence is used both to enforce a notion of social cohesion (e.g. by expelling certain foreigners) and to unravel a sense of social cohesion (e.g. high levels of insecurity due to crime and interpersonal violence). The overall levels of violence are high, but not highly politicised. Instead, violence is tied to everyday crime, inter-personal relations and business competition (e.g. taxi violence).

Cohesion, violence, insecurity and (dis)order in Imizamo Yethu

The analysis that follows is presented on the basis of evidence gathered over a period of five years in several different research projects. In 2011 we conducted a representative household survey of Imizamo Yethu, interviewing 306 respondents on mostly demographic and livelihoods issues. That same year we also embarked on a participatory action research project exploring insecurity that involved five participatory focus groups in addition to a week-long digital story-telling workshop with 11 residents. From 2012 to 2015 we conducted over two dozen in-depth elite interviews with SANCO, ANC leaders, non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff, community organisers, local government officials and leaders of the migrant community on projects dealing with housing, transport, xenophobia, and waste and water. In addition, we have kept a close eye on the local media, both print and social, in relation to these themes.

Social cohesion

Central to the Forest and Kearns account of social cohesion are shared norms, identities, order, equality, solidarity and sense of belonging. While at its formation in 1991, with just 450 families, Imizamo Yethu was sometimes described in these terms, today most long-standing residents explicitly contrast the plurality, mobility, diversity, violence and disorder of the present unfavourably with the social order of the past. Demographically it is clear that Imizamo Yethu has changed tremendously in 20 years, growing at a rate of nearly 1 000 new people a year to about 25 000 people today.[15] When asked

in 2011 how many people live in Imizamo Yethu, the most common response from our 306 householders was 'too many'. Further, most of the residents are migrants, mostly from the Eastern Cape, but increasingly from the rest of Africa.[16]

In addition to growing quickly, Imizamo Yethu has also become more diverse, and obviously so, with foreign nationals prevalent in the informal business sector in the township, especially Somalis in spaza shops, Namibians in taverns, and Congolese in hair salons, and with significant numbers of Angolans, Malawians and Zimbabweans resident throughout Imizamo Yethu. Along with the diversity of nationalities come language and cultural differences that have limited the ability of the isiXhosa-speaking majority to unite the community in cultural terms. Hence, language at community meetings has become an issue of contention, as isiXhosa is used rather than English, which is also understood by the coloured and foreign residents of Imizamo Yethu. The inability of SANCO to include foreign residents in its various meetings is clear ('they don't want us, but we see SANCO as a South African thing anyway'.)[17] The general decline of SANCO has undermined its ability to manage increasing diversity. Hence, as one former leader put it:

> [I]n the 1990s SANCO was strong, every meeting had hundreds of people, and we controlled everything. It was a good place to live. Now people only come to a meeting if they're going to get a house, and people do what they want.[18]

With this diversity has come greater inequality, as many migrants are poorer than more established families. Since 2000 the upper slopes of the Oranje Kloof mountain have become crammed with shacks that number over 4 300, to the roughly 1 100 formal houses in Imizamo Yethu.[19] Further, local leaders complain of having no ability to control migration into Imizamo Yethu: 'People just rent out their backyards, and sometimes the whole house to foreigners, without telling anyone, so we don't even know about it.'[20] Our own experience working with community members over a five-year period also suggests a significant turnover of residents, with people moving in and out of the township at a high rate. This is the

pattern of 'churning' in poorer urban settlements more widely in South Africa.[21] Thus several of the leaders we started working with in 2011 left Imizamo Yethu within a couple of years for other townships in Cape Town.

Perhaps the clearest evidence of the complexity surrounding the relationship between violence and social cohesion in Imizamo Yethu comes from the ubiquitous levels of insecurity and violence we encountered. Indeed, there is a real sense that violence is a key social norm, with many respondents referring to the need to establish order through violence, for example by reducing crime through 'community justice'. Hence one respondent wistfully longed to return to 'the old ways' or 'sorting people out' when they committed a crime. 'We caught a thief near the school', he told us one day, 'and sorted him out over there [pointing], and then over there, and over there.'[22]

Crime and insecurity: cats and dogs, not the police and SANCO

Overall levels of crime, and interpersonal violence in particular, are significant in Imizamo Yethu, and contribute to a sense of insecurity in the township. Police statistics for Hout Bay indicate an average of 13 deaths per year for the last five years.[23] This amounts to a figure of 26 per 100 000, which, while lower than the national average of 33 per 100 000, is still high. Our research also suggests that many crimes, particularly those related to sexual violence, mugging and robbery, are significantly underreported, as revealed by many respondents in our workshops who related intimate crimes they had not reported to the police or even shared with their families. Perhaps more striking has been the rise in drug-related crime, which has seen a notable spike in the last few years. There is more to this than better policing, as many respondents reported the emergence of drug gangs in Imizamo Yethu for the first time in its history.[24]

In our participatory workshops, discussions highlighted the question of insecurity. Notably, all respondents feared crime, especially at night, and in all parts of the settlement other than in the section where they lived. While respondents felt that 'the police, SANCO/ANC and the community' should be the leading actors in reducing crime, in that order,

they reported that those who made the community safe were 'cats and dogs, neighbours and family', in that order. Cats, because they 'kill rats and mice that eat food', and dogs because 'they bark at *tsotsis*'.[25]

Despite these general observations, the nature of insecurity experienced by respondents changed depending on their social positioning. Some with resources, like shopkeepers, reported 'always watching for thieves'.[26] Certain foreigners (e.g. those from Zimbabwe, Malawi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) were more vulnerable to violence than others (Angola, Namibia) because 'everyone knows the Namibians don't play. They will fight every time.'[27] Women, especially young women, felt vulnerable at night in areas of the township outside their immediate neighbourhood, in particular shebeens. There were also important differences in perceptions of safety by type of housing, with those living in shacks feeling more vulnerable than those in formal housing. As one woman put it: 'We live in fear of someone kicking down the shack door and raping us.'[28] Lastly, some respondents reported deliberately befriending powerful people in the township to get protection: 'I always make friends with gangsters so no-one messes with me.'[29]

This work threw into sharp relief the meaning of insecurity and violence for social cohesion and local governance. It was clear that these generalised levels of insecurity led respondents to see the state, and the police and justice system in particular, as inadequate. This lack of trust in the state was not replaced by a faith in local political actors such as SANCO. Indeed, the space of effective security governance, whether by state or society, remained mostly a vacuum in Imizamo Yethu, at least until the anti-gang violence of late 2015 and the nightly community patrols. Although some respondents complained that 'patrols sometimes beat up the wrong people', all agreed that they had made the township much safer.[30]

Taxi violence: *amaphela* versus *amahoender*

Generally in Cape Town, taxi associations are important role players, as they are well armed, organised and relatively wealthy, and have in the past been accused of operating in mafia style.[31] In both Hout Bay and Imizamo Yethu there is a history

of violent conflict linked to business competition between taxi owners,[32] as noted above. In 2011 the conflict we encountered was between two informal taxi associations that did local routes around Hout Bay, respectively known as the *amaphela* (cockroaches) and *amahoender* (chickens). After much bargaining, they merged in 2013.

Most recently, a former taxi owner has become the chairperson of SANCO, following community protests against resettlement linked to building a Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) turnaround point on the Wynberg route that runs past Imizamo Yethu. Thus, although the protest invoked the long-standing demand by SANCO for housing rather than other facilities to be built on the vacant land in Imizamo Yethu, it also coincided with the particular interests of a small group of taxi owners yet to be incorporated into the system. Despite this, the overwhelming impression we gained from respondents over many years' fieldwork is that while taxi owners are influential in Imizamo Yethu, they do not control SANCO. As one respondent put it, 'they are much too busy making real money to worry about small politics'.[33]

Consequently, our workshops identified taxi associations as a source of both insecurity and security. At times, taxi associations have been drawn in to intervene to protect residents, such as in incidents involving street gangs. At other times, taxi associations drive violence and insecurity through internal disputes, such as the conflict over local routes that we stumbled on in 2011. Indeed, this lack of clear alignment with both wider community agendas and community leaders undermines conditions for both social cohesion and effective local governance by contributing to a generalised sense of unpredictability.

Xenophobic attacks and protection rackets

Our 2011 household survey of Imizamo Yethu revealed that the vast majority of respondents (85%) were South African. This finding runs against the received wisdom of many who live in Imizamo Yethu that the proportion of foreign migrants in the settlement is around 40 to 50%. Our survey findings are closer to the 2011 census, which identifies 3.3% of the Hout Bay population as 'other'. Assuming the

vast majority of the 'other' live in Imizamo Yethu, this would be about 7% of the settlement – roughly half of what we found. Notably, a 2003 Development Action Group survey found just 5% of Imizamo Yethu were foreign nationals, so our 2011 figure is a threefold increase in eight years.[34] Although this uncertainty around the number of African migrants in Imizamo Yethu is unresolvable without more careful research, the available evidence suggests that it is probably closer to the 20% mark (4 000 people) rather than the 40% (8 000 people) often invoked by Imizamo Yethu residents and local leaders in public forums.

While many foreign-born residents experience violence in Imizamo Yethu, there are many reasons to believe that it is not always about national identity. Foreign residents as well as South African nationals experience everyday crime, business competition, personal conflicts and the like. However, there is no doubt that xenophobia is real, as reported by many foreign residents. We also encountered this first hand when a digital storytelling workshop collapsed after conflict between South African and foreign participants.[35] In addition, Imizamo Yethu has been the site of several attempts to expel foreign residents by mobs threatening violence; the most substantial of which was during the 2008 xenophobic wave that swept the country.[36] Notably, the only time we encountered stories of protection rackets against foreign nationals in Imizamo Yethu was in respect of allegations that certain ANC Youth League members approached foreign shopkeepers in the wake of expulsions in order to extort money for protection – with the implication that they could prevent (or incite) xenophobic violence.

While the ambivalence among South Africans towards foreign nationals clearly undermines a shared sense of belonging in Imizamo Yethu, and thus social cohesion, it also weakens local rule. This is not only because of the ambivalence of local leaders towards foreign nationals but also because many residents know that foreign nationals are less likely to go to the police when robbed, as many feel vulnerable to state persecution due to inadequate documentation. Indeed, this exclusion from rule is also manifest in the reluctance of the vast majority of foreign-born residents to participate in SANCO structures, thus

further parsing representation in Imizamo Yethu rule along national lines.

Service delivery protests: houses or buses?

Compared to most townships, Imizamo Yethu has a relatively limited history of service delivery protests,[37] excluding the xenophobic and vigilante attacks already discussed. However, the most recent one occurred in April 2015 when a community protest led to the destruction of eight aluminium-framed houses built by the City of Cape Town for families who were going to be displaced by a MyCiti Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) turnaround station planned for the northern entrance to Imizamo Yethu. According to a leader of SANCO, 'the city could not explain why these few people had got housing ahead of others who have been waiting for years … also why was MyCiti going where we had agreed there would be housing? This angered the community and we tore them down.'[38]

This story is consistent with accounts of service delivery protests that identify both the failure to deliver and poor communication by municipalities as key reasons for protest.[39] Indeed, if we return to the taxi conflict we encountered on the first day we entered IY in 2011, the two groups of SANCO leaders involved in that were divided by the issue of housing. Where one group had supported the building of a new school instead of houses, the other saw this as selling out. The issue was not just that they were taking the side of the 'white' DA-run city, but also that the decision to build community facilities specifically for Imizamo Yethu, rather than share existing ones in the white area, would further racially segregate Hout Bay. As one leader put it: 'We are all Hout Baynians, we should share the same facilities.'[40] The complaint that the white residents of Hout Bay were racist and did not want black people in 'their area' was one made frequently by one SANCO faction at the time, as well as by local ANC leaders.

At the same time, however, there was more than race politics driving the anti-BRT protests of 2015, as some of the key SANCO leaders involved also have interests in the taxi industry, and are potentially threatened by the extension of the BRT to Wynberg. Thus, while this protest represented a

moment in a longer struggle over access to housing and integration into Hout Bay, it also provided an opportunity for some local elites to pursue personal interests. This is a good example of what Von Holdt terms as 'protests within protests',[41] and potentially undermines faith in SANCO to reliably champion all the residents of Hout Bay. Indeed, the claim of corruption was publicly wielded by various local leaders in Imizamo Yethu. Paradoxically then, service delivery politics and protest do not necessarily unite Imizamo Yethu, and may even exacerbate rivalry for local leadership.

At the same time, however, the weakening of SANCO and enduring conflicts over housing and other forms of development in Imizamo Yethu have not undermined the ANC at election time. As revealed by an examination of national election results for the two Imizamo Yethu voting districts, ANC popularity has remained constant at just below 90% since 1999 (Table 1) and indeed, voter turnout in Imizamo Yethu has increased with every national election, and is comparable to the white community who live in the valley (Figure 1). Indeed, this is not just a phenomenon of national elections; a similar positive trend is evident

Table 1: ANC national election results Imizamo Yethu voting districts 1999–2014

Voting district	Venue	1999 ANC	2004 ANC	2009 ANC	2014 ANC
97130684	Hout Bay Christian Community Association	86.15%	88.89%	82.51%	86.49%
97130022	Gospel Outreach Ministries	87.01%	87.35%	84.97%	86.72%

Table 2: Party vote Hout Bay, local government elections 2000–2011

	2000	2006	2011
DA	57.62%	48.67%	51.90%
ANC	31.40%	39.68%	43.94%
ID	0.00%	7.50%	0.00%
ACDP	2.57%	1.18%	0.33%

Figure 1: Voter turnout for three communities of Hout Bay, 1999–2014

in support for the ANC in local government elections in Hout Bay (Table 2). Whatever the travails of SANCO and weak rule, the ANC remains electorally strong in Imizamo Yethu.

Conclusion

The pervasive and varied nature of violence in Imizamo Yethu is implicated in complex dynamics of order and rule, such that there is no simple relationship between violence and social cohesion. Most recently, popular mobilisation against drug gangs led to the deaths of the gang leaders at the hands of a mob, and ongoing nightly patrols by the community. These events appear to have re-established a form of social cohesion between the community, SANCO leaders and the police around the violent repression of crime. However, this moment represents an exception in the history of rule in Imizamo Yethu over the last 10 years, where local leadership and local rule have become increasingly weak. Notably, during this period neither local rule nor the contest for leadership were settled through violence.

Key to explaining these paradoxes, we suggest, is the disjuncture between local leaders in Imizamo Yethu and the local state. Thus, unlike much of the rest of South Africa, identification with the ANC in Imizamo Yethu is a disadvantage in accessing the DA-run city and province, and hence the patronage available through the 'party state' is limited. At the same time, though, the exclusion felt by Imizamo Yethu leaders, best represented in the struggles over housing and racial segregation in Hout Bay, reinforces the idea that the ANC is the true champion of the racially oppressed black people of South Africa. Thus weak local rule poses no threat to ANC popularity, and under certain circumstances may even reinforce it. Ironically it is the popular demand for security, manifest in the anti-drug mobilisation of 2015, that has disrupted the slide from 'aliocracy' to 'disorder' in Imizamo Yethu. However, it seems doubtful whether this powerful moment of social cohesion can indefinitely withstand the wider partisan logic of state patronage and race politics.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

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Facilitating or hindering social cohesion?

The impact of the Community Work Programme in selected South African townships

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This article discusses the contribution of the Community Work Programme (CWP) to social cohesion, a term that is widely used in post-apartheid South Africa.[1] The article is based on a study that examined the contribution of the CWP to violence prevention. The study by researchers from the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation was conducted in six communities: Ivory Park, Orange Farm and Kagiso (situated in Gauteng), Bokfontein (North West Province), and Grabouw and Manenberg (Western Cape). Some work undertaken through the CWP, such as programmes against gangsterism, drug abuse and domestic violence, are directly aimed at addressing violence and may not have been possible had the CWP not provided an enabling context for such activities. However, we show in this article that that the impact of the CWP is not always positive and that the CWP may in some cases result in tensions and contradictions that hinder social cohesion and even cause violence. If not implemented in a consultative participatory manner, the CWP may be a source of conflict rather than of social cohesion. It is thus necessary to ensure that the CWP is implemented with integrity if it is to contribute to positive social cohesion and prevent violence.

The meaning of social cohesion

Social cohesion was a key concept in a study commissioned by the Department of Arts and Culture to deal with the issue of race and racism and other

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forms of exclusion in post-apartheid South Africa in 2004.[2] During this period, the term was used to talk about the need for South Africans to unite as part of a broader process of nation building and reconciliation.[3] In South Africa, as a result, the term 'social cohesion' has been equated with issues of race relations.[4]

International scholars, on the other hand, have used the term to analyse and understand the interaction between social exclusion, poverty and inequality.[5] More recently, the term social cohesion has been used in studies of crime and violence.[6] The dominant view in these studies[7] is that a lack of social

cohesion is associated with high rates of crime and violence in communities. This view was echoed by Veit, Barolsky and Pillay,[8] who argued that increasing levels of crime and violence are a sign of weak social cohesion in South Africa and can be ascribed to apartheid, which led to social disintegration and the erosion of social values in many black communities. However, during apartheid, job reservation and experiences of oppression and suffering limited upward mobility for black South Africans and may have reinforced feelings of solidarity in black communities. The transition to democracy in the 1990s brought rising inequality within black communities,[9] which may have contributed to a decline in social cohesion.

Today family instability is a frequent feature of black townships as a result of absent father figures,[10] high levels of domestic violence,[11] alcoholism and drug abuse.[12] Some studies[13] attribute high levels of violence to weak social relations. It is asserted that 'the breakdown of social cohesion is perceived to have created an anomic context for violent crime to occur'.[14] From this perspective, social cohesion acts to 'hold society together' to prevent crime and violence, even while it may also 'provide a source of social capital for offenders'.[15]

While social cohesion may be considered necessary to prevent violence, some studies show that social cohesion may also be a source of division, intolerance and violence. (See, for example, the article by Barolsky on page 17 of this edition of *SACQ*).

Is a lack of social cohesion the missing link in overcoming violence in South Africa? This is the primary question this article seeks to answer by analysing tensions and contradictions within the CWP, and how they facilitate and hinder social cohesion in communities.

For the purposes of this article social cohesion is defined as 'the shared sense of common purpose; aspects of social control and social order between people, groups and places as well as the level of social interaction within communities or families; and a sense of belonging to place'.[16]

Researching the impact of the CWP as a crime and violence prevention programme

The CWP is a government initiative that falls under the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs. It was designed to provide two days of work per week (up to 100 days per year) to unemployed and underemployed people. During the year April 2014 to March 2015 there were 202 599 participants in the CWP at 186 CWP sites across South Africa.[17] The primary purpose of the CWP is to provide an employment safety net to unemployed people in order for them to obtain a basic stable income.

Any unemployed or underemployed person over the age of 18 years who meets the set criteria can join the CWP. The work undertaken in the CWP is supposed to be identified, prioritised and decided upon by community members in consultation with local councillors and key community stakeholders. The CWP work is categorised into social, environmental and economic sectors. The social sector programmes include home-based care, providing home visits and care to people who are terminally ill, very old people with no family support, child-headed households and indigent families. It includes support work at schools, such as assisting learners with their school work, and early childhood development (ECD) programmes for young children. Environmental sector programmes include cleaning public roads, removing rubble, clearing drains and planting trees. Economic sector programmes include agricultural projects, such as food gardening. Crime and violence prevention initiatives are part of the social sector programmes and were identified as key projects. These are the focus of this article.

It is important to note that the CWP was never designed to prevent crime and violence. However, it appears to have the potential to contribute in this way.[18] The CWP's community-orientated approach empowers community members to decide on priority projects in their communities. Communities burdened by high crime and violence have prioritised programmes that directly aim to prevent crime and violence. This was the case in all six communities studied and reported on in this article. In short, the

CWP appears to have galvanised these communities to address crime and violence.

The study involved interviews with more than 20 individuals, and five focus group discussions in each of the six communities. Those interviewed included CWP participants, coordinators and managers, police officials, school principals, local social workers, agents of the implementing organisations, and government officials responsible for the implementation of the CWP. A combination of snowballing and purposive sampling techniques was used to recruit all participants. Four CSVR researchers conducted these interviews in the six communities over a period of two years (July 2013 to June 2015).

Thematic content analysis was used to identify and code all the themes for in-depth analysis.

Creating and enhancing social networks

One of the key attributes of social cohesion is to 'instill in individuals the sense of belonging to the same community and the feeling that they are recognised as members of that community'.[19] Kate Philip argues in her work that one of the unintended consequences of the CWP has been the facilitation of social relations among CWP participants and community members.[20]

One CWP participant who contributed to the CSVR study asserted that the CWP promotes the spirit of ubuntu among participants and that they provide each other with support.[21] Positive social bonds between participants were found to be valuable in enabling CWP participants to work well as a group.

> It [CWP] does create ubuntu among the participants. We did not know each other at first. But right now as we kept on meeting each other I ended up knowing her and she ended up knowing the other one. So if I didn't know this one then I wouldn't have been able to help this one. So because of the one I know, I am able to help the next person.[22]

> Yes. Friendships do develop. We are in the same society, we communicate about where we meet. And then if you need advice about something I would just [ask] for an advice on what to do. We visit each other … so friendships develop as colleagues.[23]

> We are like a family now because of what CWP taught us. We can work together with the community.[24]

It was evident in the six communities that networks between people increased as a result of the implementation of the CWP programme. The fact that the CWP facilitators and coordinators meet once a week to discuss work to be undertaken in the community enhances social relations and the spirit of collegiality among them, as described in the quote below.

> We meet every Friday to provide reports but to also share among ourselves what we are doing in our wards. Before we used to compete against each other but now we support each other because we all want to succeed … We have become closer like one big family.[25]

Generally, the CWP appeared to foster a high level of cohesion among participants, drawing together residents from different wards to work together for the betterment and safety of their community.

The work of the CWP not only contributes to cohesion among the CWP participants themselves but also extends to improving social cohesion in the broader community. CWP participants are seen as an invaluable resource, especially in communities where people do not have access to basic social and welfare services. For example, interviewees noted that if a CWP member or indigent community member dies, CWP participants provide support to the bereaved family by cleaning their house and the yard, digging the grave for burial, contributing money if the family cannot afford to arrange the funeral, and connecting such a family with the relevant social and welfare services.

> We do support by going to assist with cooking and cleaning when our member has died. The camaraderie among ourselves is really good although we do not contribute lots of money but we contribute some money to assist the bereavement. The contribution is voluntary.[26]

We as participants support each other. When a participant dies we agreed that we as coordinators we will contribute at least R50 and participants contribute R10. When a participant loses her partner or husband we contribute R30 and participants contribute R10.[27]

CWP participants also participate in other social networks, including stokvels and burial and savings clubs.

With regard to the stokvels, we realised that the CWP money is little, so we decided to contribute R100 with certain ladies. We were nine and we would contribute R100.[28]

Yes, there are so many stokvels where people meet and contribute money every month.[29]

[With] the money we get from CWP we are able to do many things. We are able to pay for burial societies, stokvels. We use that money. Maybe you'd find that we each pop out R20 – sometimes when it comes to you it's R200 and you are able to buy school uniform and so on.[30]

Generally these networks are formed to improve the livelihood of all those who participate in them. For instance, members of the stokvels or savings clubs come together to save money that is distributed equally among their members. The CWP enables people to participate in these clubs by providing them with a regular income. It also creates linkages within communities that facilitate the formation of such clubs, or increase participation in existing clubs. This money helps participants to supplement their income and buy other goods that they need in their homes.

It appears, therefore, that the CWP provides a foundation for social cohesion, building relationships of mutual support, solidarity and greater care within communities, which in turn may reduce or prevent violence.

CWC and violence prevention

Crime and violence are major concerns for the communities included in this study, as evidenced by the following statements:

I believe that crime in Ivory Park is out of control because it is not safe as a woman to walk alone

at night. Women in this community are victims of rape and domestic violence. In my street, in May alone, two women who stay in my streets were raped on two different occasions. This place is definitely not safe for women because we live in fear that one day someone will attack and rape you.[31]

Crime is a big issue in Orange Farm.[32]

Manenberg is a depressed community on the Cape Flats, where gangsters roam, drugs are readily available and unemployment is high.[33]

It is therefore not surprising that initiatives aimed at reducing crime and violence initiatives were undertaken by the CWP participants, and were seen as valid CWP work.

Indeed, the CWP appeared to offer an opportunity for people to come together to discuss practical ways in which the problem of crime and violence could be addressed in their neighbourhoods. Crime prevention activities included cutting long grass and trees in 'crime hotspots' where people have been attacked and robbed of their possessions;[34] providing recreational activities for young men; integrating ex-offenders into the CWP;[35] and assisting in the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act and campaigns against gang violence. Other work performed by the CWP, such as providing support to early childhood development, may also in the long run contribute to violence prevention, though work of this kind is not done primarily to prevent crime, nor is it necessarily seen as such by community members.

CWP participants play a significant role in organising recreational activities such as soccer that involve young men who are, as research has indicated, most likely to be involved in criminal activities.[36] Participants said:

As you can see, Ivory Park has many people who are unemployed and have nothing else to do. These young people end up committing crimes because they are also bored. This programme aims to bring together all these young people and keep them occupied with sports… As you can see across the field, we have so many unemployed boys gambling and getting high on drugs. It is these people that we

want to attract to this programme so that we can also contribute towards reducing crime and related problems.[37]

We do not just play but we use soccer to recruit many people because they all like soccer. It is easy to get them if you ask to come and play soccer or other sports. This is when we talk to them [about] many other things, like crime, *nyaope* and other things. We tell them about school and education, you see.[38]

Gary Barker found that soccer was effective in preventing violence in the townships (favelas) in Brazil, especially where these soccer events were linked to acquisition of other life skills, mentorship programmes and career opportunities.[39]

CWP participants use soccer matches to raise awareness about substance abuse and the impact of crime, as well as to identify and promote job opportunities in the local municipality. Linking football and mentorship for young people through the CWP is facilitated by the GIZ-Seriti-Phaphama Social Health and Education (SHE) initiative.[40]

In Manenberg, Orange Farm and Ivory Park, ex-offenders were recruited to join the CWP and to participate in anti-crime campaigns intended to raise awareness about the consequences of crime among youth both in and out of school. The ex-offenders used their own life stories to tell others (especially the youth) that 'crime is not good' and that 'crime does not pay'.

We want to spread a message that crime is not good as well as drugs. We have public anti-crime campaigns by telling young people to stay away from crime because crime is not good. We tell them as ex-offenders because we know that crime is not good.[41]

With crime prevention programmes in CWP, we have a project whereby we motivate young people [in and out of school] not to do crime and drugs.[42]

You see, [we] use our experiences as former criminals that crime does not pay. We want to show young people that crime does not pay. We have been there. We know what we are talking about because we served long sentences.[43]

Whether this will be effective is open to debate, as studies have questioned the effectiveness of using ex-offenders to raise awareness about the consequences of doing crime. For example, it has been shown that the Scared Straight campaign in the United States (US) was ineffective in deterring young people from involvement in criminal activities.[44] Nevertheless, such interventions remain popular.

The key value of involving former offenders in the CWP is likely to be the impact it has on the lives of those ex-offenders, whose reintegration into communities is facilitated by the opportunity. Uggen and Staff[45] argue that the involvement of ex-offenders in work can offer a 'turning point' in their lives, motivating them to not re-offend, yet the limitations of these interventions must be acknowledged.

It was also evident in the interviews conducted with ex-offenders that they saw their involvement in the CWP as positive, and giving meaning to their lives through the work they were doing in schools and the community. They interpreted their CWP work as 'payback time' for the crimes they had committed.

In Orange Farm CWP participants have worked closely with the police to assist victims of domestic violence to apply for protection orders, as required by the Domestic Violence Act of 1998. CWP participants were involved in organising public campaigns to raise awareness about gender-based violence. Men were involved in organising these public campaigns – which emerging literature identifies as an important feature of successful campaigns to address domestic violence.[46] The involvement of men in campaigns such as this gives them the opportunity to reflect about violent practices associated with negative forms of masculinity that oppress and subjugate women.[47]

In Manenberg, CWP participants initiated a public campaign against gang violence. Several public marches took place under the banner of 'Take Back Our Streets'. Ex-gang members were also recruited to be part of these public campaigns, aimed at dealing with the problem of gang violence in the area.

These examples illustrate the potential of the CWP to bring community members together in doing work that is intended to prevent crime and violence. The

CWP may therefore serve to mobilise and enable community members to work together for a common cause, and thus increase social cohesion while preventing or reducing violence.

How the CWP may hinder social cohesion

Despite these positive examples presented above, in some communities the CWP has been a source of local contestation and division.

One of the main sources of tension within the CWP related to recruitment into the programme. Any unemployed or underemployed person over the age of 18 years is theoretically qualified to join the CWP. The CWP guidelines recommend that the process of recruitment is done openly and transparently through community consultation. While many participants asserted that the recruitment process was fair and transparent, there are instances where the recruitment process has been politicised.

In Ivory Park, opposition political parties took to the streets to protest against unfair recruitment practices which were said to be favouring ANC supporters. A participant who identified herself as an Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) member shared her experiences during the recruitment process:

> I totally and completely disagree with what some of the participants are saying because I was victimised for being an active Inkatha member until I joined the ANC and the ANC Youth League. It was very clear that unless I do that I will starve until I die because I was told that this was an ANC government programme for ANC members and supporters. I had to join the ANC and the ANC Youth League for me to be in the CWP. Although I go to ANC meetings I have never supported the ANC or voted for them. I am a member of IFP but had to take the membership of the ANC in order to survive.[48]

Two other CWP participants said:

> I don't think it's something the ANC would confirm that we are only recruiting members and supporters of the ANC because this is a government programme not ANC programme. I remember that when I joined the CWP in 2012,

I had to join the ANC and present myself to the labour desk as an ANC member. This was easy to do because I am not an active member of any political party. When I produced my membership card I was pushed right in front of the list. When they were recruiting I was one of the people who are recruited.[49]

> I was told that the ANC is bringing work to the people so I must get my ID to the ANC councillor for me to get this work. This meant that those who are not connected were left out of the process.[50]

In addition, opposition political parties were accused by the CWP of spreading false information about conditions of employment under the programme, leading to tensions between community members and CWP staff.

> They [CWP participants] understand me but they choose not to understand me due to the interference of third party, one, the APC [African People's Convention] and now the EFF [Economic Freedom Fighters]. The EFF spreads rumours that CWP are entitled to UIF [Unemployment Insurance Fund], which is untrue because this is a poverty relief project. The APC has been notorious of lying to participants that they are supposed to be full time employees with benefits. They even organised a march to force the government to provide permanent jobs for participants. The APC is trying to advance its political gains by misleading the community.[51]

In such cases the CWP may have a negative impact on social cohesion.

These tensions have at times even led to public protests, for example in Ivory Park where the APC organised public protests against the alleged recruitment of people on the basis of party political affiliation.

Portes and Landolt have argued that some interventions may lead to perceptions of social exclusion from social and economic benefits.[52] Social resources that are used to bolster particular groups may contribute to the marginalisation of other groups and increase community cleavages. It is therefore important that community programmes such as the

CWP are inclusive, consultative and depoliticised so that they do not become a source of division and violence in communities.

Concluding remarks

Even though the CWP was not developed as a crime and violence prevention intervention, it has the potential to play this role. This may be directly, through activities such as community patrols, working with young men at risk through soccer and mentoring initiatives, implementing early childhood programmes, and working with the police to assist victims of domestic violence, among others. The CWP also has the potential to facilitate a spirit of solidarity and unity among community members. It strengthens social bonds based on experiences of mutual assistance and increased consciousness about the need to help those who are less privileged. On the other hand, if the CWP is used to further the ends of particular parties or groups it may fracture social cohesion, which in turn would undermine efforts aimed at preventing violence.

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Pulling us apart?

The association between fear of crime and social cohesion in South Africa

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Fear of crime, like crime itself, is thought to be a factor that constrains efforts by government and non-state actors to promote socially cohesive communities and a caring society. As concerns have mounted over various aspects of the social fabric in South Africa, increasing policy attention has been directed at perceptions of safety and nation-building. In this study, we use nationally representative survey data to examine recent theoretical models on the link between fear of crime and social cohesion within communities. The results do not offer strong support for the hypothesis that higher fear of crime is associated with lower levels of social trust, neighbourhood ties and civic cohesion, although fear does have a moderate, adverse influence on attitudes towards law enforcement.

The concept of 'fear of crime' has been the subject of substantive international interest and debate since the 1960s.[1] This attention was particularly motivated by the recognition that it is a salient social problem in its own right, with a notable share of citizens across many countries expressing worry about crime.[2] It further reflects concern with the complex and detrimental effects that fear of criminal violence imparts on quality of life at individual, community and societal levels. As research evidence has amassed concerning the skewed spatial patterning of crime and the fear of crime across different localities both internationally and in South Africa,[3] a growing academic emphasis on local environmental context as drivers of both these phenomena has emerged. Over the last three decades, therefore, renewed attention has been paid to ecological theories in understanding and explaining the relationship

between social disorder, processes of change within neighbourhoods, and levels of crime.

Social disorganisation theory has been especially prominent, drawing on pioneering work in Chicago by Shaw and McKay.[4] Simply put, social disorganisation refers to 'the inability of local communities to realize the common values of their residents or solve commonly experienced problems'.[5] In its classic formulation, this theoretical perspective examined low socioeconomic status, high population turnover and ethnic heterogeneity as the dominant factors weakening the influence of social rules on the behaviour of residents in communities. However, new questions have gradually been posed and social disorganisation perspectives have expanded to include an additional range of structural measures and processes, such as social cohesion, informal control, social trust, social capital and collective efficacy.[6] The attention devoted to social disorganisation theory has included the influential, though contested, 'broken windows theory', which maintains that minor signs of physical disorder serve as visual cues that lead to

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serious crime and mounting urban decay, as well as subsequent theoretical critiques arguing that other factors instrumentally influence crime rates and that the disorder-crime link is weakly associated.[7]

In this article, our intention within this broader theoretical framework is to provide some preliminary South African empirical evidence with regard to the association between *fear of crime* and social cohesion. While crime represents a central variable in social disorganisation theory and is referred to in places throughout this article, our research primarily focuses on fear of crime rather than the occurrence of crime in examining associations with social cohesion.

Specifically, we analyse nationally representative survey data to determine the existence and strength of the association between these social indicators. For the purposes of this article, analysis has been confined exclusively to 2013 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) data, as this is the most recent survey round that contains both the fear and social cohesion measures that we use, as described below. We begin by outlining theoretical approaches to examining fear of crime and social cohesion, as well as associated empirical evidence. We then describe the survey data used for analysis, including a discussion of the definitional and measurement debates on fear of crime, and present the distribution of our chosen fear indicator. We also examine the influence of fear on two aspects of our multidimensional conceptualisation of social cohesion, namely social trust and neighbourhood ties, as well as political legitimacy. We conclude by relating our findings to theoretical perspectives on the consequences of fear in communities, and reflecting on the implications for policy efforts aimed at addressing crime and fear of crime as the basis for greater cohesion and improved personal, community and national wellbeing.

Fear of crime and social cohesion in theory

One strand of the social disorganisation literature has focused on exploring the complex ways in which contextual mechanisms influence crime and perceptions of crime within localities. Neighbourhood characteristics, such as disadvantage, population

stability or mobility, level of urbanisation, racial or ethnic diversity and prior crime levels are seen to shape collective efficacy (social cohesion, trust and informal social control) and social disorder, which inform beliefs and worries about crime and violence.[8] One extension of the social disorganisation perspective recognises that a reciprocal relationship may exist between fear of crime and neighbourhood social cohesion. This implies that while the characteristics of neighbourhoods are likely to have consequences for levels of crime and fear of crime, it is also possible that fear of crime may have a bearing on neighbourhood trust, cohesion and attachment.

There are two dominant theoretical perspectives pertaining to community responses to fear of crime, termed by James Hawdon and colleagues as the 'fear-decline' and 'fear-solidarity' models.[9] According to the fear-decline model, escalating fear of crime can weaken the ability of local communities to collectively address problems. This occurs because fear inhibits social interaction, which, in turn, may result in a decline in social cohesion and trust, erode the informal social control or collective efficacy that keeps crime and disorder in check, and foster a retreat from neighbourhood life.[10] Consequently, this process of decline is thought to further provoke fear and a rise in crime. By contrast, the fear-solidarity model argues that fear of crime may actually serve to enhance community solidarity by motivating residents to come together, establish shared values and respond collectively to the common threat posed by crime.

Existing evidence on the fear-cohesion association

There have been a number of studies, mostly from North America and Europe, that have attempted to test the hypothesised effect of fear of crime on neighbourhood social ties and attachment. In an early Canadian study from the late 1970s, Timothy Hartnagel found that fear of victimisation was *not* inversely related to neighbourhood cohesion and social activity, but did have a significant effect on attachment to the community as a place of residence.[11] Despite this finding, a number of other studies have tended to confirm the view that fear promotes decline and withdrawal rather than solidarity.

For instance, Allen Liska and Barbara Warner's 1991 study of United States (US) cities found that fear of crime constrains social interaction, which they contend is likely to have a damaging effect on social solidarity and attempts at building cohesiveness.[12] Similarly, using British Crime Survey data, Markowitz and colleagues found in 2001 that declining neighbourhood cohesion increased crime and disorder, which resulted in escalating fear of crime and imposed further downward pressure on cohesion.[13] A more recent example comes from a 2013 Finnish study, where Hawdon and colleagues suggest relatively strong support for the fear-decline perspective but not for the fear-solidarity model.[14] In fact, very limited evidence exists favouring the solidarity model. One exception is the 2009 study of Chicago residents by Joong-Hwan Oh and Sangmoon Kim, who found that mounting fear of crime among the elderly promoted greater social interaction with their neighbours and created the basis for stronger social cohesion and interpersonal trust.[15] South African evidence on the fear-cohesion nexus is especially limited, particularly if one narrows the focus to quantitative studies. There have nonetheless been several articles in South Africa testing different aspects of social disorganisation theory.[16]

Methodology

This study employs quantitative data from the 2013 round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), a repeat cross-sectional survey series that has been conducted annually since 2003 by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Each SASAS round has been designed to yield a nationally representative sample of adults aged 16 and older living in private residence. Statistics South Africa's 2011 Population Census Small Area Layers (SALs) were used as primary sampling units (PSUs). For each round of SASAS, 500 PSUs were drawn, with probability proportional to size, from a sampling frame containing all of the 2011 SALs. The sampling frame is annually updated to coincide with StatsSA's mid-year population estimates in respect of the following variables: province, gender, population group and age group. The sample excludes special institutions (such as hospitals, military camps, old age homes, school and university hostels), recreational areas, industrial areas, and vacant areas. It therefore focuses on

dwelling units or visiting points as secondary sampling units (SSUs), which are separate (non-vacant) residential stands, addresses, structures, flats, homesteads and other similar structures. Three explicit stratification variables were used in selecting SALs, namely province, geographic type and majority population group.

In each of these drawn PSUs, 21 dwelling units were selected and systematically grouped into three sub-samples of seven, each corresponding to the three SASAS questionnaire versions that are fielded. The questionnaire containing the relevant fear of crime and social cohesion was included in only one of the three instruments, and thus administered to seven visiting points in each PSU.[17] The sample size of the study consisted of 2 885 interviews.

The English base version of the research instruments was translated into the country's major official languages and the surveys were administered in the preferred language of the respondent. This was to ensure that all respondents in different provinces understood the questionnaire and that it was culturally equivalent and consistent across all languages. Pilot testing was conducted in an attempt to ensure the validity of the research instrument. Interviews were conducted by means of face-to-face interviewing, using print questionnaires.[18]

Study limitations

Two particular limitations of the study need to be mentioned. The first relates to the availability of cross-sectional versus panel data. As previously mentioned, SASAS is a repeat, cross-sectional survey series. Therefore, while the series permits the analysis of trends in underlying beliefs and attitudes over time, it is not a longitudinal panel study that interviews the same individual respondents at regular intervals. The absence of repeated observations for the same sample of South African adults over a number of waves of interviewing means that the study is constrained in its ability to examine the observed relationships between crime, fear of crime and social cohesion among the same people. The implication is that our focus is instead confined to exploring the extent and nature of the association between these constructs.

The second limitation of the study is that, due to the sample design and characteristics, the SASAS

dataset does not permit disaggregation down to the neighbourhood level. As a result, we are unable to examine how neighbourhood level characteristics may affect crime, fear and social cohesion patterns, or reflect on the consistency or variation in observed patterns within and between different localities at the small area level. While this does mean that we are drawing on neighbourhood-level theory to inform and guide the national-level analysis we perform, we believe that survey results will at least serve as a broad evidence of the fear-cohesion nexus that future neighbourhood-level, quantitative research could substantiate or refute.

Measuring fear of crime

The steady expansion of research on fear of crime in recent years has prompted significant methodological reflection on the survey-based measures traditionally used to examine this phenomenon. One of the most commonly used fear of crime questions asked of individuals includes variants on the following: 'How safe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?' This is the primary indicator included in Statistics South Africa's Victims of Crime Survey series to capture fear of crime.[19] This line of questioning is said to capture 'formless' fears that address a vague threat to personal security, and can be distinguished from measures aimed at identifying 'concrete' fears that refer to a particular crime (e.g. types of property crime or individual/personal crime).[20] Criticisms levelled at the formless fear questions include:

- The lack of explicit reference to crime

- The imprecise geographical reference – the 'neighbourhood' or 'local area'

- The reference to an activity that many may seldom undertake ('walking alone after dark'), either by choice or owing to physical limitation

- The absence of a specific recall period and failure to capture frequency of fearful experiences (e.g. number of times in the past year that the person felt unsafe)[21]

Various refinements have been experimented with in response to such criticisms, ranging from basic phrasing changes to the inclusion of multiple items. Of particular relevance is recent research that

suggests that fear of crime is both an *expressive* and an *experiential* phenomenon.[22] The expressive component of fear refers to 'a more diffuse/ambient anxiety',[23] which is essentially a general awareness of the likelihood or risk of victimisation. Alternatively, experiential fear can be described as 'an everyday worry', a set of tangible emotions deriving from a feeling that one's personal safety is being directly threatened. The conventional formless fear questions arguably tap into more general anxiety or the expressive element of fear. They may also overestimate fear of crime due to a focus on how afraid one is (intensity) without taking account of how often one is worried or fearful (frequency) or the impact of such worries on everyday life.[24]

As such, in this article we draw on measures originally developed for inclusion in the European Social Survey (ESS) to better capture experiential fear. These measures combine items on the frequency of worry about specific crime types with questions on the adverse impact of fear on quality of life. This narrows the focus to emotional experiences that adversely affect wellbeing, which may lead to more precise estimates of the everyday experience of the fear of crime.[25] The specific form of these questions is as follows:

(1)   'How often, if at all, do you worry about your home being burgled?', with the response categories 'All or most of the time', 'Some of the time', 'Just occasionally' and 'Never'.

(2)   (If the answer is other than 'Never'): 'Does this worry about your home being burgled have a serious effect on the quality of your life, some effect, or no real effect on the quality of your life?'

(3) – (4) Two questions with similar phrasing, though 'your home being burgled' is substituted with 'becoming a victim of violent crime'.

These experiential fear measures have been included in each round of the SASAS series since 2008, alongside the more traditional indicators of fear, namely the perceived safety of walking alone in one's areas during the day and after dark.[26] In Table 1, the frequency of responses to the worry about burglary and violent crime questions, as well as the follow-up

Table 1: Frequency of responses to four questions on worry about crime (2013)

	Worry about burglary	Worry about violent crime
Frequency of worry		
Never	38%	38%
Just occasionally	15%	16%
Some of the time	31%	26%
All/most of the time	17%	21%
Total	**100%**	**100%**
Effect of worry on quality of life		
Never worry	38%	38%
No real effect	11%	12%
Some effect	33%	33%
Serious effect	18%	18%
Total	**100%**	**100%**

Source: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), 2013.

items on the impact of such fear on personal quality of life, are presented for the 2013 survey round. Close to two-fifths (38%) of adult South Africans indicated that they never worried about their home being burgled or becoming a victim of violent crime, while a slightly higher share expressed worry either 'just occasionally' or 'some of the time' (46% for burglary; 50% for violent crime). For both types of crime, around a fifth of adults indicated that their worry was a constant presence in their lives (17% for burglary; 21% for violent crime).

A similar distribution of responses is evident in relation to the items addressing the impact of worry on one's quality of life. Of those that expressed some level of worry about the two crime types in 2013, only around a tenth (11–12%) felt it had 'no real effect', with a significant proportion (33% for burglary and violent crime) acknowledging at least 'some effect'.

In Table 2, the cross-tabulation of the frequency of worry and effect on quality of life items is presented. The results demonstrate a consistent and expected pattern, namely that the more frequently one worries about crime, the more inclined one is to report appreciable effects on quality of life. Those who

Table 2: Estimated proportions of different effects on quality of life given frequency of worry about crime (2013, row percentages)

	Effect of worry on quality of life				
Frequency of worry	**(Never worry)**	**No real effect**	**Some effect**	**Serious effect**	**Total**
Worry about burglary					
Never	100	–	–	–	100
Just occasionally	–	42	52	6	100
Some of the time	–	16	65	18	100
All or most of the time	–	4	37	59	100
Total	**38**	**12**	**33**	**18**	**100**
Worry about violent crime					
Never	100	–	–	–	100
Just occasionally	–	42	47	11	100
Some of the time	–	13	70	17	100
All or most of the time	–	5	27	69	100
Total	**38**	**11**	**33**	**18**	**100**

Source: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2013.

indicated that they worried 'just occasionally' mostly reported that it had 'some effect' (52% for burglary; 47% for violent crime). Among those stating that they worried 'some of the time', a far greater share stated that it had 'some effect' on their quality of life (65% for burglary; 70% for violent crime). Finally, for those worrying 'all or most of the time', the dominant response was that this exerted a 'serious effect' on their wellbeing (59% for burglary; 69% for violent crime). These patterns have exhibited modest fluctuations between 2008 and 2014 (results not shown), but the overarching pattern is one of broadly consistent levels of worry which, for a sizable minority, has a serious impact on the quality of their lives.[27]

The responses to the four questions were combined into a single categorical measure of fear of crime, using an approach that Jackson and Kuha refer to as a 'model-supported method'.[28] The scaling of this measure ranged from 1 (unworried) to 6 (most worried). The responses for 2013 are provided in Table 3.[29] On average across the period, slightly more than a third (36%) of respondents were unworried, while 13% worried occasionally only about home burglary or only about violent crime. A quarter of the adult population (23%) displayed moderate levels of worry, 5% had a

Table 3: Levels of fear of crime in South Africa in 2013 based on the new categorisation

	2013 (%)	95% confidence intervals	
		Lower bound	Upper bound
Unworried	39	35.1	42.2
Burglary only	6	4.5	7.1
Violent crime only	8	6,.0	9.3
Infrequent worry	22	19.3	24.5
Frequent worry	6	4.7	7.8
Persistent worry	20	18.0	23.2
Total	100		
Mean score (1-6)	3.12	2.99	3.26

Data: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), Round 11, 2013. Weighted percentages have been calculated using sampling design weights, benchmarked to Statistics South Africa's mid-year population estimates. The total number of respondents with valid responses to the fear of crime measures is 2 845.

fairly high level, while 23% were classified as having very high levels of worry. Year-on-year estimates show a similar pattern, though with some differences at the tail ends of the distribution.

The experience of criminal victimisation has a clear bearing on levels of fear. In 2013, SASAS respondents were asked: 'Have you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the last five years?' Of those who answered affirmatively,[30] almost two-fifths (37%) were found to be in class 6 (most worried) and only about one-seventh (15%) were in the first class (least worried). Further testing found that fear was lower among those who had not been victims of crime.[31] A Pearson's chi-squared test identified that the observed differences between fear of crime and experience of crime were statistically significant, as did a one-way ANOVA test.[32] This suggests that, in South Africa, an individual's fear of crime has a relationship with his or her experience of crime. Yet it is also possible for fear of crime to be disproportionate relative to the actual risk of criminal victimisation. For instance, the city of Barcelona (Spain) has a low and declining crime rate, but fear of crime in Barcelona remains high, indicating a mismatch between actual levels of victimisation and the fear of being victimised.[33] In such instances, fear may reflect a more generalised sense of risk.[34] It must be considered, therefore, that the relationship between fear of crime and criminal victimisation can be complex and non-linear.

A multidimensional approach

Like fear of crime, social cohesion has received increased policy attention in South Africa over the last decade, especially following the widespread xenophobic violence of 2008. It has been promoted to address concerns related to the high levels of violent crime, but also to promote positive national identity in a multicultural, stratified society.[35] The 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security identified the promotion of social cohesion as an important element underlying its social crime prevention efforts. More recently, the 2012 National Development Plan (NDP) included a chapter entitled 'Building safer communities', which among other things stressed that safety and security requires an environment that is conducive to 'strengthened social cohesion'. Even the 2015 draft White Paper on Security and Safety includes the need 'to improve the

social fabric and cohesion within families' as one of six core objectives. Institutionally, a Chief Directorate of Social Cohesion has been established in the Department of Arts and Culture to coordinate social cohesion activities across government departments. Yet, despite this, social cohesion has been, and continues to be, the subject of considerable conceptual and measurement debate. There remains little agreement on what constitutes social cohesion and whether or how it can be measured.[36]

In this instance, we draw on research conducted by the HSRC on conceptualising and measuring social cohesion. This conceptual framework assumes that social cohesion is multidimensional in that it encompasses a number of domains of social life, involves both attitudinal and behavioural predispositions, and is an attribute of a group or society rather than individuals.[37] The HSRC work identified three specific dimensions of cohesion:

- *Socio-cultural cohesion,* which includes social capital, trust, tolerance and shared identities and is the core focus in much social cohesion literature

- *Economic cohesion,* which addresses economic development as well as support for strategies to reduce poverty and inequality

- *Civic cohesion,* which addresses political support and legitimacy as well as active political participation by citizens

A full examination of the association between fear of crime and social cohesion, using a range of measures to inform this particular conceptualisation, is beyond the scope of this short article. Instead, we focus on two key aspects of socio-cultural and civic cohesion, the first relating to interpersonal or social trust and neighbourliness, and the second focusing on key components of political support. Use will be made exclusively of the 2013 SASAS data, as this is the most recent round that contains both the fear and social cohesion measures.

Results

Does fear diminish social trust?

Despite common references to the 'rainbow nation' and the moral philosophy of ubuntu, national and comparative data on social trust suggest that South

Africa is a society characterised by low levels of trust.[38] Given criticism concerning the reliability of single-item measures of generalised interpersonal trust, we make use of three items included in SASAS.[39] The measures are phrased as follows: (1) 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?'; (2) 'Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?'; and (3) 'Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?'.[40] Responses to these items are captured on an 11-point scale, where 0 represents the lowest level of trust and 10 the highest.[41] Again, relatively low levels of trust are evident, with the mean scores ranging between 4.02 and 4.40 on the scale. The scores for the three items were subsequently averaged together and the resultant 0–10 score transformed into a 0–100 trust index, with higher values indicating greater trust in others.[42]

In Figure 1, mean social trust index scores are presented for each of the six categories in the experiential fear of crime measure. The results do not reveal a stark gradient of difference across the

Figure 1: Mean social trust index scores by experiential fear of crime, 2013

Source: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2013.

Note: Social trust is measured on a 0–100 scale, with higher values indicating greater levels of interpersonal trust. The vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for each point estimate.

fear scale. A one-way ANOVA was conducted and revealed that fear of crime did exert a significant effect on social trust [M=42.2, SD=21.4, F(5,2817)=6.55, p < .001].[43] However, post hoc comparisons using the Scheffé test show that only those in the most worried category are less trusting than those with lower levels of fear,[44] while correlation analysis shows that there is only a weak, inverse relationship between fear and trust (r = -0.047, p = 0.0134).

These results suggest that fear of crime is inversely related to social trust, but it needs to be acknowledged that the levels of fear need to be relatively high in order for this association to be observed. Similar findings emerge when using measures of neighbourliness rather than social trust.[45] We also find that the conclusions do not alter if one substitutes the experiential fear variable for the conventional 'walking alone at night' fear measure.[46] Such findings indicate that fear of crime exerts a nominal negative influence over social trust and community ties, which is most evident at the upper margin of the fear scales. One might take this finding as evidence that South Africans are resilient and do not allow fear of crime to depress their levels of social trust or damage neighbourly bonds. However, given the low general trust scores, one could also argue that such trust and community ties may to some degree already have eroded and that expectations of a strong pattern of difference, based on such measures, are possibly misplaced.

The political consequences of fear

The process of democratic transformation and consolidation in the country has focused on progressively realising a united, cohesive society. The NDP emphasises political legitimacy and democratic participation as primary goals of the state and core indicators of social cohesion. The importance of civic cohesion derives from mounting international concern over the last two decades about an apparent erosion of the foundations of citizenship and democracy, or a 'crisis of democratic legitimacy'. Evidence of declining electoral turnout, falling confidence in government and mounting public discontent are often cited in support of this thesis.[47] It has provoked wide-ranging initiatives aimed at building up citizen-state relations, including opening up opportunities for direct citizen

engagement in decision-making processes and efforts at improving government transparency and accountability.

To examine the consequence of fear of crime on civic cohesion, we examine measures that allow us to discern patterns of political legitimacy and illegitimacy. We draw on a nested understanding of political support, ranging from diffuse measures of national identity and pride through to more specific evaluations of democratic performance, institutional trust, and approval of office-bearers.[48] For the purposes of this article, we leave aside the political participation element of civic cohesion. Future studies will hopefully explore the impact of fear of crime on political behaviour in the country. National pride is assessed based on the level of agreement with the following statement: 'Generally speaking, South Africa is a better country than most other countries.' Two measures of democratic performance are used, namely satisfaction with the functioning of democracy as a whole and, more narrowly, satisfaction with the way that the government is handling crime reduction in one's neighbourhood. With regard to institutional trust, we focus on trust in the police and the courts, while the last measure we employ for our analysis is trust in current political leaders in the country. In all instances, a standard five-point Likert scale is used to capture responses.

Table 4 presents levels of pride, satisfaction and trust for each of these political support measures and how these attitudes vary by different levels of experiential fear. It is interesting to observe from the bottom row in the table that, after two decades of democracy, South Africans are resolutely proud of their country, but judge fairly harshly the general performance of the democratic system and the quality of political leadership. Citizens also lack confidence in the police and courts, while less than a fifth (18%) were content with government crime reduction efforts in their neighbourhood. Observed levels of discontent in 2013 in many instances reflect a general decline in political support over the 2008–2014 interval.[49] Unfavourable evaluations of the performance of democracy and core political institutions could be interpreted as a sign of the emergence of a more critical citizen who is concerned with the accountability of institutions and office-bearers.

Table 4: Relationship between fear (and experience) of crime and civic cohesion

	National pride	Satisfaction with democracy	Trust in political leaders	Trust in courts	Trust in police	Satisfaction with crime reduction
Unworried	82	33	28	48	36	24
Burglary only	76	40	34	65	30	24
Violent crime only	69	36	29	50	27	21
Infrequent worry	81	31	25	44	21	13
Frequent worry	86	46	29	41	26	16
Persistent worry	76	27	26	35	22	12
National average	79	33	27	45	28	18

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2013.

Note: The first column showcases the share of the population who agree that South Africa is a better country than most other countries; columns two and three reflect the adult public who are satisfied with democracy and political leaders; the fourth and fifth columns reflect the share who trust in the courts and the police respectively; and finally the sixth column depicts the proportion of the population that is satisfied with the government's crime-cutting efforts in their neighbourhood.

Does fear have a discernible impact on these measures?

The evidence presented in Table 4 shows that the results are rather mixed. An association between fear of crime and national pride is clearly not manifest. The same appears to be true of satisfaction with democratic performance and the country's current political leaders. As can be observed from the table and as one might intuitively expect, there is a slightly stronger but nonetheless moderate inverse association between fear and both trust in the police and satisfaction with crime reduction. Further examination, using single pairwise correlations, shows a negative association between fear of crime and confidence in the police and in crime-reduction efforts.[50] In other words, as an individual becomes more fearful, his or her confidence in the criminal justice system declines. While worry about crime therefore has some association with more specific political support items, on the whole it is unlikely to be a primary driver of political legitimacy in the country, given the strength and nature of the observed association.

Conclusion

In South Africa, fear of crime continues to be reported by a significant share of the population, irrespective of whether expressive or experiential measures are

employed. Reported fear of crime is no doubt informed by experiences of crime, and a significant segment of the adult population reported having been a victim of crime in last five years. While much concern has been voiced about the likely consequences such fear may bring to bear on local society, the study results offer fairly circumscribed support for a corrosive effect on the particular aspects of social cohesion that we examined. There is only a weak, negative association with social trust and neighbourhood ties. Greater fear is associated with more negative views of police effectiveness and overall police confidence. Yet it does not yield a consistent, adverse association with more diffuse measures of political support, such as satisfaction with democracy and national pride. Where such a relationship exists, it tends to be apparent only at the extreme, upper margins of the fear scale. Therefore these results certainly do not provide unequivocal evidence in favour of either fear-decline or fear-solidarity models of community responses to fear. At best, they show marginal and somewhat variable support for the fear-decline perspective.

Obviously, the study is constrained by the data available for analysis. Longitudinal data would allow us to better understand the direction of the relationship observed in this study. As Markowitz observes, the absence of such panel data has been a general impediment in social disorganisation

research, which has mostly relied on cross-sectional data. Moreover, there is a need for data that would allow neighbourhood-level disaggregation, permitting researchers to test the paradigms of social disorganisation theory in South Africa, especially in teasing out the nature of the relationship between social cohesion, fear of crime, and crime.

Further work will need to be undertaken to determine the replicability of our findings, by experimenting with alternate measures of both fear and cohesion. Since we focused on national patterns, the consistency of our findings across different groups, geographies and individual and community attributes will need to be explored. If our findings are, however, replicated through other studies it would suggest that success in efforts at reducing crime and the fear of crime are unlikely to translate into immediate and substantive gains in terms of positive forms of neighbourhood cohesion.

Furthermore, the fact that low levels of social trust, trust in the police and courts, as well as satisfaction with democratic functioning are common to both the fearful and fearless raises fundamental questions about the nature of the social fabric and community in the country. Perhaps, as Suren Pillay contends, we are a nation where such attitudinal predispositions may have encouraged tendencies towards 'fragmentation rather than unification'.[51] This is apparent in the proliferation of gated communities, the growing reliance on non-state forms of policing, calls for retributive justice, and the rise of forms of cohesion that target perceived external threats (such as foreign migrants) and nurture out-group hostility. While more needs to be done to ensure freedom from crime and the fear of crime, we must be careful in assuming that this would serve as a catalyst for more multicultural, bridging forms of cohesion as desired by the government's nation-building programme.

Acknowledgement

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Notes

1   Examples from across the decades, covering theoretical, methodological and empirical traditions, include James Garofalo and John Laub, The fear of crime: broadening our perspective, *Victimology,* 3:3-4, 1978, 242–253; Timothy F Hartnagel, The perception and fear of crime: implications for neighborhood cohesion, social activity, and community affect, *Social Forces,* 58:1, 1979, 176–193; Ralph B Taylor and Margaret Hale, Testing alternative models of fear of crime, *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,* 77:1, 1986, 151–189; Kenneth F Ferraro and Randy L Grange, The measurement of fear of crime, *Sociological Inquiry,* 57:1, 1987, 70–97; Chris Hale, Fear of crime: a review of the literature, *International Review of Victimology,* 4:2, 1996, 79–150; Rachel Pain, Place, social relations and the fear of crime: a review, *Progress in Human Geography,* 24:3, 2000, 365–387; Jonathan Jackson, Experience and expression: social and cultural significance in the fear of crime, *British Journal of Criminology*, 44:6, 2004, 946–966; and Ian Brunton-Smith and Patrick Sturgis, Do neighborhoods generate fear of crime? An empirical test using the British Crime Survey, *Criminology,* 49:2, 2011, 331–369.

2   SD Farrall, JP Jackson and E Gray, *Social order and the fear of crime in contemporary times,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

3   On the spatial patterning of crime and fear of crime in South, see for example Gareth Newham et al., Murder and robbery: overview of the official statistics 2-14/15, *ISS Fact Sheet,* 2015; Benjamin J Roberts, State of affliction: fear of crime and quality of life in South Africa, in Dave Webb and Eduardo Wills-Herrera (eds), *Subjective well-being and security,* vol. 46, Social Indicators Research Series, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2012, 149–175. A recent example from the international literature is Gregory D Breetzke and Amber L Pearson, The fear factor: examining the spatial variability of recorded crime on the fear of crime, *Applied Geography,* 46, 2014, 45–52.

4   CR Shaw and HD McKay, *Juvenile delinquency and urban areas,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.

5   Robert J Bursik, Social disorganisation and theories of crime and delinquency: problems and prospects, *Criminology*, 26:4, 1988, 521.

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7   James Q Wilson and George L Kelling, Broken windows, *Atlantic Monthly,* 249:3,1982, 29–38; Robert J Sampson and

Stephen W Raudenbush, Seeing disorder: neighborhood stigma and the social construction of 'broken windows', *Social Psychology Quarterly,* 67:4, 2004, 319–342.

8   Ian Brunton-Smith, Jonathan Jackson and Alex Sutherland, Bridging structure and perception on the neighbourhood ecology of beliefs and worries about violent crime, *British Journal of Criminology,* 54:4, 2014, 506.

9   James Hawdon et al., Social responses to collective crime: assessing the relationship between crime-related fears and collective sentiments, *European Journal of Criminology*, 11:1, 2014, 39–56. See also Allen E Liska and Barbara D Warner, Functions of crime: a paradoxical process, *American Journal of Sociology,* 1991, 1441–1463.

10   Wesley Skogan, Fear of crime and neighbourhood change, *Crime and Justice,* 8, 1986, 203–229; Liska and Warner, Functions of crime; Joong-Hwan Oh and Sangmoon Kim, Aging, neighbourhood attachment, and fear of crime: testing reciprocal effects, *Journal of Community Psychology,* 37:1, 2009, 21–40.

11   Hartnagel, The perception and fear of crime.

12   Liska and Warner, Functions of crime, 1446, 1459.

13   Fred E Markowitz et al., Extending social disorganization theory: modeling the relationships between cohesion, disorder, and fear, *Criminology,* 39:2, 2001, 293–320.

14   Hawdon et al., Social responses to collective crime.

15   Oh and Kim, Aging, neighbourhood attachment, and fear of crime, 37.

16   See, for example, Tony Emmett, Social disorganisation, social capital and violence prevention in South Africa, *African Safety Promotion,* 1:2, 2003, 4–18; and Gregory D Breetzke, Modeling violent crime rates: a test of social disorganization in the city of Tshwane, South Africa, *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 38:4, 2010, 446–452. A recent analysis of Afrobarometer data has also examined the association between victimisation, fear and indicators of democracy and governance; see Zenobia Ismail, Is crime dividing the rainbow nation? Fear of crime in South Africa, Afrobarometer, Briefing Paper, 96, 2010.

17   Interviewers called at each visiting point selected and listed all those eligible for inclusion in the sample in terms of age and residential status criteria. The interviewer then selected one respondent using a random selection procedure based on a Kish grid.

18   The HSRC's Research Ethics Committee granted ethical approval for the instrumentation and research protocols for each round.

19   The specific phrasing of the StatsSA measure is: 'If you had to walk, how safe would you feel walking alone in your area when it is dark?.' A similar item is included to capture daytime fear. These measures were included in the 2011, 2012 and 2013/14 survey rounds.

20   For a useful account of these distinctions, see Ferraro and LaGrange, The measurement of fear of crime.

21   Stephen Farrall and David Gadd, Evaluating crime fears: a research note on a pilot study to improve the measurement of the 'fear of crime' as a performance indicator, *Evaluation,* 10:4, 2004, 493–502; Hale, Fear of crime; Ferraro and LaGrange, The measurement of fear of crime.

22   See Jonathan Jackson and Jouni Kuha, Worry about crime in a cross-national context: a model-supported method of measurement using the European Social Survey, *Survey Research Methods,* 8:2, 2014, 109–126.

23   Jonathan Jackson and Emily Gray, Functional fear and public insecurities about crime, *British Journal of Criminology,* 50:1, 2010, 1–22.

24   Farrall and Gadd, Evaluating crime fears; Jackson, Experience and expression; and Emily Gray, Jonathan Jackson and Stephen Farrall, Reassessing the fear of crime, *European Journal of Criminology,* 5:3, 2008, 363-380.

25   This is discussed in greater detail in Jackson, Experience and expression.

26   Apart from the walking alone during the day and at night, a third indicator commonly employed by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in its national surveys since the early 1990s asks respondents to rate how safe they 'feel personally on most days'.

27   These results are consistent with what was found by Roberts, State of affliction.

28   This entails a combination of latent class modelling together with logical, pragmatic choices in deriving the final scale. For an in-depth examination of the particular steps and choices involved in deriving the six-class measure, based on the model-assisted scoring method and using the fear of crime questions, see Jackson and Kuha, Worry about crime in a cross-national context. The construction of the measure in the South African case was done with the assistance of Prof. Jonathan Jackson from the London School of Economics.

29   Weighted percentages have been estimated using sampling design weights that are benchmarked to Statistics South Africa's most recent mid-year estimates. Province, gender, population group and 5-year age group were used as benchmark variables, with the view to represent the South African population 16 years and older as closely as possible.

30   According to the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) data from 2013, more than one out of every four adult South Africans (27%) reported that they or another household member had been a victim of burglary or assault in the last five years.

31   The share reporting that they or another household member had been a victim of burglary or assault in the last five years ranged from 11% among the unworried to around half among those with frequent or persistent worry (50% and 49% respectively).

32   One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) results between these measures of fear of crime and experience of crime are as follows: victim in the last five years had a fear of crime classification mean of 4.15 (Std. Dev. = 1.83, n=755); not a victim in the last five years had a classification mean of 2.74 (Std. Dev. =1.88, n =2085). The Prob > F statistic was 0.000.

33   Sergi Valera and Joan Guàrdia, Perceived insecurity and fear of crime in a city with low-crime rates, *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 38, 2014, 195–205.

34   Jackson, Experience and expression, and Farrall, Jackson and Gray, *Social order and the fear of crime in contemporary times* also provide a worthwhile discussion of this phenomenon.

35   Suren Pillay, Crime, community and the governance of violence in post-apartheid South Africa, *Politikon*, 35:2, 2008, 141–158.

36 See, for example, Vanessa Barolsky, A better life for all': social cohesion and the governance of life in post-apartheid South Africa, *Social Dynamics,* 38:1, 2012, 134–151; Vanessa Barolsky, The 'state' of social cohesion: re-stating the question of social cohesion and 'nation-building', in U Pillay et al., *State of the nation: South Africa 2012–2013,* Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2013; and Ivor Chipkin and Bongani Ngqulunga, Friends and family: social cohesion in South Africa, *Journal of Southern African Studies,* 34:1, 2008, 61–76.

37 This framework is discussed in Jarè Struwig et al., Towards a social cohesion barometer for South Africa, in Pillay et al., *State of the nation: South Africa 2012–2013,* 399–421.This South African study drew on the work of Jane Jenson, *Defining and measuring social cohesion,* London: Commonwealth Secretariat and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2010.

38 For example, the 2010–2014 round of the World Values Survey (WVS) includes a repeat dichotomous measure asking respondents whether they thought most people could be trusted or if you needed to be very careful. While only a small minority (23%) of South Africans believed that most people could be trusted, we are not exceptional in this regard. The low expression of social trust in South Africa approximates the average for the 60 countries included (25%) in the survey round and is notably higher than in countries such as the Philippines, Ghana, Brazil and Zimbabwe, where less than one-tenth are trusting towards others. See World Value Survey Online Analysis, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp. In only five countries did more than half the adult population exhibit broad trust in others, namely the Netherlands, China, Sweden, New Zealand and Australia. Also see Jan Delhey, Kenneth Newton and Christian Welzel, How general is trust in 'most people'? Solving the radius of trust problem, *American Sociological Review,* 76:5, 2011, 786–807.

39 The three SASAS items derive from the European Social Survey; see Delhey et al., How general is trust in 'most people'?.

40 The first item is a classic social trust question that has been used for close to 70 years, while the other two items focus on fairness and altruism and are added to form a more reliable trust scale.

41 This rating scale represents a notable improvement on the dichotomous WVS measure. For a discussion of these variables, see Tim Reeskens and Marc Hooghe, Cross-cultural measurement equivalence of generalized trust: evidence from the European Social Survey (2002 and 2004), *Social Indicators Research,* 85:3, 2008, 515–532.

42 The scale has a good reliability, with a Cronbach coefficient of 0.804 and the item-rest correlations showing that all three items fit well with the index scale. The distributional characteristics of the measure are as follows: mean = 4.22; median = 4.33; skewness = -0.012; kurtosis = 2.526.

43 In addition, the Kruskal–Wallis test was conducted as a nonparametric alternative to one-way ANOVA, thereby testing the null hypothesis of equal population medians. The test results (p = <0.001) agree with our one-way findings of significant differences in social trust by fear of crime.

44 Specifically, the means social trust score among the most worried category (class 6, M=3.82, SD=2.24) was significantly lower than fear of crime class 1 (M=4.20, SD=2.12, p = .019), class 2 (M=4.59, SD=2.49, p = .015), class 3 (M=4.47, SD=2.03, p = .019) and class 4 (M=4.36, SD=1.90, p = .001). The difference between the most worried category and class 5 (M=4.47, SD=2.39, p = .07) was not statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. All other group-based differences are also not significant.

45 We tested the relationship between fear of crime and attachment to those living in one's neighbourhood, level of comfort borrowing small items from neighbours (a cup of sugar, an amount of R20), as well as agreement that people treat each other respectfully in one's area of residence. The 2013 SASAS data show modest positive association with the first measure (r=+0.03, p = 0.0765), and modest negative associations with the other items (r=-0.04, p = 0.0247; r=-0.05, p = 0.0153; and r=-0.07, p = 0.0002 respectively). One-way ANOVA results between these measures of neighbourliness and fear of crime are as follows: attachment to one's neighbours: F(5,2813) = 3.29, p = 0.0058, n=2819; borrowing a cup of sugar from neighbours: F(5,2805) = 12.71, p < 0.001, n=2811; borrowing R20 from neighbours: F(5,2801) = 12.78, p < 0.001, n=2807; people treat each other respectfully in neighbourhood: F(5,2804) = 8.55, p < 0.001, n=2810.

46 The correlations between this fear measure and the social trust index is -0.11, while for the four neighbourliness items the correlation coefficients are -0.05, -0.12, -0.10 and -0.09 respectively.

47 See, for example, Russell J Dalton and Martin P Wattenberg (eds), *Parties without partisans: political change in advanced industrial democracies,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; John R Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (eds), *What is it about government that Americans dislike?,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; Stephen Macedo, *Democracy at risk: how political choices undermine citizen participation, and what we can do about it,* Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005; Peter Mair and Ingrid van Biezen, Party membership in twenty European democracies 1980–2000, *Party Politics,* 7:1, 2001, 5–22; Susan Pharr and Roberts Putnam (eds.), *Disaffected democracies: what's troubling the trilateral countries?,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000; Roberts D Putnam, *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community,* New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000; Mariano Torcal and José Ramón Montero, *Political disaffection in contemporary democracies: social capital, institutions, and politics,* London: Routledge, 2006; and Jan W Van Deth, José Ramón Montero and Anders Westholm, *Citizenship and involvement in European democracies: a comparative analysis,* New York: Routledge, 2007.

48 In conceptualising political support, we are indebted to the pioneering work of David Easton, *A systems analysis of political life,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; and Pippa Norris, *Democratic deficit: critical citizens revisited,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

49 Jarè Struwig, Benjamin J Roberts and Steven Gordon, Amandla awethu: public attitudes, South African democracy and political participation, in Daniel Plaatjies et al. (eds), *State of the nation, South Africa 2015: who is in charge?,* Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2016.

50 The correlation coefficients are -0.15 and -0.18 respectively.

51 Pillay, Crime, community and the governance of violence in post-apartheid South Africa, 141.

Comfortably cosmopolitan?

How patterns of 'social cohesion' vary with crime and fear

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Achieving 'social cohesion' across race and class divides in South African settlements is a major challenge, given the divided urban geography of apartheid. Cosmo City, a new mixed-use settlement north-west of Johannesburg, was conceived and designed for social inclusion and cohesion, albeit between people of different income levels rather than race groups. A number of the development's spatial features were also thought likely to reduce crime and fear of crime, either directly or as mediated by stronger social cohesion. A survey was conducted among 400 Cosmo City households to determine the extent of community cohesion, fear of crime, and rates of crime victimisation. Results found a strong sense of localised community pride and belonging within immediate neighbourhoods, and relatively high feelings of safety. However, self-reported crime victimisation rates did not suggest that there had been a crime reduction effect – in fact, they were extremely high. This may be a surprising but not unprecedented outcome of strong social cohesion, which may allow knowledge of crime incidents to spread through community networks as a shared sense of victimisation and thus raise the likelihood of survey reporting above the real rate of crime incidence. Further research should test whether, regardless of any impact on crime itself, greater social cohesion may reduce fear of crime even while raising a perception of crime rates. Policy and design that successfully promote social cohesion but fail to reduce crime may exacerbate a perception of victimisation.

Social cohesion in theory and practice

An interest in the significance of the neighbourhood, of shared space, values and a sense of community naturally has a long history in social theory and policy.[1]

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Developments at various points in the last century have driven waves of heightened concern about the perceived growth in individualism, competition and anomie, and about the tangible and intangible common goods lost as a result. At the same time, in many places global mobility and the perception of increasing diversity have raised anxieties about multiculturalism and integration, and about what it takes to build and sustain meaningful, effective communities.[2]

One of the key concepts to have emerged through these various iterations of theory and research on the role of the collective is that of 'social cohesion'. Social cohesion has been a buzzword for roughly the last

two decades,[3] but like many of its aligned concepts (such as 'social disorganisation', 'social capital', 'collective efficacy' and even 'neighbourhood') it has been plagued throughout by debates about its conceptual robustness and meaning.[4] As others have done,[5] this article opts for a fairly loose definition of social cohesion, as representing the sense of community among and level of interaction between residents in the area under consideration.

A range of conceptual and research approaches have found that the strength of social ties is related to other social outcomes, including patterns and feelings of crime and safety. In one direction, the functioning of community ties and spaces is affected by crime and the fear of crime, which can lead people either to restrict their involvement in public spaces and activities and to wall themselves in, or to unite against a shared danger.[6] In the other direction, social norms such as willingness to intervene for the public good and informal monitoring and guardianship of spaces have been shown to exert downward pressure on crime.[7] Further, community factors, including social cohesion, have been shown to shape assessments of risk and fear of crime, regardless of their impact on crime itself.[8] This research is complicated by the fact that many of the demographic and social variables that affect social cohesion (including poverty, population turnover, and racial/ethnic diversity)[9] also affect crime and fear directly.[10]

There are also ways in which the built environment is thought to help facilitate social cohesion. Design for cohesion includes factors such as encouraging mobility and accessibility to various means of transport, promoting multi-functionality of public spaces, drawing people of diverse backgrounds to share the same services and facilities, and maximising feelings of comfort and safety.[11] These and other elements of the built environment, such as the 'defensibility' of space and signs of neglect, have in turn also been shown to have a direct impact on both crime[12] and fear of crime.[13]

To further complicate the picture, research has shown that there are often surprisingly weak relationships between fear of crime, perception of the risk of crime, and actual crime victimisation rates, because the information we receive about crime is filtered through various personal and social lenses.[14] The perception of the amount of crime and fear of crime also involve separate components of the cognitive and emotional responses to crime.[15] There is by no means a clear one-to-one relationship between the various components of the objective and subjective experience of crime.

Ultimately, there is a web of relationships between social cohesion, socioeconomic variables, characteristics of the built environment, crime levels, the perception of crime risk, and fear of crime. These interrelationships suggest the need for a complex and reflexive model, for example as portrayed in Figure 1.

Figure 1: A model of some of the multiple relationships around social cohesion

The literature clearly indicates that tensions can be expected between social cohesion and diversity. For all that the harms of segregation have been well demonstrated, and that integration may be desirable for achieving various social ends, a large body of evidence suggests that spaces (ranging in size from neighbourhoods all the way through to countries) that have more ethnic, racial and socioeconomic diversity find it considerably more difficult to form cooperation, trust and social cohesion.[16] Social ties and a sense of community are easier to build with people who seem similar to us.[17] This is the case not just for race or ethnicity, but also for wealth. Inequality compromises the development and maintenance of social cohesion,[18] even as an appeal to social

cohesion can mask issues of inequality by stressing values and togetherness rather than the correction of concrete inequalities.[19] Overall, the success of attempts to increase social utility on various measures through the creation of socio-economically mixed environments worldwide has been equivocal.[20]

South Africa's divided spaces

Inequality, difference and segregation are chronic South African concerns, to the point where it is not clear whether the 'South African society' can really be said to exist at all – that is, whether values and space are sufficiently shared to allow it all to meaningfully hold together.[21] Even by the standards of many developing countries, South African cities are massively fragmented. Apartheid policy not only enforced rigid segregation by race but also effectively drove the poor to the urban peripheries, making for long and expensive commutes between work and home, and a vicious cycle of poverty and exclusion.[22] Income inequality in the major metros is extremely high,[23] such that there are hard-to-climb 'income cliffs' between socioeconomic levels and their associated spaces.[24] The result is a system of tightly overlapping inequalities of race, space, wealth, opportunities, services, health and so on, which in turn undermines attempts at promoting growth, development and legitimacy.[25]

The post-apartheid government has made considerable progress towards providing low-cost homes to the huge backlog of people without formal housing, but the urgency of the task has meant that quantity has largely taken precedence over quality, with subsidised housing still mostly being built on the urban peripheries and in economically and socially unsustainable forms.[26] Major new residential developments of the last 20 years have tended to fall into one of three clear categories: fully subsidised (e.g. Reconstruction and Development Programme [RDP]) housing areas; informal settlements; and relatively affluent 'gated communities' built by private developers.[27] This has contributed to the fact that many neighbourhoods remain highly internally homogeneous.[28]

The importance of more 'integrated', 'inclusive' or 'mixed' housing (incorporating a range of housing types, sizes and prices in close proximity)[29] has long been acknowledged in policy and law, but fiscal and bureaucratic constraints and the market for land have been chief among the numerous challenges to widespread implementation. However, in Johannesburg's north-west region, near Roodepoort and Fourways, a public-private partnership was formed and successfully built a new mixed-income, mixed-use settlement known as Cosmo City.

This area is located geographically and conceptually at the forefront of post-apartheid urban developments. It has seen massive growth since the mid-1990s, such that living in a new development is the norm here.[30] It has become emblematic of the new housing model that is neither township nor suburb,[31] but instead takes the form of 'complexes', 'estates' and 'gated communities'.[32] These spaces take a range of different characters, usually with distinct class niches and architectural styles, but all are marked by their privatised and collectivised approach to governance, which has managed to bring white and black South Africans to a shared sense of middle-class urban citizenship rarely seen elsewhere.[33]

In Cosmo City this model of private, middle-class governance has been fused with the more traditional approach of state-provided housing for the poor. It was built with the explicit aim of having people of diverse backgrounds and income levels (but not racial groups) live in close proximity and share space and facilities. As such, it offers a unique case study for the concept of social cohesion. This research sought to determine the degree to which this new development has succeeded in fostering a sense of community, as well as what this might mean for levels and fear of crime.

Building a diverse, cohesive community

In 2000/2001, a partnership known as CODEVCO was developed between private real estate developer Basil Read, a black economic empowerment consortium called Kopano, the City of Johannesburg as landowner, and the Gauteng provincial government as subsidy provider. CODEVCO undertook, following a court order, to house the residents of the informal settlements of Zevenfontein and Riverbend who were illegally occupying private land, and to do so by developing an inclusive and sustainable residential

and commercial space for people of mixed incomes and backgrounds. The development was granted 1 105 hectares of formerly privately-owned farm land. Following years of legal challenge from residents of the relatively affluent surrounding areas, who claimed that the development would harm their property prices,[34] building work started in earnest in January 2005. The first beneficiaries moved in by the end of that year, and residential building was completed in 2012. All roads are tarred, all units have in-house water supply, water-borne sanitation and pre-paid electricity, and a large number of units are also fitted with solar geysers.[35] The private developers have gradually handed over maintenance responsibility to the City, but continue to play an active role in some aspects of governance.

The formal population in Cosmo City as of 2015 is estimated at around 70 000 people, but the number living in backyard sublets is unknown, such that the total population may be closer to 100 000.[36] The development is mixed in that it comprises 5 000 low (or no) income, fully subsidised RDP houses; 3 000 somewhat larger, credit linked, partially subsidised houses; 3 300 even larger, privately bonded, open market houses; 1 000 rental apartment units; plus schools, parks and recreation sites, commercial, retail and industrial sites, and a 300 hectare environmental conservation zone that runs through the development. It was anticipated that household incomes would vary between less than R3 500 per month in the RDP section to more than R15 000 in the privately bonded houses.[37]

The mixed profile, including lower-income and lower middle-class residents, was intended to make the development economically and socially sustainable and inclusive. It was envisioned that residents of different income levels would be able to send their children to the same local schools, to shop in the same retail areas, and to use the same recreation spaces. Key to this ideal of shared spatial use in Cosmo City is what is known as the Multi-Purpose Centre, a central cluster of buildings that include an events hall, a skills centre, a library, a gym and various sports fields. The developers have also attempted to foster a sense of community pride and cohesion through co-sponsoring an annual garden competition, assisting with the setting up of residents associations,

providing all new residents with an information pack with details on what is expected of them and who to contact for service delivery issues, and setting up a local newspaper called the *Cosmo Chronicle* to spread information and report on local news.[38]

The residential areas are divided into small, distinct neighbourhoods or 'extensions', each with a typical housing size and design, with many streets shaped as crescents and culs-de-sac – all with the goal of creating a village-like character.[39] These residential clusters (which correspond with different housing classes) are scaled internally for pedestrians, but are separated by tracts of open land and conservation areas.[40] Although not access controlled like many of the more upmarket developments nearby, it is self-contained, so that few people entering it are just passing through, and there is a clear delineation separating it from surrounding areas. Streets are named in common theme after countries, states and cities from around the world, and (with a hint of the Orwellian) residents sometimes call each other Cosmopolitans. Many of these features of Cosmo City's built environment hope to help facilitate social cohesion. On the other hand, its goal of condensed socioeconomic diversity provides certain challenges.

Diversity achievement

The 2011 national census was fielded before Cosmo City had been completed (reflected in the fact that it counted a total of just 44 292 residents), but its results do suggest that Cosmo City has achieved something unusual in its vicinity. Some rough comparison is possible between its ward (of which it made up more than 80% of the population), the ward that covers the greater part of the nearby township of Diepsloot, and the ward that includes Honeydew, the Eagle Creek Golf Estate and many of the other complexes described in other research on this region, for example by Duca and Chipkin.[41] The Cosmo City ward's residents' average household income is about double that of greater Diepsloot (which is close to the national average) but a quarter of that in the Honeydew area. It also has a considerably higher proportion of people employed (62%) than in Diepsloot (55%), but lower than in Honeydew (77%).[42] About 14% of its residents have completed

education past grade 12, as compared to about a third in Honeydew and less than 2% in Diepsloot. But rather than simply finding itself between these socioeconomic spaces, Cosmo City does to some extent seem to straddle them. As demonstrated in Figure 2, it shows a relatively wide and even spread through the income brackets, whereas Diepsloot skews far more sharply and poorer, and Honeydew skews more sharply and wealthier.

This does suggest that the development has been successful in creating a more mixed-income residential profile than have some of its key neighbours. There are other signs of relative diversity. Almost 75% of Honeydew's residents speak primarily either English or Afrikaans, compared to 3% in Diepsloot and 13% in Cosmo City. In the Honeydew ward, the 2014 national vote went to the Democratic Alliance (DA) by a landslide. The landslide in in the Diepsloot ward went to the African National Congress (ANC) , with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) well behind and the DA barely showing. The ANC had a smaller but still comfortable majority in Cosmo City's ward, but here the EFF and DA were almost tied in their share of the rest of the vote.[43] Although less so than Diepsloot, Cosmo City

also has greater concentrations of people who were born outside Gauteng and outside South Africa than the Honeydew profile and the Johannesburg average. According to Johannesburg's Customer Satisfaction Survey data, about half of the 119 randomly selected Cosmo City ward residents polled had had a brick or concrete house as their previous dwelling before moving to Cosmo City, 26% had lived in an informal dwelling in an informal settlement, and 12% in an informal dwelling in the backyard of a formal dwelling.[44]

However, the promotional documents and interviews with the private and city role players suggest that racial or ethnic diversity never featured in the inclusiveness goals or outcomes for Cosmo City.[45] The overwhelming majority of Cosmo City residents are still the 'previously disadvantaged'.[46] It is over 97% black African, less than 1% coloured, and less than 0.5% white or Indian and Asian respectively.[47] This is little different from its directly neighbouring informal settlements or from Diepsloot, and considerably less mixed than the Honeydew ward and Johannesburg as a whole, as demonstrated in Figure 3 (overleaf).

Figure 2: Annual household income bands in three communities

Source: http://wazimap.co.za/.

Figure 3: Population group diversity by area

Source: http://census2011.co.za/.

All told, Cosmo City does seem to be remarkably more mixed than at least some of its more traditional neighbouring areas in terms of income level and some other socioeconomic and political indicators, but not at all mixed in terms of population group. As such, it is at best an incomplete model of how post-apartheid inclusion and integration might be envisioned for the city or country more broadly. Nevertheless, it is a fascinating case study on community diversity, social cohesion and their impact on crime and fear.

Research method

The South African Cities Network (SACN) commissioned the Centre of Criminology at the University of Cape Town to produce a number of outputs on different aspects of the state of crime and safety in South African cities. One component of this larger project was to determine the extent of social cohesion in Cosmo City – as evidenced in a sense of community belonging and pride, the level of interaction between people of different backgrounds, and the extent of fear of crime and level of crime victimisation. Reported crime figures could only be obtained from the South African Police Service (SAPS) for the entire Honeydew policing sector, within which Cosmo City falls. The SAPS refused access to crime figures specifically for the Cosmo City part of the sector, on the grounds that any crime

statistics released to the public must first be tabled in Parliament, and that this was not done on such a small geographic scale.

Vibrand Research, a market research agency that uses mobile phones to capture the results of face-to-face interviews, was commissioned to complete a survey. The survey was administered to 400 Cosmo City households from 6 to 9 May 2015. The sample consisted of 133 households in fully subsidised housing, 80 in credit-linked units, 27 in rental apartments, 88 in bonded housing, and 72 in backyard sublets. These proportions were selected to correspond with the proportions of housing types as they appear in the area, with the likely exception of the backyard sublets, of which the number of units or residents is unknown, and for which the correct sample size was therefore necessarily speculative. The sample's gender split was approximately equal, and the race composition roughly in line with that estimated for the area in Census 2011.

A total of 25 questions were asked, covering demographic identifiers, income, perceptions of and responses to crime and policing, rates of crime victimisation, community pride, and so on. Responses were immediately captured and transmitted via mobile phones. Of this data, only those survey items that have a clear bearing on social cohesion, perceptions of safety and levels of self-

reported crime victimisation have been extracted for discussion here. Unfortunately, although adequate to give a general indication, the data set does not make it possible to properly test the associations, never mind a model of the complexity proposed in the introductory section above. As such, this is not a perfect test of social cohesion[48] or its association with crime perceptions and victimisation, but it is a first descriptive step towards revealing how these dynamics may be playing out in this highly unusual neighbourhood. Its mobile format precluded matching the question structures directly, but for context and where possible, comparisons are made between the results of this survey and those of the National Victims of Crime Survey.

Measuring social cohesion

In order to get a sense of how much social cohesion respondents experienced in Cosmo City, they were asked:

• To what extent do you feel part of the community in the part of Cosmo City where you live [street, neighbourhood, extension]?

• To what extent do you feel part of the community in the whole of Cosmo City?

• Are you proud to be a resident in Cosmo City?

• How many of the people you interact with in Cosmo City have a similar background to you?

• How would you describe your interaction with other people who live in Cosmo City?

Table 1: Summary of key social cohesion results

Percentage feeling somewhat or very much part of the community in the part of Cosmo City where they live	85%
Percentage feeling somewhat or very much part of the community in the whole of Cosmo City	73%
Percentage feeling somewhat or very proud to be a resident in Cosmo City	85%
Percentage satisfied by their level of interaction with others in Cosmo City	43%
Percentage interested in more interaction with others in Cosmo City	44%
Percentage feeling that half or less of those they interact with in Cosmo City have similar backgrounds to their own	73%

More than 85% of the respondents said they felt at least somewhat part of the section of community where they live – that is, their own street, neighbourhood or extension. Less than 10% did not really think about it or care, and 5% did not much or at all feel part of their immediate community. About 73% of respondents said they felt at least somewhat part of the community of the whole of Cosmo City. The proportion who did not much feel part of the greater Cosmo City community, at about 7%, was slightly higher than that for the respondents' immediate community, and the proportion who did not really think about it or care was about double that for the immediate community, at 20%. In the absence of survey replication or other suitable comparison, it is of course difficult to determine exactly how much better or worse Cosmo City is doing on social cohesion than other areas. Nevertheless, the findings here suggest a significant degree of 'community' and 'pride' in Cosmo City, and more so in immediate neighbourhoods than in the development as a whole. Cohesion at one level does not necessarily imply cohesion at another,[49] and indeed it is never clear what level of geographic aggregation is most appropriate in testing neighbourhood effects such as social cohesion.[50]

That people should identify more with the smaller neighbourhood in which they live than with the large development as a whole is not surprising, but it may suggest a measure of caution in the extent to which social cohesion and integration are stretching across socioeconomic boundaries. It may well be that relations are good within each housing type area, but that there is relatively little interaction between, say, the poorer residents who live in the fully subsidised units and the relatively affluent who live in privately purchased houses. So it is that Cosmo City has been described as being less about mixed housing than about combined housing, with the different housing types and associated classes living apart in separate neighbourhoods even as they share the name of Cosmopolitans.[51]

Eighty-five percent of the respondents said they felt at least somewhat proud to be a resident in Cosmo City, and 57% said they felt very proud. Although the immediate neighbourhood clearly has more significance in terms of belonging, the proportion of

residents who reported feeling part of and proud of the entire community is high.

About 74% of respondents said that at least half of the people they interact with in Cosmo City have different backgrounds to their own. At the same time, about 43% were satisfied with the level of interaction they had with other people who live in Cosmo City, and a further 44% were interested in interacting more. Only 13% expressed no interest in interaction. This is a positive sign, given the large proportion saying that those they interact with in Cosmo City mostly have different backgrounds to their own. These are encouraging indications of good social cohesion, especially given that Cosmo City is still so new.

Crime and fear of crime

To determine the extent of their crime victimisation and fear, respondents were asked:

- How are you most affected by crime in Cosmo City?

- What crimes have the members of your household experienced in Cosmo City in the last five years? The response options were:
  - Theft of personal property
  - Mugging/robbery in public space
  - Theft of a car/motorbike/bicycle
  - Car hijacking
  - Home burglary
  - Home robbery
  - Business burglary or robbery
  - Physical assault
  - Sexual assault/rape
  - Murder
  - Other

About 74% of respondents said they feel safe in Cosmo City, at least during the day. According to the Statistics South Africa National Victims of Crime Survey for 2014/2015, about 85% of South Africans say they feel safe walking alone in their area during the day.[52] On the other hand, about half of respondents here said they feel safe in Cosmo City all the time, while about 69% of respondents to the National Victims of Crime Survey said they felt unsafe walking alone in their area at night – and by implication no more than about 31% could say

Table 2: Summary of key crime and fear results

Percentage feeling safe in Cosmo always	50%
Percentage feeling safe in Cosmo in the day but not at night	24%
Percentage feeling unsafe in public places	7%
Percentage whose household had experienced a listed crime in the last five years	71%
Percentage whose household had experienced mugging or robbery in a public place in the last five years	17%
Percentage whose household had experienced home burglary in the last five years	17%
Percentage whose household had experienced murder in the last five years	6%

that they felt safe at all times.[53] Only 7% of Cosmo City respondents felt unsafe in public places, as compared to 37% of National Victims of Crime Survey respondents nationally who said that fear of crime leads them to avoid going to open spaces unaccompanied.[54] The questions in the two surveys are not perfectly comparable, but there is some indication that Cosmo City residents are less fearful of crime than the national average.

Seventy-one percent of the respondents said that the members of their household had experienced at least one of the listed crime types in the last five years. Six percent said that someone in their household had been murdered in the last five years. This would imply a murder rate about 15 times that of the official police statistics in the precinct – especially implausible given the evidence that murder is relatively well reflected in official statistics.[55] But rare and particularly memorable crimes like murder are often massively over-represented in victim surveys, and indeed their numbers are also implausibly inflated in the National Victims of Crime Survey.[56]

Rates for a number of the other crimes reported are also considerably higher than those in the National Victims of Crime Survey. The self-reported rate of theft of personal property in Cosmo City is about 30% in five years, or about 6% a year, as compared to the National Victims of Crime Survey result of 2%

a year. Some other crimes see Cosmo City self-reporting rates more in line with those seen in the National Victims of Crime Survey. The framing and phrasing of the questions do not make for a perfect methodological match, but the overall suggestion is that self-reported rates of crime victimisation in Cosmo City appear to be considerably higher than the national picture, some improbably so.

Conclusion: knowing your neighbour, knowing their crime

It is unclear to what extent crime victimisation is indeed more common in Cosmo City, although Honeydew police are quoted in the press as suggesting that Cosmo City has a disproportionate share of the crime in the sector, itself one of the highest crime areas in Johannesburg.[57] It is also unclear to what extent the survey conditions or community characteristics, including social cohesion, may have influenced the respondents' inclination to self-report these crimes. An overwhelming proportion of respondents reported having experienced some form of crime, a very large proportion reported strong social cohesion, and a small proportion reported much fear. The unexpectedly limited variation in responses and the relatively small sample size make it impossible to reliably ascertain a relationship between these factors. It is noteworthy, however, that there is certainly no evidence that the apparently strong social cohesion has resulted in a low crime rate.

The self-reported victimisation rates are strikingly high. One possible explanation is that a relatively informal survey setting, in which responses are recorded on a mobile phone, can lead to different results to those recorded in a booklet of some 60 pages as used for the National Victims of Crime Survey. The data collection mode (e.g. Internet vs face-to-face) has been shown in other research to have an impact on victimisation survey results, but not anywhere near the extent suggested here.[58]

Another possible explanation for this anomaly may in fact be a result of Cosmo City's strong, albeit localised, social cohesion. Individuals receive information about the relative risk of victimisation 'not only through their direct experience with crime but also indirectly through others' experiences'.[59] Social

cohesion may facilitate the spread of information about crime experiences through the community, such that far more people hear about and to some extent have experience of a single crime incident. The familiarity with more crime incidents may well heighten a sense of crime victimisation risk, and it may have been this sense that filtered through into a question ostensibly about direct crime experiences. Put differently, although respondents were asked only about the crimes experienced by those in their own direct household, their sense of kinship may extend to many more people on their block or in their neighbourhood, so that the same crime is being reported by respondents in numerous, ostensibly discrete households.

This effect is not entirely unprecedented. A study on low-income communities in Latin America suggested that highly dense and strong social networks can allow the sense of crime victimisation risk to proliferate.[60] Another study, on residents who were displaced following Hurricane Katrina, found that strong networks foster the transmission of rumours, raising the sense of crime risk.[61] To the extent that Cosmo City's levels of social cohesion are high, it may be another example of such an effect. What is most interesting is that the heightened perceptions of risk – expressed, it is argued, as an exaggerated recollection of personal victimisation – are not matched by heightened levels of fear. More research to properly test the association is clearly required, but it may be that the same social cohesion that disperses the perception of crime victimisation risk also diffuses its emotional impact. High levels of social cohesion, whatever their independent impact on crime levels, may reduce fear of crime even as it raises perceptions of risk. These variables should certainly not be conflated. Policy may simultaneously succeed in promoting social cohesion and fail to address high crime levels, and it may thereby promote a sense of relative safety even while heightening crime level perceptions. Social cohesion is by no means a magic bullet for problems of and around crime.

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- Regional Report: Southern Africa

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SACQ 53 is a special edition on commissions of inquiry into policing, guest edited by Elrena van der Spuy. The focus of this edition was prompted by the release of the findings in 2015 of the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry into policing deficiencies in the Western Cape township; and the Farlam Commission that investigated police culpability in the deaths of protesting miners at Marikana. The edition concludes with a interview with Judge Kate O'Regan, who reflects on her experience in heading the Khayelitsha Commission.