

THE CONSORTIUM ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION

# DIALOGUE ON SAFETY AND SECURITY: INSIGHTS FROM CAPE TOWN



Key points from the third international Dialogue on Safety and Security  
Cape Town, 25–27 February 2015

## 1. Background

In recent years, there has been a shift from a traditional law enforcement approach to crime prevention to one that emphasises community safety and public health. Making a success of such an approach requires community ownership and a multi-sectoral, holistic approaches to dealing with the conditions that give rise to very high levels of crime and violence in certain parts of the world, notably in Latin America and Southern Africa.

The third international Dialogue on Safety and Security took place in Cape Town from 25–27 February 2015. It brought together academics, activists and practitioners in the state and non-state sectors from across the world (see Annexure I). A wide range of presentations were made, focusing mainly on South Africa, but also including material from Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Namibia, Mozambique and Kenya (see Annexure II).

The core convening partners were the Igarapé Institute (Brazil), Fundación Ideas Para la Paz (Colombia), Instituto para la Seguridad y la Democracia (INSYDE, Mexico), and, from South Africa, the African Policing and Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF) and the Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention (CJCP).

Financial support for the Cape Town dialogue was provided by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA).

The event was part of a three-year initiative to examine what works and what does not work in public safety in the four participating countries. A key output has been original commissioned research published in *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*. The programme has also facilitated international exchange visits by senior police officials from participating countries. The first two dialogues took place in Rio de Janeiro (March 2014) and Mexico City (November 2014). The last dialogue will take place in Bogotá in April 2015.

## 2. Brief overview of the security architecture of the host country

The challenges to security in South Africa are severe. While it leads the Southern African region in terms of wealth and human development indicators, the country has very high levels of unemployment, severe income inequality, systemic corruption, a lack of economic and social transformation, and poor health and educational outcomes. It also has a

homicide rate that is four times the global average, one of the highest in the world. The criminal justice system is inefficient and ineffective at times. As is the case in many other countries, public calls are frequently heard for a return to repressive and punitive methods of policing.

At a normative level, there has been considerable progress in developing a preventative and developmental approach to safety. Soon after the advent of democracy, the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy and the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security established the importance of prevention and the necessity for involving multiple actors. The Department of Social Development's Integrated Social Crime Prevention Strategy of 2011 sets as its vision 'a safe South Africa, safe communities, safe families and responsible individuals'. The National Development Plan Vision for 2030 says that a holistic approach is needed to address violent crime; an approach that seeks to address root causes; an approach that recognises that long-term attention is required. The draft Integrated Urban Development Framework stresses the importance of integrated local safety plans; a focus on prevention; the transformation of places where crime and violence are concentrated; and public participation in prevention initiatives. Its broader aims include: integrated spatial planning; integrated transport and mobility; integrated and sustainable human settlements; integrated urban infrastructure; efficient land governance and management; inclusive economic development; and effective urban governance.

The latest significant development is the imminent publication for comment of the 2015 Draft White Paper on Safety and Security. Its objectives are: to provide an overarching policy for an integrated approach to safety and security; to facilitate the creation of a sustainable, well-resourced implementation and oversight mechanism; and to coordinate, monitor, evaluate and report on implementation of crime prevention priorities across all sectors. It recognises the importance of an effective criminal justice system; early interventions to prevent crime and violence and promote safety; victim support; effective and integrated service delivery for safety, security and violence and crime prevention; safety through environmental design; and active public and community participation. The paper says that effectively preventing crime and violence requires a developmental life-course approach which addresses the multiple risk factors at the structural, environmental, developmental, cultural and social levels. It emphasises the roles of the health, social development, education and the criminal justice systems to address risk factors.

The role of local government is seen as: establishing community safety forums (CSFs); ensuring that

statutory integrated development plans (IDPs) take safety and security into account; ensuring alignment of local strategies with relevant national and provincial ones; and ensuring effective enforcement of relevant by-laws.

### 3. Key areas of discussion

*The post-2015 international development agenda and spending priorities are currently being negotiated. Two draft Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have the potential to promote the safety agenda.*

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) period is about to come to an end. The MDGs will be replaced by the SDGs for the period 2015–2030, once negotiations are complete. A draft SDG agenda will have been agreed by July 2015. Two draft goals have the potential to advance the safety agenda – Draft Goal 16 ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’, and Draft Goal 11: ‘Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’. A separate international Financing for Development (FfD) negotiation process is underway. This will culminate in a conference in Addis Ababa in July 2015 at which critical decisions will be taken around finance and technical support for implementation of the SDGs.

South Africa, Brazil and Mexico are all very important actors in the negotiations around both the SDGs and FfD. Planning for implementation of goals and targets at national level needs to start now. Meetings between civil society and government officials as soon as possible could help prepare the ground for a stronger citizen safety agenda, matched by appropriate levels of implementation support.

*Transnational organised crime poses a great threat to security.*

Peru has overtaken Colombia as the world’s biggest producer of cocaine, but what has happened in Colombia is a good predictor of what is likely to happen in other countries.

Organised crime in Colombia has become much more sophisticated than it was in the days of the first generation, the Medellín and Cali cartels – drug smugglers who owned and operated every link in the value chain. The Urabeños have absorbed many rivals into a network. The organisation has enormous expertise and specialist capacity for violence, including the assassination of senior political figures across Latin America. In 2002 and 2006, Colombian

paramilitaries financed the election of at least 30% of the members of Congress. Organised crime has become differentiated into what can be seen as three concentric circles. The outer circle comprises street gangs. Because they get paid in cocaine, this has generated a local market for drugs and raised the level of violence in many places. About 95% of arrests are at this level. The inner circle is the ‘board of directors’ – high-level crime bosses who are no longer in competition with one another. There have been no arrests at this level for a long time. The group between the bosses and the street gangs comprises paramilitaries and criminal bands which engage in extortion and provide transnational services to criminals who engage in human trafficking and smuggle drugs, gold and coltan. The life of a street-level criminal is short, so many of them are going to other countries. Guerrillas from FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army) and the ELN (National Liberation Army) have been engaged in smuggling to fund their war efforts, and they have effectively been ‘the law’ in the areas of the country they control. Now that peace between the Colombian government and these movements is imminent, demobilised FARC and ELN members are likely to go into organised crime unless ways can be found of employing them in community projects and community policing. Most guerrillas were recruited when they were very young, and many are illiterate, so they have very few marketable skills.

The US has always been the biggest market for cocaine, and Latin America is fast becoming the second. The level of drug use has increased in all transit countries in Latin America, which is far and away the most violent region in the world. The nature of transnational crime is changing. Organised crime is going to those places where there is money to be made. A kilogram of cocaine is worth \$25 000 in Asia, Australia and most of Europe. In Spain and the Netherlands, it is worth \$35 000; in Russia, \$80 000; and in Japan \$100 000.

*The Luanda Guidelines can be used to lobby for improved conditions of police custody and pre-trial detention in Africa.*

The implications of excessive and arbitrary pre-trial detention in Africa have an impact on over three million people on any given day, and some 14 million people pass through pre-trial detention during the course of a year. This figure does not include those in police custody. There are serious indirect negative impacts on families and communities, possibly affecting hundreds of millions of people. Many people in pre-trial detention should not be there. People may have been arrested for arbitrary reasons, or to harass marginalised groups, or for offences that are so petty that any kind of imprisonment is too harsh a punishment.



The Luanda Guidelines is 'soft' law adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. They are a non-binding authoritative interpretation of peoples' rights under the African Charter. An open, transparent and consensus-building approach has been adopted, with states and civil society organisations being consulted so that their concerns can be taken into account. The Guidelines will be launched by the African Commission in April 2015. This makes possible a reduction of the number of people going through the criminal justice system and putting in place alternatives for police to arresting people when the circumstances do not warrant it.

South Africa represents a unique challenge. Unlike many other African countries, the systems and human rights framework are already in place. However, there are many areas of the criminal justice system that do not function as well as they should.

*A clear understanding of risk factors and protective factors help the design of effective interventions.*

A developmental approach to preventing violence seeks to mitigate the risks that predispose children to becoming aggressive and violent, and to strengthen those factors that protect them. Risk factors operate at a number of levels. At the individual level, children may have neuro-psychological problems that put them at increased risk of aggression and violence. These may be the result of exposure to alcohol and tobacco in the womb and during the early years of life; exposure to lead; and exposure to trauma. At the microsystem level, parenting practices such as beating, smacking and inconsistent behaviour increase risk. By contrast, warm and consistent parenting is a protective factor. At the mesosystem level, poor home-school connections increase risk. A school environment that provides after-school activities and parents who ensure their children do their homework are protective factors. At the exosystem level, neighbourhood disorder, gangs and inadequate policing increase risk. At a macrosystem level, unemployment and the availability of alcohol, drugs and weapons increase risk. Research on young people in prison in South Africa shows the life course predictors of violent offending include: violence/ abuse at home; victimisation; having criminal family members; a lack of support from parents; poor school performance and motivation; being male; alcohol abuse; and being a member of a gang.

Risk factors identified in South Africa's Draft White Paper on Safety and Security are, at the individual level, the following: gender, age, low social status related to class, race and ethnicity; poor nutrition and pre-natal health care; low self-esteem; a lack of empathy; and engagement in risky behaviours

(abuse of alcohol and drugs and high-risk sexual behaviour). Risk factors at the community level are: families and communities that condone violence; high levels of neighbourhood crime and violence; poor access to quality education and training opportunities; and easy access to drugs, alcohol and firearms. Relationship risk factors are: family violence; harsh and authoritarian parenting; low levels of parental involvement; neglect and/ or maltreatment; caregivers or siblings in trouble with the law; and teenage parenthood. Macro/ structural risk factors are: structural (economic and political) inequalities; rapid urbanisation; the 'youth bulge'; social norms condoning inequality; social norms condoning violence; and institutional fragility (uneven provision of services, a weak criminal justice system, weak governance and control of firearms and drugs; and poor service delivery).

*Local-level interventions can make people safer, if they are able to secure community buy-in and manage political interference.*

The premise that crime prevention efforts must take place at local government level is widely accepted. However, crime prevention is extremely politicised at province/ state level and at national level, and this undermines the ability of local state actors to engage in crime prevention. That said, local citizen safety interventions have shown the potential to work, as long as they are well designed and have community buy-in.

A crime and violence prevention pilot project in three sites in Namibia aims to steer the public conversation about crime away from calls for stiffer sentencing and the death penalty. It brings together the leadership of three critical groups at local level to improve safety: politicians at the local and national level; community, private sector and civil society leadership; and professional criminal justice system leadership. The project seeks to address its efforts directly at the development and management functions of the three municipalities, namely providing a safe and sustainable urban environment; providing support for the local economy; supporting social inclusion; supporting progressive land and housing markets; and engaging in good urban governance.

After the Mozambican civil war ended in 1992, there were 100 000 demobilised soldiers without work, 30 000 of them former child soldiers. Many had weapons. In 2001, the government encouraged communities to establish voluntary community policing councils to help the police fight crime. Within a short time 500 councils had been established across the country with 50 000 volunteers. However, violent crime continued to rise. Some community council members became vigilantes and some became criminals themselves.

There is a low level of trust in the police and the justice system, and there is a high level of police corruption. A new approach focuses on community safety rather than community policing. It establishes partnerships between communities, municipalities and the police. A participatory risk analysis is done, priority problems are identified, and interventions are designed to address those problems. Only then is a multi-sector community safety council established with a mechanism to ensure accountability to the community. Community mobilisation is an important part of the intervention, as is suitable capacity building. Members are trained to collect illegal firearms. An evaluation of the intervention's effectiveness will be possible in two or three years' time.

The homes of many wealthier South Africans are like fortresses, surrounded by high walls. These boundary walls have been built for security, privacy and noise reduction reasons. Durban Metropolitan Police say that houses with low walls or visually permeable fences are less prone to crime. Will breaking down high walls and replacing them with fences that neighbours and passers-by can see through make neighbourhoods safer? A non-profit organisation in the city has agreed to test this hypothesis. The municipality will be taking down the wall around this property and replacing it with a fence. If the experiment fails, the municipality will rebuild the wall. If the idea works, other householders may follow this example.

UN Habitat has shown that people in informal settlements across the world are more vulnerable to crime and violence than those in formal neighbourhoods. Violence prevention and improving the safety and security of people in informal settlements should be the most important priorities of upgrading interventions rather than an incidental consequence. Case studies of community perceptions about upgrading in two informal settlements in Cape Town show that, while physical upgrading of facilities may benefit residents, the multi-layered safety impacts of reconfiguring space must be carefully considered. At the structure/ house level, conditions may be better. At the settlement level, reconfiguration may enhance safety (e.g. through enabling passive surveillance and improved access for emergency vehicles), but it may also undermine existing beneficial social relations. At the community level, upgrading may create unintended safety hazards. In one of the settlements, the upgrading disrupted an informal system of marshals who managed boundary tensions between gangs. This led to an increase in gang violence. Also, the number of *shebeens* (informal liquor outlets) increased. The lesson is that upgrading programmes should be designed in a way that supports and enhances existing social networks and community cohesion within settlements.

After two years of planning, an ambitious five-year comprehensive intervention focusing on children and youth safety has been launched in Walmer Township, Port Elizabeth, South Africa. The project aims 'to improve developmental pathways for children, and increase levels of safety and well-being – at home and at school – for children in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan area, while contributing to an evidence-based knowledge of what works in preventing violence against children'. It brings together interventions with several target groups (at-risk caregivers, local service providers, out-of-school youth and communities), and several areas of endeavour (safety in schools, technical innovation, substance abuse and work opportunities). The project is expected to generate an evidence base about what works in a single location for five years, as well as what has failed to work. It has been designed in such a way that it can be adjusted over time. Two randomised control trials will take place. Longitudinal studies will be necessary to measure change over ten to 20 years, but the change in schools can be measured over the course of one year. Case management data, administration data, surveillance data and survey data are all part of the M&E design. Crime rates are a proxy for what is happening in communities. Researchers hope that the project will encourage higher rates of reporting of abuse and neglect, and that more offenders will be convicted. The evidence the project generates is expected to inform the design of safety interventions at the national and provincial level.

Over the last 25 years, almost one million people were murdered in Brazil. Government, communities and civil society in Pernambuco state entered into the *Pacto pela Vida* (Pact for Life), an agreement in which government undertook to reduce the homicide rate by 12% a year and address factors facilitating violence in at-risk areas while respecting human rights. The investigative capacity of the military police was enhanced. The leaders of gangs were identified and arrested, ending impunity for violent crime. Social violence prevention programmes were started with at-risk individuals in areas with high homicide rates. Progress was monitored weekly and a variety of government institutions were encouraged to identify obstacles and work together to address them. Homicide rates dropped by 39% between 2006 and 2013 in Pernambuco, and by 60% in the state capital Recife. In 2014, the homicide rate went up for the first time since the programme started in 2007.

Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU), a public-private partnership between the City of Cape Town and donors to enhance safety in low-income neighbourhoods of the city, has been active since 2006. It brings together three strands of work: 1) situational crime prevention – a focus on the restructuring of the built environment according to

urban planning and design principles to form safe and integrated human settlements with accessibility to basic amenities such as water and electricity and social services; 2) social crime prevention – the facilitation of social and cultural transformation, community cohesion, community participation and ownership and civic engagement, as well as victim support and other violence prevention activities that focus on youth and children; and 3) institutional crime prevention, which is centred on joined-up governance with integrated planning and implementation of violence prevention at all levels of government, and the support of civil society organisations working in this domain. Community engagement is strongly emphasised alongside research evidence because it fosters ownership, effective implementation and sustainability. VPUU has skilfully managed the political tension of working in areas where the African National Congress (ANC) is dominant in a city and province ruled by the Democratic Alliance (DA).

The numbers of service delivery protests in South Africa have increased sharply since 2005 to over 10 000 a year. These are often violent, with protestors fighting running battles with police. They are frequently characterised by the destruction of public property, disruptions to education and stopping people from going to work. According to one protester, 'the authorities only respond to grievances when they see smoke'. These protests have been described as a rebellion of the poor, and a rebellion of unemployed people (not necessarily unskilled), most of them men. This violence has become xenophobic in some cases, with attacks on foreign nationals and foreign-owned businesses. A number of drivers of this violence have been identified. 1) 'Differentiated citizenship' – while all citizens are equal in the eyes of the law, services to people living in townships and informal settlements are inferior or inadequate. 2) There is a mismatch between available employment opportunities and people with the necessary skills to take up those opportunities, especially among young people. 3) The ability of local government to deliver services, especially in smaller municipalities, is compromised by a lack of resources, a growing legislative mandate and corruption. 4) Apartheid-era spatial inequalities continue to exclude many people from access to amenities and the labour and housing markets.

*The notion of social cohesion has the potential to enhance safety, and to undermine it.*

The South African government runs a programme to enhance social cohesion, linking it with nation-building. Implicit in the notion of social cohesion is that a lack of it is linked to a lack of social control and violence, and that more of it acts as a protective factor against violence. This presupposes that residents are willing to act collectively based on

mutual trust and solidarity. The country has a long history of marginalised people surviving poverty and repression through informal social organisations and social networks. These are more powerful than formal institutions. Informal institutions in townships have an ambiguous relationship with the state, the law and legality. People expect the state to deliver services and goods, but the authority of the state, particularly of the police, is deeply contested. Social networks can act as conduits for friendship. They may also support exclusion and violence.

People in Khayelitsha 'know' each other but this 'knowing' can be a source of violent retribution. Those who are identified as 'criminals' are subjected to violent public punishment. People who report crime are known to criminals, and this discourages victims from going to the police. Relationships of mutuality may also lead to the enforcement of a moral community against 'the other'. This can take the form of xenophobic violence by mobs acting as a 'moral community'. Taxi associations play a key regulatory function. They are a more powerful presence than police and are known for the use of coercive force. They play a key role in controlling youth gang violence. There is widespread sanction for the violence of taxi associations and other forms of violent collective ordering.

Indicators to measure social cohesion, collective efficacy and citizen security must move away from generic, normative ideas of what these constructs mean and how they may reduce violence. They must engage with the complexity and specific material conditions, values and identities of people living in specific contexts.

The notion of citizenship is imagined. There is a whole series of citizenships and hierarchies of citizenships. Brazilians living in *favelas* may see themselves first as citizens of the *favela*, then of Rio de Janeiro, then of Brazil, with different levels of allegiance to each. Notions of belonging are layered, and people resist being co-opted into a national notion of 'Brazilianness'.

*Research and M&E data has a potentially valuable role to play in violence prevention.*

Safety work is complex and hard to evaluate, but there is no doubt that evidence-based advocacy requires the collection of credible data. Specific kinds of data may have to be collected for donor-funded projects, e.g. unit costs, input costs, outputs and outcomes. Collecting data takes time, money and commitment. Data in this field is context-specific. The benefit of data must exceed the cost of collecting it. The more fine-grained the data, the more expensive it is to collect. It may be useful to include cost benefit analyses, because this is something that politicians understand and are likely

to respond to. From a cost-benefit point of view, the most effective interventions are those that target early childhood development and single-headed households (the gain is between \$7 and \$10 for every \$1 spent). The value of intangibles such as human rights under international law cannot be quantified.

Large-scale public health interventions such as reducing the availability of alcohol, reduces violence. However, convincing politicians to act requires hard evidence based on research questions that are causally linked to outcome variables. An evaluation has been commissioned to examine the impact of reducing the availability of liquor on levels of violence in three areas in Cape Town where VPUU works – Khayelitsha, Gugulethu and Nyanga. Five indicator domains have been chosen to simultaneously measure multiple interventions, exposure variables, and known confounders and effect modifiers: 1) youth development; 2) safety and security; 3) economic and human development; 4) alcohol use; and 5) infrastructure. Primary data sources are: 1) cross-sectional injury data from casualty departments, collected for a one week period every six months; 2) annual surveys of 1 500 households in the three study sites; 3) liquor outlet mapping; and 4) qualitative work with stakeholder groups (e.g. police and *shebeen* owners). Secondary data sources are: M&E surveys done by VPUU; crime data; and Census data, geo-located to small areas. VPUU's network of community stakeholders was fundamental to the delineation of small areas, which reflected community-perceived neighbourhood boundaries. The household questionnaire has been administered once a year in 1 500 randomly chosen houses by researchers put forward by community organisations. It comprises two parts. The first set of questions asks heads of households about individual household members; urban upgrading (physical/ social); alcohol policy and enforcement; their experience of violence; and active organisations and programmes. The other questionnaire asks young adults in a household about safety risks: illegal access to and consumption of alcohol, and access to and carrying of weapons. Mobile phone technology was used to administer questionnaires in two locations. Because it is captured immediately the data quality is better than in the third location where a paper-based approach was used.

Police and advocacy organisations know that there are no quick fixes to crime and violence, but politicians want quick results. What kind of data, who collects it, and what methods are in place for critiquing it are all highly political. Political pressure on police creates an incentive for them to manipulate data to give politicians what they want and to make the public feel safer. Police statistics about the success of two high profile quick-fix crime interventions ordered by the President of Colombia

did not stand up to critical scrutiny. A crackdown on drug dealing hotspots in 2013 may have displaced and dispersed dealing to many smaller locations rather than reducing it, as the police had claimed. Police claimed that the homicide rate had gone down after a crime crackdown in 2014. However, the statistics they used to claim success were not from comparable time periods, they reflected a seasonal variation. When statistics were analysed for comparable periods, it was clear there had been no reduction in homicides. One genuine success was a decline in the number of personal injuries.

There is an unspoken agreement between police and politicians in Colombia that they have to make a show to make people feel safer without changing anything. There is a lot of pressure for the police to show results, not only measured by the number of seizures of illegal goods and arrests, but also by reducing the number of homicides. In various parts of Latin America, police would rather be accountable for operating indicators than for crime reduction targets because operations are within their sphere of control. Attribution is difficult – it cannot be said exactly what causes the number of homicides to go up or down. Police effectiveness is one factor, but the number of homicides may be linked to lead in the drinking water, or levels of teenage pregnancy, or many other factors. Police in South Africa don't like crackdown operations because they know these make their jobs harder. Crackdowns on drug dealing victimise addicts, especially at street level, and the shortages they create push up prices to the benefit of dealers. Police drug crackdowns can have other unintended consequences. They may overwhelm the capacity of the courts to process alleged offenders. In Mombasa in Kenya, a crackdown led to hospitals being overloaded because addicts went into withdrawal. More appropriate responses are needed to respond to drug addiction, particularly at street level.

The Danish Demining Group (DDG) works to reduce armed violence in informal settlements in Kenya through working with at-risk youth. Some of the youth are engaged in criminal activity from time to time. Most have experienced disrupted families, trauma and substance abuse. The project assists them to think through their futures, generate a vision and a plan, and change their attitudes towards themselves and others. Methods include training (in emotional skills, life skills and conflict resolution); role plays; discussions; and storytelling. Some have made documentaries about themselves. Participants' plans have included becoming entrepreneurs or re-establishing contact with families. While 15% of participants have dropped out, 50% of those who remain have implemented their plans to a greater or lesser extent. Attitudes have changed and, anecdotally, it seems there has

been some behaviour change. DDG's approach to assessing impact is to map theory of change pathways with indicators. It is important to have a context-specific approach to the possession of small arms in Kenya. Too many guns in informal settlements increases the risk of violence and crime. But people living in rural areas along the borders of South Sudan and Somalia need arms to protect themselves.

*Social auditing and data-driven activism are effective mechanisms for communities to gain access to justice and to advocate for safer living conditions.*

Social auditing started in India 20 years ago and can be defined as a civil society-driven process that encourages community participation in monitoring government service delivery and expenditure. The process allows communities to understand, measure, verify, report and ultimately contribute to improving government performance. The methodology is as follows: accessing information; analysing information; physical verification; capturing and collating information; holding public hearings; and following up. Social auditing is not a fault-finding exercise. It aims to enhance community participation, active citizenship, accountability and transparency. Small changes can bring about a big difference to the quality of people's lived experience.

States produce statistics and surveys about populations 'from above'. Social auditing is data produced 'from below' that engages with, and challenges, data from above. Critics of the modern state say data gathering is a form of surveillance which aims at producing a docile population. If governments use statistics to lie about service delivery, it is possible to use evidence produced from below to speak truth to power.

Since 2013, the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) has, through its 12 branches in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, secured the engagement of communities in social auditing to gather factual information on the quality of municipal services, notably a lack of acceptable public toilets and inadequate refuse removal. Both of these services are provided by private companies contracted by the City of Cape Town. However, the quality of services is poor, the companies are not adhering to their service level agreements, and the city is not holding non-performing service providers to account. SJC is strongly focused on solutions. Its activities are aimed at ensuring participatory co-governance through which communities monitor the quality of services they receive and hold the City and its outsourced service providers to account when there are problems.

In 2014, SJC submitted a social audit report on toilets in Khayelitsha. This provided evidence to the

City of Cape Town that one in four public toilets were not working, that janitors were not inoculated against diseases (a hazard of the job), that there were long queues, and that people faced serious security risks when they went out to attend to the call of nature, especially at night. SJC drew public attention to the everyday plight of people living in informal settlements. Data and photographs rendered many previously 'invisible' things visible, e.g. children playing in places surrounded by sewerage. A media briefing was held on the site of dysfunctional toilets, enabling journalists to see the situation first hand. This challenged conventional understandings of activism and engagement in governance. It enabled people to lobby, pressure and, where necessary, shame and blame the state into more effective service delivery.

The City of Cape Town has been generally uncooperative, largely because the DA administration believes the SJC's activism is an ANC campaign to discredit it. SJC has had some success in convincing the national Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation and the National Treasury to accept social audits as evidence. It is trying to convince the Western Cape provincial government and City of Cape Town to do the same.

The SJC social audit report on toilets in Khayelitsha and its associated activism campaign has made sanitation a political issue. A High Court ruling on unenclosed toilets in a part of Khayelitsha found that the City of Cape Town had violated the constitutional rights and needs of the poor. The emerging jurisprudence will improve conditions to good sanitation to people across South Africa. The demand for decent sanitation has been taken up by the Ses'khona People's Movement, an activist group with a much more confrontational approach than the SJC. For example, this group has dumped faeces in public places in support of its demands.

*Police reform is difficult and necessary, and there are some success stories.*

Political control of the police in Mexico was lost when the one-party state came to an end in 2000. Many police members are involved in criminal activities. Of the 32 state police forces, only two have internal affairs units that carry out successful supervision. There have been 20 years of legal reforms and a lot of funding for institutional reform. However, there is still no clear agreement of how policing should be done, legally, professionally, honestly, with respect for human rights. Victimization surveys show there is still a very low level of public trust in the police. Through learning from its failures, INSYDE has refined its approach to supporting police reform. It recognises that police will only be willing to learn from INSYDE if INSYDE is willing to



learn from them. It also recognises that police reform is impossible without the necessary political support. INSYDE begins by proposing a reform process with politicians, police and social leaders. Police are asked to tell their own story. INSYDE uses qualitative and quantitative research techniques to place the voice of the police in the centre. The police is what police say it is, not what anyone else thinks it should be.

A programme operating in 19 municipalities in the La Montaña region of Mexico supports citizens to report human rights violations at the hands of police; supports police to report abuse at the hands of municipal police institutions; and mediates conflict between various municipal police services. The programme develops proposals for institutional reform to mitigate abuses and has had some success.

The first external oversight mechanism with any direct authority over any of Mexico's 2 000 municipal, state and federal police institutions was established by the city of Querétaro in 2014. It evaluates police performance by receiving and processing complaints; validating and issuing recommendations for internal investigations; conducting investigations; developing proposals to improve police compliance and practice; proposing standards, procedures or protocols; facilitating police transparency; and forging links with communities.

Key lessons from practice include: a context-specific local approach is necessary; civilian oversight of police requires consensus among all stakeholders; police buy-in and participation is essential; language must be used very precisely; local legislation is necessary to anchor initiatives; and the M&E mechanism must be carefully designed.

In Brazil, there is agreement that there is a need for police reform, but the entrenched organisational culture is hierarchical and authoritarian. The police do whatever they want to members of the public, and to their own members. Politicians know that they have very little power to control the police. Police members like to be seen as heroes who kill criminals.

The murder rate in Khayelitsha is between 76 and 108 per 100 000, well above the national average of 31. A population of between 400 000 and 500 000 people live in the most dangerous place in South Africa. The poor quality of the built environment and facilities creates an unsafe environment. The SJC compiled a docket of information based on gathering data on a number of specific cases. This provided evidence of how police were failing to protect the community, failing to investigate cases properly, and failing to secure convictions. This information was taken to communities in the context

of education about how the criminal justice system should operate. A docket of information was taken to the Western Cape Premier to lobby for the appointment of a judicial commission of inquiry into policing in Khayelitsha. This struggle lasted ten years, and was opposed by the national government all the way to the Constitutional Court, but eventually the commission was appointed.

The commission found that Khayelitsha had the lowest ratio of police to people in the Western Cape. It found that the allocation of resources formula that was used under apartheid to disadvantage poor areas was still being used. A new station commander was appointed immediately. He established joint forums to enable the community to discuss the commission's recommendations. The struggle to get the national authorities to treat Khayelitsha fairly is far from over. If it is successful, it will secure a better policing dispensation for every community that experiences similar conditions.

*Access to information laws can be used to support citizen safety.*

After the advent of democracy, South Africa adopted a package of 'open democracy' laws to provide access to information, to protect whistleblowers, and to protect private information. The potentially beneficial impact of these laws is being opposed by politicians and civil servants who say that open access to information threatens national security. A controversial bill to regulate the classification, protection and dissemination of state information was passed in 2011 but has been sent back to Parliament for reconsideration. The national security discourse privileges the views of the security establishment. The transparency discourse provides access to information to citizens as a right so that they can monitor what government is doing and advocate for their socio-economic and political rights. The fact that South Africa is one of eight countries participating in US President Barack Obama's Open Government Partnership provides potential leverage for the development of indicators that can support better safety initiatives.

*Gun control reduces the potential for violence. Progressive legislation must be defended against corporate interests.*

In 2013, Brazil accounted for less than 3% of the world's population, but 12% of the world's homicides. Approximately 70% of these homicides were committed with a firearm. A civil society advocacy campaign backed by academics and security forces contributed to the passing of a gun control law in 2003. Only the police and armed forces may now carry firearms. Anyone who wants a firearm must be over the age of 25, and is subjected to a background check, a psychological check, and a

proficiency test. Research has shown a clear correlation between the implementation of the new law and a fall in the number of homicides. Brazil is one of the world's largest exporters of small arms and ammunition, and manufacturers have a lot of money and political influence. This industry lobbied the National Congress to draft a bill to make the firearm law much more permissive. Civil society organisations took action to mobilise public support for retaining the 2003 law. They made public the direct financial links between 30 members of Congress advocating for a new law and firearm manufacturers. The campaign was backed up by public statements of support from senior government officials and politicians. The bill has been shelved, but it may be revived at some point in the future, so civil society must stay vigilant.

*Engaged journalism can support public safety by highlighting abuses of power and promoting respect for human rights.*

São Paulo is an extremely violent city. There were 130 000 homicides between 1960 and 2010. This reached a peak of 65 per 100 000 people in 1999, higher than the rate in Iraq during the war in that country. A key driver of homicide has been police seeing violence as a law enforcement tool rather than as a crime, especially in low-income neighbourhoods. Police killed an average of 568 people a year between 1982 and 2005. A second driver was vigilantes, killing suspected criminals with impunity during the 1980s and early 1990s. This culture of impunity created an environment in which people killed each other in the course of interpersonal conflicts, and it increased the intensity of gang wars. The culture of violence is deeply entrenched in the police. There are cases of police members publishing photographs of the people they have killed on their personal blogs and sending such pictures to friends and relatives of the dead person. Generally speaking, there is a high level of support for the use of violence by police and vigilantes to control crime, among wealthier people as well as sections of the working class.

Sensationalistic 'entertainment' journalism seeks to exploit public fear, reinforce stereotypes, support vigilantism and encourage a simplistic 'good vs evil' view of the world. In the absence of a functional criminal justice system, it encourages a desire for revenge and the killing of scapegoats who have not been found guilty in a court of law. By contrast, engaged journalism can make the public aware of abuses of power and miscarriages of justice in support of respect for human rights. Violence weakens democracy and is the result of fragile institutions. People do not really feel safe in an environment where prisons are overcrowded and police kill without legal consequences. Engaged journalism encourages people to think about social

values and to examine their own inner conflicts about the use of deadly force in place of due legal process. The challenge for engaged journalists is not to preach to the converted, but to change the minds of people who think that defenders of human rights are defenders of criminals.

*Community advice offices can help provide access to justice for marginalised people in rural areas.*

Community advice offices (CAOs) are small, non-profit organisations across the rural parts of South Africa that offer free basic legal information, advice and services to people who may not understand their legal and constitutional rights, and who are marginalised through poverty, social circumstances and geographical location. Their history of assisting and mobilising communities goes back to the apartheid era. Some CAOs offer the services of community-based paralegals who help clients deal with legal and social problems through mechanisms other than the courts, e.g. alternative dispute resolution. CAOs support clients to with a range of problems, including gaining access social grants and dealing with civil matters, labour disputes and land matters. The National Alliance for the Development of Community Advice Offices has tried to convince the government to make provision for a formal role for paralegals in the Legal Practice Bill, something which would help CAOs become less dependent on donor funding, but this call has fallen on deaf ears.

*Educational initiatives can play an important role in reducing violence.*

The homicide rate of people under the age of 19 years in Brazil increased by 194% between 1980 and 2012. Young people are incarcerated at a higher rate than adults. Of 196 safety interventions mapped by the Igarapé Institute from 1988 and 2012, 75 contained educational components, and 40% took place at city level. Educational interventions in the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo which target at-risk children and youth in vulnerable areas have had dramatic results. Critical success factors included the ability to bridge the functional divide between the education field and the safety and security field; good partnerships between government and NGOs and the ability to scale these up; appropriating public spaces to break down 'invisible walls' between people; countering stigmatisation; countering gender bias; and working at the local government level.

Education has the potential to change behaviour in ways that law enforcement cannot. In South Africa, this potential is currently not well harnessed. The formal education system does not include violence prevention components. There are poor links between education departments, police, safety and security departments, and departments which

support sport and culture activities. Information is often not shared. Data is limited, unreliable, not up to date, and often lacks the level of detail that could inform the design of educational activities.

Contextually specific indicators should be developed at national and provincial level that measure behaviour change. The private sector is looking for ways to contribute. Through framing the discussion as part of education and skills development, there is real potential to establish public-private partnerships that can improve safety.

Research is being done into the role that the South African Police Service (and sometimes municipal police) play in reducing crime and violence in schools in high-crime parts of two provinces. Some examples include: search-and-seizure operations and the arrest of learners in possession of weapons and drugs; bringing ex-convicts into schools to speak to learners about the consequences of committing crime and the hardship of prison life; escorting learners to and from school during exams; patrolling and guarding schools; and life skills workshops. Reactions among learners, teachers and parents are mixed. Some welcome the police, others resent them. Police are usually called in to deal with weapons, gang activity, fights, drugs and bullying. There is a risk of teachers and parents relying on police to play roles they should really be playing.

*Youth crime prevention activities led by youth are more likely to succeed than those led by government.*

The amount of government finance made available for crime prevention in Mexico grew by 850% between 2011 and 2015. One grant is awarded to municipalities, the other goes to states for local programmes designed in conjunction with municipalities in accordance with the diagnostic studies performed by crime prevention specialists. However, government actors often manipulate what they use the money for, and most of them lack staff with real expertise in the field. Politicians have awarded contracts to companies that provided them with election campaign support, or to companies that sell tactical gear rather than those with expertise in crime prevention and working with youth. In cases where crime prevention experts have been appointed, their contracts have often been terminated after a few months. When local government administrations engage in crime prevention activities among young people, they often do this to mobilise youth for party political purposes. Youth resent this.

There is some good news. Between 2011 and 2014 a group of young people in Querétaro took the initiative and made a real difference to youth in their city. They gained formal certified training in crime prevention at the University of Chile. Their training included mediation skills, counselling skills, dealing with issues such as gender-based violence and quantitative and qualitative diagnostic skills. They have done very good work with groups of young people. For example, they have provided skills training for photography, videography and graffiti, and provided opportunities for youth to participate in extreme sports.

## 4. Conclusion

The Cape Town Dialogue included a number of in-depth discussions about crime and violence prevention in urban communities. The characteristics of both informal and formal spaces and the challenges and opportunities this poses in safety and security is evident in South Africa. However, many questions still remain unanswered, especially as these relate to urban crime and violence. This can be addressed by focusing on the following, amongst others:

- The implementation of social programmes that promote social cohesion and reduce social and economic inequalities;
- Harnessing urban economic opportunities to create employment and reduce absolute and relative poverty;
- Seeing urban crime and violence as risk management issues as important as every other sectoral intervention in the bid to create better cities;
- A focus on the youth, women and children, and on improving the urban environment to reduce crime and violence; with a special focus on disadvantaged, marginalised areas;
- Controlling key drivers of crime and violence including access to drugs and alcohol and firearms.

A clear path is necessary if progress is to be made on crime and violence prevention. Dialogue is an essential tool to map the best way forward. Ongoing dialogue is an essential tool to gain and retain community, government and political support. Effective monitoring and evaluation is necessary to learn from practice and to ensure that lessons from practice are continually integrated into the daily work of building safer communities.

## Annexure 1: Participants in the third international Dialogue on Safety and Security

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## Annexure II: Programme for the third international Dialogue on Safety and Security

25 February 2015

<b>09:00 – 10:00</b>	<b>OPENING SESSION</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i The Security Dialogues Project: Context <i>Robert Muggah, Igarapé Institute</i></li> <li>ii Welcome Message: International Development Research Centre <i>Njeri Karuru, International Development Research Centre</i></li> <li>iii Setting the Scene for the Cape Town Dialogue and Introducing Minister <i>Sean Tait, African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum</i></li> <li>iv Keynote Address: United Front on Action against Crime <i>Minister of Police, Nathi Nhleko (TBC)</i></li> </ul>
<b>10:00 – 11:00</b>	<b>THE POST-2015 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS</b> <i>Facilitator: Lorenzo Wakefield</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i South Africa's Position on Justice as a Sustainable Development Goal <i>Branch: Multilateral, Department of International Relations and Cooperation (TBC)</i></li> <li>ii Justice as a Goal: The advocacy agenda <i>Betsy Apple, Open Society Foundation</i></li> </ul>
<b>11:00 – 11:15</b>	<b>TEA BREAK</b>
<b>11:15 – 13:00</b>	<b>LOCAL APPROACHES FOR SAFETY AND SECURITY</b> <i>Facilitator: Terence Smith</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i Breaking Down Walls: New imaginations for more effective urban crime prevention in South African cities <i>Monique Marks, Urban Futures Centre, Durban University of Technology</i></li> <li>ii The Role of Upgrading in Improving Safety in Informal Settlements – Experiences from Cape Town <i>Mercy Brown-Luthango, African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town</i></li> <li>iii A Multi-level Approach to Primary Prevention of Crime and Violence: The future of Nelson Mandela Bay <i>Patrick Burton, Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention and Lilly Artz, Gender Health and Justice Research Unit, University of Cape Town</i></li> <li>iv Building Safe and Caring Communities in Namibia: Inspiring glocal multi-sectoral approaches for crime and violence prevention <i>Nathanael Areseb, Namibian Association for Local Authority Officers</i></li> </ul>

25 February 2015/continued

<b>13:00 – 14:00</b>	<b>LUNCH</b>
<b>14:00 – 15:30</b>	<b>THE VALUE OF DATA FOR VIOLENCE PREVENTION</b> <i>Facilitator: Craig Oosthuizen</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i Evaluation of Safety Interventions in Informal Settlements in Cape Town as a Model for Good Practice <i>Richard Matzopoulos, School of Public Health, University of Cape Town</i></li> <li>ii Deceitful Police Strategies to Curb Down Crime Data <i>Maria Victoria Llorente, Fundación Ideas para la Paz</i></li> <li>iii Piloting Armed Violence Reduction Approaches in Urban Kenya: Conclusions and lessons <i>Simon Rynn, Danish Demining Group, Kenya</i></li> </ul>
<b>15:30 – 15:45</b>	<b>TEA BREAK</b>
<b>15:45 – 16:45</b>	<b>WHAT DOES 'JUSTICE AS DEVELOPMENT' LOOK LIKE?</b> <i>Facilitator: Monyane Chelete</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i Multi-media Presentation</li> <li>ii Social Audits as a Mechanism to Promote 'Justice as Development' <i>Axolile Notywala, Social Justice Coalition</i></li> <li>iii Community Advice Offices as 'Justice as Development' <i>Nomboniso Maqubela, National Alliance for the Development of Community Advice Offices</i></li> </ul>

26 February 2015

<b>09:00 – 10:45</b>	<b>POLICING, VIGILANTISM AND PRIVATE SECURITY CHALLENGES</b> <i>Facilitator: Natalie Jaynes</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i Policing Experiences and Police Reform in Brazil <i>Robson Rodrigues, Military Police of Rio de Janeiro</i></li> <li>ii Police Accountability in Mexico: A chronic failure <i>Ernesto López, Instituto para la Seguridad y la Democracia</i></li> <li>iii Approaching Private and Public Security: Complementary or substitute services? <i>Daniel Rico, Fundación Ideas para la Paz</i></li> <li>iv Community Policing in Mozambique <i>Albino Forquilha, FOMICRES (Peace Promotion, Crime Prevention and Social Reinsertion)</i></li> </ul>
<b>10:45 – 11:00</b>	<b>TEA BREAK</b>

<b>11:00 – 13:00</b>	<b>PREVENTION OF YOUTH VIOLENCE AND THE EDUCATION SYSTEM</b> <i>Facilitator: Michel Cartoon</i>
	i <b>Development Approaches to Preventing Youth Violence</b> <i>Catherine Ward, University of Cape Town</i>
	ii <b>Youth and Public Institutions: Revictimisation through crime prevention</b> <i>Juan Rojas Valdés, Articulación Ciudadana</i>
	iii <b>Addressing Urban Violence through Education: Experiences from Brazil</b> <i>Luísa Phebo, Network for International Policies and Cooperation in Education and Training and Michele dos Ramos, Igarapé Institute</i>
	iv <b>The Role of Education in Addressing Urban Violence: South Africa</b> <i>Amy West and Claire Nowlin, American Institutes for Research</i>
	v <b>Conflict, Violence and Education: Service delivery protests in South African municipalities</b> <i>Peliwe Lolwana, Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand</i>
	vi <b>Searching for Solutions to Cease School-based Violence: A snapshot into SAPS' involvement, challenges and strategies</b> <i>Tariro Mutongwizo, Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention</i>
<b>13:00 – 14:00</b>	<b>LUNCH</b>
<b>14:00 – 16:15</b>	<b>SECURITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY OVERSIGHT</b> <i>Facilitator: Moses Tofa</i>
	i <b>Arms Control, Parliamentary Debates and the Role of Civil Society in Brazil</b> <i>Ivan Marques, Sou de Paz Institute</i>
	ii <b>Journalism, Citizen Security and Human Rights</b> <i>Bruno Paes Manso, NEV-University of São Paulo/Independent journalist</i>
	iii <b>External Police Oversight in Mexico: Experiences, challenges and lessons learned</b> <i>Alejandro Espriú Guerra, Instituto para la Seguridad y la Democracia</i>
	iv <b>The Evolution of Colombian Organised Crime and the Challenges Presented by a Post-conflict Scenario</b> <i>Jeremy McDormett, Insight Crime</i>
	v <b>Social Cohesion: The missing link in overcoming violence and creating citizen security</b> <i>Vanessa Barolsky, Human Sciences Research Council</i>
<b>16:15</b>	<b>TEA BREAK</b>
<b>END OF DAY 2</b>	
27 February 2015	
<b>09:00 – 10:45</b>	<b>DOUBLE-SIDED COIN? ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE</b> <i>Facilitator: Melanie Lue Dugmore</i>
	i <b>Data-driven Activism for Safety and Justice</b> <i>Steven Robins, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch University</i>
	ii <b>Access to Justice and Community Safety: A case study of Khayelitsha</b> <i>Phumeza Mlungwana, Social Justice Coalition</i>
	iii <b>Open Government Partnership and 'Justice as Development'</b> <i>Mukelani Dimba, Open Democracy Advice Centre</i>
	iv <b>The Luanda Guidelines: The role of soft law in the promotion of access to justice for pre-trial detainees</b> <i>Louise Edwards, African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum</i>
<b>10:45 – 11:15</b>	<b>TEA BREAK</b>
<b>11:15 – 13:00</b>	<b>CRIME AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION STRATEGIES AND POLICIES</b> <i>Facilitator: Sean Tait</i>
	i <b>Integrating Safety in Urban Development and Management: The IUDF perspective</b> <i>Thandeka Kabení, Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs</i>
	ii <b>Promoting a Safe and Healthy Environment: A primary role for local government in South Africa</b> <i>Mvuyisile April, South African Local Government Authority</i>
	iii <b>The Community Safety Policy and White Paper on Police in South Africa: An update</b> <i>Bilkis Omar, Civilian Secretary of Police</i>
<b>13:00 – 13:15</b>	<b>CLOSURE AND WORD OF THANKS</b>
	<b>LUNCH</b>
<b>15:30 – 18:00</b>	<b>PUBLIC EVENT</b>  Inequality, Safety and Development: A conversation and open discussion Homecoming Centre, Buitenkant Street  <b>SPEAKERS</b> <i>Albie Sachs, Robert Muggah, Edgar Pieterse and Mukelani Dimba in conversation, facilitated by Vuyiseka Dubula</i>



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