PEOPLE TO PEOPLE DIALOGUES

Situational Analysis Synthesis Report

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Acronyms

ALPS   ALPS Resilience

CATA   Cape Amalgamated Taxi Association

CODETA   Congress of Democratic Taxi Associations

CPF   Community Policing Forum

IY   Imizamo Yethu

NoRBA   Northern Region Business Association

P2P   People to People

RDP   Reconstruction and Development Programme

SANCO   South African National Civic Organizations

SAPS   South African Police Service

SASA   Somali Association of South Africa

SaVI   Safety and Violence Initiative

UCT   University of Cape Town

USAID   United States Agency for International Development

1.   Introduction

This synthesis report is based on a qualitative study conducted by the Safety and Violence Initiative (SaVI) at the University of Cape Town (UCT) on behalf of ALPS Resilience. It is part of a broader project: the '*People to People Dialogues: Fostering social cohesion in South Africa through conversation*' project (P2P). The report presents the findings of qualitative semi-structured interviews conducted in 15 selected sites in diverse South African communities of the Eastern Cape (Walmer, Wells Estate, Korsten), Gauteng (Atteridgeville, Katlehong, Mayfair), KwaZulu-Natal (Inanda, Ntuzuma, KwaMashu) and the Western Cape (Belville South, Imizamo Yethu, Lwandle, Masiphumelele, Mbekweni, Zwelihle) provinces. The objective of this study was to understand the drivers of conflict and tensions between non-nationals and South Africans, with the broader aim to develop strategies to promote social cohesion. Prior to the fieldwork, researchers conducted extensive background, quantitative, and qualitative analyses for each selected site. This was followed by fieldwork in each location, including in-depth interviews with key stakeholders and community members, and informed rapid conflict assessments in each researched community. While similar criteria were used to select each site, the findings reveal that these communities are complex and dynamic, and hence there is no uniform standard for understanding and analysing them, as discussed below.

The research component of the P2P project included some important methodological aspects:

- **Site selection criteria**: ALPS and SaVI worked to develop a flexible set of site selection criteria for the project. This included a focus on selecting a variety of sites, with an explicit focus on not only researching poor, predominantly black townships that have been the sites of xenophobic attacks. We noted that much of the prior research on violent xenophobia tended to focus in black townships, and we did not want to extend and pathologize without a fuller sample. Indeed, this research shows a complexity of issues across all research sites. Furthermore, we developed a site selection criterion that could be adapted while researchers were in the field. Given that site selection depended on secondary research, if researchers found in-the-field information to the contrary, the selection criteria could be used to develop alternative sites: this happened on more than one occasion during field research.

- **Site scorecard and a direct relation between research and intervention**: for this project, SaVI researchers were closely interconnected to the intervention, dialogue side of the project. First, the researchers developed a community scorecard that evaluated conflict and conflict resolution, leadership and governance, and other categories related to intervention decisions. This was one element that then guided interventions themselves. Second, researchers – in their site reports and engagements with ALPS – were asked to directly identify the risks and opportunities for the dialogue programme in each site. The researchers made valuable and important insights.

- **From research to site selection for dialogues**: Through agreements with USAID, it was decided that ALPS would not have to intervene in every site researched. Should the conditions for dialogue intervention be too hostile or problematic, or the chances of success too limited in the time given, and depending on community dynamics, site selection for interventions could be based on research

findings. In this way, the project represents a 'learning' process whereby research directly informs the nature of intervention, and the decision about whether to intervene at all.

- **Responsiveness**: following research in the Eastern Cape, SaVI wrote a rapid assessment in which they suggested to ALPS an accelerated entry, particularly for Walmer Township. Walmer was experiencing a rise of tensions around a community group that was trying to extort foreign national businesses. Through engagements with our P2P facilitators in the Eastern Cape, ALPS was able to implement a rapid intervention, which contributed to the immediate calming of tensions and prevention of violence.

Overall, ALPS and SaVI worked to ensure that the research and programmatic design was such that research and community intervention became strongly interconnected. This represents an important innovation and valuable learning for the project.

This report is structured into three broad substantive sections. First, the research methodology and approach are discussed, including how sites were selected, site changes (Section Two), and the broader research methodology (Section Three). Second, this report gives individual summaries of field research in each of the fifteen (15) sites (Section Four), followed by a presentation of common trends and emerging themes from across the sites (Section Five). Finally, this synthesis report offers critical reflections on the research component of the P2P project, covering an evaluation of the site scorecard (Section Six) and a review of limitations and successes of the research (Section Seven).

2. Research plan

2.1 Site selection methodology

In order to conduct successful interviews in relevant sites with potential respondents, the site selection process was carefully carried out in line with the objective of the research project, which was to understand and promote social cohesion in South African communities. Based on previous experience, this process could have yielded unwanted results if the characteristics of the sites were not thoroughly examined prior to the final selection. In this regard, researchers intended to follow a site selection process which consisted of three steps, namely: determine site selection criteria; develop a list of candidate sites; and apply site selection filter. The main purpose of this exercise was to gather and analyse sufficient information about each potential site. This would allow the team to draw informed conclusions regarding the selection of the most appropriate sites. The site selection process was as follows:

1. **Determine site selection criteria**

➢ Concentration of businesses: Eligible sites were selected based on the concentration of Somali and foreign national-run 'spaza' shops in a particular area, and/or residential areas where they live. Descriptive statistical data on each potential site was sought for this purpose.

➢ Previous tension/conflicts: Background research was conducted through desktop research, specifically focusing on recent tensions or conflicts. Media articles as well as online websites such as *Xenowatch* were useful in this regard.

➢ Current tensions/conflicts: Sites that had experienced tensions between local and foreign shop owners and/or tensions between foreign national shop owners themselves were considered.

➢ Places that have experienced tensions/conflicts in the past but have been without reports of such conflicts in recent years: These are communities that were able to quell tensions and have since been living relatively harmoniously.

➢ One non-criteria site in each province: In each province, researchers wanted to enter one site which did not fit into the above-mentioned criteria for site selection. These sites were determined based on the concentration of the targeted group for xenophobic attacks but where there had not been reported attacks. In other words, in each province, the researchers aimed to select a site where many foreign nationals live, but where reports of xenophobic violence had not taken place. Preferably, the sites should not be townships. The basis for this decision was to understand why these areas do not experience xenophobic conflict and violence, as well as to avoid pathologizing poor (black) communities by only focusing on them in research. In general, the sites that fitted this category were centres for shopkeepers, with owners who have multiple spaza shops in their province residing in the area, and with provisions, such as wholesalers and other business facilities, being present.

2. **Develop a list of candidate sites**

➢ The team first identified an initial list of possible candidate sites. The list included potential back-up sites to be entered in case of problems encountered within some of the sites selected initially.

3. **Apply site selection filter**

➢ The research team held a discussion to review the list of candidate sites and eliminated/added based on the requirements.

➢ The research team attempted to coordinate with the Somali Association of South Africa (SASA) to determine which sites specifically impacted Somali communities (although this proved to be unsuccessful, despite numerous attempts to arrange a meeting).

➢ It was decided that if, upon site visitation, the environment was not conducive for fieldwork purposes, researchers would identify another site based on the selection criteria.

Following in-depth research about each site, the research team started fieldwork with the following *original* list of candidate sites:

Table 1: Original list of candidate sites

Western Cape	Eastern Cape	Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal
Imizamo Yethu	Grahamstown	Atteridgeville	Inanda
Masiphumelele	Korsten	Katlehong	Verulam
Lwandle	Humansdorp/St Francis Bay	Mayfair	KwaDabeka
Mbekweni			
Zwelihle			
Mitchell's Plain			

2.2   Site changes

Upon commencing fieldwork, researchers immediately experienced issues with regards to site selection. In many cases, desktop research had proven inadequate/outdated as a means of accurately reflecting the dynamics and conditions in these communities. Therefore, the decision that researchers would identify another site if one was not conducive for fieldwork was particularly useful. Several changes were made once fieldwork began.

• In the Western Cape, the 'non-criteria site' – Mitchell's Plain – was switched to Bellville South, which was informed by fieldworker site observation. After making several contacts in Mitchell's Plain and touring the area, researchers determined that there was not a clearly defined area that could be predominantly viewed as a haven for foreign nationals. Researchers worked with the assumption that Somalis in particular would live peacefully in an area with a predominantly Muslim

and Coloured population. This did not appear to be the case in Mitchell's Plain. Rather, Bellville's central business district was perceived as a 'safe haven' for Somalis. However, researchers did not think it would be conducive to measure social cohesion in a business area. Instead, researchers focused on the residential area of Bellville South. After an initial visit to the area and establishing initial contacts, researchers noticed a large number of Somali nationals who appeared to feel safe in the site. It was thus selected as a research site.

- In the Eastern Cape, researchers met with the staff of the Eastern Cape Refugee Centre (ECRC) who advised the research team against entering Grahamstown. The reasoning was that the Somali presence had significantly declined since researchers had previously entered the area. Based on this information, researchers went to observe for themselves and discovered that there were only 2-3 Somali shops operating in the space. Ethiopians were now the primary spaza shop owners. The ECRC suggested switching to Walmer Township as a site due to current xenophobic tensions in the area. Researchers found the change in sites to be particularly helpful. Additionally, Humansdorp and St Francis Bay in the Eastern Cape, initially identified as sites, were too isolated and too distant for the budget of this project. The decision was made to switch to Motherwell instead. However, since Motherwell is such a large area, researchers decided to further narrow the scope of the site and rather focused on Wells Estate (which is based within Motherwell) as it was a site of xenophobic protests in 2017.

- In KwaZulu-Natal, there were numerous difficulties when choosing sites. Upon visiting Verulam, where the media had reported xenophobic attacks having taken place, researchers found that the violence was sectarian (between rival Muslim groups) and not based on xenophobia. Furthermore, when researchers entered KwaDabeka, they found that most of the shops were owned by South Africans and there were not many foreign-owned shops in the area. Based on these observations and through consultations with police representatives, community leaders and political organizations, researchers decided to focus on the INK area – Inanda, Ntuzuma and KwaMashu. This site selection had multiple benefits, as the INK area, in many regards, has similarities and operates as a whole. This did mean, however, that there was no 'non-criteria site' in KZN.

The final sites selected and researched are outlined in the table and marked on the map below:

Table 2: Final list of candidate sites

Western Cape	Eastern Cape	Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal
Imizamo Yethu	Walmer Township	Atteridgeville	Inanda
Masiphumelele	Korsten	Katlehong	Ntuzuma
Lwandle	Wells Estate	Mayfair	KwaMashu
Mbekweni			
Zwelihle			
Bellville South			

Figure 1: Map of selected research sites by province

Gauteng
- Atteridgeville
- Katlehong
- Mayfair

KwaZulu-Natal
- Inanda
- Ntuzuma
- KwaMashu

Western Cape
- Bellville South
- Imizamo Yethu
- Lwandle
- Masiphumele
- Mbwekweni
- Zwelihle

Eastern Cape
- Korsten
- Walmer
- Wells Estate

2.3   Research methodology

This synthesis research report is based on qualitative fieldwork that was carried out in fifteen (15) selected sites in diverse South African communities of Eastern Cape (Walmer, Wells Estate, Korsten), Gauteng (Atteridgeville, Katlehong, Mayfair), KwaZulu-Natal (Inanda, Ntuzuma, KwaMashu) and Western Cape (Bellville South, Imizamo Yethu, Lwandle, Masiphumelele, Mbekweni, Zwelihle) with the intention of understanding and promoting social cohesion. The main objective of the project was to deepen understandings of social cohesion, conflict resolution mechanisms, community violence, and community relations. While some of the areas have experienced waves of xenophobic attacks in recent years, others were selected because they are known to be relatively peaceful and are perceived as socially cohesive.

The fieldwork was initiated in November 2018 and was completed in March 2019. While most of the interviews were conducted in public spaces, including local shopping centres, others were conducted in private homes at participants' convenience. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with research participants including foreign nationals, community members, community leaders, representatives of the local municipal authority, and representatives of community-based organisations. The respondents were males and females of various age groups from early twenties to 65 and above. The interviews were conducted in isiXhosa, Afrikaans, English, as well as isiZulu, and in some instances, Somali (with the help of an interpreter for Somali respondents). As mentioned above, the researchers took a qualitative approach, but combined different research methods, namely: individual face-to-face interviews and focus

group interviews (as was the case with a Somali female group in one site); and human and locational observations, including informal conversations with police and basic community mapping. Some of the respondents were purposively selected by our partner organisations, particularly those who are involved in community structures, while researchers also employed a snowballing technique during the fieldwork in order to identify other participants.

Most respondents were willing to take part in the research and even welcomed the researchers into their private spaces (homes and shops). On the other hand, foreign nationals, Somalis in particular, appeared suspicious, and in some areas were difficult to access. In some sites, researchers could not access the few local organisations that were specifically dealing with issues related to foreign nationals. Although foreign nationals have their own organisational structures largely based in the city centres, it often proved difficult to connect with their leaders who could have then assisted the researchers in connecting with foreign nationals in the selected sites. These leaders also appeared to be suspicious of the research team and were evasive and unwilling to meet with the researchers (despite numerous attempts to interview them). In addition, some local (South African) respondents and police officials were suspicious of the research intentions but felt comfortable after explanations from the researchers. Furthermore, some respondents wanted to know what benefit they would receive and whether there were any incentives for taking part in the research. KwaZulu-Natal proved to be a highly politicised area and, with the election around the corner, proved difficult to access some key stakeholders in their communities.

All interviews and discussions were voluntary and conducted in accordance with an ethics-approved protocol of informed consent. All interviews and observations used in this report were confidential in nature, in accordance with this protocol. For the sake of preserving this confidentiality, all participants are referred to by a collective name such as 'CPF member' or 'community member' or 'police official'.

3. Evaluation of the scorecard system

After exiting each site, researchers would score the community based on its social cohesion and its ability to peacefully resolve conflict. These scorecards then informed ALPS Resilience as to whether intervention was necessary and possible in a site. The figure below represents the site scorecard that was used:

Table 3: Community peace-making potential scorecard

Community Peace-making Potential scorecard	Scorecard key: 1 = strongly disagree 2 = disagree 3 = neither agree nor disagree 4 = agree 5 = strongly agree

		Score
Community leadership	It appears that community leaders are generally concerned with the wellbeing of all residents irrespective of their race, ethnicity or nationality.	
	It seems that community leaders are generally trusted and respected by residents.	
Discrimination	It appears to be no discrimination (on the basis of race, ethnicity or nationality) in terms of the allocation of, and access to common community resources.	
Racism and xenophobia	There seems to be an absence of racist and/or xenophobic comments and behaviour in the community.	
	Community members have a general understanding of what it means to be xenophobic or racist.	
Cohesion & Interdependence	It seems that residents will help each other when they are in trouble irrespective of their race, ethnicity or nationality.	
	It appears that there are good relations between neighbours and residents on the streets.	

Community conflict	Conflicts in the community seem to be resolved in a fair and non-violent manner.	
	There appear to be processes and/or structures in the community that have been created to resolve conflicts in a non-violent and fair manner.	
Community development	There seems to be active community-based organisations and/or NGOs that provide welfare and development interventions in the community.	
The Police	There appears to be general community trust in the South African Police Services (SAPS), and community members typically report crimes to the SAPS.	
Community safety	There appears to be active community police organisations and/or neighbourhood watch type structures that work to promote safety for the whole community.	
Fear	It seems that residents are not overly fearful to walk in the streets during the day and night.	
Tensions between shop-owners	There appears to be no tensions between shop-owners of different nationalities	
Identity /belonging	Residents think of themselves as part of this community regardless of where they come from.	
	Overall score (out of 75)	

The scorecard was taken into account with all research findings. Each site was unique and presented certain opportunities and challenges for dialogue interventions. These needed to be carefully calibrated ahead of community entry. Indeed, the scorecard might have been an accurate measure of the effectiveness of community structures and trust in the police among other things, but they did not accurately measure community resilience. In other words, the categories of the scorecard, while useful, were not reflective of the community. For example, in Imizamo Yethu, there was strong leadership and strong trust in those leaders to provide safety. Yet, the area itself was run autocratically with an extra-legal group enforcing an illegal curfew for residents. As such, each score for a community must be read with broader research findings and community dynamics in mind.

Table 4: Overall scorecard results per site

Scorecard results per site	Social cohesion scale:
	0-15 Very poor
	16-30 Poor
	31-45 Fair
	46-60 Good
	61-75 Excellent
Site	**Score out of 75**
Imizamo Yethu	44
Masiphumelele	41
Mbekweni	35
Lwandle/Nomzamo	55
Zwelihle	43
Bellville South	64
Korsten	43
Walmer	31
Wells Estate	55
Atteridgeville	39
Mayfair	37
Katlehong	33
KwaMashu	24
Inanda	33
Ntuzuma	44

Despite not always being an accurate reflection of a community, the scorecard was particularly helpful for researchers as it aided the team to coordinate thinking, reach consensus and provide a better understanding of the communities in which research was conducted. At first, each researcher filled out an individual scorecard for each site and then compared these results. Researchers soon realised that while we had all entered the same community, we often had different understandings of the community. Discussing the variance in our scores allowed the research team to better share information and reach common understandings. It was then determined that researchers would work together to score the community on one scorecard, while making note of any issues where there was disagreement.

As such, it was the discussions after scoring the community that enabled researchers to make better recommendations regarding whether ALPS should enter the site for community dialogues. The scorecard itself should, therefore, not be used as a sole determining factor for site entrance. The scorecard might be useful for drawing comparisons between sites, thereby gaining an understanding of the processes and dynamics of the site. However, when determining which sites require intervention, the scorecard should only be used in conjunction with the findings and recommendations in the site reports.

4. Findings & observations

This section summarises the major findings in each selected site. Researchers observed certain trends and commonalities across various sites, which will be discussed after the summaries. The findings of this research study are an important steppingstone to deepen understandings of social cohesion, conflict resolution mechanisms, community violence, xenophobia, and community relations. It also provides insights in understanding community complexities and dynamics in each site and informs the development of mechanisms with the potential to prevent violence in these communities.

4.1   Imizamo Yethu

Imizamo Yethu (IY) is a relatively small township located in the mostly affluent area of Hout Bay. There is a significant population of foreign nationals from Malawi, Zimbabwe, as well as Ethiopia and Somalia, who reside in the area and who own several shops in the community. This research found that competition between shop owners has resulted in some violent episodes in the past, and informal regulations have been implemented in order to limit the number of shops operating in the area. This strategy seems to have worked as incidences of violence related to spaza shops have reportedly decreased significantly in recent months.[1]

The researchers also established that some tensions between South Africans exist, which are mostly underpinned by conflicts relating to a lack of housing and the re-blocking process that is currently underway in the area due to a massive fire that destroyed numerous dwellings in 2017. In this context, foreign nationals who live in the site targeted for re-blocking are caught up in these tensions as they fear losing their houses when the government builds new ones for South Africans. Furthermore, the findings suggest that there are some tensions between locals and foreign nationals as a result of fishery employers who prefer foreign nationals over locals.

There is ongoing taxi-related conflict and violence centred around the licencing process and access to lucrative taxi routes. The violence is believed to be related to ongoing disputes between two associations affiliated with the two main taxi associations, the Cape Amalgamated Taxi Association (CATA) and Congress of Democratic Taxi Associations (CODETA), with one of the taxi associations attempting to prevent competitors from operating in the area. This violence has claimed the lives of five people and left two injured in early April 2019.

There are some community initiatives that seek to foster good relations between South Africans and foreign nationals, and one of them is iSolezwe, which is the most influential community leadership structure in the area. iSolezwe has multiple functions, but its largest function is as a community safety

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[1] Interview with the Community Development Worker, Imizamo Yethu, November 2018.

patrol. However, iSolezwe is a patriarchal organisation that has regularly used violence and intimidation to resolve conflicts and exert social control. Besides researchers observing people going in and out their office, several respondents mentioned this organisation as being a key actor they approach when they are in need of assistance with family matters, robberies, truancy, etc. In order to receive assistance from the iSolezwe group, community members are expected to pay certain fees for their services. The biggest challenge is that, through violence, this structure has acquired some legitimacy and is trusted by many residents, including foreign nationals.

Lastly, while observing the community and trying to get access, researchers established that the Imizamo Yethu community needs to be approached delicately. There were major sensitivities where community leaders took offence at the word 'violence' when researchers described the project. Several community leaders wanted to know where the team had heard that there was violence in the area and complained about how the media misrepresented the community. Researchers were often made to feel unwelcome and the attitude towards research without material benefits created a hostile environment at times. The community leaders argued that they would have preferred to be approached as a group, because they want to be transparent, and many interviews were denied because no one wanted to speak on an individual basis. When they heard that the research team was only on site for three days, they said the team should come back in several months after a WhatsApp group had been formed and all leaders had been informed of the research project.

4.2   Masiphumelele

Masiphumelele is an area that has previously experienced xenophobic violence, as well as protest violence. At the time this research was conducted, Masiphumelele appeared to be a relatively calm place, and foreign nationals, including spaza shop owners, have been able to live in relative peace for the last few years. Informal regulations around the number of shops and closing times appear to be in place and seem to facilitate communication and the management of business-related conflicts between foreign national shop owners. The findings suggest, however, that a key challenge is the current lack of credible community leadership structures owing to the leadership vacuum left behind after the previous protests, and the disconnect between younger and older people in the area (due to the inter-generational change of leadership). Vigilantism as a collective method of problem-solving seemed to have led to tensions between the older and younger generations. Such a state of affairs would make any effort to implement a dialogue or conflict resolution process a risky endeavour. There is, however, a distinct need for interventions that focus on foreign national women within Masiphumelele. Foreign national men appear to have integrated well in terms of business and community relationships. The women, however, are still dependent on the men to help them integrate and this has not been happening. If relationships can somehow be built between women of different nationalities, this might help foreign national women to feel safer in the community.

Overall, Masiphumelele does not appear to be a community where xenophobic attacks are likely to happen anytime soon. This assumption is founded on an event that occurred after researchers left the site, where a foreign national drove over a South African resident, but the community was able to resolve the problem peacefully. However, the leadership vacuum in the site does mean that, should xenophobic attacks occur,

then such conflict would be difficult to manage. The tribal issues caused by the lack of oversight of shop openings combined with the lack of community structures are likely to cause tensions in future. Business owners seem to be the most organised, but community tensions cannot be resolved by only talking with business structures. Moreover, one cannot leave out the community structures that are still claiming to be in control of the community. The community might be seen as relatively cohesive for now, but there are several challenges which can affect that cohesion. Various groups are vying for a leadership role, and this may give rise to conflict within the community in the near future. Additionally, when a community is seen as leaderless and disorganised, it is more likely that radical individuals or vigilante groups will emerge and attempt to assume control.

4.3   Lwandle/Nomzamo

Lwandle is an area that has previously experienced xenophobic violence, violent protests and considerable crime against foreign national shop owners. Despite this, research shows that the community is relatively cohesive and there are identifiable leadership structures in place that seek to maintain peace. These community leadership structures seem to be functional and are able to undertake interventions, implement conflict resolution mechanisms, and get involved as peacekeepers in cases of alleged xenophobia. There is, however, a misunderstanding within the community regarding what constitutes xenophobia (as explained below). In this regard, it is paramount that any interventions in the area should clarify this, as well as contribute to understandings of xenophobia and the integration of foreign nationals in this community, especially Nigerians. In addition, members of the South African Police Services (SAPS) at times have been accused of being complicit with regards to some extra-legal activities by virtue of working with some structures within the community.

Community leaders appear to be competent and seem concerned about the needs of the community and are generally trusted by the residents of Lwandle. This includes the police. There have been attempts to resolve conflict in a non-violent manner. However, the extra-legal mechanisms employed by the taxi association have undermined community efforts to resolve its conflicts peacefully. Moreover, there are many service delivery protests which are sparked by a lack of housing in the area. Despite community members being encouraged to hold protests outside the area, property does get damaged during protests.

There does not seem to be xenophobic rhetoric within the community. Rather, the community appears to rise up against criminality and violence in the community regardless of whether the perpetrators are locals or foreign nationals. However, the understanding about what constitutes xenophobia is contested. Community members appear to disregard individual actions against foreign nationals as xenophobia. They also seem to think that perceptions of whether a foreign national is guilty or innocent contributes to whether or not actions are deemed xenophobic. Therefore, while the community is willing to stop acts of collective violence against foreign nationals, they do not seem to recognise and are blinded to small-scale xenophobia based on rumours and perceptions of wrongdoing. Community leadership, however, seems committed to stopping any possibility of xenophobia in the area. They believe that the community is cohesive.

Within this community, the leaders assume that everything is going well, but they cannot speak to how foreign nationals experience the community. The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, most foreign nationals running spaza shops are employed by the owners who live outside of the area, and secondly, community leaders communicate with owners of the spaza shops on issues mostly related to business. It was a major disadvantage for researchers not to be able to access foreign nationals in this community, particularly Ethiopians and Somalians. Those who are running spaza shops are hardly able to speak local languages and appear to be uncomfortable in speaking to outsiders/researchers without the consent of their bosses.

4.4   Mbekweni

The research in Mbekweni uncovered a history of tension between community members from different backgrounds and origins. The community is divided in terms of those who were born in the Western Cape province, those born in the Eastern Cape, and those from elsewhere. As such, there have been many incidents of collective violence, especially between Western Cape 'borners' (those who were born in the area) and Eastern Cape migrants (those who were born in the rural areas of Eastern Cape). While, there are no major conflicts or tensions between foreign nationals and South Africans, tensions continue to exist between the 'borners' and Eastern Cape migrants, which may be typified as a category of xenophobia. It is alleged that the groups frequently compete over resources relating to service delivery, particularly housing. Somali shops are often looted during these service delivery protests. Those who were born in the Western Cape tend to claim more citizenship and have a sense of entitlement when it comes to services and opportunities. This group tends to think those who were born in the Eastern Cape are backward and look down on them. On the other hand, those who were born in the Eastern Cape view those who were born in the area as weak and lazy individuals. Consequently, these struggles create an ideological friction between these groups. This friction is exacerbated by 'borners', who are mostly backyarders, claiming that Eastern Cape migrants often stay in shacks and tend to receive more attention from government, especially RDP (Reconstruction and Development) houses. This often plays out in leadership structures when those who are from the Eastern Cape are elected in positions because they are the majority. Leadership structures are often crippled by factional battles between these groups.

The community has also been affected by xenophobic attacks where migrants from outside South Africa were targeted. These tensions still seem to be active, but more specifically between foreign nationals working in the farms and surrounding areas. These tensions have arisen around employment practices on farms in the area. Some farmers have allegedly been favouring the hiring of foreign nationals (especially Zimbabweans) over South Africans as foreign nationals are reportedly willing to work for lower wages than South Africans. Consequently, it was reported that South Africans have been evicted from housing on farms, resulting in unemployed persons settling in Mbekweni, which in turn has exacerbated tensions around access to housing. In short, the most commonly referred to xenophobic tensions appear to be aimed at foreign national farm workers who are perceived to be taking work opportunities away from South Africans. However, foreign-owned shops also seem to be targeted for looting whenever there is a protest. Since there are only a handful of shops that are owned by South Africans, and the community does experience frequent violent protests, this may be reported as xenophobic looting.

Currently, there appears to be a significant deficit in terms of trusted leadership and conflict resolution mechanisms in existence within Mbekweni. The community leadership in Mbekweni is considered inefficient and absent. Community members usually try to take care of community problems themselves. However, extra-legal groupings are said to be a challenge, and this makes it difficult for any structures to operate freely in the area. One such group is a structure that has allegedly used extra-legal mechanisms to control the community and who are perceived as corrupt and violent. Some residents refer to this group as a neighbourhood watch, but most refer to them as gangsters. This structure has allegedly blackmailed police officers and have reportedly intimidated residents that have stood up against them.

There is very little evidence of robust social cohesion in this community. Community leaders and police are generally mistrusted and perceived as corrupt and nepotistic. There also appears to be significant xenophobic sentiments in the community, including from Western Cape 'borners' against migrants from the Eastern Cape. The only thing that unites these two groups is when they both stand up against the foreign nationals who are considered as more problematic 'outsiders'.

4.5   Zwelihle

Zwelihle experienced a series of violent protests in 2018 relating to housing and access to land. Spaza shops, including those owned by foreign nationals, were looted during some of these protests. Foreign nationals and their properties were attacked and displaced because some of them decided to go to work and were accused of not supporting the protesters in their attempt to occupy a piece of empty land. Respondents claimed that attacks on foreign nationals do not occur because they are hated or seen as 'other', but rather because certain foreign nationals were not part of the collective and did not support the protests. The looting was also considered by all, including foreign nationals, to be criminally motivated, since South African shops were also looted. However, some of the respondents complained that employers, especially in the hospitality industry, prefer to hire foreign nationals from Malawi and Zimbabwe. This has been a cause of concern and may destabilise relations between groups.

The protests over land also saw the emergence of Zwelihle Renewal, which has become a key power broker within the community. During researchers' conversations with community members and some members of Zwelihle Renewal, this group appears to be unbiased in the way they deal with the community. However, due to political allegiances they are not trusted by all within the area. While the findings reveal that residents approach them to solve problems and keep the peace, they are viewed by some as being opportunistic. Although the group are entrusted with a conflict resolution mandate by some members in the community, such conflicts are often not solved in a peaceful manner. There is no communication from elected officials and so the community is looking towards radical groups to communicate on their behalf. Zwelihle appears to have devolved into an autocratic community led by unelected, yet representative, leaders. This has happened because community-based organisations are active but not functional; while NGOs are considered powerless. When researchers left the area the dynamics within the community were still volatile and there have been tensions between various groups of spaza shop owners as discussed below.

It was also established that there are very few problems between the foreign nationals and the community. The tensions are more between South African and Ethiopian shopkeepers regarding the opening of new shops in the area. The land occupation in the area has expanded and presented opportunities for opening spaza shops for both locals and foreign nationals. However, local entrepreneurs and Somali shopkeepers claimed that there are too many Ethiopians and that they should not be allowed to open new shops. They agreed that opportunities should be given to South Africans and Somalis who have fewer shops in the area. During the fieldwork, tensions between Ethiopians and Somalis/locals were high because one of the Ethiopians opened a shop without following the rules. Ethiopians were also accused of buying *pangas* (machetes) from the nearby hardware store in order to defend themselves should they be provoked or attacked.

4.6   Bellville South

Bellville South is considered a relatively 'safe haven' for foreign nationals, particularly Somalis, as it reportedly does not have a history of xenophobia or xenophobic violence. Despite major challenges of securing formal interviews with Somali residents, comments by the respondents in this research suggests that there is considerable social cohesion in this area. In addition, the research findings also showed that conflict resolution mechanisms have been successfully employed by a variety of community leaders and organisations to manage tensions. Key stakeholders in this regard are the ward councillor, the Imam, and the Bellville South Community Policing Forum (CPF).

Observations reveal there is evidence of significant social cohesion in Bellville South. A possible contributing factor is that people living in predominantly Coloured areas, where religious involvement is emphasised, tended to be more accepting of foreign nationals because they do not necessarily see them as 'other' or 'different'. Coloured people are descended from different races and nationalities and therefore may recognise a bit of themselves in every race or nationality. So much so that in the Western Cape, everyone who is not White or Black African is often thought of as 'Coloured'. This is especially true of Muslim foreign nationals, because of the familiarity with Muslim culture even amongst Christian Coloured people.

This often leads to a blanket acceptance of everyone in their communities. When asked why there is little violence in the community, most respondents claimed that it was: "the Coloured culture"; "the Coloured upbringing"; or that "Coloured people are simply not violent". While this is not necessarily true, it is highly unlikely that violence in Coloured communities will be based on contrasting identities, and especially not national identities. In urban Coloured communities, much of the population understands or is aware of Muslim culture, which contributes to the acceptance of Muslim foreign nationals, particularly Somalis. There is no singular Coloured identity that dictates collective action, collective spaces, or collective behaviour. Therefore, there is no strong attachment to or ownership of the surrounding spaces, which means that they do not often claim that others should not invade those spaces.

Another contributing factor to the good relations is that the area is a predominantly residential area and that there are few people who choose to run businesses in the space. Therefore, there is less business competition leading to tensions between locals and foreign nationals or between foreign nationals

themselves. Most of the foreign nationals living in Bellville South own shops in the Bellville CBD and thus are not seen to be 'taking' any opportunities from local residents. The area also appears to be quite affluent, with many residents finding job opportunities, finding it easier to travel to work outside Bellville due to it being a transport hub, and finding many opportunities for self-improvement due to the proximity of tertiary institutions such as Northlink College, the Cape Peninsular University of Technology (CPUT) and the University of the Western Cape (UWC). However, differences in cultural practices and beliefs have nonetheless contributed to tensions at times, and foreign nationals do not feel entirely at home in the area. For example, a Somali female respondent explained that she would never expect her neighbours to help her, not because she was Somali, but because "nobody helps anybody here".[2]

There are strong, trusted and effective community leaders in Bellville South. The councillor seems to be trusted by most community members and has been frequently approached by residents from various backgrounds, including foreign nationals, to facilitate the resolution of certain issues affecting the community. The CPF and sector forums appear to enjoy high levels of trust amongst community members as well, despite some accusations of being exclusionary. On the other hand, the presence of the mosque appears to be extremely helpful with regards to conflict resolution. The Imam is the key person for community leaders to approach with regards to issues around foreign nationals, especially Somalis; while the Imam is also the point of contact for Somalis to approach for problem-solving. The Muslim identity appears to be a strong unifying factor, allowing Muslim foreign nationals to be seen as part of the Muslim community. Indeed, nationality does not seem to be an impediment to the Muslim identity in Bellville South.

4.7   Korsten

During a study on social cohesion in 2016, SaVI researchers visited Korsten and noted what seemed, at face value, to be a relative haven for foreign nationals, despite being surrounded by several communities where xenophobia was prevalent. Based on this observation and discussions with ALPS Resilience and the Eastern Cape Refugee Centre (ECRC), it was determined that Korsten would be an appropriate research site. Researchers also found relatively positive integration between foreign nationals and South Africans. However, the reasons behind the perceptions of safety were unexpected. While a shared religious faith and supporting infrastructure is a major reason for foreign nationals feeling integrated in the area, researchers also found that some foreign shop owners were paying protection money to local gangsters in Korsten so that their businesses would not be robbed.

There were also increasing tensions between the non-Muslim Coloured population and the Muslim population in general, which includes Somali nationals. The area had previously seen intense business competition between Ethiopians and Somalis, as well as clan conflict within the Somali community. However, in 2018, as a way to resolve the business-related and intergroup conflicts, a new structure was established by foreign nationals in the area. This structure was created in order for its leadership (mostly elderly) to be more inclusive, and representative of different clans and ethnicities among the Somalis and

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[2] Interview with Somali national, Bellville South, 21 January 2019.

Ethiopians residents. Since then, crime and conflict has reportedly decreased, despite recent reports of Somali in-fighting. Although interventions have already taken place through the ECRC, an intervention targeted at improving Muslim-Christian relations in the area might go a long way to prevent future conflicts.

It seems that the peacebuilding work undertaken by the ECRC in the area has had a positive impact. Prior to their intervention, there was in-fighting between foreign national shop owners, but such incidents seemed to have lessened. However, there is a need for dialogue to address xenophobic attitudes held by the South African community leadership. Community leaders and members feel suffocated by the presence of foreign nationals and blame them for disregarding zoning laws. Although local community leadership structures make xenophobic utterances, it rarely translates into conflict between foreign nationals and South Africans.

4.8   Walmer

Walmer Township is an area that has previously experienced xenophobic violence. As early as 2001, Somalis who operated spaza shops in the area were threatened and attacked by rival local business people. Local business people were also able to mobilize other community stakeholders in an attempt to force foreign nationals to leave the area. The tensions relating to foreign nationals within the spaza shop business arena are still present within this community. Currently, the community is experiencing tensions regarding the regulation of foreign-owned shops. While foreign nationals have made significant progress in terms of integration in this area and with the community at large, business structures representing some South African residents in Walmer have laid several grievances against foreign shop owners. The most controversial of these structures is a youth business forum called Vuka, which is attempting to place limitations on foreign-owned shops. Vuka is closely allied to the ward councillor and together they are advocating for locals to be hired in shops and for increased health inspections to be conducted in shops. Other demands from Vuka are that foreign owned spaza shops must pay R1500 per month to Vuka, and source products made in Walmer (such as bread). In response, foreign nationals have united under one representative business forum that incorporates all nationalities, tribes and ethnicities. They have also closed their shops in solidarity and to protest against these measures. During the fieldwork, the local councillor and relevant stakeholders initiated a dialogue to improve the situation, but tensions remained high.

Walmer Township appears to be cohesive in terms of general relations between residents on the street. There does not appear to be much interpersonal conflict and relations between customers and shop owners are good. However, residents will not offer the same help when crime occurs, on occasion intervening directly when a local is affected and only offering sympathy when a foreign national is affected. This might indicate that foreign nationals are treated well merely due to the commercial services they provide, but they are not necessarily accepted as part of the community.

The community does have structures that provide platforms for nonviolent methods of resolving conflicts, such as the CPF, Area Committees and even external help from ECRC. Nevertheless, violence has still occurred in this area and, in most cases, foreign nationals are targeted. There are also reports that

community groups such as Vuka have resorted to criminal activities and the use of violence against foreign nationals in order to pursue their specific business interests. On the other hand, tensions between shop owners of different nationalities are not as high as in other areas because regulatory measures have been put in place to prevent such conflicts. Nonetheless, foreign nationals do not seem to have feelings of belonging in the community. They appear to want to belong; however, the local leadership has been making it difficult for them to integrate.

4.9   Wells Estate

Wells Estate is a relatively small community on the outskirts of the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality that has a significant population of foreign nationals (mainly Somalis and Ethiopians), especially in the spaza shop sector. It has a history of xenophobic violence (i.e. in 2001, 2007, 2011 and 2013), in which xenophobic attacks often involved the looting of and damage to foreign-owned – predominantly Somali - shops. Nonetheless, the findings of this research show that conflict resolution mechanisms have been established by community leaders with foreign nationals, as well as the ECRC, with an aim of preventing conflicts and violence in relation to spaza shops. Such mechanisms have been the outcome of extensive dialogue between foreign nationals, local authorities, community leaders and community groups. Furthermore, the efforts of the Eastern Cape Refugee Centre have reportedly had positive effects on reducing xenophobic sentiments through proactive dialogues and the implementation of measures that educate South African communities about foreign nationals.

However, policing in the area appears to have been substandard. The police station is situated quite a distance away and not easily accessible to residents of Wells Estate. Community members have claimed desperation as the reason for their acts of vigilantism because their community is plagued by crime, which is often violent. Community leaders have established structures to deal with crime, and apparently do not condone vigilantism, but they seem to empathise with the community members who they feel cannot rely on the government and police to deal with criminality. Consequently, vigilantism is a common occurrence.

Furthermore, the expansion of the area may lead to future xenophobic-related conflicts, especially in terms of competition over the establishment of new spaza shops. Wells Estate community groups have established conflict management processes and implement informal regulations in an attempt to prevent and proactively deal with conflicts, particularly in the spaza shop sector. Such processes have appeared to be effective to date, but from an economic point of view, such an approach is anti-competitive as it has ultimately sought to prevent new entrepreneurs from establishing shops in the area. With the growth of the new informal settlement called eNdlovini on the outskirts of Wells Estate, such conflict resolution mechanisms may be insufficient. Consequently, this may ultimately contribute to conflict and violence in future if individuals or groups that are not party to the spaza shop regulations attempt to establish shops. While researchers were conducting fieldwork, it became apparent that there were already allegations of bribery in relation to the establishment of some new shops in eNdlovini.

4.10   Atteridgeville

Atteridgeville has experienced several xenophobic attacks in recent years and is considered to be at-risk for future xenophobic attacks. However, the reasons for xenophobia do not appear to be similar to other sites visited for this project where business competition is rife. Instead, there appears to be a political motive behind xenophobic attacks in the area, with community leaders calling meetings for genuine issues such as housing, but then using these meetings to foment anti-foreigner sentiment. Foreign nationals in the area feel as though they have little protection or adequate representation in the community. When a protest takes place, it is extremely likely that these protests will result in the looting of foreign-owned shops. As soon as protests start, most foreign national shop owners tend to relocate to Pretoria West in anticipation of being looted.

The area is diverse in terms of income, providing some opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship, which means that there is less competition for jobs between South Africans and foreign nationals. There are very few active community organisations, and even fewer effective ones. Most leaders appear to only join structures with an aim of gaining experience or recognition for future employment. The CPF appears to be the most functional structure in the area. However, there is only one police station and most formal community structures are based in the centre of the town, with very few in informal areas. Community leaders appear to be generally concerned with their own interests and seek community leadership positions for their own financial or personal gain. The councillors are generally seen as corrupt and the police as inefficient. As a result of these perceptions, there have been numerous instances of mob justice and looting.

When interviews were eventually agreed to, researchers were often caught off-guard by respondents suddenly ending interviews or only allowing a certain amount of time to talk before dominating the conversation in a way that made it difficult for researchers to ask specific questions. This meant that researchers could not interrogate some of the more nuanced questions, such as whether there is discrimination in terms of access to resources; whether residents think of themselves as part of the community; or whether community members have a general understanding of what it means to be xenophobic or racist.

Conflicts and crime in the community are also generally solved in a violent manner since the community is not well organised and police are not trusted. Researchers heard that "if they catch you, you will die", as well as "if they catch you, you will lose a hand". There are processes and structures, such as South African National Civic Organizations (SANCO) representatives and the CPF in the community that seek to resolve conflict peacefully. However, these structures appear to exist in name only and are not functioning well. The CPF is the most trusted structure, but only sees its mandate as being that of police oversight. Furthermore, there are no neighbourhood watch or community safety structures. Thus, in the absence of trusted structures to deal with community issues in such a volatile environment, it is likely that foreign nationals may experience the same attacks in the future when local residents embark on protest actions.

4.11   Mayfair

As in Korsten, researchers in Mayfair anticipated that foreign nationals would be well-integrated and co-existing well with local South African residents in this area. This study found that there is a significant population of foreign nationals, mostly Ethiopians and Somalis, who seem to outnumber South Africans in the area. Residents are divided along national, ethnic or tribal lines. However, in this context, ethnic or tribal identities tend to be stronger than national identities which sometimes leads to conflicts between different tribal/ethnic groups. In addition, the findings show that, while tensions were often centred around business competition, most of the time, conflict takes place on an interpersonal level and escalates into tribal/ethnic conflicts. Elders from each group are considered as important role players in maintaining peace and fostering reconciliation among the community members. Furthermore, interviews with female respondents reveal that there is a perception that Somali/Ethiopian women are discriminated against in local hospitals because of their high number of pregnancies and children, and their religious belief against contraception. Concerns were raised that, despite various objections, pregnant women had been pressured into having caesarean sections (further research should be undertaken on this issue).

There is no one group of community leaders that is concerned with the wellbeing of all residents, as leadership is also divided along ethnic and tribal lines. Each ethnic group seems to have its own leadership structure that generally does not communicate with other structures and only represents its own interests. Somali leadership is viewed as providing help exclusively to those from their own tribes. Leaders are not completely trusted by residents. Elders are seen as only being able to handle certain issues, while local leadership is barely acknowledged. Additionally, women's issues are often neglected.

There does not appear to be much discrimination with regards to access to schools based on nationality or ethnicity. This is mostly because there are specific Muslim and Somali schools, and many other services that cater to the Muslim population. However, there were cases where some Somali children were not allowed into schools without asylum-seeker documentation. There are also issues related to discrimination and harassment in taxis, clinics, and hospitals outside Mayfair.

The community has a general understanding of xenophobia and racism, but this does not mean that xenophobia and racism are not present in the space. Researchers were told several times, especially by Somali women, that "the blacks are the biggest challenge".[3] There have also been threats of what some leaders termed reverse-xenophobia, where Somali people joked with the local Indian population that they were going to conduct an ethnic cleansing of Indians in Mayfair.

When it comes to community cohesion, residents tend not to help each other across tribal lines. There are also not many interactions on the streets across the ethnic divide. Researchers witnessed several intergroup altercations among foreign nationals during the fieldwork. However, if an outsider threatens the wellbeing of the residents of Mayfair, foreign nationals in the area often mobilise in response. This often takes the

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[3] Interview with Somali woman, Mayfair, February 2019.

form of mob justice. People seem to feel safe walking around at all hours of the day. However, Somali women still reported feeling unsafe.

The community of Mayfair is often described as lawless, and residents usually resort to violence to solve conflicts. However, there are structures in place to resolve conflict peacefully. The elders might not always be able to resolve conflict through peaceful means, but their decisions are usually respected. Due to the more traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution, the residents of Mayfair do not always report safety issues or crimes to the police. Trust in the police is minimal, as it was alleged that the police often exploit foreign nationals, seek bribes, and perform illegal searches on them. However, the issue with Mayfair residents not reporting to the police seems to be less about issues of trust than about issues of procedure. They have their own methods of solving conflict, and the police are considered unnecessary and unwelcome in Mayfair.

There are still tensions between shop owners of different nationalities. It was reported that Somalis and Ethiopians (predominantly of the Oromo ethnic group) frequently fight amongst themselves due to business competition. However, most of the conflict and violence happens within their own groups. Researchers also heard vehement claims of belonging in Mayfair, where foreign nationals complained about police because they were intruding in 'their' space. This sense of belonging has prevented authorities, such as law enforcement officers, from conducting their duties in the area as they are seen as outsiders. In sum, while official mechanisms of conflict resolution are in place, foreign nationals prefer traditional approaches and view officials as outsiders.

4.12   Katlehong

Katlehong (Mandela Park) used to have a number of foreign nationals from countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Pakistan and Bangladesh. During the fieldwork, it was established that these nationalities were not visible in Mandela Park, but were located one street adjacent to Maphanga area. All spaza shop operators from the above-mentioned countries from were displaced by community members, led by structures like the Business Association, SANCO, as well as CPF. The findings suggest that Katlehong is an area that is mostly governed by local extra-legal groups and businessmen who have been against foreign nationals who operate spaza shops in recent years. The research focused on an area called Mandela Park, also referred to as Holomisa. Mandela Park is an informal settlement where foreign national spaza shop owners were previously displaced in late 2016 due to threats from South African residents in the area who subsequently seized control of their shops. Perpetrators of these xenophobic attacks reported that, as they had permitted foreign national fruit vendors to remain in the area, the displacement of the spaza shop owners should not be considered as xenophobic. During the fieldwork it was established that those foreign nationals who were displaced were still not welcome in the community by the Business Association.

Community structures and leadership appeared to be xenophobic, particularly toward foreign national shop owners. Foreign nationals, especially Ethiopians and Somalians, struggled financially after they were forced to leave the area due to xenophobic violence. Many of the local landlords want the Somali and Ethiopian shop owners to return because it was reported that they generally paid rent on time, gave the landlords credit, and provided cheaper prices than the South African shops. Other foreign nationals such

as Malawian, Mozambican and Zimbabwean businessmen who remain in the area appear to have been exploited the Business Association financially. In order for this group to operate a business in the area, such as selling fruit and vegetables, they have to pay a fee of R5000 to the Association.

There is very little trust in the police, with residents on occasion refusing to allow the police access to the area. There have been several killings of community leaders, leading to mistrust and an atmosphere of tension. 'Parliament' is the converging space for community leaders where community members typically go when they are faced with challenges, such as conflict and crime. Leaders of the 'Parliament' are usually based in their shack office and tend to address community concerns and criminality extra-legally, and sometimes even resort to vigilante justice. Residents do engage with street committees and the CPF to address some community problems, but most of the conflicts in the community are solved in a violent manner. Voices of dissent are often disregarded, and the areas that have protected foreign nationals have been 'othered', with some of the leaders of Mandela Park stating: "if anything happens in that area because of those foreigners, we will not help them."[4]

4.13   Inanda, Ntuzuma, KwaMashu (INK)

KwaZulu-Natal had mixed spaza shop types and was in many ways quite similar to the sites in Gauteng and the Eastern Cape. The three researched areas that make up the INK site (Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu) are represented here as one section because they face similar issues that are often a result of shared key role players who have an influence over all three areas. In the INK areas there are quite a number of shops owned by South Africans, where they sell through windows. Similarly, container shops owned by Ethiopians sell to their customers through windows. Somali shops were rented spaces in houses while Ethiopians would either be located outside the yard or on the fence or gate inside the yard. Ethiopian shops would often be minded by two shopkeepers while, with Somali shops there would be, on average, four staff in addition to a cleaner (usually from Malawi).

In the INK area there is a regional business association covering the entire area called the Northern Region Business Association (NoRBA). NoRBA is in opposition to the business competition presented by foreign nationals in the area and the association has resorted to violence and intimidation against foreign nationals. The association has allegedly mobilised drug addicts and other community members to incite violence against the foreign nationals in the spaza shop sector. One of their justifications for attacks included an accusation that foreign nationals get preferential treatment from wholesalers. They postulate that, because most Somalis are Muslim, Indian wholesalers (who are also predominantly Muslim) give Somali business owners exclusive discounts and credits. This argument is quite flawed in that Ethiopians are predominantly Christian and are fast becoming the majority in the spaza shop sector in the area.

KwaMashu

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[4] Interview with Business Association member, Katlehong, 9 February 2019.

The area has a well-documented history of collective violence. Since the 1980s, the area has been renowned for politically motivated killings and rivalries between members of the African National Congress (ANC), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and, more recently, the National Freedom Party (NFP). Over the past 20 years, there have been various incidents of xenophobic violence, including the looting of foreign-owned shops. The reasons for such violence towards foreign nationals have generally appeared to be due to business competition between local (South African) and foreign national shop owners combined with opportunistic behaviour by some residents who loot shops run by foreign nationals during xenophobic attacks.

Local shop owners, many of whom are represented by NoRBA, perceive foreign-owned shops (and large shopping malls) in the area as being major threats to their business survival. This group has demanded that every spaza shop owner, including foreign nationals, be registered on a database and certified with the aim of preventing the perceived unsustainable proliferation of new spaza shops in the area. Many local residents, however, appear to be supportive of the foreign-owned shops due to the generally lower prices of their goods. Members of the local community leadership structures expressed a generalised sense of dissatisfaction with the local municipal authority and the South African Police Services (SAPS), particularly regarding their inadequate responses to conflict within this community. There appeared to be minimal levels of visible civic organisation and participation, but there was distinct party-political activity taking place, especially in hostels.

Inanda

Inanda has high levels of poverty, unemployment and crime. Since 2015, it has been affected by various acute incidents of xenophobic violence, with the most recent incident occurring in May 2018. During this incident, foreign-owned shops (mainly owned by Somalis and Ethiopians) were damaged or destroyed and looted. The violence was exacerbated by the actions of NoRBA. NoRBA demanded that foreign national shop owners close their shops and vacate the area, which was largely ignored by shop owners. The conflict resolution process that was initiated by government, both local (eThekhwini Metropolitan Municipality) and provincial (KwaZulu-Natal led by premier Willies Mchunu and former Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Sihle Zikalala) has largely been unsuccessful to date. Efforts to establish longer-term peace-building processes by the eThekhwini Metropolitan Municipality have been stalled given the lack of robust and representative community leadership structures and tensions within the community of foreign nationals in the area. This is also exacerbated by the divisions among general community members who still prefer foreign national shops in the area.

Ntuzuma

Ntuzuma is the most underdeveloped of the three INK areas (Inanda, Ntuzuma and KwaMashu). At present, leadership in the area appears ineffective, especially from elected leaders. Leaders are said to be unaccountable and inefficient. The community policing forum (CPF) and South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) leaders have reportedly dealt with community issues inadequately. Police are not trusted and appear to lack adequate resources. Furthermore, foreign nationals are not organised within the community, making it difficult for them to engage with South African community leadership structures. However, foreign nationals (spaza shop owners) seem to have a good relationship with some CPF members, resulting in the CPF providing information and protection to some foreign nationals at the time

of the attacks. Compared to the other two INK areas, the effects of attacks driven by the North Region Business Association (NoRBA) were relatively minimal in this area.

5. Common trends

5.1   Main perpetrators

Researchers found that perpetrators of xenophobic violence were mostly young males who were usually unemployed and/or drug users. However, in many cases these young men were sent by others to commit acts of violence and were not always personally motivated to attack foreign nationals. Most xenophobic attacks in the sites were difficult to define as 'xenophobic' because they appeared to be motivated by business interests. In Katlehong, for example, local shop owners instigated attacks against foreign national shop owners in order to reduce business competition, but only targeted shop owners and left many other foreign national groups alone. In Lwandle, Mbekweni (Western Cape) and in the Eastern Cape sites, foreign nationals were often sent to destabilise the businesses of other foreign nationals. In Mayfair, one foreign national hired a South African to kill another foreign national. The incident was reported as xenophobia because the perpetrator was South African. However, it was difficult to establish the motivations behind many of the attacks. This is because the dynamics in these communities are complex: understanding the nature of inter-relations (or lack thereof) and the way in which multiple discriminations may influence an attack is important to properly unpack the nature of xenophobia in each place.

5.2   Main victims

Somalis and Ethiopians are targeted the most in townships, seemingly because they are the ones who have food-stores (spaza shops with bread, maize meal, etc.). Somalis used to be the primary target; however, the targeting of Ethiopians has increased as their dominance in the spaza shop sector grows. In many cases, the foreign nationals who run fruit and vegetable stalls or sell blankets and crafts are barely acknowledged. Alternatively, in more rural, industrial, and farm-based areas, Zimbabweans appear to be the primary targets. The reasoning behind this is that they often work for low ages. Other groups of foreign nationals were barely mentioned. Interestingly, in earlier research, it was uncovered that Nigerians were often targeted as victims of hate-crimes due to rumours and stereotypical views of Nigerians as being drug dealers. In this field research, however, Nigerians were barely mentioned when discussing foreign nationals and xenophobia.

5.3   How xenophobic violence starts

In many cases, foreign nationals will hire their friends and/or family members to operate shops without helping them understand the local language, norms, and social values of the community. This possibly discourages foreign nationals from further integration in their communities. This, in turn, encourages foreign nationals to band together, thus reinforcing local perceptions of foreigners as 'outsiders'.

The continual migration of different people into communities makes it difficult for locals to accept foreigners, especially when familiarity cannot be established. Furthermore, many migrants have been traumatised by violence (often from their homelands and in South Africa) and their first instinct is to defend themselves. Communities have come to believe that Somalis, in particular, are trigger-happy and prone to respond to injustice with gun-violence.

While there is often xenophobic sentiment and resentment in a community, it usually spills over into violence once there has been a shooting at a spaza shop. In Katlehong, local business owners admitted to waiting for a shooting to happen so that they could use it as an opportunity to chase foreign nationals out of the area. This occurred in KwaZulu-Natal as well. Most xenophobic attacks also occurred during service delivery protests. Again, the targets during these protests were the groups of foreign nationals who sell food. Often, these shops are attacked indiscriminately (meaning that if there were South African run spaza shops, they would also be looted), but it is still reported as xenophobia.

Researchers found that very few locals still own spaza shops in many of the sites. For this reason, when spaza shops are targeted, it is immediately reported in the media as xenophobia. This is problematic because it negatively influences site selection when researchers come to investigate media reports of xenophobia and find little evidence of such. However, not all these attacks are based on opportunistic looting. Foreign nationals are often targeted for robberies because community members know that the police do not protect foreign nationals and police at times extort money/goods from foreign national shop owners. Several foreign nationals also reported not going to the courts (after being victims of crime) because of time constraints, religious reasons, or fear of retaliation. This, in turn, makes them easy targets.

5.4   How xenophobic violence is prevented

Evidence from Katlehong shows that leaders in the Maphanga area, which is adjacent to Mandela Park, stood up against xenophobic leaders and allowed foreign nationals to operate in their area. This indicates strong leadership is central to the prevention of xenophobic violence. This was after Mandela Park community members and their leaders decided to chase out spaza shop owners who they collectively referred to as 'Pakistanis'.

The findings also reveal that having informal regulations in place can allow for effective dialogue between foreign nationals and locals, which ensures communication and decreases the chance of tensions and conflict. In areas where there are well-organised business structures amongst foreign nationals, allowing for internal cooperation and coordinated engagement with other groups, there is more social cohesion. They can communicate with other community structures if any issues related to their shops arise. For example, the opening of a new shop outside of agreed restrictions by a Somali national in Masiphumelele did not result in violence because of communication between leadership structures. In Lwandle, protestors attempted to loot spaza shops, but this was prevented by community leaders who recognised foreign national leadership structures.

The relationship between shopkeepers and the community also plays an important role in preventing xenophobic attacks. This study has established that landlords and neighbours who provide shop rental space for foreign nationals can act to prevent xenophobic violence. Lastly, foreign nationals who become

involved in community issues (funerals, sports, etc.) tend to be better integrated into their communities, and the practice seems to foster acceptance in the community. This also ensures that they are not exploited by illegitimate community leaders because their involvement in the community would increase awareness of legitimate leadership structures.

5.5   Non-criteria sites

As previously mentioned, Mayfair, Korsten and Bellville South were selected as sites because they were centres of migrant trading populations. Research found some shared commonalities. These areas are places where most spaza shop owners stay with their families. They send their children to schools within these vicinities, not far away from their residences. Business owners, especially those who have been successful in township businesses, do not stay in their shops, but rather hire shopkeepers (often males from their countries of origin). This is in contrast to other sites where most foreign national spaza shop owners sleep in their shops. Many respondents during the fieldwork mentioned that residents opportunistically used the apparent health concerns associated with shopkeepers sleeping in their shops as a justification to loot spaza shops owned by foreign nationals.

Another important finding is that foreign nationals, particularly Muslims, feel welcomed and comfortable living in these areas (Mayfair, Korsten and Bellville South) because of their religious links and the availability of infrastructural support, such as the presence of mosques. Islam stipulates how Muslims should do business, which lays a foundation for common understanding between the foreign nationals and local Muslims in these areas. Moreover, Muslims pray in Arabic, so a common language is shared regardless of their country of origin.

Yet, the apparent cohesiveness of community members in these areas is often questionable. At face value, one might assume that foreign nationals live in these areas because they connect well with locals. Instead, the evidence shows that some foreign nationals pay protection fees in order to feel safe in these areas. For example, foreign nationals in Korsten were assumed to have developed good relations with the Coloured community, but the real reason they felt comfortable was because they paid local gangsters for protection. The community is diverse (not only Muslims) and, as a result, foreign nationals felt they needed protection against those who are not Muslim.

5.6   Foreign nationals, income generation and competition

South Africa has experienced significant and steady urbanisation over the last two decades. Pronounced poverty and unemployment in rural areas of the country has led many South Africans to migrate to the metropolitan cities of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape and the Western Cape. Similarly, migrants from other countries outside of South Africa also prefer to live in these cities to search for better opportunities. Like other research conducted in these areas, the current research has shown that

xenophobia tends to happen in areas that have experienced considerable internal migration of South Africans. These are areas where, to some extent, foreign nationals compete for jobs with South Africans. It must be noted here that those who are competing for jobs are not necessarily operating or employed in the spaza shop sector.

In Imizamo Yethu, Mbekweni, Lwandle and Zwelihle there have been issues with the employment of foreign nationals, especially in the hospitality, fishing and farming industries. Employers have been accused of hiring the cheapest labour and those most desperate, usually foreign nationals. This leads to tensions between foreign nationals and South Africans. Farmers in the surrounding areas of Mbekweni have been accused of ejecting South African labourers and their families from their farms in favour of hiring foreign nationals.

5.7   Informal regulations

One noticeable trend in the areas of Masiphumelele, Lwandle, Zwelihle, Walmer, Wells Estate, Imizamo Yethu, and Katlehong is the formulation and implementation of informal regulations in order to regulate spaza shops. The following are some examples of the informal regulations agreed upon by foreign nationals operating spaza shops, and to some extent these agreements involve community structures and local authorities:

- There must be no more opening of new shops by foreign nationals in these townships. However, if South Africans wish to open shops, they are not restricted by these agreements.
- Unless the shops are selling different items, each shop must be at least 100 meters away from each other.
- When new opportunities arise, such as the development of a new settlement in the area, preference is given to a local (South African) or it can be given to a foreign national who has fewer shops.
- If anyone opens a new spaza shop outside the agreements, it can be forcefully shut down.
- If there is an opportunity to open a new shop, community members who live in that street need to agree to it.
- Operating hours/prices must be agreed upon and monitored by relevant business forum members.

In these townships, key stakeholders or stakeholder groups are empowered to enforce these informal regulations through various mechanisms depending on the dynamics of the township.

The presence and active participation of both foreign nationals and community stakeholders in ensuring compliance to the informal regulations have both positive and negative implications. On the positive side, in areas where there is presence of informal regulations agreed upon by community stakeholders, foreign nationals gain acceptance and are protected by community leadership structures. The successful implementation of the agreements provides an identifiable channel for conflict resolution for each party and simultaneously promotes social cohesion. In this environment, foreign nationals fight less and collaborate with local community members making them feel more welcome in these areas. The establishment of business forums for each group (locals and foreign nationals) to oversee adherence to the regulations provides a platform for engagement in a peaceful manner. In addition, community leaders

who are party to the agreements take responsibility and protect foreign nationals in the event of eminent attacks.

While the introduction of informal regulations has brought somewhat of a perceived 'peace', it has also led to violent threats between community members and among competing foreign national traders. This is partly because informal regulations are generally not accepted as legitimate and codified by foreign nationals who want to open new shops. Thus, although some community members are part and parcel of these agreements, they are not widely accepted as legitimate and are therefore not 'rules in operation'. Consequently, informal regulations have resulted in the use of extra-legal mechanisms of conflict resolution, tension and criminal activities instigated by foreign nationals, as well as corruption.

5.8   Somali migration

Compared to the findings of previous research conducted by the Safety and Violence Initiative in collaboration with the African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS), this research has revealed that Somalis are gradually leaving the townships while Ethiopians are taking over the informal business sector. For example, in 2016/2017, researchers went to Joza township in Grahamstown and found that there were some Somali shops in operation. The current research found that most of the Somalis had left the township and sold their shops to Ethiopians. In addition, when Somalis leave the townships, most relocate closer to the city centres in areas that are referred as 'Little Mogadishu' or 'Somali Town' such as Mayfair, Korsten, and Bellville. Some move to places that have infrastructural support for their businesses or religion (such as mosques). It appears that the entry of Ethiopians into the spaza business sector has increased competition and has caused friction between the various groups operating in the sector. Friction between Somalis and Ethiopians seems to have been exacerbated by Ethiopians having been more adept at integrating into South African communities than Somalis. This was particularly noticeable in terms of the greater number of marriages and friendships between Ethiopians and South Africans (compared to Somali-South African marriages and inter-relations).

6. Reflections & recommendations for future research

The findings of this research project revealed that the determinants, nature and dynamics of xenophobic violence (or the absence thereof) in the fifteen (15) sites were relatively complex and often differed considerably from how this issue has been portrayed in the media. Indeed, there were stereotypical cases where groups of South Africans used violence to target foreign national spaza shop owners for commercial or personal reasons. In many cases, the findings showed that much of the violence that had been directed at certain foreign-owned spaza shops and/or spaza shop owners had been perpetrated by foreign nationals. Nonetheless, xenophobic sentiments were acute in many areas. Furthermore, given the reported inadequate service provided by the police (SAPS) in many areas, combined with the lack of trust that foreign nationals had in the police, the research findings emphasised the importance of ward councillors, CPF members and some community organisations as key facilitators of both social cohesion and conflict resolution. Hence, these entities are essential to arranging and sustaining community dialogues that are geared towards building peace (where required).

This section outlines the various methodological constraints encountered, lessons identified, and solutions that were pursued during the research process. Recommendations for future research projects and possible interventions are also noted.

6.1 Constraints: Methodological & access-related

Politicization: In areas where there were upcoming elections and/or contestation between groups, the researchers were often suspected by respondents as being spies or members of opposing political parties. For example, in Zwelihle, one of the researchers was wearing a blue t-shirt on the day of fieldwork. Some residents were suspicious and mentioned that they did not trust strangers wearing the colours of the Democratic Alliance (DA). The assumption was that researchers could be spies sent by their opponents (presumably the DA) to spy on them. Some respondents also questioned the timing of the research as the research took place shortly before the 2019 national elections. KwaZulu-Natal areas and Zwelihle were similar in terms of being highly politicized spaces, not just for locals but also for foreign nationals. Hence, many respondents appeared guarded during the interview process. In KwaZulu-Natal, for example, political assassinations are a regular occurrence, and as a result, many local councillors have armed bodyguards accompanying them. This made it difficult for the research team to set up meetings with politicians and councillors.

Time and contacts/networks: Within the researcher sites, one ideally needed months to build relationships and trust with residents. Site visits of only two to three days ensured that many of those

respondents gained through the snowball technique were unavailable. For example, in Imizamo Yethu, one respondent wanted us to give her two months to get everyone together, and start a WhatsApp group, claiming "researchers can't just come in there and expect people to be available".

Community dynamics: It was often difficult to understand the dynamics of the various communities and ask relevant questions if one has not had sufficient time to undertake extensive background field research relating each community. As pointed out earlier in this report, desktop and media reports can often be misleading. Some of the respondents claimed that the researchers did not really know what was happening in the community. Examples of some of the comments were as follows: "Did you just learn this in the media?" "Do you know the real story?" "Did you even do research?" Often, researchers initially approached the inappropriate/irrelevant community representatives who did not possess the relevant authority.

Over-researched areas: Many of the communities appeared to have been over-researched (by other research groups) and claimed to have never experienced any benefits of the research findings. Researchers were often viewed as people who just visited the area to mine the community for information for their own purposes without providing feedback to the community.

Somali-focus: Cultural and other differences make it very difficult for non-Somali researches to access potential Somali respondents, and the lack of facilitation from SASA made this very difficult for the research team.

Budget constraints: Due to the limited research budget, only two researchers were allocated to most sites. However, more than two researchers were needed. As a result, the Eastern Cape team was too small. Researchers never had an opportunity to take pictures and it was difficult to gain a well-rounded understanding of the community without a well-balanced research team. The very limited time that was available to conduct research in 15 sites also limited access to relevant respondents and other data sources.

6.2 Lessons Identified and Solutions Pursued

During the research process a number of key positive lessons were identified and important solutions pursued in relation to the constraints encountered.

Community access through existing networks: Researchers were able to link up with non-governmental and community organizations who were already working with foreign nationals in some of the targeted areas, and many of these organizations were able to provide researchers with access to some relevant respondents. This approach was particularly useful in the Western Cape, Gauteng and the Eastern Cape through the aid of ALPS Resilience, the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) and the Eastern Cape Refugee Centre (ECRC), respectively. KwaZulu-Natal was a province where researchers had few connections, and where it was extremely difficult to gain the trust of the community. In some areas, researchers were able to gain access to relevant respondents through previously existing personal networks.

Making use of existing foreign national networks: In sites that where there were relatively significant populations of foreign nationals (especially Somalis), researchers were able to use connections from

previously researched sites to make contact with relevant foreign nationals in some of the other research sites. For example, a Somali contact in Mayfair assisted the research teams in making contact with foreign national respondents in Atteridgeville.

The role of the police: Although the police were often not trusted by foreign national residents in many of the targeted areas, in the KwaZulu-Natal targeted areas, the research team found the local police to have been being particularly helpful in identifying potential respondents and making the necessary introductions. The police also had a well-informed understanding of the relevant community dynamics in these areas.

Use of foreign national facilitators: In some areas the research teams were assisted by Somali facilitators/interpreters. In such cases it appeared that respondents were less suspicious of the research team and were more open in their responses during the interview process.

6.3 Recommendations for future research

Whilst undertaking research for this project the team identified the following key topics for future research in this area:

Informal regulation of the spaza shop sector: This was a relatively common feature in most research sites, where there appeared to be a correlation between the nature of the how the spaza shop sector was regulated and controlled (particularly in relation to foreign nationals) and xenophobic-related tensions and violence. A more informed understanding of such regulations is essential for more nuanced future peacebuilding efforts.

Competition and conflict between different nationalities: In a number of research sites, competition and conflict in the spaza shop sector was evident between foreign nationals from different countries, especially between Somalis and Ethiopians. At times these conflicts had linkages with local criminals or criminal groups. A more informed understanding of such conflicts and tensions are important from a peacebuilding perspective.

Xenophobia and the role of the police: Police have the potential to make valuable peacebuilding contributions in communities affected by xenophobia and related violence. However, the research team often found that trust between foreign nationals and the police was relatively low. Research on how trust between the police and foreign nationals in such areas is much needed.

Xenophobia and the role of local councillors: As the research showed, local councillors can build peace or contribute to xenophobic conflict. Further research on how councillors can more effectively contribute to local peacebuilding is essential.